

**IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS  
AND DEVELOPMENT  
EXPECTATIONS OF  
CARIBBEAN REGIONALISM**





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CARIBBEAN REGIONALISM**



EDITED BY

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# PREFACE

**THE PUBLICATION IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS OF CARIBBEAN REGIONALISM** has been crafted as a much-needed research tool to facilitate reflections and conversations on policy directions designed to enable the region to stem the slide towards greater marginalization of its economies. It places in the public domain, critical aspects of more than forty books published by the **INTEGRATIONIST** over the period 2000–2021 all intended to add to and in some cases, lead the debate in the search for solutions to the many challenges encountered by Caribbean States.

These books offer articles by citizens-scholars, politicians, Trade Unionists, industrialists, writers, artists among others who have both theoretical and practical experience in managing various aspects of Caribbean political, economic and social life. Some the papers contained therein, point to the urgency of locking the youths of the Caribbean into the debates which ensue thereby encouraging them to share the vision of a region that can bring prosperity to its peoples while creating social space for the realization of their talents.

We considered it useful to include in part I of this edition, select public pronouncements and status reports presented by major regional institutions to their statutory bodies as a way of encouraging much needed reflection on the Community's adherence to democracy. These institutions are CARICOM, CDB, OECS, UWI, CXC and Cricket. The material testifies to the continued existence of one of the most enduring integration systems in the international community. It mirrors the ideology of Caribbean Regionalism which became the clarion call of our outstanding regional giants, most of them, no longer with us. It is beyond dispute that the establishment and functioning of these institutions collectively constitute the framework of the CARICOM System that has survived and grown in strength and stature.

My journey towards developing a body of material on Caribbean Integration had its impetus when I became Pro Vice-Chancellor and Principal of Mona Campus, UWI and became conscious of the dearth of publications on Caribbean integration. This struck me as perplexing since it was the University of the West Indies which blazed the trail in creating space for Caribbean Integration to be debated upon and to form a crucial component in the education of the Caribbean people. Yet by the nineties UWI was bereft of any programme or academic unit offering tutoring in

integration studies or even a space within the institution for students wishing to obtain a historical perspective of the space and culture of the Caribbean domain on which they resided. This needed to be corrected if only to support the region in its continual quest to improve the lives of its peoples.

The onslaught of the COVID pandemic has shaken all of our countries to their core making it even more difficult for small developing countries like those of the Caribbean to lead a viable economic and political existence. The urgency for the region to engage in a period of reflection and to set in motion policy-oriented debates towards laying the foundation for the region's survival and recovery is now.

I have every confidence that the work of the INTEGRATIONIST over the last two decades and as ably captured in this book will provide our political leadership with the resources needed to lighten the burden of carrying the Caribbean alone through enabling their citizens to be better informed and educated to appreciate the benefits derived through Community membership and the role, they must play in building a strong and vibrant Caribbean.

**The Most Hon. Professor Sir Kenneth Hall**, ON, GCMC, COM (Spain),  
OJ, PhD Former Governor-General of Jamaica  
Director, THE INTEGRATIONIST



# INTRODUCTION

AS I REFLECT BACK UPON THE PERIOD OF the 1980s and into the early 1990s, when as Secretary General, it strikes me in a most compelling manner how true it is that CARICOM — in the broad sense of the movement along with its institutional infrastructure — has really been as much a search or an integration arrangement as an actual integration arrangement itself. As such CARICOM constituted a continuity with earlier groupings of the West Indian people's sense of mutual belonging and familyhood for concrete self-actualisation.

—Roderick Rainford in *Awaiting the Dawn of a Greater Unity*.

A unified and economically integrated Caribbean could be a significant intellectual and moral force within the Americas.

...

Some 40 to 60 years on from independence, the Caribbean as a whole ought to have become a modern vibrant unity and pandemic aside, one that is strong, making real economic progress, speaking with a single voice, supported by an executive authority to which clearly defined areas of decision making have been ceded, with strong regional relationships that cross the divide of language and dependency.

—David Jessop in *Why is the Caribbean Letting Others Shape Its Future*.

## BACKGROUND

As early as the mid nineteenth century, individuals and organisations with different motives have sought to achieve Caribbean unity. The historical and cultural consanguinity of Caribbean peoples has been remarked on by persons as removed from each other in history, time and space as Pere Labat, a Jesuit priest who was in the Caribbean in the eighteenth century and Norman Manley, Premier of Jamaica in the 1950s and early in 1960. Labat made note of the cultural affinity of the region.

I have travelled everywhere in your sea of the Caribbean from Haiti to Barbados to Martinique, Guadeloupe and I know what I am speaking about . . . You are all together in the same boat sailing on the same uncertain sea . . . citizenship and race unimportant, feeble little labels compared to the message that my

spirit brings to me that of the position and predicament which history has imposed upon you. I saw it from the dance, the merengue of Haiti, the begine of Martinique, Dominica and the legendary Guiana... it is no accident that the sea makes no difference to the rhythm of your body.

Addressing a Caribbean Labour Congress in 1947 in Jamaica, The Hon. Norman Manley observed:

Above all I am impressed by the fact that wherever there is an Assembly of West Indians in the Caribbean area, there, immediately and obviously, and without the slightest difficulty, you feel at home and as one. You are conscious of being with your own people . . . the sense of unity in the West Indies . . . is so powerful and so rapidly growing today that the minor historical differences are irrelevant in the face of our innumerable common ties.

The explanations usually given for the common desire of the Caribbean people for a united existence is that the similarity of their historical evolution, slavery, indentureship, economic and social structures, religious beliefs, a common language, has forged a consciousness, a sense of a common identity among the Caribbean English-speaking peoples. It was a thesis that was understood and accepted by succeeding generations of leaders.

The Caribbean has a right to face the future with confidence. For this region of only six million people, before the membership of Haiti on 1 July 2002, has demonstrated its ability to compete at the level of ideas in global society. . .

It possesses features that might well make it the envy of so called more advanced societies. In various groups, whether identified in racial, ethnic or religious definitional terms, live if not in complete harmony, at least in a peaceful coexistence that other Third World areas ravaged by communalism and tribalism, might envy.

There can be no debate that integration has established itself as a quest for unity and integration. Though it has not solved the historical knots of survival and geography, it has managed to establish itself as a permanent part of the integration infrastructure of the OECS, CARICOM at the wider level and indeed all the Caribbean institutions that dot the Caribbean landscape. It is an ideological journey for countries which find it impossible to provide for themselves so the quest for unity is an acknowledgement of that hence the late Norman Girvan's contention that integration is an essential part of our development thrust. which is not constrained within national boundaries.

The approximately four hundred years of the existence of the peoples of the Caribbean have forged bonds of unity among them and created values and shared beliefs of which the West Indies Federation and the other institutional unity are an expression. It is this sense of unity which did not

fall with the West Indies Federation and which helped the Caribbean people to overcome the rancour and bitterness which flowed as a consequence of this fall.

The resumption of the movement towards Caribbean unity so soon after the end of the Federal experiment in 1962 can be attributed to the convergence of many factors. Among them is the long history of the struggle for West Indian unity by such men as Uriah Butler of Trinidad and Tobago, and T.A. Marrayshow of Grenada. The work and recognition by the Caribbean people that unity was essential to the meaningful economic development of the region. It was a thesis that was understood and accepted by succeeding generation of leaders.

The Caribbean Community by dint of the intellectual endeavours of its leaders and those associated with the integration movement has been able to overcome threats posed to its existence and create conditions for its continued progress. There is a point which needs to be emphasised. The body of ideas on which the survival of the Community is based was formulated for the Region and by the Region. They are completely endogamous. And these ideas have led to the transformation in the ethos of the Community from an inward-looking organisation to one, it bids fair to say, is well on the road to becoming characterised by the movement of production of labour and capital.

But let it not be suppressed that the Region has had to traverse major obstacles and challenges to arrive at this position of optimism and hope. There was at one time, a general feeling that the Community would not survive. This pessimism resulted from the belief that the Community would not surmount the crisis generated by the dislocation in the world economy in the '70 and '80s. Indeed, one contributor was not above predicting the failure of the Community. The Community's demise however, proved to be grossly exaggerated. What was not recognised is that the intellectual tradition of the Caribbean is a powerful and effective weapon in any crisis.

Note for example, that almost from the very inception the Leaders of the Community recognised that its development must be premised on the independence and territorial integrity of its constituent elements. In other words, there was a clear recognition that the development of one must be the basis of the development of all. As a result of this doctrine the Caribbean Community has kept faith with its members who at various times had their development threatened by external aggression, natural disasters, or the lure of centrifugal forces. Consequently, and vitally, the Community for example, continues to keep faith with Guyana in its long-standing controversy which has arisen as a result of the contention by Venezuela that the 1899 war which settled the boundaries between these two States was null and void. It also gave support to Belize in its quest to resist claims to its entire territory by Guatemala. Only the hiatus in meetings of the Conference of the Heads

of Government between 1975 and 1982, prevented the Community from reaffirming its support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Guyana and Belize. However, it must be noted that in every case the Community with the support of international law and in the context of the respective and relevant Treaties also gave unstinted support to Montserrat after the volcano on the Island erupted. It also sought to intervene to blunt centrifugal forces and tendencies in Nevis Jamaica and later Dominica and currently St. Vincent and the Grenadines devastated by an ongoing volcano which is affecting nearby islands such as Barbados, Grenada.

Discernible mechanisms have also been evolved with intent to resolve situations in which political instability and social tension might threaten the viability of a Member State. It will be recalled that the Caribbean Community and its predecessor Organization, intervened thrice in Guyana in order arrest further deterioration of the political and economic situation in that country. The Herdmanston Accord, the St. Lucia Statement and more recently, their involvement in the decision to recount the votes cast in the Guyana's 2020 elections, are all symbols of the determination of the Community to protect the integrity of the regional Integration process. The Community also has played an outstanding role in restoring democracy in Haiti and Suriname and generally in laying down the principle that it is in fact one that is committed "to democracy and popular participation as enshrined in the Charter of Civil Society and adopted by the Conference in 1997 as well as the Kingston Declaration on Democracy and Popular Participation adopted in July, 1990."<sup>1</sup>

## **THE INTEGRATION PROCESS**

It is appropriate at this juncture to lay out for readers the foundation instruments of CARICOM which essentially laid the political and economic basis of the Integration Process and which culminated in the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973, a process which was given impetus by the signing of the Dickenson Bay Agreement in 1965 by three of the Grand Old Men of Caribbean Integration, Bird, Barrow and Burnham.

The story is yet to be told why these men took this bold step at the time. What is known is that the desire for integration had gained momentum with the introduction of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean Countries in 1963.

The Dickenson Bay Agreement had specified that the aim was to promote the "expansion", "diversification" and the "progressive development" of the economies of the Region in the context of a Caribbean Free Trade Association. The usual measures and procedures associated with the creation

of a Free Trade Area were in place as was provision made for other countries of the Region to join the Free Trade Area.

Five years later the integration process took a further step with the creation of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA). The emphasis was again on free trade and trade expansion “to the mutual benefit of Member States . . .”<sup>2</sup>

The CARIFTA Agreement mirrored that of the Free Trade Area set up under the Dickenson Bay Agreement.

The Treaty of Chaguaramas marked a departure from those two Agreements in that it established not only a Free Trade Area but also a community that encapsulates the tenets of the Integration Movement.

## **FOCUS CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION**

In the sixties the University of the West Indies Mona came to be regarded as the beacon of knowledge on Caribbean integration having created a space for Issues on this subject to be fiercely debated upon and to form a crucial component of the education of the Caribbean people. Academic courses and public spaces were available to support the integration fervor which existed at that time. Those who shouldered the responsibility of managing the intellectual requirements of that period included icons of the ilk of Arthur Lewis, Roy Augier, Alister McIntyre, Lloyd Best, Norman Girvan and Rex Nettleford.

But by the nineties, the University Mona Campus which once demonstrated belief in the advantages of Caribbean integration had seemingly withdrawn all its programmers and other forms of studies offering Caribbean Integration as a field of study and generally a fountain of knowledge of the historical and cultural perspectives on the Caribbean means of understanding the historical and cultural perspectives on the Caribbean domain on historical and cultural perspectives on the Caribbean.

This notable absence was singularly responsible for avenues being pursued to fill the vacuum that had been created. One of the initiatives pursued led to the University of the West Indies (Mona Campus) and the Caribbean Community Secretariat entering into an agreement in December 1999 to formally establish the UWI-CARICOM Project. This initiative set in motion the terms of a relationship designed to focus the energies and know-how of each into providing regional leadership with the sort of vital information and researched based analyses that could accrue from such an alliance.

The Project’s mandate was interpreted as comprising two elements, (i) to serve as a mechanism with responsibility for preserving key decisions, speeches and writings made by our political leaders and intellectual in

accessible formats so that future generations could have credible insight into the people and processes that led the Region during a significant period in our history. (ii) to garner and publish analyses of key events, decisions and issues that impact of the region recognizing that informed decision-making was critical in a variety of areas which affect us collectively such as energy, food security, climate change, trade, crime and regional-cum national security.

Other initiatives pursued were:

- Annual hosting of the MONA Academic Conference at which scholars of the ilk of Professor Denis Benn and Louis Lindsay played key roles.
- Partnership with Ian Randle Publishers to enable publication of the books produced through the partnership.
- The production of a documentary titled “Integration or Perish” which catalogue the history, experiences and achievements of the Integration Movement.
- The creation of a Dictionary of Caribbean Acronyms and abbreviations of terms and phrases which had facilitated discussions amongst technical experts on Caribbean integration issues.

## FOCI OF PUBLICATIONS

A brief review of the publications presented in this volume would reveal that they essentially, examine critical questions the more central of which are:

- The survival of CARICOM
- The achievements of CARICOM
- Critical issues facing Member States
- The workings of CARICOM and its major institutions
- The institutional development of one of the most enduring economic integration systems in the international community.

## RESEARCH CHALLENGES

Researching and documenting the quest for Caribbean unity has its difficulties as well as its rewards. The region has not distinguished itself in the care and preservation of its records. Yet records are the foundation of history and a society which is careless with its records will challenge its own history and risk its own future. The Caribbean is certainly one of those regions where an understanding of its past is a *sine qua non* for its development and the preservation of its cultural identity. There is therefore a clear need for

a regional archival policy, which will ensure the preservation of important documents, their retention, and retrieval for future Caribbean generations. Preserving the records of its past was in fact recognized as an important objective since the second conference of the Region's Heads of Government held in Jamaica in 1964 discussing proposals by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for "the interchange of information on libraries, museums, archives and archaeology". Since then, those proposals gained resonance in one of the seminal presentations of former Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Hon. P.J. Patterson when he strongly advocated the promotion of reliable online access to credible sources of information and knowledge which were properly identified, catalogued, distributed, promoted and amenable for discussion via appropriate electronic and other tools. This, he posited, would enable contributors and users to gain valuable insights into development strategies and processes in private sector, government entities, as well as access to knowledge and expertise embedded in our institutions.

Quite apart from the forgoing identified, there is the age old and continuing difficulties experienced by most researchers about the intellectual contributions of the Caribbean's influential thinkers were accessible to only a select few because, to a large extent, the material was generated and preserved in hard copy format in different parts of the region, and even outside the region. This restricted access in turn created a major impediment to any effort to understanding the ideas by the people of the Caribbean Community. Accordingly, acceptance of the ideas and their implementation, were severely inhibited. This situation was worsened by the skills shortages resulting from migration.

Fortunately, advances in electronic technology have now made it possible for information to be recorded, stored, retrieved and made available to a range of users for whom such accessibility had hitherto been difficult or nearly impossible. As a result, the works of some of the region's leading thinkers can now be brought into the reach of ordinary interested persons who are all stakeholders in the regional development process.

Within the territories of the Caribbean, actions and reactions are substantially influenced by the activities and prescriptions of opinion formers including their griots and other intellectuals. Currently, and certainly for the past four decades, these actions and reactions have been in the context of the dominant meme enshrined in the motto on the Haitian flag – *L'Union fait la force* (Union makes strength, hence CARIFTA leading to CARICOM leading to the CSME).

It is in this context, and from this vantage point that a number of papers within the several collections allow readers to look into the minds of our influential proselytisers. One by one, or in groups to which they choose to belong, those minds and their works have to a large extent been made accessible and has laid bare the dimensions of their views. These views are

presented in a manner that does not ignore the content and influence of contemporary views. Also, some attempt has been made to get an impression of what agents who are reasonably intelligent recipients as opposed to seasoned professionals have understood of the views. Finally, pieces within the publications, allow for recognition of the fact that all of this opinion forming does not take place in a vacuum and all ideas and proposals cannot but be viewed in a milieu in which other significant world events are competing for attention.

It is evident then, that these publications produced under the Integrationist label, are intended not only to capture the outcomes of research initiatives from across the region and further afield, but to make determinations about the future wellbeing of our Caribbean.

An equally important objective is to make accessible to political leaders and interested Caribbean citizen (including students), the views of various intellectuals and main opinion-formers who have spoken and written on the Caribbean condition. These persons are the influential proselytizers of ideas related to the past, present, and likely states of the nations of the Caribbean.

Involving the people of the Caribbean, and accessing their undoubted talent, in the matter of their own development, requires an ease of access for them to what their leading intellectuals have said and are saying about ourselves and about the world of non-benign competition in which we live, must react, and hope to thrive.

We are confident that all individuals and organizations serious about fostering the development of the Caribbean can learn the process of integration and facilitate the maximization of our collective strengths in negotiating for our survival through enabling the documenting of the journey we have travelled over the past seven decades.

## **CONCLUSION**

The creation of this Research tool has been a monumental exercise and an important undertaking. It holds the distinction of being the singular source to date to have documented in one place, the critical thinking and positions of our leaders. I am confident that the people of the Region will esteem it as a researcher's dream.

One last word. Every so often while engaged in the selection process of material to be drawn upon in developing publications, one finds an inspirational paragraph or the expression of an idea which not only defines the optimism reflected in the approach to the building of the integration movement but also captures a sense of the resilience and determination of Caribbean leaders who are struggling to build a Caribbean House of Unity. The following paragraph aptly illustrates this point:

The Caribbean is an area of the world that has managed to defy historical analysis. It has proven the pundits wrong in everything from political, to cricket, to educational achievement. Surely the leadership possesses the ingenuity required to chart harmonious pathways to that cherished goal of regional integration, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.

## ENDNOTES

1. Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, February 14–16, 2001, Bridgetown, Barbados.
2. Resolution adopted by the Fourth Heads of Government Conference of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Barbados 1967.





PART ONE

**THE CURRENT  
STATE OF  
REGIONALISM**





# 1.

## MATURE REGIONALISM

Address at Special meeting of the OECS Authority 14

March, 2019 – Guadeloupe

Dr. The Hon. Ralph Gonsalves, Prime Minister of St. Vincent and The Grenadines

**THE REVISED TREATY OF BASSETERRE ESTABLISHING THE ORGANISATION** of Eastern Caribbean States Economic Union was signed in 2010, replacing the original Treaty of 1981 upon which the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was founded. The accession of Guadeloupe, an overseas department of the Republic of France, to the status of an Associate Member of the OECS is in accord with the Revised Treaty, a status to which Martinique, part of the French overseas region, had earlier acceded. The other associate members of the OECS are the British Overseas Territories of Anguilla and the British Virgin Islands. The full members of the OECS are six independent countries, namely, Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines plus the British overseas territory of Montserrat which was a full OECS member from the days of the original Treaty but Montserrat does not subscribe to the Protocol on the Economic Union which forms part of the Revised Treaty; Montserrat, too, is not a member of the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority, an institution of the OECS. None of the Associate members of the OECS subscribes to the Protocol on the Economic Union and none holds membership of any, or all, of the institutions of the OECS, namely, the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank, and the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority. Similarly, the Associate members do not embrace juridically or functionally every aspect of the core Revised Treaty itself.

In short, the Revised Treaty provides enough flexibility or what may be called “the variable geometry of integration”, as the practical and/or constitutional circumstances admit, in the furtherance of deepening and

broadening regional integration of these small Eastern Caribbean Island through, and in, the OECS.

The raw territorial, population, and economic data which emphasise the “Small Island Exceptionalism” of the full and Associate Members of the OECS tell the tale of the inducements which necessarily prompt regional cooperation or integration. Our geographical propinquity, shared history of European colonialism, and the reality of our Caribbeanness — the essence of our Caribbean civilization — all pre-dispose us to a closer union in the interest of our people’s humanisation.

It is useful to remind ourselves that the composite size of the OECS members — Full and Associate — on the bases of territory, population, and economy is as follows: Total land area 2,282 square mile; total population 1,446,225; and an aggregate Gross Domestic Product (nominal) of US \$25 billion.

Each of the member states of the OECS rank at the high or very high category of the Human Development Index of the United Nations. Each is a functioning democracy with very high scores globally for political, civic, and economic freedoms. Our region is located in a Zone of Peace for which the Caribbean is acknowledged internationally.

In the Eastern Caribbean, the OECS member-states, Full and Associate, compare very favourably with two leading island-states in the Eastern Caribbean, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. The land area of Barbados (169 square miles), its population of 277,821, and its nominal GDP of US \$4.4 billion are much below the similar constellations, in the aggregate, for the OECS. The comparable numbers for the largest island-nation in the Eastern Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago, are as follows: land area, 1,981 square miles; population, 1.359 million; and GDP (nominal) US \$21.75 billion, all numbers less than those comparable for the OECS. Six members of the OECS grouping have, individually, a higher GDP per capita than Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago. These OECS members in descending order, are: The British Virgin Islands, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Anguilla, St Kitts-Nevis, and Antigua-Barbuda.

Combine all this with the airspace and seascape, too, of the OECS island chain stretching from Grenada in the south to St Kitts and Nevis in the north east, and further north to Anguilla and the BVI, the potential for cooperation, integration, and further development in the OECS is huge. Our marine resources, singly and in combination, are highly significant, out of proportion to our land area. For example, St. Vincent and the Grenadines has a landscape of 150 square miles but a seascape of approximately 11,000 square nautical miles.

The accession to associate membership of the OECS by the French overseas departments, first Martinique and then Guadeloupe, adds immensely to the OECS: Martinique comprises 436 square miles in land area;

Guadeloupe, 629 square miles. Martinique has a population of an estimated 380,000; Guadeloupe, a population of 395,000.

Each has a Gross Domestic Product in excess of US \$8 million. Each has a high level of development of infrastructure and services.

Before our very eyes the regional integration movement is being transformed with the entry of both Martinique and Guadeloupe as associate members of the OECS. Is Barbados next? What about French St. Martin and the territories which are called “the Dutch Antilles”? Is there emerging an enlarged south-eastern and north-eastern pole of regional integration? How would Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Barbados react to all this in any reordering of regional integration? Would there be a reconfiguring of CARICOM itself with the emergence of a north-western integrated pole of Jamaica, the Bahamas, Haiti, and perhaps the Dominican Republic and in time, Cuba and Puerto Rico? Would the altered, and altering, global political economy, its knock-on regional reverberations, and regional home-grown alterations demand a reordering of the regional integration movement to accommodate a flexible variable geometry of integration as the circumstances admit?

Our Caribbean experience teaches that concentric circles of integration are permissible and practical, each complementing or supplementing one another with their relevant points of contact, joinder, or association. Is the evolving OECS a path-breaker or harbinger for the future in this regard? Our landscape, our seascape, our people – our focus about which the poetic son of Guadeloupe, St. Jean Perse, writes so tellingly. He reminds always that it is no error to insist that our fame is on the sands, in the valleys, in our seas filled with conch; and he urges that we find our voice now and for the future. In “Song For an Equinox”, Perse aptly instructs:

“The voice of men is in the men, the voice of bronze in the bronze, and somewhere in the world where the sky was voiceless and the age took no heed, a child is born into the world whose race nor rank is known, and genius knocks infallibly at the lobes of a pure forehead”.

This future voice of a young and maturing OECS has been amplified and further clarified with the accession to associate membership within it. To be young is very heaven; to be maturing is blissful! Forty years ago, a young revolution in Grenada burst forth; immaturity killed it four years later. I am sure that the growing maturity and our refreshing imagination in our OECS will assure its continued access, especially with Guadeloupe in its bossom.

In the context of expanding OECS, it is worthwhile to restate the Preamble to the Revised Treaty penned in 2010 in the midst of the global economic meltdown:

“The Governments of the Contracting States —

“Recalling the links of their common history and the need to build on that history for the benefit of their peoples;

“Recognising the progress that has been made towards their integration under the Treaty of Basseterre 1981 and the Agreement Establishing the East Caribbean Common Market; “Convinced that at this time it is necessary to deepen the level of integration and the pursuit of a common economic purpose which has obtained under the Treaty of Basseterre 1981 and the Agreement Establishing the East Caribbean Common Market;

“Mindful of their obligations toward the wider grouping of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy;

“Determined to enhance the level of regional co-operation between States that are parties to the Treaty of Basseterre 1981;

“Have Agreed as follows [in the Revised Treaty”

This quest is in symmetry with the vision of our people which is affirmed and magisterially expressed by the Martinican intellectual, Edward Glissant, in his book, *Caribbean Discourse: Selected Essays*. Glissant begins an essay entitled “Toward Caribbeanness” with an insightful observation:

“The notion of ‘antillanite’ or Caribbeanness emerges from a reality that we will have to question, but also corresponds to a dream that we must clarify and whose legitimacy must be demonstrated.

“A fragile reality (the experience of Caribbeanness, woven together from one side of the Caribbean to the other) negatively twisted together in its urgency (Caribbeanness as a dream, forever, denied, often deferred, yet a strange, stubborn presence in our responses. “The reality is there in essence: dense (inscribed in fact) but threatened (not inscribed in consciousness).

“This dream is vital, but not obvious.”

The leaders, and the people, of our region know that reality of our Caribbean; we know, too, the possibilities to be harnessed in and from, this reality, and the limitations to be overcome. Pointedly and sensibly Glissant advises us:

“There is potential in this reality. What is missing from the notion of Caribbeanness is the transition from the shared experience to conscious expression; the need to transcend the intellectual pretensions dominated by the

learned elite and to be grounded in the collective affirmation, supported by the activism of the people.

“Our Caribbean reality is an option open to us. It springs from our natural experience, but in our histories has only been ‘an ability to survive.’”

The enlargement of the OECS, with the accession of Guadeloupe to associate membership, opens up tremendous possibilities not merely to survive but to thrive more markedly. We are, in the process, moving from a shared experience to a conscious expression of our Caribbean reality; and we seek in a structured way to channel the people’s activism to desired ends in programmes material and non-material, visible and invisible, reflecting the genius of our people, of our Caribbean civilization. Without an enhanced people-to-people contact, an embrace in the spheres of the economy, society, culture, and polity, our progress would be stunted. The Revised Treaty provides the framework for deeper cooperation and integration but the governments and our people must make it all work for their benefit and development.

Centuries of European colonial rivalries in the Caribbean have contributed to the fracturing of our countries in differing linguistic groups and a contrived island separateness. Yet, within and arising from the rivalries, contradictions, and separations are the very seeds which pre-dispose our territories to a greater and more perfect union, as the circumstances admit. The development challenges of our contemporary realities induce us to a necessary and desirable cooperation and integration, functionally, and in a quest for deeper integration beyond functionalism, which is itself useful though limited, yet ever more promising. A strategic, many-sided roadmap is thus required for the ongoing remaking of our OECS.

Our region possesses the material, institutional and intellectual resources, and inter-connectedness, to refresh and enhance the strategic path as laid down in the language of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. This meeting of the OECS Authority offers opportunities to do so in a wide range of areas of policy and programmes, reminding ourselves nevertheless that leaders make history but only to the extent that the circumstances of history and contemporary reality permit them so to make.

Fundamentally, our OECS bolsters the assurance of good government for our peoples. This is the enduring cross-cutting issue of significance which underpins the strategic, policy, and programmatic thrust of the Revised Treaty. It makes “good governance” sense to do things regionally together which are not themselves possible to be wisely or optimally done separately.

This good sense in governance reflects, and extends, the sensibility of our Caribbean civilization and its evolution. Derek Walcott, the Caribbean’s

Nobel Laureate from St. Lucia, in his Nobel Lecture *The Antilles: Fragments of Epic Memory*, draws our attention to this vital consideration:

“Break a vase, and the love that reassembles the fragments is stronger than the love which took its symmetry for granted when it was whole. The glue that fits the pieces is the sealing of its original shape. It is such love that reassembles our African and Asiatic fragments, the cracked heirlooms whose restoration shows its white scars. This gathering of broken pieces is the care and pain of the Antilles, and if the pieces are disparate, ill-fitting, they contain more pain than the original sculpture, the icons and sacred vessels taken for granted in their ancestral places.”

Political leadership is insufficient, even inadequate, in the strategic quest of reassembling the fragments made manifest through the fever of our history. But the political leaders, reflecting the people’s will, have put in place the institutional machinery of our OECS to affect the re-assemblage and sustainable development, and to do so with great love, friendship, and solidarity. With Guadeloupe, as with Martinique, love is in the air in our OECS!

The maturation of the OECS embraces practically the variable geometry of integration as made manifest in its welcoming of Martinique and Guadeloupe to associate membership. A maturing regional integration movement in a ripening civilisation cannot fear alterations and change; if it does, it would atrophy, and through a slow or accelerated process become a metaphoric dinosaur. As St. Jean Perse reminds us in his Nobel Lecture in December 1960:

“Inertia is the only menace — Do not fear nor doubt, for doubt is sterile and fear is servile. Listen instead to the rhythmic beat that my high innovating head imposes on the great human theme in the constant process of creation. It is not true that life can renounce itself. There is nothing living which proceeds from nothingness or yearns for it — The tragedy lies not in metamorphosis as such.”

Guadeloupe’s accession to associate membership of the OECS highlights our quest for a further metamorphosis, alteration, and change. In so doing we rage against the menace of inertia. On this day we marry a well-grounded scientific exploration of our contemporary reality, the memory of the pains and joys of our historic journeys, and the imagination to capture a spirit devoid of learned helplessness, confident that our better years are ahead, together.

Thank you!

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*Address delivered at the Opening Ceremony of the Special Meeting of the Authority of the OECS for the Accession of Guadeloupe to Associate Membership of the OECS. Guadeloupe, 14 March, 2019*

## 2.

# OPENING STATEMENT: The 51<sup>st</sup> Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors

The 51st Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors 30 June,  
2021 – Barbados

Dr. Hyginus 'Gene' Leon, President of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB)

IT IS A DISTINCT PLEASURE AND HONOUR TO deliver my first Board of Governors' statement during what is projected to be a challenging but potentially impactful five-year term as President of the Caribbean Development Bank. The confluence of unfinished structural challenges, evolving climate change, and amplifying impact of the COVID-19 pandemic leaves policy makers with little choice but to confront the creation of our future in a bold and decisive manner. The mandate establishing the Caribbean Development Bank is as important today as it was in 1969, and, if **suitably re-imagined, can remain relevant** for the next 50 years.

This is the aspiration we need to embrace – helping shine the light on and pave the road to the consensus goal of sustainable and inclusive growth. Leading this distinguished organisation during these unprecedented times presents me with a unique opportunity to tackle the crippling challenges our Region faces. Like my predecessors, who have fought the noble cause, I seek to continue a tradition of service and commitment to the advancement and development of our region and its people.

Through the legacy left behind by the astute leadership of my predecessors – Sir Arthur Lewis, Dr. William Demas, Sir Neville Nicholls, Dr. Compton Bourne, and Dr. Wm. Warren Smith – and with your support, I wholeheartedly and confidently take hold of the baton to continue this relay race.

I am aware that I have taken on a monumental task. I can state confidently that I will persevere; and ably supported by the competent cadre of professionals who welcomed me into the Bank almost two months ago, I am determined to make a contribution toward realising the dreams of our people. The institutional machine is well tested and tried, the staff – namely the fuel and lubricants – are rearing to go, and the ignition spark has been lit, starting the engine to a thunderous roar!

Since the first cases of COVID-19 was recorded on March 10, 2020, the pandemic has wreaked havoc on Caribbean economies and societies. As a health crisis, the pandemic has placed a heavy burden on health systems, likely not designed for this kind of impact. From an economic perspective, it led to a collapse of economic activity with unprecedented negative growth rates; set back the steady gains in **poverty alleviation** and **inequality**; put in slow-motion the **educational advancement** of our youth and underlined the pernicious vulnerability of **export concentration**. Our tourism-concentrated economies have been severely hit, as were counterparts worldwide; and many of our social protection systems hang precariously in the balance.

While the pandemic has spared no one, there is the inescapable and untenable reality that not everyone has felt its socioeconomic consequences in the same way. Reports show that women are faring worse with regard to the economic impacts of COVID-19, as they generally earn less, save less, and tend to occupy more insecure jobs, or are more likely to live in poverty than men. We have seen the prevalence of unpaid care work increase significantly during the pandemic, as schools have closed, and families are spending more time at home. This is having a greater impact on women who typically take on a greater burden of house tasks related to care than men. Deeper economic and social stress, coupled with movement restrictions and social isolation, have also led to an exponential rise in gender-based violence [United Nations (UN), 2020], and quite likely sown the seeds of deep emotional trauma, the effects of which may still be unfolding.

To be honest, we had our fair share of structural impediments to sustainable growth before COVID 19. So, while this unwelcomed visitor, COVID-19 is also a wakeup call to action, it is the alarm clock heralding the time has come to shake away the feeling of slumber. When combined with the additional and multidimensional vulnerability that characterises the countries of the region, we can only ask, with some trepidation, how will we deliver on the promise of inclusive and sustainable development that is embodied in our commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)?

This morning I propose to:

- Take stock of where we are as a region;
- Elaborate on the role of innovation in building resilience and advancing the standards of living of our people; and

- Outline the role of the Bank in facilitating this development and define how we must transform to adequately fulfil this role.

## EVIDENCE-BASED DECISION-MAKING: MEASUER BETTER TO TARGET BETTER

Let us assume that we can take for granted the non-trivial notion of a national, even regional, consensus on the main challenges we need to address urgently. How do we forge agreement on acceptable, clearly articulated, and measurable targets and anchors?

A foundational principle would be to foster evidence-based decision-making, ensuring the analyses are robust and based on data that is accurate and of high quality. As a first pass, it appears that we do not have robust data architectures that would allow for adequate monitoring or provide tools for adaptive change. For example, where are we today with respect to the SDGs? Can we argue confidently about policies needed to achieve specific targets and over what period of time?

Since committing in 2015 to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, only seven of the Bank's nineteen BMCs have managed to submit Voluntary National Reviews, outlining and reporting the pace of SDG implementation. Notwithstanding, BMCs in the main have sought to align and anchor their respective national development plans and policies to the SDG framework, with many establishing national bodies to oversee SDG mainstreaming and localisation. Most, however, have singled out the enduring challenges of **data paucity and insufficient statistical capacity** in BMCs to monitor, report, and formulate evidence-based policies which directly respond to the SDGs. Equally, concerns **regarding inadequate funding and the ever-present risk of natural hazards** to SDG implementation is a recurring theme throughout the BMCs' Voluntary National Reviews, thus derailing efforts towards the SDG.

While credible data on the region's progress is absent, it is equally clear that actions to meet the goals are not advancing at the speed and scale required. Mind you, this concern is not unique to the Caribbean, leading UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres to issue a global plea for us to make this a "Decade of Action". Our statistics are at best disheartening. Economic growth, which has been receding in the last 50 years, slowed to an average of 0.4% during the ten years to 2019. The impact of COVID, especially in the tourism-dependent economies, amounted to double-digit declines in growth. With poverty rates already high – largely clustered between 20% and 40% – the pandemic has, no doubt, worsened these rates, moving the region further away from this SDG goal.

Access to education took a blow during the pandemic, with the digital divide retarding access and raising concerns about the longer-term

implications for human capital accumulation. We can only imagine the cumulative devastation that could ensue from a severe hurricane season! What this amounts to, and as evidenced by less onerous periods of our history, is that our ability to recover to pre-catastrophe levels is weak – it takes many years, is very costly, and we are prone to repeated events. The shocking reality is that after all of the effort and financing we would NOT have grown relative to our pre-catastrophe state!

As a starting point, **we need to measure better to target better**. That includes building data architectures and databases to better inform our evidenced-based decision making; involves improving capacity in data analytics, leveraging developments in big data and digital technology; and requires better measurement of the impact of our vulnerabilities and articulating better the nexus among enabling **resilience** for increasing public value, promoting priority growth-oriented **investment**, and managing financing needs for **debt sustainability**.

I propose creating a data hub at CDB. Could we not be the go-to portal on regional data? Could we not design and build a distance-to-SDG tracker that updates not only implementation but associated measures of distances to benchmarks, quantum of financing needs, and estimates of concessionary terms that could facilitate more rapid reductions in these distance metrics? Could we not extend this to a resilience tracker that informs on various dimensions of resilience and therefore our ability to recover or sustain a growth momentum?

## **INNOVATE TO BUILD RESILIENCE: SHARE TO GROW**

At the core, I believe that sustainable and inclusive growth requires resilience. Because sustainable livelihoods are founded on the principles of stable ecosystems, resilience needs to be interpreted broadly to include resilience in social development (health and education); in institutional capacity; in the environment (markets and nature – disasters/ hazards); resilience to external shocks (trade, spillovers); and by extension, resilience in the integration of all of these on macroeconomic outcomes.

The pace and state of development of the Region is rooted in its low resilience, for example to global economic shocks and natural hazard events. The transmission of such shocks is often acute and protracted because of the high level of export concentration that characterises the Region. The main source of this export concentration is a lack of competitiveness that leaves countries specialising in exports that rely largely on natural endowments. By increasing productivity and reducing costs or introducing new products or product varieties, innovation promotes export diversification. This export

diversification generates resilience by reducing the susceptibility of national output to the fortunes of a one or two industries.

Resilience, in turn, requires innovation. So, eliminating poverty, advancing standards of living, and delivering equitable prosperity by ensuring that no one is left behind will depend critically on our ability to innovate. Innovation describes the development and application of ideas and technologies that improve goods and services or make their production more efficient. Let me underscore that innovation ultimately depends not only on inventors, but equally on the creativity of the potential users of the new technology to find new ways to put existing concepts and ideas to productive use.

The role of innovation as a driver of economic prosperity is well established. In fact, both neoclassical growth and endogenous growth theories, emphasise technological advancement, of which innovation is a critical part. One of the hallmarks of innovation is its ability to **utilise limited resources to expand production possibility frontiers**, resulting ultimately in higher levels of outputs – a concept which should be particularly attractive to and be embraced by the Caribbean given the scarce resource endowments that are available.

A healthy innovation ecosystem incorporates many of the aspects of resilience mentioned earlier. For example, the Global Innovation Index includes institutional features such as the regulatory environment; the environment within which human capital is created and research and development are undertaken; information and communications infrastructure; the quality, size, and sophistication of markets; and the level of business sophistication. While we will not dwell on every aspect of resilience and its innovation nexus, the same principles outlined below will apply.

To begin, innovation can be operationalised through the backbone framework or process of KIDS – Knowledge, Innovation Diagnostics, and Strategies. The KIDS process is flexible and outcome-based, is agile, can be applied at firm, sector, or economy-wide levels, can leverage strategic international partnerships, foster development of institutional capacity, and promote backward and forward linkages. As a tool it is bounded only by the imagination of our people and has the potential to create the “industrialisation of knowledge.” KIDS operates in three interacting phases, each of which can be used to create high value-added segments of the supply chain, and hence has the potential to unlock **economic diversification**.

As an illustration, application of **knowledge accumulation**, which is the gathering, organising, refining and disseminating of information, can spawn search, scan, classification, and archiving technologies and products.

Second, **innovation diagnostics**, which fosters discovery by establishing a synthesis of success factors from the accumulated knowledge, can be used

through **partnerships** with tertiary institutions (regional and external) to promote centers of excellence and integrate knowledge tourism.

Third, **strategies**, which transform the synthesised knowledge to create and market specific viable business propositions, can be implemented at home, regionally, or globally. Noting that, as a people, we do NOT have a comparative disadvantage in generating knowledge, that the process can be applied on a modular basis in practically any field of interest, and because we can, especially with digital technologies, tap into the infinite supply of global knowledge, [reminiscent of Sir Arthur Lewis' unlimited supplies of labour], we can harness the unbounded imagination of our people.

It is important to note that the absence of comparative disadvantage referred to early has to be maintained. That requires our education systems to promote, even more, learning processes that based on inquiry, discovery, and problem solving. I **propose a long-term investment focus on innovation in Education**, to build social resilience.

Having recognised the importance of innovation, how do we create an appropriate environment for promoting and sustaining innovation?

Global experience suggests that those countries that create a healthy environment for innovation are more prosperous and more resilient. Such countries include Switzerland, Sweden and Finland. However, small states such as Singapore, which is consistently among the top 10 most innovative states, are also consistent high performers that demonstrate the strong link between innovation, resilient economic growth, and development.

Much like the recently published Cornwall Consensus identified critical roles for G7 governments in fostering a climate of inclusion and innovation, Caribbean governments are called upon to cultivate a regulatory environment that encourages entrepreneurship and innovation. There is need for a financial system with sufficient depth to accommodate appropriate levels of **risk taking**; education systems that place value on critical **innovative thinking** and reward students accordingly, and a Caribbean society that embraces a culture of **creative disruption**.

A critical weakness in the environment for innovation is also the size of individual markets. I believe successive generations of regional leaders have recognised this, and endeavoured to create first the Caribbean Community and Common Market and subsequently the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. Colleagues, if we are to deliver on the post-COVID acceleration that is required to achieve the SDGs, we must spare no effort in completing the full establishment of the CSME. Let me further state, that it is not only about creating a larger market to facilitate scale, it is also about partnering with the private and other non-public sectors to co-create markets and institutions, aimed at achieving a common purpose. It is this investing in and harnessing of regional public goods that will create an enabling ecosystem for innovation.

## ROLE OF CDB: THOUGHT LEADERSHIP AND CHAMPIONING OF TRANSFORMATION AGENDA

The mission of the Bank is to achieve social and economic development, and in this regard, the Bank and its BMCs have signed on to the SDGs. Our current task is to systematically take stock of where we are with respect to the SDGs and assess the level of effort that it will take to get us there. This requires a number of things.

First, we must properly map the theory of change between those goals and the activities and outputs that we must undertake. Second, we must establish the volume of spending that is required on these activities and outputs. Third, we must map the development financing matrix that will get us to these outputs and activities. Fourth, we must determine the level of resources that CDB must mobilise as part of this effort. Finally, we must determine how we go about mobilising these resources.

Innovation will play a critical role. CDB must be a vibrant part of an innovation ecosystem that drives the **knowledge products** facilitating these efforts. Specifically, knowledge products will be important in areas such as the theory of change underpinning the goals; the role of public sector investment, governance structures and public sector regulatory frameworks; monitoring and implementation systems; and financing modalities and instruments. Therefore, the Bank must be a thought leader on these issues, from a regional context.

The Bank will also have to continue to play a role in **mobilising finance** to upgrade the infrastructure and institutions that are important in improving competitiveness and productivity, increasing innovation and resilience, driving growth, and the achieving the SDGs. Our preliminary estimates suggest that to reach our goal of halving poverty by 2030 would require more than a doubling of average CDB lending. This underlines the magnitude of the task at hand, the need for multiple sources of funding and financial instruments, as well as a clear identification of the role that CDB is expected to play in marshalling this development finance. Such considerations require further discussion on the fit-for-purpose size of the Bank.

The susceptibility of the Region to **natural hazard events** and the increasing intensity and frequency of these natural hazard events resulting from climate change also plays a role in defining the optimal size of the Bank. Natural hazard events typically reduce the capital stock while also reducing the stream of output from that capital stock. This means that such natural hazard events increase the capital needs of a country and suggest the interest rate at which this capital is financed should be appropriately lower. This is counter to the standard market dynamics, where increased perception of risk would increase the rates of interest required of countries in the wake of a natural hazard event; and would push those rates to levels that lead to adverse debt dynamics, given lower output trajectories and higher interest

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rates. This market failure and the expected losses associated with natural hazard events in the region increases the level of financing that the static development deficits that currently exist would suggest.

A clear narrative from operational experience is a large **implementation deficit**. The Bank will need a strong focus on innovation to build resilience in implementation capacity in BMCs. This will not only accelerate the pace of development; it will also increase the effectiveness of every dollar loaned or granted. So institutional strengthening and adherence to the highest governance standards would be another area of focus.

If the Bank is to function as an effective development partner in the drive towards the SDGs and beyond, then it must remain **relevant and fit-for-purpose**, and is appropriately sized, skilled and structured. Internal structures will need to be reconfigured to better equip the Bank to meet the needs of its BMCs within the context of their development milieu. The creation of internal ecosystems for generating ideas that lead to efficiencies will be important. Appropriate structures that optimally leverage the experience and expertise of staff to produce knowledge products is an area for improvement.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the road ahead is surely not paved in gold. But our challenges are clear; our resolve is resolute; our collective passion is fired up; and we will aim to be good stewards in serving our members.

Thank you.

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*Address delivered at the Opening Ceremony of the Special Meeting of the Authority of the OECS for the Accession of Guadeloupe to Associate Membership of the OECS, 14 March, 2019*

### 3.

## OVERVIEW of Report to University Council 2019–2020

Professor Sir Hilary Beckles, Vice-Chancellor,  
The University of the West Indies, April 2021

### UNIVERSITY PERFORMANCE RISES: RAISING NEW REVENUE

THE CARIBBEAN ECONOMY, WHILE SLOWLY EMERGING FROM THE 2007/2008 global financial epidemic, has been crippled by the COVID-19 public health pandemic that heaped further havoc upon all economic and social life. Within this destructive, dreadful, existentially threatening context, our task has been to keep The University of the West Indies (UWI) abreast and ahead and rising to the expectations of stakeholders.

I am pleased to report, that because of the persistence of commitment from our caring and courageous university community and its allies we have achieved the objective of delivering our services as mandated. We succeeded in the face of the COVID scourge, and the illness and death visited upon our campus and general communities, to achieve the widely considered impossible objective.

We kept our classrooms available to our students; converted hundreds of their academic programmes to online, remote formats, took them through examination processes and on to graduation. We are proud of this excellent achievement. We honoured our pledges to our students and their families. This is our core business and we succeeded in banishing all doubt from our doors.

During the year, the university skillfully managed the double agenda of building out its academic reputation as a first-class, globally-respected enterprise while deepening strategic plans to accelerate non-government

revenue-generation. It was the year in which we pivoted in the Strategic Plan from the phase one “**Reputation Revolution**” to phase two “**Revenue Acceleration**”. We have become known as an enterprise of integrity that delivers upon its promised objectives. We are also known as an activist university that stands up for our stakeholders in meeting their most dire challenges.

On the reputation side, we are happy to report that in 2020, the Times Higher Education presented us with a Triple 1<sup>st</sup> Ranking: first in the Caribbean; top 1% in Latin America and the Caribbean; top 1% in the Golden Age category of universities in our 50-80-year cohort. This is a magnificent performance achieved within the context of global competitiveness that reaffirmed the enlightenment of our leadership and the correctness of our collective strategy.

Meanwhile, we met head on the challenges associated with the impact of regional economic decline upon our revenues as a publicly funded university. There is no escaping the significant negative consequences of the regional economic catastrophe upon the operations of the enterprise.

The challenge has been to seek to arrest and stabilize the decline in government contributions; settle as far as possible the enormous public debt accumulation on our balance sheet; and suppress the annual impairment of millions of dollars in respect of this debt that weakens our financials. On the other hand, we went about the serious business of radically enhancing revenue generation as part of an entrepreneurial exercise intended to offset balance sheet leakage and promote the financial health of the enterprise.

We set out on this path in a scientific, strategic fashion. University leadership in our developing nations’ context is not an ad hoc affair. It is at once an art and a science. In short time we saw positive results from the collective efforts of some campuses.

At the core of this strategy was the importance of facilitating the transition from the 30-year-old deficit financing model to the balanced budget approach. The university grew significantly within the mutually agreed deficit financing business model. The time has come to drive forward with the balanced budget approach in which frugality rather than the brutality of austerity holds the centre. Frugality is undoubtedly the mother of future growth. Austerity is the anchor of endless decline.

The Chairman of the University Grants Committee, the Honourable Colm Imbert, agreed that outgoing chair, Honourable Prime Minister of Barbados, Mia Mottley, would chair a sub-committee to bring these discourses to maturity. Working with the Honourable Prime Minister Gaston Browne of Antigua and Barbuda, and regional finance ministers, the committee brought matters to maturity and closure. It affirmed that the governments and the university should enter into a new phase of mutual

bonding and trust in order to move forward on the same page to prosperity. This is the new arena in which the future is being forged.

Management is now empowered with better understanding to build out the new entrepreneurial UWI in order to close the US\$25 million deficit within the multi-campus, consolidated eco-system. Government arrears that stood in 2015 at a record high of US\$117 million is now reduced to US\$45 million. Already the new commitment is yielding significant results.

Coming out of our 2019 Management Strategy Retreat we rolled out the New Financial Plan 2020 to 2025. In addition to implementing a 10% cut in expenditure, it proposed a 10% increase in entrepreneurial revenue. A multimillion-dollar revenue strategy is being implemented that focuses on new markets for our academic services.

Already very good short-term results are being reported with multimillion dollar contracts and agreements signed and being executed. Agreements to take the university to the regional capital market are in place and 2022 will witness the roll out of these measures. Short and medium term strategies, therefore, are in place to see the university meet its revised self-financing targets. These strategies were promised. Outcomes will be delivered.

The Revenue Revolution, then, is well on its way in a new and unprecedented fashion. It's a moment that was imagined and is being managed. It was planned and is being implemented. The activist university will honour its pledges and maintain its strategic integrity.

We are not afraid of the volatile world; we have visions for it and energy to meet it face on as an example of Caribbean resilience and thriving. We are amongst "the best in the developing West" and have shown the significance of such a hard-earned status. The year in review, then, was a period of academic prosperity in the face of the regional financial and health ferocity faced by the stakeholder family. We stood our ground and defended our communities and nations, serving them as we are mandated to do. The UWI is in a good, strategic position; to erase tomorrow what is today's deficit. We are grateful for the extraordinary support received during the year. It will be the seed of tomorrow's fruit.

## 4.

# CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: Context and Framework of Strategic Plans

## INTRODUCTION

AT THE TWENTY-THIRD INTER-SESSIONAL MEETING OF CARICOM HEADS of Government in March 2012 it was agreed<sup>1</sup> inter alia that,

“ . . . it was necessary to re-examine the future direction of the Community and the arrangements for carrying [it] forward which would include the role and function of the Secretariat”; and further that a strategic plan for the Community should be prepared, “Targeting a narrow range of specified outcomes within specified timeframes, focusing on a few practical and achievable goals.”<sup>2</sup>

The change intervention anticipated two (2) major outcomes, viz. (i) a 5-year strategic plan for the Community; and (ii) a [transformed] Secretariat with strategic focus, implementation capacity and strengthened corporate functions guided by the approved Community Strategic Plan.<sup>3</sup>

The CARICOM Strategic Plan designed for that period, sought to provide a holistic framework to guide the action of the CARICOM Organs, Institutions, Bodies and Member States, to address the critical needs expressed in consultations with Community nationals, key sectors of the Community and other stakeholders, and to create favourable conditions for improving the quality of life for the people of the Region, unleashing the growth drivers of the Region’s economies and building an integrated Community for all. To that end, the strategic focus has been on building social, economic, environmental and technological resilience; action to engender the Regional Identity and Spirit of Community and strengthening Governance arrangements for greater efficiency and effectiveness of the CARICOM architecture.

## THE CONTEXT FOR PLANNING AND ACTION

The existing global economic and geo-political environment which exists today is a highly dynamic, impacting heavily on the development of individual states, particularly small developing states. This environment is characterised by a growing proliferation of economic groupings/blocs as countries seek to consolidate their assets and economic/political influence to the best advantage.

In this context is the growing dominance of China, and the emerging economies among the ASEAN community and the 'BRICS' in particular, with north-south and south-south trade becoming more prevalent. The high growth in these economies has been facilitated in part by and increasing adoption of value chain and convergence models as a principal method of organising production and marketing of goods and services; as well as substantive investment in human capital development and technology.

These countries represent the fastest growing economies and consumer markets, with increasing demand for energy, food and raw materials. These emerging economies have also influenced global financial markets, for example, as a major source of direct foreign investment and developing funding.

In addition to the growing dominance of the economic groupings such as ASEAN and the BRICS, the European Union itself has expanded to 29 countries. The G7 has expanded to the G20, in part a testimony to the influence of the high growth economies in Latin America and Asia.

Globalization also engendered a new era in the role of non-state **actors** in governance. Civil Society and private sector play and increasing important role in closing a critical gap in development viz. "lack of people's voices in policy design, implementation and monitoring along the whole line of accountability from the global to the national to the local levels;"<sup>4</sup> and in creating the opportunity for a "new type of governance based on public-private partnerships and networking"<sup>5</sup> that can facilitate development through participation in the provision of public goods, enabling business development and employment, and access to development finance.

Other critical trends impacting the global environment include (i) the effects climate variability/climate change viz. severe weather patterns;(ii) the growing incidence of health pandemics; and (iii) the threat of terrorism and war; all of which severely threaten the development of the small states of CARICOM.

## REGIONAL CONTEXT

Caribbean states are facing crippling economic realities, the lingering remnants of the Global Economic Crisis and the consequence of *failure to implement*, at the regional and national levels, measures to mitigate the

impact of persistent vulnerabilities over time. The majority of CARICOM Member States face high and rising debt to GDP Ratios exacerbated by the decline in the agricultural sector across the Region in recent years, which is primarily due to the contraction in traditional exports.<sup>6</sup> Higher food-import bills, amidst recent external supply shocks and concomitant high and volatile oil prices, have directly and indirectly contributed to a *deteriorating trade balance*. A higher (general) import bill and a *weakening fiscal balance*, due to increases in government transfers and subsidies to insulate movements in international food and energy markets, have also contributed to this state of affairs.<sup>7</sup> The absence of an enabling air/maritime transport infrastructure to facilitate effective intra-regional trade and hassle-free movement of people across the region has undoubtedly exacerbated the contagion effects. On the social side, the high incidence of maternal mortality (190 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 2010), adolescent birth rate (68 per 1,000 girls in 2010) and new HIV infections (13,000 new infections in 2011) all impacting achievement of key Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The resultant impacts to Member States have been relatively low rankings on global composite indices, coupled with average low to medium high human development in recorded global indices. Additionally, the Region as a whole lags the developed countries in internet (ICT) penetration rates, speed and bandwidth.

In light of the challenges, the Region must take decisive steps to ensure its place in the global arena and the sustainable development of Member States, taking strategic advantage of 14 (sovereign states) acting in one accord.

The goal therefore is simple yet complex.

How does the region unify and rally around the creative talents of its people, foster innovation and implement mechanisms to unleash the growth potential for our island states . . . all whilst ensuring the most vulnerable are not neglected?

Indeed, in pursuit of building resilience for the CARICOM region, it has been established that economic recovery and growth will not be unleashed and sustained without a concomitant ICT enabling business environment, driven by an innovative human capacity development programme. Further, any tangible benefits derived were likely to be eroded without mitigating the manifest vulnerabilities associated with youth marginalization, gender inequality, citizen and health security, as well as climate vulnerability and the crippling experience of recovery from the debilitating impacts of natural disasters on the Region.

Alongside the significant challenges of the global and regional environment, within the CARICOM architecture there are a number of issues which ultimately impact the extent to which regional arrangements have been able to assist Member States in overcoming the challenges faced and meet the development needs of the people of the Community.

These 'internal' issues included inter alia weakness in the governance 'infrastructure' which affects decision making and implementation of regional agreements; limited engagement of non-state actors; a persistent insularity in thinking and problem solving, a lack of clarity of roles and responsibilities, and limited dialogue and collaboration among the implementing agents across CARICOM (i.e. CCS, institutions, ministries in Member States); lack of sustainable funding of the work of CARICOM; weaknesses in public education, public information and communications; challenges of human and other resources at the Secretariat, in Member States and the institutions; and weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation.

Any strategic plan devised for the region would of necessity have to concentrate on select, targeted actions to realize the benefits of an integrated approach to improving the quality of life of the people of the Community, engendering strong economies by unleashing growth drivers and building CARICOM unity and an integrated Community for all; through ensuring agreed protocols are mainstreamed at the national levels and measured consistently within an agreed framework.

## THE PLANNING PROCESS

The strategic direction proposed by CARICOM had been predicated on a triangulation of findings, priorities and action items emanating from:

- i. the voice of the peoples of the Regional via National Consultations (15 Member and 2 Associate States), Regional Tele-Survey (15 Member and 5 Associate States), a Youth Online Survey, written submissions and key informant interviews; (ii) various studies commissioned by the Secretariat and adopted by Heads of Government for the Region; and (iii) several leading world authorities.
- ii. Across the data sources the common themes/gaps which emerged consistently were the need to: Aggressively promote the CARICOM and regional integration agenda;
- iii. Assure the growth and development of the Community through effective interventions that address the challenging economic situation of Member States through tapping the sectors with potential for growth, production and increased trade, intra-regional transportation, human capacity development, free movement of skills, youth development, food security; and
- iv. Strengthen the institutional arrangements to create a much more effective CARICOM.

These ideas were deemed interoperable and indeed formed the basis for the six-point strategic framework, which had been developed and rolled out.

## THE WAY FORWARD

### VISION

“A Caribbean Community that is resilient, secure, inclusive, smart, driven by the aspirations and efforts of its citizens and representing an integrated force in the global arena”

### MISSION

To work together to deepen integration and build resilience so as to:

- realise our human potential, full employment and full enjoyment of human rights;
- ensure that social and economic justice are enshrined in law and embedded in practice;
- systematically reduce poverty, unemployment and social exclusion and their impacts;
- mainstream all aspects of sustainable development, including the environment, economic and social dimensions;
- encourage citizens to willingly accept responsibility to contribute to the welfare of their fellow citizens and to the common good;
- to create the environment for innovation, global competitiveness and in which the collective strength of the region is unleashed;
- affirm the collective identity of the Caribbean people.
- have a coordinated approach on international issues; and
- increase savings and investment flow within the community.

## THE CORE VALUES

### Unity/Togetherness:

commit to winning hearts and minds to work towards a robust and inclusive Caribbean Community able to work together to preserve the gains of regional integration and address the current challenges of economic recovery and growth and sustainable human development.

	celebrate the strength of both the shared and diverse aspects of our culture, heritage, and communities.
<b>Equity</b>	emphasizes the reach of services and benefits to all stakeholders across the Community.
<b>People-centeredness</b>	emphasize the pivotal role of the peoples of the Community at all levels and in all spheres of endeavour to embrace regional integration and the benefits it continues to offer.
<b>Performance-Driven/Results Focused</b>	emphasize the importance of results to achieve targeted results in achieving sectoral/cross sectoral as well as institutional strengthening goals
<b>Good</b>	Governance have an abiding respect for human rights, the rule and law, and take action to ensure social and economic justice for the people of the Community.
<b>Provide</b>	proactive, visionary leadership for promoting and reinforcing the spirit and commitment to regional integration, emphasizing transparency, accountability and operational excellence within all organs and institutions in the Community.

We rely on research and information technology-driven decision making at all levels, with a systematic approach to monitoring and measuring policy outcomes and impacts.

## PRIORITIES

Findings of the consultative process and scan of the environment which was undertaken in in the preparation process of CARICOM'S 2015–2019 Strategic Plan did highlight critical gaps requiring attention. These included the urgency of mitigating and overcoming the high debt, low growth, vulnerabilities to environmental shocks and the general need for re-balancing intra-regional trade between Member States. This resulted in the formulation of ten (10) broad based objectives:

1. Macroeconomic Stabilization & Enabling Business Environment
2. Youth Development, Entrepreneurship & Innovation

3. Improved Citizen Security & Health
4. Human Capital Development
5. Gender Equity & Mainstreaming
6. Reduction in Environmental Vulnerabilities
7. Diversification and Development of Energy Sources
8. Unleashing ICT Access
9. Strengthening Good Governance
10. Building a Regional Identity

To address these broad development objectives a set of **integrated** Strategic Priorities were proposed viz:

1. Building Resilience:
  - Economic
  - Social
  - Environmental
  - Technological
2. Strengthening the CARICOM Identity and Spirit of Community
3. Strengthening Governance Arrangements within CARICOM

The six-point strategic framework focussed on the execution of ten (10) broad based objectives driven by key interventions intended to act as ‘trigger’ mechanisms to build resilience – streamlined via

- Economic Resilience (Stabilisation and Sustainable Economic Growth and Development)
- Social Resilience (Equitable Human and Social Development)
- Environmental Resilience
- Technological Resilience

In that regard, the strategic projects proposed targetted key sectors during the short to medium term planning period (2–5 years), focusing on building resilience through cross-cutting initiatives inclusive of **Human Capacity Development, ICT, Youth, Health and Gender Mainstreaming**. A supporting infrastructure was provided via a **Change Management, Mainstreaming and Measurement** framework. It was anticipated that a broader range of cross-sectoral mechanisms would have been employed during the medium to longer term planning period (5–15 years) based on the conclusive results of the CARICOM Commission on the Economy, inclusive of appropriate financing mechanisms to support various strategic initiatives.

Moreover, recalling at all times desired outcomes of reducing poverty, unleashing growth and regional unity; undergirding the ‘core priority’ of Building Resilience, are the strategies to **promote the CARICOM identity**

**and Spirit of Community, and strengthen the governance and institutional arrangements** that will engender higher levels of efficacy, responsiveness and results.

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The development of a monitoring and evaluation framework for CARICOM drew on two models – Results Based Management (which engendered a results-driven approach) and the System of Indicators for Regional Integration (SIRI), which provides a reliable mechanism for determining the value-added of regional integration to Member States, and in that regard ensured equity of the benefits derived.

## CONCLUSION

It has doubtlessly been established that the periodic development and implementation of strategic plans provide Heads of Government with the opportunity to share, on an ongoing basis, the value, importance, benefits and challenges of regional integration with the people of the Region, who, are both contributors to, and beneficiaries of, regional integration. It also provides Heads of Government, Community Council and other organs of the Community with the tools needed to assess the results of the work undertaken within the time frame set within the confines of the strategic plan.

The value of periodic development and implementation of strategic plans to guide the systematic development of the Caribbean region has indeed earned its place in the books of the organs and institutions of the Caribbean Community.

## END NOTES

1. Extract from the Twenty-Third Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Paramaribo, Republic of Suriname, 8–9 March 2012.
2. Ibid, p. 3.
3. Ibid, p. 2.
4. A New Frontier for Caribbean Convergence: Integration Without Borders; Hon. Winston Dookeran, April 2013.
5. Ibid.
6. *Agricultural development and employment in the Caribbean: Challenges for the Future*, by Dr. Carlisle Pemberton.
7. <http://www.worldbank.org/>

# 5.

## CARIBBEAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL: Strategic Plan 2021–2025

Professor Sir. Hilary Beckles, Chairman  
Wayne Wesley, Registrar and CEO

COMMITTED TO OUR PEOPLE. SHAPING OUR FUTURE

### FOREWORD

IN 1973, TWO REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS WERE ESTABLISHED THAT would have tremendous impact on the Caribbean's future, they were the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC). CARICOM has served as a vehicle for realising its member countries' political independence aspirations, and the CXC has facilitated the emancipation of the secondary education system from the inherited British system of examinations that determined the transition of Caribbean students to tertiary level. CXC has evolved to take a place of pride in the Caribbean, providing a comprehensive qualifications framework for students who exit the secondary school system at various points, thereby allowing them to enter the workforce of to gain entry to post-secondary institution in the region and across the world.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in near-seismic shifts in the education system across the Caribbean. The CXC rose to the occasion and delivered examinations at CSEC and CAPE levels despite some hurdles. However, with ongoing changes taking place in the global education

landscape, the **CXC** must ensure that it builds institutional capacity, resilience and flexibility to be able to effectively address any challenges that may lie ahead. A new strategic plan to guide its continued growth for the next five years – 2021 to 2025 – has been developed through a consultative process involving internal and external stakeholders, with keen attentiveness to regional needs as well as a global outlook. The plan recognizes that **CXC** functions as part of a wider education ecosystem and is oriented towards not only advancing the strategic mandate but also includes plans for the sustainability and viability of the institution within the ecosystem.

**CXC** is a regional enterprise anchored in the fundamental principle of people-centeredness, placing value on the contribution and involvement of all stakeholder groups. This strategic plan places emphasis on the transformation of **CXC** for the benefit of all regional stakeholders and by extension the development of our region.

**Professor Sir Hilary Beckles**  
Chairman

## PREFACE

The Caribbean Examination Council (**CXC**) is transforming for greater regional impact. Accordingly, a new strategic plan for the 2021–2025 has been developed to strategically direct the Council's transformation. A new vision and mission reflective of the transformational direction of the Council have been articulated. This transformation will address critical regional imperatives, such as digital transformation, as a key resilience strategy for the region, and the creation of an agile education system.

The transformation agenda of **CXC** is to project itself, as a regional enterprise that demonstrates a degree of awareness and collective understanding of the scope, risks and challenges facing the region. This regional enterprise comprises key stakeholders which include the staff, ministries of education, schools and universities, teachers, students, parents, employers and unions. **CXC**, as a regional enterprise, will facilitate the requisite integration and development by becoming the premier regional authority on influencing teaching, learning and assessment through the infusion of digital technology informed by research and development.

Our communication and engagement will be digitally transformed for seamless and efficient stakeholders' interactions. The Council will harness the power of new and emerging information and communication technology (ICT) to drive innovative solutions which will include: data portals with interrogative capabilities for descriptive and predictive analytics, dashboards and digital validation of results, and the deployment of e-Learning and

e-Testing systems in schools, as well as teachers' colleges to provide familiarity and preparation for both teachers and students.

This transformation agenda is to ensure that the Council is repositioned as a regional enterprise that is **Integrated** – working collaboratively with all stakeholder. **Flexible** – being able to adjust to efficiently and effectively meet the needs of our stakeholders. **Responsive** – demonstrating the capacity to remain relevant and innovative, and **Proactive** – anticipating and actively addressing challenges. Central to this transformation agenda for CXC is the people-centred approach which advocates for:

- Empowering employees with information and resources to work efficiently and effectively.
- Empowering management with authority to manage by performance and
- Stimulating cordial working relationships with all stakeholders

The foregoing is aimed at fostering an organizational culture that is characterized by an atmosphere of recognizing and valuing people.

Let the transformation begin! Collectively, as a regional enterprise, we can and we must.

**Wayne Wesley PhD. CMgr**  
Registrar and CEO

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The impetus governing this five-year strategic plan (2021–2025), boldly embraces the technological dynamism of the future as we re-imagine the strategic development of intelligent systems to advance regional cooperation for human and social development. The essence of this new thrust is captured in the new mission and vision of the Council to reflect a focus on the new frontier for human capital development and digital transformation. The Council's strategic transformational agenda seeks to innovatively build resilience in the provision of educational services crucial to the continued economic development and growth of the region. The strategic plan articulates deliberate and coherent strategic initiatives that CXC will employ guided by its core values, while embracing the people-centred. CXC endeavours to optimise its resources and capabilities to create organisational transformation that will not only ensure the Council's sustainability, but also the value proposition of advancing the regional good of a resilient education system for the benefit of all stakeholders.

The strategy formulation, presents the strategic elements to create a digitally transformed regional enterprise impacting and repositioning the regional education system to be adaptive and agile. The new vision advances that that future state of the Council, in five years, is a digitally transformed enterprise providing quality, relevant and globally recognised educational services. Accordingly, the Council's new mission articulates the purpose in executing our mandate, as we develop the human capital of our Caribbean people through partnerships for global competitiveness.

To support the achievement of the vision and mission, four guiding pillars of excellence emerged during the formulation of the strategy. These pillars, referred to as the strategic themes, are Customer and Stakeholder Excellence, Technology and Innovation Excellence, Operational Excellence and Governance Excellence. The key outcomes, as expressed by the strategic results, embodies the transformational imperatives that must be manifested and sustained by the Council.

Influenced by the people-centred approach and the transformation agenda. The Council will provide the requisite opportunities to improve the knowledge, skills, and attitudes of the staff guided by strategic objective 13 (SO13). The strategic intent is to establish the crucial foundation on which the improvement in technology, business continuity, organizational culture, and strong corporate governance (SO9, SO10, SO11 and SO13) can be maximized. A robust and capable organizational capacity will provide the platform on which the Council's business processes are made to be efficient and effective.

The business processes perspective addresses the development and execution of the Council's core product and services along its value chain. The strategy is to engage in a structured system of transformation, incorporating artificial intelligence, research and development, and the digitalization of systems and processes. These strategic interventions are geared towards improved product and service quality, increased operational efficiency and enhanced corporate performance management (SO6, SO7 and SO8). The optimised business processes will create the conditions suitable to achieve financial sustainability and prudent corporate stewardship.

In light of the prevailing economic challenges facing the region and the associated repercussion on the finances of regional institutions, the strategic approach involves redesigning the current funding model, and targeted expansion into other markets both globally and regionally. The financial perspective has identified strategic initiatives that are intended to increase revenue and reduce cost (SO4 and SO5). To enhance stewardship of the Council's resources a comprehensive enterprise risk management framework will be developed and implemented. Achieving financial stability and exercising excellent stewardship will facilitate the provision of quality stakeholder experiences.

It is envisioned that with a robust and capable organisational capacity, efficient and effective business processes, coupled with prudent financial stewardship, the stakeholders' perspective is poised to guarantee excellence in quality product and service delivery. The stakeholder perspective thus consolidates the outputs of the other performance perspectives in ensuring enhanced brand awareness, improved stakeholder satisfaction and improved customer satisfaction and improved customer satisfaction (SO1, SO2, SO3). These strategic objectives and performance perspectives are intentionally integrated in formulating a compelling and deliberate approach for the seamless execution of initiatives and projects to drive the success of the strategy.

Recognising that staff are critical to the attainment of the Council's strategy, the core values are emphasized as one of the key strategy components. These values form the basis for staff recognition and appreciation through an initiative dubbed ResPECT. This initiative is aimed at developing an organizational culture of value people.

The strategic imperative is CXC repositioning for greater regional impact!



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## 6.

# REFORMING CRICKET WEST INDIES FOR IMPROVED ON-FIELD RESULTS

Sir Frank Worrell Memorial Lecture

16 November, 2020

Ricky Skerrit, President, Cricket West Indies (CWI)

## REFORMING CRICKET WEST INDIES FOR IMPROVED ON-FIELD RESULTS

**GOOD EVENING, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. I ACKNOWLEDGE THE** distinguished members of the audience who have taken the time to be with us tonight. I am aware that the Sir Frank Worrell Memorial lecture series is an extremely prestigious event with an impressive history. The list of past speakers in itself makes me feel humbled and honored just to have been invited to speak with you. Thank you to the UWI faculty of Sports for inviting me. I must confess that speaking at this event has forced me to do more writing over the past two days than I have done for a long time.

For tonight's purposes I will assume that the word "lecture" means that I am allowed to share some information and ideas of my choice, designed to further an ongoing conversation about West Indies Cricket and its importance to the life and livelihoods of people in our region. I do not intend to be professorial, or to sound off as if I am some kind of technical expert, which I am not. Nor do I intend for my talk to take the form of a major history lesson.

But one does not have to be a historian to be in awe of the true Legends of West Indies cricket and to know that there are individuals who have indelibly impacted and shaped West Indies cricket and the culture and history of our region. Sir Frank Worrell is clearly one such outstanding individual. And it is my distinct pleasure to speak at a lecture series that has been named in his memory.

As the first black man to be appointed permanent captain of the West Indies, Sir Frank Worrell was entrusted with what must have been the most difficult task in the history of West Indies cricket. I say “most difficult” because he simply could not afford to fail under the circumstances that prevailed at the time, at the end of the 1950’s. He was made captain, some 32 years after West Indies had first been granted Test Match status in 1928. His resounding suitability for the leadership role must have helped the selectors to dispense with the tradition of picking a captain of lighter skin colour, often with an English University background. The socio-political environment itself, over which Worrell had no control, must have placed Sir Frank under immense pressure to succeed. And no one knew it more than him. But it was the manner in which he achieved his successes, rather than the triumphs themselves, for which he is best remembered.

It was under Worrell’s leadership that the West Indies team first matured and became a formidable and more collective team, one that was no longer characterized only by individual feats of note. It was Worrell who first molded his team from a mix of brilliant individualists from across our region, into a cohesive unit. No Test Match was more illustrative of the benefit of the teamwork and discipline that Worrell had created, than the famous tied Test at Brisbane when he kept his team on their toes and motivated an exciting young fast bowler, just 23 years old at the time, to stay fully focused during that nail-biting last over. It will be most fitting when, later this month, a life-sized statue will be unveiled in Barbados, in tribute to Sir Wes Hall, the same young man who showed such maturity in bowling that famous over. The tribute to Sir Wes comes almost exactly 60 years after that thrilling first ever tied test in Australia. Sir Frank and the other heroes who have gone beyond, will no doubt be attending that unveiling ceremony, in spirit.

So tonight, we also reflect on Sir Frank Worrell’s guidance and inspiration as a leader of specially gifted young West Indians like Wes Hall, and others who he helped put on the path to becoming a world-beating combination back in the 1960’s. It was Sir Frank Worrell, more than anyone else, who laid the foundation for the success of other cricket leaders and teams, who followed.

But what if Sir Frank was to return to the world of cricket today? He would observe that Cricket is now one of the most popular sports in the world. More than 300 million people of all ages play the game, which boasts a worldwide fanbase around one billion strong. He would also observe however that cricket has become an industry and that the cricket world is changing fast.

Sadly, Sir Frank would also note that West Indian cricket on field success does not come quite as frequently as it did when he was captain. He would see that regional cricket administrators have been grappling for the past 20 years

or so with declining and inconsistent team performances, in all three formats of the game. Having won most of the Test Matches in which he captained, Sir Frank would be disappointed to find that of the 194 Test matches played by West Indies in the past twenty years alone, we have lost 104, and won only 41, or 21%. In the same period, we have won only 32% of the 434 ODI's, and 45% of the 124 T20 Internationals we have played at home and abroad. The data would tell him that in the same 20 years, West Indies selectors put more than 150 individual players and 18 different captains on the field to represent the West Indies. This was the same period in which West Indies fell to the bottom of the ICC rankings ladder in all three formats of the game. These past twenty years also saw our selectors pick 28 different opening batsmen, 45 fast bowlers, and 39 spinners in Test cricket alone. The selectors' turnstiles have been busy in the past twenty years. I remind you that, except for an occasional injury break, Greenidge and Haynes were our only opening pair for at least a decade, and Lance Gibbs was the main specialist spinner for nearly twice as long.

The data suggests that the CWI Board has been pointing our fingers at the coaches as being responsible for the declining team performances. In those same past 20 years, we hired 15 men's team Head Coaches, most of whom spent very little time before they were relieved of the job. Most of the contracts of these Head Coaches were either intentionally made short-term, or were terminated well before they officially ended, suggesting that the coach was the one who had performed unsatisfactorily. Dozens of assistant coaches and supporting technical and management specialists, from all over the world, have also been hired and fired in the same twenty-year period.

This data does not include the 5 Head coaches and 13 Assistant coaches engaged for the Women's team, just in the past 7 years since our Women's program began in earnest. I remind you that just three years ago, in 2017 after what was a disappointing ODI World Cup performance, the entire Women's Coaching staff was dismissed immediately on their return home. This came just one year after almost the same women's team and coaching staff had brought great joy and celebration across our region after winning the T20 Cricket World Cup.

## WEST INDIES CRICKET TEAM RESULTS – SINCE 2000

Format	Matches	Won	Lost	Draw Win		Captains	Players	Openers	Pacers	Spinners
					%					
Tests	194	41	104	49	21%	14	113	28	45	29
ODIs	434	166	240	n/o	32%	18	127	44	51	39
T20s	124	56	63	n/o	45%	11	83	23	31	21

**WEST INDIES MEN'S HEAD COACHES – SINCE 2000**

- Roger Harper
- Gus Logie
- Bennett King
- David Moore
- Henderson Springer
- John Dyson
- David Williams
- Otis Gibson
- Stuart Williams
- Phil Simmons
- Stuart Law
- Nick Pothas
- Richard Pybus
- Floyd Reifer
- Phil Simmons

To me, this data really tells the more important story of the inherent weaknesses in our local and regional cricket systems which do not sufficiently support enough of our young cricketers to become truly motivated, disciplined, skilled and mentally competitive for the global stage. The poor win/loss ratios, the numerous panicky team selection changes, the extremely high turnover of coaches, and the long list of team Captains tell a sorry story of poor returns on investment by CWI. It also suggests that West Indies cricket administrators need to be more strategic and comprehensive in addressing the growing need for us to change the way we operate and the decisions we make – as producers of the West Indian cricket products.

And the cost of personnel remuneration during the same 20-year period has been astronomical. CWI spent a Quarter Billion US Dollars on our players, coaches and fulltime staff during the past twenty years. This 250 Million US Dollars does not include the cost of travel, sustenance, and housing our many coaches, players and administrative support people when on tour. So, CWI has undoubtedly spent heavily on our teams, without any sustainable improvement in performance. And in contrast to the relatively poor results we have achieved, we have massively increased expenditure in personnel by more than 600% in twenty years. Expenditure was poorly targeted with too much resulting waste. Altogether CWI handled in excess of 700 Million US Dollars in the past 20 years, including significant income earned from hosting the ICC 2007 ODI Cricket World Cup. What do we have to show today, after so much expenditure? Certainly not enough returns on the field of play.

In making this point about remuneration wastage, I am conscious that cricket provides a much better livelihood for players and coaches than it did pre-2000. Today's Top players can become millionaires and we should be happy for those West Indians who have done so. But erratic governance and poor decisions at the administrative level can make the difference between a well-rewarded career and poverty for some of our players. The right to work is a fundamental right. CWI must not affect the exercise of that right by penalizing those players who seek to work elsewhere. Our public duty is all the more complex for that reason alone.

### **CWI PERSONNEL COST SUMMARY (2000–2019)**

- Direct Expenditure – USD 224,395,022
- Expenditure in 2000 – USD 3,011,914
- Expenditure in 2019 – USD 18,375,640
- Percentage increase over 20 years – 610%

Although the finger-pointing is continuing, especially at each other, I believe that most of our administrators and directors are now more aware of the need for strategic change and governance reform, at least on some fronts. The truth is, and I am confident that Sir Frank Worrell looking on us would agree, that CWI needs reform on all fronts if we are to get good returns on investment on the fields of play. I am clear in my own mind that pointing accusatory fingers at coaches and moving dozens of new players through our squads, has not provided CWI with the level of results that we should all be seeking. I did not have this data to hand a year and a half ago when Dr. Kishore Shallow and I told CWI voters that we would usher in change. Back then we listed a 10 point “cricket first” plan which was more of a To-Do list than a plan. Action on that list is underway. But it has been further developed into ‘*The West Indies Cricket First Philosophy*’ also referred to as ‘*Cricket First*’. It forms the main substance of my speech tonight. ‘Cricket First’ is the player-centric guiding star around which CWI’s values, decisions, strategies, and actions must revolve going forward. It is also the foundation on which competence, confidence, continuous learning, self-discipline, and high standards are being built.

All components of ‘*Cricket First*’ must enable our cricketers to tailor and strengthen their physical and mental skills in between tours, in order to cope with the many challenges, they will face during tours. ‘Cricket First’ is the overarching approach which now forms the basis upon which Cricket West Indies (CWI) plans and programs are being rebuilt.

The rebuilding will not happen overnight, but it is already happening. Just in the past year alone we have undertaken several internal studies and

reviews, including a **Team Selection System Review** which has delivered the first ever documented and transparent selection policy, and includes unique approaches to men's and women's cricket. That review has also resulted in the appointment of the first ever female as a lead selector. We have also conducted a **Business Situation Assessment and Financial Operations Review**, also known as the PKF report. Although it was not a forensic study, it pointed towards several procurement and financial operational concerns and opened our eyes to the need for closer risk management. Our CEO and his team have also put together an **HR development plan, a Coaching Education Plan** and a **Pandemic Safety Protocols Master Plan**. With other cricket-centric plans underway, these reviews have provided us with a number of consequential recommendations and options, most of which are already being implemented.

The most recent review that has come to hand is the Wehby Report on Governance Reform which is currently being studied and discussed for possible utilization by Territorial Board shareholders and stakeholders. It is no secret that several previous Governance reform reports were rejected by the CWI Board in the past. You can therefore expect that this Wehby Report will face various obstacles and hurdles within our Board as we attempt to move it forward. While there is already some resistance, we are doing all we can to ensure that this report does not become another political football. I am confident that this Governance report provides more recommendations on which we can agree, than disagree. Interestingly, it points to the relevance of good Governance to achieving on field results. In any event, our new '*Cricket First*' mantra dictates that the only way that we can drive sustainable improvement to our on-field cricket results is with a healthy and focused supporting balance of Organization-wide Creative thinking, Governance reform, and Strategic decision-making.

This '*Cricket First Philosophy*' is slowly but surely becoming the foundation upon which all key CWI strategic decisions and actions are based. We believe strongly that, for West Indies cricket to get on an upward trajectory, cricket-specific matters have to be prioritized as the #1 organizational focus over all other matters. '*Cricket First*' must therefore be the ultimate foundation for all things CWI. But I also believe that simultaneously, the Board, Executive Management and all staff must significantly improve the transparency, accountability and quality of CWI's operations and decision making. The big challenge is to get all concerned to understand that it can no longer be business as usual – that reacting to losses and disappointments on the field by taking knee-jerk or short-term decisions off the field, is not a sustainable strategy.

The '*West Indians First*' policy which was adopted officially by the CWI Board in December 2019, is actually a key derivative of our '*Cricket First Philosophy*' that I am introducing to you tonight. The '*West Indians First*'

Policy is focused on empowerment and procurement. It recognizes that West Indies cricket, at its best, has always been a representation of the hopes and aspirations of the people of the West Indies, and an illustration of the heights of excellence that our small Caribbean nations can attain when we work together.

Cricket has been one of the few areas of our common West Indian culture and experiences, where together we have been able to punch above our weight, and achieve global excellence and recognition over a period of generations. That is why West Indies cricket has been aptly described as a 'public good' that belongs to all West Indian people no matter where we are located, across our region and the world. Unfortunately, the concept of West Indies as a "public good" is not popular among most of our cricket administrators and has been a stumbling block for Governance reform. As someone who is first and foremost a cricket fan, I have no doubt that it is not only those with a financial share who own West Indies cricket. I am very aware that there are many fans and other stakeholders who have made years of emotional investments in our players and teams. When our cricket teams and gifted cricketers showcase their excellence and toughness on a world stage, we walk taller as a West Indian people. We beam with pride as we look at our own young West Indians face up with confidence, and God-given talent, to their adversaries and best competition from across our globe.

Sadly, the inverse occurs when our teams underperform, when they look unmotivated, especially when they get badly beaten. Fans feel gravely let down, and our West Indian pride and spirit stagger in frustration. Our West Indies team being continuously low-ranked on the ICC success ladder causes strong feelings of denial and embarrassment, and stakeholders are rightly demanding explanations, solutions, and improved results.

The '*West Indians First*' policy is therefore a timely call to action, designed to help change an organizational culture, through the empowerment of West Indian talent and production. Its main outputs must be an empowerment that impacts all players, staff and executives. It leads to the best available creativity, effectiveness, and performance excellence both on and off the field. Transitioning and reorganizing for performance improvement must therefore take place strategically and speedily. At all levels and on all fronts, CWI must engage in a series of calculated moves designed to gain global competitiveness and reignite the passion for this new cricket-centric culture – A West Indian culture where our cricket and our pride must be where they belong, at the very center. This West Indian culture is owned by the people of our entire region, and not solely by any one individual, group or country.

The *West Indians First policy* therefore emphasizes that properly developing at the highest possible production and performance standards, and carefully exposing and promoting Caribbean talent and service

expertise, is an absolute necessity for the future well-being of West Indies cricket. The policy also emphasizes that organizational excellence off the field of play, is the prerequisite for achieving consistent world class on-field performances.

### **THE FIVE POLICY ESSENTIALS ARE:**

This very recent *West Indians First policy* will only be effective if it is properly and consistently implemented. The CWI Executive Management must therefore take ownership of this call to action, while CWI Board takes responsibility for its utilization as a critically important policy. It is a necessary and timely policy which should make a major difference to the quality of the future output of West Indies cricket.

All of CWI's key cricket decisions must be designed to develop that sense of pride and aspiration for our representative West Indies teams that has been too often absent over these past 20 years. In order to achieve a renewed sense of purpose and excellence within CWI, difficult choices and challenging decisions will have to be made.

The *Cricket First philosophy* and the *West Indians First policy*, which are interconnected and inextricable, together mandate that the revival of West Indies cricket should be developed around West Indian talent, culture, and heritage, and should aim to always achieve excellence and pride in the best of what it means to be a West Indian.

### **'CRICKET FIRST' ENCOMPASSES THE FOLLOWING KEY GOALS:**

- a) Strengthening of the West Indies cricket teams, and a return to winning ways.
- b) Building on the on-field performance on four inter-connected and inter-dependent pillars – physical fitness, physical skills, mental skills, and strategic thinking. If any of these pillars is weak, performance will suffer. Mastery of these fundamentals will improve the players' growth, competence and enthusiasm and should motivate the teams to become the best fielding, bowling and batting unit that they can be, in all formats of the game.
- c) Designing, implementing, and monitoring performance improvement practices and programs between tours, for achieving excellence during tours.
- d) Developing a sustainable and justifiable governance structure and system, off the field, that affects behavior and performance on the field. If CWI's structure and systems are coherent, and aligned with

the principles of '*Cricket First*', performance will automatically improve.

- e) Establishing a contract of expectations between the Coaches and the Players to improve communication, teamwork, team esteem and team cohesion. This contract will properly inform the players about their roles and functions, and will help them to understand exactly what is expected of them. Players should also be allowed to express their expectations of the coaches.
- f) Promoting a common philosophy, and working cooperatively and harmoniously with Territorial Boards to improve teamwork and achieve a shared and mutually beneficial purpose. CWI and Territorial Boards must be on the same page in order to stimulate a new growth curve, and a physical and psychological rebirth and revival of West Indies cricket.

In today's complex and rapidly changing world, to be an effective organization that produces winning teams, we must direct all of our resources towards developing appropriate and efficient cricket-specific processes and outputs. We must simultaneously embrace the concept of perpetual growth, continuous learning, and constant improvement of our human resources on every level. And we must sincerely believe, and practice, that the combined effort and joint action of the best talent and minds from across the Caribbean region is greater than the sum of the individual parts, and their separate effects.

One potential barrier to improving in a changing environment, and capitalizing on the benefits of change, is the reluctance of too many of our people to develop a sense of discipline, commitment, preparation, and follow through. Daniel Webster wrote: "Failure is more frequently from want of energy than want of capital". Our cricketers and staff must therefore be taught to develop and implement improvement goals and priorities. And they need to understand that all improvement goals are not equal. They therefore need to identify the goals and improvement processes that will give the more significant pay-offs. And we must all have the discipline and enthusiasm to implement solutions no matter how uncomfortable or unpopular. Focus and Context are the two key things that must be put back at the center of our organizational ability if we are to once again be able to continuously punch above our small size and weight. Quite simply put, we must now do more with less.

I firmly believe that adhering to '*The Cricket First Philosophy*' and implementing the *West Indians First Policy* will produce, within the next two to ten years, the following outputs that Dr. Shallow and I envision for Cricket West Indies:

- a) CWI, all of its cricket teams and its various technical intervention programs, led by competent and empowered professionals, mostly of West Indian origin with respect for our proud history and culture, and with strategic minds and winning attitudes.
- b) A modern and fit-for-purpose Corporate Governance system, which is consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable, inclusive and results in the best decision-making.
- c) A well-organized grassroots program in every member territory, jointly funded by Government, private sponsors, and the local cricket association; with technical inputs and standards from CWI as needed.
- d) Kids wanting to play and enjoy cricket, and getting opportunities to do so through relevant school, community and club leagues and programs with young boys and girls enjoying and learning the game with technical oversight by committed and competent coaches, trained centrally through CWI's own coaching Education and Development Programs.
- e) Cricket-loving kids who are encouraged to do well academically, with access to cricket and other sports activities being used as rewards and platforms for learning.
- f) CWI (in partnership with private sponsors) delivering regional age group tournaments commercially branded as the future stars (U15) and rising stars (U17 and U19) of West Indies cricket, with mentoring inputs from past players.
- g) A busy overseas tours program for emerging players (U23) being exposed to international environments and good competition, in advance of selection to the senior team.
- h) Closer monitoring and improved collaboration with the regional franchise system, to ensure adherence to minimum standards for coaching, and for player fitness and health.
- i) A player remuneration and contractual system that rewards outstanding performance, recognizes future potential, and frowns on mediocrity. Player welfare must also be at the foundation of such a remuneration system.
- j) A modern research and science-based High-Performance Program, delivered through a Network headquartered at CCG Antigua, and operated in partnership with regional higher-learning institutions, focused on preparing and up-skilling individual players and coaches, and preparing representative teams for winning performances.
- k) Head Coaches commencing strategic planning, team building, and technical preparation for competing in ICC Cricket World Cup events, a minimum of 18 months ahead of the actual event.

- l) CWI, and its subsidiary CCG, to be transformed into a sustainably financed and efficiently led and operated corporation, employing the best available professionals, adhering to global standards of governance at all levels of operations, and engaging productively with all shareholders and stakeholders.
- m) Achieving at least 60% of winning results in all three formats, with ICC rankings never lower than the top five, and with several elite male and female West Indian players ranked within the top 20 players in the world.
- n) Cricket Fans of all ages being engaged and re-energized to love West Indies cricket, with the establishment of a highly motivated and organized supporters club.
- o) An efficient, creative, and modern public communications system, producing and delivering relevant and interesting stories of past, present, rising, and emerging West Indies cricketers and team performances.
- p) Territorial Boards committed to improving communication, teamwork and regional cooperation, minimizing insularity, and focused less on cricket politics and more on local grassroots development and growth of the sport.

The unprecedented and unexpected global pandemic has introducing new shocks while accelerating other secular trends. It has disrupted regional and international schedules, and introduced significant biosecurity costs and dramatically changed markets for sponsorship and broadcast rights, reduced facilities access, and caused development funding cuts, no gate receipts, and numerous job losses. The truth is that for the past eight months Covid-19 has significantly slowed our forward reform momentum on both the cricket operations and financial revenue fronts. Fortunately, before the advent of Covid, we had already begun important and urgent off field reforms that will ultimately fulfil the essentials of the *Cricket First Philosophy*. While it is clear that the financial and other, challenges of Covid-19 will not go away quickly, we cannot stop moving forward.

You will recall that there were naysayers who didn't believe that a summer test tour to England this year was possible. According to them, we were putting the lives of our players in jeopardy.

They predicted that the players would all get contaminated the minute they set foot in London. And there were others who, for politically mischievous reasons, demanded that CWI leverage the unprecedented circumstances of the tour as financial blackmail of the English Cricket Board.

It was our *Cricket First Philosophy*, with a sense of creativity, a commitment to partnership, and never say die attitudes, on both sides of the Atlantic, that made the pioneering test tour to England possible this past

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summer. Once the Men's tour had taken place safely, as we had predicted, it opened up new possibilities for a Women's tour to follow. In spite of the hasty and inadequate match practice time and other challenges, our on-field defeats were a small price to pay for those opportunities for our players to work and grow their games. I have no doubt that we were justified in pursuing those tours. And I am extremely proud of the leadership of our medical experts, and the decision of so many players to face up to the travel risk that Covid-19 may have presented, but having placed their confidence in the carefulness of our decision-making. I believe our players and team management now know that they have a President and a Vice President who care about their welfare on all fronts.

Ladies and Gentlemen, our cricket is facing great challenges. But I still believe strongly that it also has a tremendous opportunity to improve and grow. Great things can be achieved when the West Indian cricket community strives to think big and think differently, to collaborate and innovate together, and to put insularity and petty cricket politics to bed. Cricket still has a golden chance to drive transformative growth and secure its sustainable long-term future in our West Indian culture for several more decades to come. West Indians are a resilient people. Sir Frank Worrell showed us how to face up to adversity and in honour of his memory, let us pledge tonight to continue to rally around the West Indies.

At CWI, I believe we have stopped the knee jerking and reactionary fiddling at the wheel, and instead are now inspiring and demanding data-based and more collective decision-making from our executives. We are no longer afraid to be focused on medium and long-term results. Rooted in a mindset that is both technological and entrepreneurial, we are revising our roadmap to help cricket forge into the future, confident that we can emerge from the current COVID-19 pandemic in the strongest possible shape.

I believe it was Winston Churchill who once said:

“In the course of my life, I have often had to eat my words, and I must confess that I have always found it a wholesome diet.”

I hope that my words to you tonight won't have to be eaten by me or anyone else.

Thank you.

PART TWO


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# 7.

## THE CARICOM SYSTEM: Basic Instruments



### INTRODUCTION

BY IDENTIFYING, LOCATING AND PRESENTING IN ONE VOLUME a variety of historical documents inspired by the political directorate of the Caribbean Community from its birth to the present time, *The CARICOM System: Basic Instruments* records the institutional development of one of the most enduring economic integration systems in the international community by having the documents speak for themselves. The utterances gleaned from these instruments are both eloquent and instructive. Apart from the University of the West Indies, the instruments set out in this volume postdate the demise of the West Indian Federation in

1962. In fact, the period following the collapse of the Federation registered significant advances in regional cooperation, both in terms of functional cooperation and economic integration. Indeed, when Dr. Williams finally broke his silence and announced the withdrawal of Trinidad and Tobago from the Federation by sponsoring a resolution in the Peoples National Movement (PNM) to 'reject unequivocally any participation in a federation of the Eastern Caribbean', the door was kept open for 'the future establishment of a Common Economic Community embracing the entire Caribbean Area' as stated by Sir Fred Phillips in *Freedom in the Caribbean* (Ocean Publications Inc.1977). So it was that the Dickenson Bay Agreement was concluded a mere three years later and CARIFTA was established in 1968.

The collapse of the federal experiment in 1962 did not moderate or stymie efforts at regional integration. Indeed, the decade following the events of 1962 saw the establishment of CARIFTA, the Caribbean Development Bank, the West Indies Shipping Corporation, the Caribbean Examinations Council, and the Council of Legal Education. With the exception of the West Indies Shipping Corporation which went into liquidation and CARIFTA, which was succeeded by the Caribbean Community and Common Market, these institutions have survived to the present and have grown in strength and stature. The signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973 by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago must be considered one of the defining moments in the historical and institutional development of the Caribbean Community. Given the acrimony characterising the relations between Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in the period 1958–68 it was not a plausible expectation that representatives of the two governments could have deliberated and reached an accommodation in 1973. In this connection, Trinidad and Tobago must be seen to have made a herculean effort at accommodation given the known preference of the Williams' administration for a customs union in the Commonwealth Caribbean and for a strong central administration in any integration arrangement. Although a hesitant first step, the Treaty of Chaguaramas provided the basis for wide-ranging functional cooperation, important initiatives in foreign policy coordination and invaluable experience in the operation of a free trade regime, however constrained by impediments to the free movement of goods and factors of production.

From these early beginnings the CARICOM System has grown and flourished comprehending at present a range of regimes in the areas of governance, social security, export development, agricultural research and development, the environment, meteorology, disaster preparedness, administration, culture, fisheries, tourism, Front telecommunications, food and nutrition, animal health, climate change, standards and quality and so on.

At the centre of the system is the Caribbean Community which is being transformed by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas from a trading regime to a single market and economy in which factors move freely as a basis for internationally competitive production of goods and provision of services. This transformation comes largely as a response to galloping liberalisation and globalisation in the world economy but is still in an early stage of development. Operationalising the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) calls for the establishment of various enabling institutions among which is the Caribbean Court of Justice, which is encountering serious opposition from some sections of the regional legal fraternity, particularly the private Bar in Jamaica. Given the critical importance of this institution to the successful operation of the CSME, it is necessary to await developments in this area before venturing an evaluation of the prospects for success of

the development paradigm being introduced by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. It may be instructive to note however, that participation in the regime of the Caribbean Court of Justice in its original jurisdiction is a *sine qua non* for participating in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.

Given the date of conclusion of many of the regimes included in this compendium, it is conceivable that some instruments have undergone minor amendments which might not have been incorporated in the texts presented here. Unfortunately, time constrains militated against their incorporation. Furthermore, one or two regimes are either dysfunctional or in an advanced state of dissolution; nevertheless, their historical significance was perceived as justifying their inclusion. Cases in point are the Caribbean Food Corporation, the West Indies Shipping Corporation and the Caribbean Enterprise Regime.

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
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## 8.

# THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY: Beyond Survival



### INTRODUCTION

TWENTY-SEVEN YEARS AFTER ITS CREATION, THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY, consisting of fifteen states stretching from the Bahamas in the north to Suriname in South America, presents a picture of a relatively mature and stable regional organisation characterised by successful programmes of functional cooperation, important formal links with the major global powers, trade and other partnerships with the principal states of the Caribbean Basin, and a demonstrated capacity to withstand the vicissitudes of its evolution. And even though it has been criticised for a number of deficiencies, as have the European Union and other economic

groupings, the fact remains that it has survived and can be said to have made significant contributions in regional and international affairs.

Yet at one crucial moment it was not expected to survive. Overwhelmed by the world economic crisis of the 1970s, unsettled by ideological divisions, weakened by internal differences, the Caribbean Community seemed destined for failure. That it did resolve these problems is not only testimony to the power of the integration idea among the peoples and the Governments of the region, but also to its ability to fashion its own instruments for survival and success. This survival and success must also be attributed to a body of ideas and analyses which have emerged out of the various heads

of government conferences in the 1980s and the studies and commissions authorised and brought into being by them. There is a distinct ideology of survival encapsulated in the ideas which have emerged from these studies and declarations.

Having overcome the crisis of the 1970s and the challenges of the 1980s, CARICOM is in a position, indeed has the capacity, to reposition itself to face the challenges of the new century and take advantage of the opportunities it will offer. The changing nature of the integration movement will make this a distinct possibility. The Caribbean Community has been transformed from an economic grouping concerned with the promotion of economic self-reliance in relation to the rest of the world, to one in which the movement of labour and capital will be a notable feature. Measures to enhance its negotiating capacity and its capacity to harness the benefits of globalisation have also been taken.

The Caribbean has every right to face the future with confidence. For this region of only six million people has demonstrated its ability to compete at the level of ideas in global society. Small as it is, it has produced two Nobel Prize-winners, outstanding thinkers, writers and creative artists, and the anthem of the millennium was composed by one of its sons. These are significant achievements. These historical, spiritual and cultural strengths will ensure that the success of the movement towards unity is assured. The Caribbean Community also has a lesson to teach the world as far as cultural dynamism and racial harmony are concerned. This has been noted by Gordon Lewis in his seminal work, *Main Currents in Caribbean Thought*:

. . . it (the Caribbean) possesses features that might well make it the envy of so-called more advanced societies. Its various groups, whether identified in racial, ethnic, or religious definitional terms, live, if not in complete harmony, at least in a peaceful coexistence that other Third World areas ravaged by communalism and tribalism might envy. Its peoples and cultures, indeed, being so much a rich mixture of America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, have shaped out of their experience some of the leading ideas of the modern world especially relevant to Third World problems: negritude, black power, black nationalism, Creole Marxism, Cuban socialism and the rest. Indeed, relative to its size, the region has produced a disproportionate number of artists, thinkers, and scholar-politicians, many of them with an international fame

. . . and many of them, in addition, combining political leadership and intellectual culture in a way that has almost disappeared in the political life of countries like Britain and the United States. All of these things . . . are the elements of the promise of Caribbean life. The future of the Caribbean lies within the capacity and the willingness of those elements to fulfil and indeed enlarge that promise.

More than fifty years ago in September 1947, a generation of West Indian leaders met in Montego Bay to chart a future for this region in the post-war era. They met under the banner 'The Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies', a clear indication that it was recognised that Caribbean unity was essential to the progress of the region. The meeting was the culmination of a relatively long process in the search for integration. It laid the foundation for the creation of the West Indies Federation and was the result of the recognition that a politically and economically unified Caribbean would not only foster and promote economic development but, more importantly, would be a barrier to the twin evils of particularism and fragmentation. Important spiritual as well as political milestones were laid on the road to Montego Bay.

But the impetus towards West Indian Federation had manifested itself long before, in the ideologies and activities of a number of individuals, associations and organisations which helped to raise the consciousness of the people of the region. The precursors of the Montego Bay conference included the Dominica Conference of 1932 and the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC), which as early as 1926 had declared its interest in a federal union. Various professional associations organised on a regional basis: The Caribbean Union of Teachers which after 1935 sought support for uniform education standards; the Caribbean Bar Association which after 1916 had as an objective the codification of the separate Island Laws; and the Regional Civil Service Federation which after 1944 wanted the unification of the Regional Civil Service – all in their various ways supported the idea of the Caribbean integration movement. The work of men such T.A. Marrayshow, Uriah Butler and Albert Gomes also contributed to the process. But even from as early as the mid-nineteenth century, individuals and organisations with different motives have sought to achieve Caribbean unity. The historical and cultural consanguinity of Caribbean peoples has been remarked on by persons as removed from each other in history, time and space as Pere Labat, a Jesuit priest who was in the Caribbean in the eighteenth century, and Norman Manley, Premier of Jamaica in the 1950s and early 1960s. Labat made note of the cultural affinity of the region:

I have travelled everywhere in your sea of the Caribbean . . . from Haiti to Barbados, to Martinique and Guadeloupe, and I know what I am speaking about . . . You are all together, in the same boat, sailing on the same uncertain sea . . . citizenship and race unimportant, feeble little labels compared to the message that my spirit brings to me: that of the position and predicament which History has imposed upon you.

. . . I saw it first with the dance . . . the merengue in Haiti, the beguine in Martinique, and today I hear, *de mon orielle morte*, the echo of calypso from Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, Dominica and the legendary Guiana . . . it is no accident that the sea makes no difference to the rhythm of your body.

Norman Manley also remarked on the historical and spiritual bonds which unite the West Indian people. Addressing the Caribbean Labour Congress in 1947 in Jamaica he observed:

Above all I am impressed by the fact that wherever there is an Assembly of West Indians in the Caribbean area, there, immediately and obviously and without the slightest difficulty, you feel at home and as one. You are conscious of being with your own people . . . the sense of unity in the West Indies . . . is so powerful and so rapidly growing today that the minor historical differences are irrelevant in the face of [our] innumerable common ties ...

The question might well be asked if there is buried in the psyche of the Caribbean peoples such a compelling and powerful urge towards integration that it can survive the temporary setbacks and mistakes which have dogged the integration process. It is a salient question, for there has never been a movement or programme in the English-speaking Caribbean which has challenged or sought to reverse the move towards integration.

Gordon Lewis has pointed out that the Montego Bay Conference arose out of the conjuncture of two factors: the need for West Indian unity and the reluctance of a weakened Britain, depleted and ravaged by the Second World War, to sustain the Caribbean, which had become a burden on the Exchequer. Decisions taken in Britain then were a prelude to the establishment of the West Indies Federation, and it was Britain that laid down the bases of the Federation equipment. The Federation, externally inspired, was of brief duration. The late Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, described its end in these terms: 'The infant nation was presented to the world in the swaddling clothes made in the United States of America and out of the made-in-Britain shroud of colonialism.'

The failure of the West Indies Federation has had a powerful impact on the imagination of the Caribbean peoples and their Governments. This is not surprising: Federation was the great divide in the integration process. The problems leading to its dissolution have served as a lesson to the architects of the Caribbean Community. It may therefore be worthwhile to look briefly at some of the factors which hastened that dissolution.

The salient fact about the Federation's birth as an external imposition is that it could not attract the support of the peoples and institutions of the region. But there were other factors at work, which might have undermined the federal idea propounded by the British Government. One of the most compelling of these was the creation of a structure which was so repugnant to the Caribbean people's sense of their history and their sense of independence, that one wonders how it could have been considered in the first place, even allowing for the prevailing political ethos of the time. Most of the main positions of the Federal structure were staffed by Expatriates and the Federal

Prime Minister, to all intents and purposes, was the clerk of the expatriate Governor-General. The latter was all-powerful:

The Governor-General, in brief, had at his disposal powers normally accepted in Dominion Constitutional practice as belonging to the Prime Minister – the power to dissolve Parliament, the power to set up a ‘packed’ Upper House, even the power to argue his case in Cabinet as the recognised Master of certain of its members.

The differences among the major states on the issue of the West Indies Federation has a negative impact on the smaller Leeward and Windward Islands. At several points along the way when Trinidad, Barbados and Jamaica could not harmonise their positions in such a way as to protect their interests, these smaller islands understandably felt abandoned. But despite the resulting bitterness, a centralised federation under the leadership of Trinidad and Tobago seemed a distinct and hopeful possibility after Jamaica departed from the Federation. This did not materialise, as Trinidad and Tobago too saw the necessity to ‘go it alone’. The financial costs of leading the Federation were a prime consideration in this regard. The experiences of the smaller states with the Federation were to colour their attitude to the integration process and impel them to greater unity among themselves. But this sequence of events remains to be told.

Apart from the weakness inherent in its exogenous nature, the Federation was also undermined by insularity, suspicion, different conceptions as to how it should function, and the seductive attraction of national independence. But although the Federation perished, the idea of unity endured, as was reflected in developments in the mid-1960s. In 1963, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago Eric Williams, concerned about Britain’s imminent entry into the European Economic Community, appreciative of the significance of the formation of economic groupings in different parts of the world, and convinced that the Caribbean must be part of this trend, initiated a number of meetings of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean. These conferences provided the Heads of Government with a forum to discuss plans and programmes to advance the cause of Caribbean integration.

The Prime Minister of British Guiana, Forbes Burnham, believed that Dr. Williams was ‘courageous’ to restart the integration process so soon after the collapse of the Federation. For it was the worst of times. Leaders shouted at each other across the Caribbean Sea. There was no dialogue or understanding. The unity of the region seemed to be in tatters. But Williams’ statesmanship was shrewd. He knew that whatever hostilities might be expressed in the meeting, the act of meeting in itself could serve to put an end to the impasse in the integration process. Williams introduced a measure of

coherence, stability and progress by initiating the meetings of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

In 1965, others who had inherited the mantle of Marryshow, Butler, Gomes and other visionaries of Caribbean integration met at Dickenson Bay to discuss the advancement of the integration process. And this has been the trend: the quest for identity remains at the centre of the thoughts, plans and actions of successive leaders of the region. It points to a compelling recognition that West Indian regionalism is a sustaining force and that the journey to the rendezvous of unity, though interrupted at points in our historical circumstances, must be continued. The contributions of these early West Indian politicians and statesmen have been of immense and lasting value because they were founded upon a common historical inheritance and an abiding faith in the common destiny of this region.

As founding fathers of the integration movement, Errol Barrow, Prime Minister of Barbados; Vere Bird, Prime Minister of Antigua; and Forbes Burnham, Prime Minister of Guyana, understood that there had been times in the West Indian past when faith and commitment to regionalism could be sustained only by taking a 'higher view' of history. Burnham in particular recognised the urgency of the movement and the necessity for action. At the 1967 Conference of Heads of Government of Commonwealth Caribbean countries, Burnham, then Prime Minister of a newly independent Guyana, urged that the imperative for integration must supersede any problems real or imagined:

We cannot start off with some ideal or perfect management. Neither can we hope to be so prescient of the future as to be able to determine all the consequences and difficulties of integration. We can, and must, of course, try to analyse and anticipate as best as we can from available data, what the effects of integration may and can be made to be, but it would be folly par excellence to wait for perfect foresight. A perfect solution to, or institution for, integration cannot be hoped for. Let us to our own selves be true. These are the facts. This is the naked truth, either we integrate, or we perish, unwept, unhonoured.

The new arrangements for Caribbean integration were substantially different from those which had characterised the Federation. The Federation as an imposition had ignored the intellectual leaders of the region and taken no account of public opinion. The new Caribbean leaders eschewed any idea of a supra-national authority and sought to advance the economic development of the region. Their efforts led to the creation of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) of 1968 and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. A Free Trade Area of three became a full-fledged Community of twelve. A Secretariat and a Regional Development Bank were established. The signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas on July

4, 1973, provided Williams, Burnham, Barrow and then Prime Minister of Jamaica Michael Manley an opportunity to offer their vision of the Caribbean Community.

Williams reflected on the significance of the creation of the Community:

The Treaty is a landmark on the long road to the Commonwealth-Caribbean has travelled since the dissolution of the West Indies Federation eleven years ago. We have experienced difficulties, friction, misunderstandings and tension. More than once we have faltered on the way, we have learned the hard way . . . the lessons of economic growth . . .

Burnham spoke in these terms:

I hope, I pray, I dream that the Caribbean will be able to teach the world a lesson, a lesson of how people who numbered their populations in terms of a few million can mobilise their resources for the benefit of their nation, the benefit of their region and ensure social justice, ban unemployment . . . some of us feel this as a matter of conviction, I hope that others of us will accept it as a matter of good sense and survival.

Manley made the following declaration:

We, in Jamaica, have regarded this occasion as implied in our mandate from the people of Jamaica last year. We have debated it in our Parliament, we have had full and fruitful discussions without institutional leaders about the aspects of the Common Market which we now enter upon and the Community which we are now joining, and we have explained calmly, but I hope clearly, that it is inevitable when countries from the separate posture of their sovereignty seek to create new and meaningful relationships that there must be compromise and that compromise is justified by the size of the goals we pursue.

Barrow on this occasion contented himself with a description of how the Dickenson Bay Agreement led to the Treaty of Chaguaramas. But he had shared his vision in other addresses to meetings of the Caribbean Community. He believed that the Community should be people-centred, and argued that integration had taken place at the level of the peoples of the region but the political leadership had failed to institutionalise this development. At the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of CARICOM Heads of Government held in Georgetown, Guyana, in 1986, Barrow criticised the Community for inappropriate communication practices and for what he saw as its reduction of the regional integration movement to matters exclusively related to trade.

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# 9.

## INTEGRATE OR PERISH

SECOND EDITION

# Integrate or Perish

Perspectives of the  
Heads of Government  
of the Caribbean Community  
and Commonwealth  
Caribbean Countries  
1963-2002

Edited by Kenneth O. Hall

### INTRODUCTION

RESEARCHING AND DOCUMENTING THE QUEST FOR CARIBBEAN UNITY has its difficulties as well as its rewards. The region has not distinguished itself in the care and preservation of its records. Yet, records are the foundation of history, and a society which is careless with its records will challenge its own history and risk its own future. The Caribbean is certainly one of those regions where an understanding of its past is a sine qua non for its development and the preservation of its cultural identity. There is therefore a clear need for a regional archival policy, which will ensure the preservation of important documents, their retention,

and retrieval for future Caribbean generations. Preserving the records of its past was in fact, recognized as an important objective since the Second Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean, held in Jamaica in 1964, discussed proposals by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago for 'the interchange of information on libraries, museums, archives and archaeology . . .' But this important initiative now seems to have been assigned a low priority.

In preparing the second edition of this book, I often found it difficult to locate important early speeches, documents and biographical information on some of the original leaders of the integration movement. For example, the effort required to garner information on such an important figure as

Ebenezer Joshua was quite disheartening. Yet Ebenezer Joshua helped to lay the foundation for West Indian unity and later Caribbean integration. It was only possible to complete a portrait of this Caribbean leader with the help of the Information Services of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. This is only one example. On the other hand, I have derived satisfaction from the fact that the first edition of this book, which depicts the struggle for Caribbean unity and integration, has met with good response from the Caribbean public. This can only mean that the Caribbean people have kept faith with the regional integration process and that their interest in this subject is profound and enduring.

In this edition, I seek to do two things: firstly, to include speeches which were made by the younger generation of leaders at the Conferences of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community and the inter-sessional convocations; and, secondly, to highlight the more intensely debated and complex questions arising from the acceleration of globalisation to which these leaders were constrained to respond and design solutions necessary for the progress, sustainability and prosperity of the Community.

The first edition ended with the year 1999; this volume extends the coverage to 2002. This expanded period will facilitate consideration of regional responses to the intensified phase that globalisation has entered. The significance of new developments such as the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001, is reflected in the speeches of the leaders of the Community. The rise of international terrorism and the impact of September 11 on the economies of the member states of the Community are treated as matters of urgency. Also, it is noticeable as the millennium began that the Caribbean Community confronted a rapidly changing and complex real it. Globalisation and the war on terrorism assumed the proportions of unprecedented challenges which had to be faced. The terrorist attack in New York in particular, with its economic fallout, had an immediate negative impact on the tourist industry of the region which was already experiencing a downturn. This impact is still being felt. Recent reports suggest that the tourist industry in those states where it accounts for a substantial percentage of the Gross Domestic Product has drastically declined. The leaders of the Caribbean Community met in The Bahamas at a Special Emergency Session one month after the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> to consider the consequences for the tourist industry. At that meeting, Mr. Hubert Ingraham, Prime Minister of The Bahamas, noted that the World Travel and Tourism Council had estimated that following this event travel fell by some 30 per cent.

But even as the Caribbean Community grappled with the implications and consequences of globalisation and September 11, it had to remain focused on the need to implement the Single Market and Economy, rethink and reconfigure the role of the state to take account of the need for new

forms of governance, and to reconstruct their economies to benefit from the knowledge revolution and technology in general. All of these significant issues came within the purview of the Community leaders, mostly young men who have been educated in environments and circumstances totally different from those in which their predecessors were nurtured. Although younger and schooled in a different time, their capacity for oratory and innovative thinking were no less impressive than those from whom they have taken over the mantle of leadership. In fact, the concerns and the commitment that animated and provoked the early leaders to flights of oratory have had the same effect on these younger politicians. It is evident in their speeches, and speeches in the Caribbean are not merely words on the printed page or spoken without a purpose. An outstanding characteristic is the extent to which speeches are used and have been deployed as weapons to achieve particular objectives. Dr. Eric Williams educated an entire nation with his lectures at the 'University of Woodford Square', and the younger Burnham at 'Bourda Green' was almost like a 'Joshua whose time has come'. These men, among others, were the legatees of Uriah Butler, Vere Bird Snr., and Albert Gomes. They represented a solid tradition which laid the foundation for a school of speakers whose eloquence has graced the Caribbean political scene.

A speech can be a vehicle for thought; it can also reflect the conditions in which it is delivered and indicate an underlying philosophy. The Gettysburg Address, for example, is memorable and lasting because it summed up important democratic principles and pointed the direction in which the Republican Party intended to take the American Union. The speeches and addresses delivered by West Indian statesmen and politicians during the period which preceded the establishment of the Caribbean Community and during its existence, describe succinctly important ideas and ideals. In these speeches, Heads of State and Government expressed the desire for political and psychological freedom; the determination to better the lives of the West Indian people; an abiding concern for the unity and the survival of CARICOM; doctrines based on contemporary politics and economics; a yearning for social justice; a willingness to grapple with problems thrown up by developments in the international system; a respect for democratic principles and practices; and, above all, the will to stay the course, even when the Caribbean Community encountered sharp set-backs and severe challenges to its very existence. In recent times, these addresses have been more concerned with the challenges spawned by globalisation and the opportunities offered to the states of the Community to create the conditions for development and prosperity.

The speeches of the Caribbean leaders rise to the highest level of oratory. A significant number are finely crafted as well as rich in thought and insight. Some have the quality and beauty of great literature. Read, for example, that

of the Prime Minister of Guyana, Mr. Forbes Burnham warning the Region to 'Integrate or Perish' in 1967, or that of the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. Michael Manley, in the autumn of his political years, at Grand Anse in 1989, and be persuaded of the motives and ideals of these men. The Prime Ministers of Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Saint Lucia, among others, have all demonstrated that they too are the proud inheritors of this oratorical tradition. Particularly worthy of mention are the speeches of Prime Ministers Mr. Owen Arthur, Dr. Ralph Gonsalves and Dr. Kenny Anthony on issues which are central to their concerns or field of specialisation. Mr. Arthur's pronouncements on the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the general economic condition of the region, for example, are erudite and persuasive, while Dr. Gonsalves' idea of a West Indian civilisation is compelling and attractive. In this regard too, it must be said that Dr. Anthony's recognition that technology and education or an alliance of these two powerful forces, are necessary elements for the building of the Community, constitutes forward thinking of the highest order. In fact, Caribbean leadership at the level of the Community benefitted and is benefitting from a combination of the idealistic young and the experienced mind: the return to Community affairs of Patrick Manning, and previously, Basdeo Panday, and the presence of Lester Bird have ensured continuity and stability. For them, as for their fellow Heads of State or Government, integration is an article of faith; a fact of political existence; a means of survival and a response to the imperatives of history. The younger leadership of the Community is grappling with challenges of the age of super complexity where change and transformation are so rapid that faith in the Community must be the life raft which must take them to the shore of Caribbean unity.

The West Indian public is a hard taskmaster. It often makes the highest demands of its leaders and expects the highest standards of intellect and performance. It is not surprising, therefore, that the question is sometimes asked whether the founding fathers and the early leaders of the Community could have foreseen the difficulties encountered or envisaged the onset of globalisation. Such a question is a historian's nightmare. It is one of the great 'ifs' and requires attention.

In general terms, one can say that the philosophical outlook of the founding fathers and the early leaders of the Community was shaped by a different environment and a different experience. In their time, the overwhelming consideration was the question of sovereignty, in both political and economic terms. They fought long and hard for this goal. The Community leaders of this period regarded the Community not only as an instrument for unity but as a means for consolidating the sovereignty they had won. The conception of the integration process was accordingly one which was inward-looking and one which sought to construct, defend

and protect the regional economy behind the ramparts of high tariff walls and import substitution. Indeed, all of the regional groupings at this period looked inward. It was a different conception of integration from that which now obtains. The development of the Community is now seen as requiring a more liberalised trade regime where protectionist measures are abolished and where the thrust of the activities of the Community is more driven by the need for a secure place in the changed global economy. This is called 'open integration'. Mr. Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados has put it aptly:

Where they (early leaders) were inward looking, it now falls to this generation of Caribbean leadership to reorient or focus outwards, and to strive to establish an appropriate niche for our region, individually and collectively, in a drastically changed international environment.<sup>1</sup>

In asking the question whether the Community leaders could have seen beyond their time, one is in fact asking a fundamental philosophical question as to whether human beings can anticipate developments which are likely to take place outside their conception of the prevailing political, social and economic reality. While this might be true for certain branches of learning such as engineering, it is less likely in the field of politics and economics. Yet, there are some developments that the early leaders had envisioned. They recognised the phenomenon of the increasing regionalisation of the world economy. Dr. Eric Williams, not surprisingly, had made a study of most of the extant regional arrangements in the context of the Federal negotiations.<sup>2</sup> It is interesting that in his informative autobiography *Inward Hunger: The Education of a Prime Minister*, he reveals that one of the issues that bedevilled the Federal negotiations was that of the 'free movement of people'. This is one of the fundamental issues in the creation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.

They saw too the pronounced inequities in the global economy and were aware of the critical role of information in global developments as well as the rapidity of change in the international system. Mr. Michael Manley, who can be regarded as the last of the early generation of leaders, in his pronouncements at the Grand Anse Summit in 1989, certainly gives the impression that his generation had some insight of what was to come. Let us note what he said on that occasion:

What is the further shape of the world economy? What is the nature of the historical locomotive that rushes upon us even as we speak, so that we must have an immediate task and a vision for the future.

The intellectual power of these speeches and their fine craftsmanship are good reasons for them to be shared with the Caribbean public. But

there is another and equally compelling reason. It is important to ensure that what the Caribbean statesmen and leaders have said over the years is available to our institutions, politicians, educators, opinion-makers and all those who have a vested interest in developments in the region. They can serve as guideposts to the future and a warning of what should be eschewed. An important theme in these speeches is that the achievement of Caribbean unity is greater than transient differences and disputes. Such unity is all the more necessary with the onset of globalisation. Disunity in the face of this powerful force simply cannot be an option.

Increasingly, as the decade of the 90s ended, a note of angst entered the speeches of the leaders of the Community. The younger leaders recognised that the Community had to remodel, re-focus and reposition itself to face challenges and to profit from emerging opportunities. It, therefore, had to become engaged in the information age, utilise the information economy and adjust to technological developments. Above all things, the leaders recognised the need for the urgent implementation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). As their establishment approaches, their concerns continue in relation to the former while their fears are allayed in regard to the latter. The prospect of the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have also intruded upon the consciousness of the Caribbean leaders and forced them to grapple with their implications and potential consequences.

Heads of State or Governments of the Caribbean Community make policy. They do so in the absence of a deliberative organ analogous to the European Parliament. The policies contained in their statements, speeches and addresses are the stuff of history and indicate what these Heads thought and envisioned at different stages in the evolution of the Community. At its birth and throughout its existence the Community benefited from the forward-thinking and bold vision of its leaders. Dr. Eric Williams, the former Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, for example, was not afraid to re-engineer the integration process in 1963, a year after the final collapse of the West Indies Federation. He was convinced that the gathering of forces of Caribbean history would sweep away the debris of suspicion and rancour left behind after the demise of the Federation. The other leaders, following in Dr. Williams' footsteps, lent their intellect, acumen, energies and statesmanship to the development of the integration process and the drive for Caribbean unity. When that unity was threatened in the 1980s, as a result of ideological differences among member states, the Caribbean leaders by virtue of their statesmanship succeeded in restoring harmony to the Community, and they did so in a very impressive way. From Grand Anse in 1989 to the end of the decade, decisions were taken by the Heads not only to revive the Community, but also to bring it in line with the requirements of the new millennium. But

by this time, most of the older leaders, having given yeoman service in the cause of Caribbean integration, had passed on and a new generation was about to step boldly on to the stage, and they did so at a time when political and economic forces were so potentially destabilising in their impact, that the Community was once again demanding of their leaders' new vision, new insight, new purpose and creative responses. But they understood one thing and they understood it well. As Mr. Owen Arthur has said, 'Our entire history has been the triumph of the resilience of our people in the face of overwhelming odds'.<sup>3</sup>

At the level of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, over the period in question, a spectrum of issues ranging from the political to the social and economic were discussed by the Heads and appropriate decisions taken. It is no exaggeration to say that the leaders of the Caribbean Community discussed 'everything under the sun'. The issues are a good barometer of the difficulties and challenges that had to be faced at different periods in the existence of the Community. Political subjects seem to dominate the early period, while economic matters take centre stage in the 80s and the 90s. Important social and business issues as well as issues related to democracy, formed the main topics for discussion as the century ended. With the dawn of the new millennium, terrorism, globalisation and the AIDS pandemic are the clamant issues. A selection of the issues which were analysed and considered by the Heads has been made. In some cases, there is a brief description of the background to these issues and, where necessary, some analysis.

There are three periods during which the speeches of the leaders of the Caribbean Community traced its evolution and defined the problems and difficulties for which solutions had to be found: 1963 to 1973; 1974 to 1984; and 1985 to 2002. The speeches from 1963 to 1973, are imbued with the sense of optimism and hope for the Region. The main theme of those from 1974 to 1984 is that of the effect and consequences of the world economic crisis and the response that would guarantee the survival of the Community. The ideological nature and direction of the Movement were also of primary concern. From 1985 to the end of the last century, the pre-occupation was with the changed international environment caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the appearance of new centres of political and economic power, the global nature of democracy, and the rise of the twin forces of globalisation and liberalisation, characterised by an explosion in information and the significance of technological changes.

Also, at this time, the Community had come to recognise that globalisation was not without its problems. While it benefited the advanced states of the Western World and some of the newly industrialised Asian countries, it proved also to be a great disruptive force for small economies. Caribbean governments were soon to find out that if benefits were to be

obtained, they would have to be fought for with vigour and determination. Globalisation also dramatised the inequities between the rich and poor nations and, in some cases, played havoc with the mono-cultural economies of small states and their social and cultural life.

Globalisation in this period also exhibited its darker side. September 11, 2001 demonstrated that technology in the form of the instant transfer of financial resources and money, and the ability to enable small groups to organise effectively over great distances, can bring about catastrophic results. The attack on the centre of capitalism in the United States, the World Trade Center, and the symbol of American might, the Pentagon in Washington, has unleashed forces with which the world is still trying to cope. In the aftermath, there has been a paradigm shift in the American approach to dealing with the rest of the world. Their priority is now to fight terrorism. Globalisation, while not discounted, has taken a back seat to new doctrines such as 'regime change', pre-emptive strikes and the primacy of military power.

As a consequence, the world now faces the new reality of a United States, led by a Republican president, who has embarked on a mission to reshape the world in keeping with a geo-political design aimed at promoting and defending US political and economic interests. The relationship between America and the rest of the world is largely determined by the response of states to the American objective of eliminating terrorism. This development compounds challenges facing the member states of the Caribbean Community that have already suffered a major blow to one of its major industries, namely tourism. It is in these circumstances that the Community has had to seek a solution to the difficulties caused by the rise of terrorism and the need to combat it, in order to maintain the integrity of the integration process.

## **BACKGROUND**

The first major step taken in the twentieth century to forge unity out of the constituent political elements in the region came in the form of the West Indies Federation which lasted only four years (1958–1962). The experiment failed for a number of reasons. Suffice it to say, the primary reasons were the rival conceptions of the Federation, disagreement among the West Indian leaders, and claims of national independence. The fact that the Federation was an imposition by the British government, and therefore, not rooted in the history and political culture of the region, undermined any possibility of its survival. When Jamaica left in 1961, after a referendum on the issue, followed by Trinidad and Tobago, the Federation entered a terminal phase.

The Federation had begun inauspiciously. Mr. Norman Manley and Sir Alexander Bustamante in Jamaica and Dr. Eric Williams in Trinidad and Tobago refused to contest the federal elections, diminishing any credibility the elections might have possessed. The 1958 elections in themselves were a harbinger of the debacle of the federal experiment. The West Indies Federal Labour Party (WIFLP), Norman Manley's Party, which was supported by Dr. Williams, did not have a clear majority at the polls. The Democratic Labour Party (DLP) led by Alexander Bustamante, opposed the WIFLP. Votes in the Eastern Caribbean enabled the WIFLP to assume leadership in the Federal Parliament. This majority, however, made no difference. The confusion and apathy which attended the birth of the Federation is succinctly captured by Professor Christoph Müllerleile:

Efforts of integration were marked by an absolute lack of enthusiasm or interest of the population for the new creation. Ignorance provided space for demagoguery and misinformation. In Barbados, the planters told the farm workers that Federation meant the re-introduction of slavery. But many Barbadians said that Federation meant they would get money or land or both.<sup>4</sup>

### **New Thrust Towards Integration**

The dissolution of the Federation represented the end of an important phase in the history of Caribbean integration but it was certainly not the end of the quest for unity. As most of the Caribbean States moved towards independence, there was a growing recognition of the need for a renewed regional integration movement. Dr. Eric Williams was the driving force in this renewed effort at integration. This represented a major change from his previous statement that 1 from 10 leaves nothing, to the recognition that a fragmented Caribbean was a danger to itself.

Speeches at this time by the major political figures highlighted the need for resuscitation. Dr. Eric Williams, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, with his keen sense of history, and despite his refusal to participate in the Federal elections, was conscious of this need and acted with dispatch. In 1963, a year after the collapse of the Federation, he took advantage of the mechanism of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean to advance the cause of integration.

Dr. Williams was not alone in his quest for Caribbean integration. Other leaders had also recognised that the Caribbean could not find its way in the world unless it was united and armed with a purpose as it pursued its goals and objectives in a modern and rapidly changing international environment.

Dr. Williams explained his purpose in his address at the Fifth Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean held in Trinidad in February 1969:

From the humble beginning in July 1963, when the Prime Ministers of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago and the Premiers of Barbados and British Guiana met in Port-of-Spain, this Conference had now become an institution truly representative of all Commonwealth Caribbean territories, inclusive of Belize and The Bahamas

He noted that the First Meeting of this kind (in July 1963) 'took place under the shadow of the frustration and suspicion brought about by the breakup of the Federation'. The house of Caribbean unity and integration was being rebuilt. The then Prime Minister of Guyana, Mr. Forbes Burnham, a committed integrationist, recognised the significance of the initiative taken by Dr. Williams. Boldness, he felt, had governed his efforts to revive the integration movement. At the same Conference, he complimented Dr. Eric Williams in the following terms: 'It required some courage to have thought of the idea, let alone formulated it immediately after the breakup of the West Indies Federation'.

The exchanges at the various Heads of Government Conferences of the Commonwealth Caribbean, the analyses carried out, together with the compelling logic of integration and unity, pointed to the creation of a Regional Economic Movement. If the international situation provided the urgency, the conviction of the leaders supplied the motive. As the speeches of this period clearly indicate, unity and integration, in view of the many regional blocs being created around the world, was an imperative.

In the July 1963 Conference, Dr. Eric Williams addressed the need for the English-speaking Caribbean to unite in the face of other emerging economic groupings:

As our countries achieve Independence or proceed to Independence, we enter into a World dominated increasingly by Regional Groupings, both economic and political. Western Europe has succeeded, Africa is succeeding, and efforts are being made to translate the political association in the Western Hemisphere into Regional Economic Groupings – the Latin American Free Trade Area and the Central American Common Market. Small countries like ours encounter great difficulty in establishing their influence in a world dominated by power and Regional Associations.

At the Fourth Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, which took place in Barbados, in October 1967, Mr. Hugh Shearer, the then Prime Minister of Jamaica, expressed apprehension over Britain's expected entry into the European Common Market:

Britain's contemplated entry into the European Common Market raises many perplexing questions for the future of our preferential markets in that country

for basic agricultural crops with heavy labour, intensive content and foreign exchange revenue earning capacity.

Dr. Williams referred to this development at the Fifth Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean in Trinidad in February 1969 as follows:

The most developed nations of the World are today grouping together for economic, social, and political reasons.

It was in this context that the Caribbean leaders articulated their concern over the possible negative consequences for their economic future as a result of Britain's entry into the then European Economic Community (EEC).

The foregoing economic considerations, the hold placed on immigration by the major Western countries, and the accumulation of major socio-economic problems attendant upon the attainment of Independence constrained the Caribbean states to seek solutions to all of these questions in the context of a regional integration movement.

### **THE VISION OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY**

The efforts of Dr. Eric Williams inspired and reinforced those of Mr. Burnham and Mr. Barrow in particular. The latter two Caribbean leaders had met with Mr. Vere Bird of Antigua in 1965 and under the terms of the Dickenson Bay Agreement had come out boldly in favour of a regional integration movement. The Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIF-TA) was born in 1968, and succeeded by the Caribbean Community in 1973. It was the culmination of a long historical process. Dr. Williams said as much on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Chaguaramas:

The Treaty is a landmark on the long road the Commonwealth Caribbean has travelled since the dissolution of the West Indies Federation eleven years ago. We have experienced difficulties, frictions, misunderstandings and tensions. More than once we have faltered on the way, we have learned the hard way the lessons of economic growth in developing countries: growth without development; growth accompanied by imbalances and distortions; growth generated from outside rather than within; growth without the fullest possible use of our resources – human, financial and natural; growth dependent on foreign technology; growth measured by the level of imported consumer goods and tastes; growth associated with the importation of raw materials which can be suspended at source without notice on the goodwill of foreign trade unions; growth implying subservience of the elected government to a multi-national corporation.

On the same occasion, the Prime Minister of Guyana, Mr. Forbes Burnham, also outlined his vision of Caribbean unity:

I hope, I pray, I dream that the Caribbean will be able to teach the world a lesson, a lesson of how people who numbered their populations in terms of a few millions can mobilise their resources for the benefit of their nations, the benefit of their region, and ensure social justice, ban unemployment . . . Some of us feel this as a matter of conviction, I hope that others of us will accept it as a matter of good sense and survival.

The Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. Michael Manley, said that the integration of the Caribbean was a goal that must be pursued:

We, in Jamaica, have regarded this occasion as implied in our mandate from the people of Jamaica last year. We have debated it in our Parliament, we have had full and fruitful discussions with our institutional leaders about the aspects of the Common Market which we now enter upon and the Community which we are now joining, and we have explained calmly, but I hope clearly, that it is inevitable when countries from the separate posture of their sovereignty seek to create new and meaningful relationships that there must be compromise and that compromise is justified by the size of the goal which you pursue.

The former Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Errol Barrow, who was well known in his lifetime for his commitment to Caribbean integration, had a vision of the Community that was people-centred. He was convinced that the 'collective wisdom' of the Caribbean people was more valuable in a certain sense than other factors which made for unity and integration. He was of the view that unless the peoples of the region understood the purpose of all regional institutions, integration would become more difficult process. Addressing the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community which took place in Georgetown, Guyana in July 1986, he explained his position:

The promise of the regional integration movement, even in the area of trade, cannot be realised unless we find new ways of communicating to the mass of our people the meaning and purpose of all our regional institutions, and that's one reason (if no other could be found) why the University must move from the confines of the campus more and more into the heart of the communities which constitute our Region. This battle of communication in defence of the unity of the Region must be won if our efforts during this week and hitherto are to survive beyond the confines of conferences.

It is usual to attribute the creation and development of the Caribbean integration movement to the politicians and statesmen of the region. However, one member of the business community has a different point of

view and has lamented the fact that '... The business community has played its part (in the creation of CARIFTA and CARICOM) and ... this has never been formally acknowledged by Governments.'<sup>5</sup> As Mr. Ken Gordon tells it, the business community, motivated by a concern with the 'development of a national economy', organised missions to the region in the 60s and 70s. The results of these missions stimulated an interest in the integration movement. Interestingly enough, Mr. Gordon observes that when the mission to the region began, '... many of the leaders of the government were not even speaking to each other.' Meetings with leaders of the region were positive, including that with Dr. Eric Williams 'who was also initially coy, (but) readily warmed up once he heard that Jamaica had agreed to meet.' 'Reports were made to all governments and it was recommended that the Caribbean leaders should meet under the chairmanship of Mr. Forbes Burnham. 'The Guyanese leader, never slow to act decisively took the necessary steps to convene the meeting. This led to the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA), later to become the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as we know it.'<sup>7</sup> This is interesting light thrown on the integration process, and it provokes the thought that whereas the business community was instrumental in forging unity among Caribbean states in the early period, the current business community seems less motivated in respect of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME).

But even as the Caribbean Community came into being, the small states of the integration movement or the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) as they are termed, which had suffered a political and psychological impact as a result of the collapse of the Federation, had apprehensions as well as justified expectations of the Caribbean Community. The Prime Minister of Saint Lucia, Mr. John Compton, was reported in the *Trinidad Express* of July 16, 1974, to have said that the relationship between the larger and small states of the Community was the same as that between 'sharks and sardines'. In his statement to the Inaugural Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in July 1974, he referred to the mischief irresponsible reporting can create and noted that the report was based on an interview long forgotten. He expressed the hope that his explanation would lay to rest any misunderstanding. This statement has not received the prominence it deserves. <sup>8</sup>There was also an expectation that the new integration movement would serve the interests of the smaller states. When the Inaugural Meeting of the Expanded Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community took place in July 1974, the leaders of the LDCs expressed their hopes and expectation of the Community.

Mr. George Walter, Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda, on this occasion, saw the Community as an instrument for accelerated development and a re-orientation of attitudes.

. . . The general principle behind the Caribbean Community must be the accelerated economic development of our people, a re-orientation of our traditional attitudes to look outwards, but instead to look within the Region first for solutions, the narrowing of income differentials within the society and the rapid adjustment in the economic pie as between the MDCs and the LDCs in favour of the latter.

Mr. John Compton, Prime Minister of Saint Lucia at the time, referred to the fulfilment of a dream and a vision; he pleaded with the Conference:

. . . to proceed with deliberation, but with great resolve in fulfilment of the vision which they [previous leaders], all young men saw, and the dreams which in later years they dreamt – the dreams of making the people of our scattered lands into a nation striving together and achieving together.

Mr. Robert L. Bradshaw, the Premier of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, felt that the Community would make the Caribbean respected in the World and create a new Caribbean personality:

The short-point of my observations, Mr. Chairman, is that this CARICOM will exert a growing influence upon the lives of its people although they are located over vast expanses of sea and land. That influence will be an amalgam of attitudes, of thought, of economics and of psychology that together should truly liberate us, making us feel less as trespassers and more as full participants on the world's field. In a word, CARICOM will provide the dynamics to propel the new Caribbean man.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LDCS AND MDCS

The small states of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) provide a special political and economic physiognomy in the context of the Caribbean Community. This has much to do with its historical make up as well as its economic evolution.

It is ironic that the Eastern Caribbean States which were eager at the time of the Federation to seek co-operation and unity with the other Caribbean States, entered the Caribbean Community with apparent reluctance. This is easily understood. The Eastern Caribbean States, which at one time constituted one of the oldest federations in this hemisphere, felt abandoned at the time of the collapse of the West Indies Federation. This development left deep political and psychological scars. As already explained, one Prime Minister, Mr. John Compton of Saint Lucia, saw the relationship between the smaller Eastern Caribbean States and the larger ones as one between 'sharks and sardines'.

The concerns of the smaller states of the Caribbean Community range from the question of size to the benefits they expected to derive from the integration process. Their conception of what was to be expected is worth recording. Dr. Kennedy Simmonds, Prime Minister of St. KittsNevis, for example, at the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community which was held in Grenada in 1989, referred to the constraint on the ability of the LDCs to take advantage of the Community because of their size:

The issue of size differential assumes monumental importance in the context of the Common Market, where every attempt is being made to remove inter-regional, (sic) trade barriers. The stark reality is that the constraints of relatively small size significantly hamper many of the smaller countries in their quest to take advantage of the increased market potential created by free trading capabilities of many countries in the LDCs . . .

The fruits of integration, quite naturally, were of concern to the smaller Caribbean states and this was articulated by the Chief Minister of Montserrat, Mr. John Osborne, at the Sixth Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community in Barbados in July 1985:

CARICOM must earn the goodwill of all its constituent territories. This is only possible if all are allowed to taste the fruits of integration. More especially, I am indicating that we must aim at a more equitable sharing of the benefits derived from integration. We must reduce wide gaps and disparities and ultimately abandon the concept of MDCs and LDCs.

Questions of size and the benefits of integration were linked to considerations of equality and dignity of the Eastern Caribbean states. The determination to be independent and free was expressed by Sir Eric Gairy, Prime Minister of Grenada, at the Fifth Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries when in providing an insight into the philosophy of 'associated status' he said:

We are a group of people conscious of our handicap in the development states. We are a group of people proud to belong to the West Indian heritage. We see our destiny as being unmistakably entwined with our other Caribbean partners, but in the same breath, I must warn that we are a people with dignity and a feeling of equality. Although historical circumstances have forced us into a grant-in-aid complex, we are now determined to extricate ourselves from the role of international beggars. We want by God's blessings to lift ourselves up by our bootstraps to take our place as equal members of the Caribbean Fraternity.

These interests and concerns articulated by the LDCs were often defended by the then Prime Minister of Guyana, Mr. Forbes Burnham. At the 1967 Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean in Barbados, he noted: 'It has been urged upon us the necessity of taking into account, during the course of our deliberations, the peculiar interests of those who have just joined us'.

The Treaty of Chaguaramas did take special account of the interests of the LDCs and created a special regime to ensure their development. But it is interesting that Mr. Burnham considered that the distinction between the LDCs and MDCs was artificial. He had hoped at the Inaugural Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Expanded Caribbean Community at Castries, Saint Lucia in 1974:

. . . that one of the things that would inspire our deliberations during the course of (this meeting) would be a preparedness to obliterate those unrealistic differences between the More Developed and Less Developed . . . I think that we should do away with these euphemisms and face the fact the entire Region represents an undeveloped or developing region in the world.

Contemporary reports on the progress of the Eastern Caribbean States into the Caribbean Community tell of many difficulties, mostly of a constitutional and political nature. For example, the Guyana Chronicle of June 14, 1974 described the late-night talks between the then Prime Minister, Mr. Forbes Burnham, and Mr. George Walter, premier of Antigua. Mr. Walter had said at the time that the Eastern Caribbean Common Market countries (ECCM) should form a 'fifth bloc' in CARICOM. He had previously argued that 'the smallest states had no place in CARICOM individually unless they were prepared to resign themselves to being led.' The then Foreign Minister of Guyana, Sir Shridath Ramphal, and Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community, Mr. William Demas, also brought their considerable experience and influence to bear on this situation. History records the success of their endeavours, but it also highlights the initial problems.

Previously, Premier of St. Kitts, Mr. Robert Bradshaw had withdrawn from the signing ceremony of the Treaty of Chaguaramas in April of 1974 because the British Government had insisted that he sign the Treaty only in the name of St. Kitts-Nevis and not that of Anguilla. Anguilla had opted for separation and after its attempt at secession in 1968 had come directly under British rule. Overcoming the difficulties described, illustrates the obstacles initially faced by the CARICOM leaders in getting the Eastern Caribbean States into the Caribbean Community, but it is also true to say that the leaders of the Community went the extra mile to ensure the membership of all six of the Eastern Caribbean states. Here is a snapshot of their efforts:

‘Immediately after the walk-out, other leaders huddled with Bradshaw in a small room of Saint Lucia’s Parliament building in an apparent attempt to change his mind’.<sup>9</sup>

The differences between the More Developed Countries (MDCs) and the LDCs were accentuated with the onset of the world economic crisis in 1973. Factors such as protectionism and the contraction of interregional markets, which arose from this circumstance, constrained the Eastern Caribbean States to launch a sub-regional grouping, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) on 18 June 1981. Several factors propelled the OECS in this direction: a common currency, common security interests, and the need for shared representation and greater co-ordination of their activities within the integration movement.

Many of its larger members had to take corrective measures, which the LDCs considered as detrimental to their interests. Their representatives complained about this at several meetings of the Community.

The OECS enjoyed a more settled relationship with the larger Caribbean community at the end of the 1980s and throughout the 90s, but during this period, the sub-regional grouping took a number of important measures not only to boost its relationship with the other member states of the Caribbean Community but also to prepare itself for the challenges of the new millennium. In 1991, the OECS Heads agreed to the creation of an OECS Single Market (OSM). The Single Market is intended to integrate all of the markets across the sub-region in order to create a single economic space. It attempts to rationalise the economic space the OECS occupies in terms of the functioning of the Eastern Caribbean Common Market. There will be free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. To facilitate this movement and to accelerate the economic development of the sub-region, macro-economic policy will be coordinated and harmonised.

The OECS has forged ahead in the areas of the free movement of people, a common currency, an Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB). Recently, there have been discussions in respect of a political union. In other words, the OECS seems to have tightened the bonds of unity and in some senses can be regarded as enjoying greater unity than the rest of the Caribbean Community.

The OECS has also taken steps to co-ordinate its external economic relations with the rest of the Caribbean Community through the mechanism of the Trade Negotiating Group (TNG). This institution relates to the RNM and co-ordinates the relevant activities.

## TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY

Regional and national sovereignty is significant in both political and economic terms. Reduction in the extent of territory of any given state in the Community is likely to have strategic, political and economic consequences. President of Guyana, Mr. Forbes Burnham, at the Third Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in 1982 referred to the fact that should Guatemala succeed in its claims against Belize, and Venezuela against Guyana, then CARICOM would have lost sixty per cent of its geographical territory. Mr. Burnham did not have to elaborate on the implications and consequences of such an eventuality. It was clear that he thought that such a reduction in the landmass of the Community would be an obstacle to an optimum process of integration.<sup>10</sup>

But concern with the threat to the territory of the constituent states of the English-speaking Caribbean region and the region as a whole, was given early consideration in the councils of the Community. This concern translated into policy decisions to support the member states of Guyana and Belize in their struggle to protect their territorial integrity and sovereignty.

In the case of Guyana, a controversy had arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitration Award of 1899, which settled the borders between the two countries, was null and void. Venezuela's claim to two-thirds of Guyana's territory was dormant until the approach of the latter's independence. Venezuela revived its claim and the relationship between the newly independent Guyana and its western neighbour became less harmonious. From the time Caracas objected to investment in the Essequibo region to the refusal to renew the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in 1982, relations between Guyana and Venezuela were acrimonious. It is noteworthy that it was the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago who brokered the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in 1970 which froze the controversy between Guyana and Venezuela for 12 years. This gave Guyana valuable breathing space to pursue developmental and other tasks.<sup>11</sup>

The Government of Guyana has always regarded the Caribbean Community as its first line of diplomatic defence. Accordingly, as early as the February 1969, Fifth Heads of Government Conference of the Commonwealth Caribbean held in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, the then Prime Minister, Mr. Forbes Burnham, sounded the alarm in relation to the threat posed by Venezuela.

Guatemala had laid claim to the entire Belizean territory. The dispute between Guatemala and Belize arose from the latter's contention that after Latin American countries became independent from Spain in 1821, they established the rule that the boundaries of the new republics would be the same as when the territories were ruled by Spain. Guatemala argued that Belize had been part of Spanish territory. The British Government refused

to accept this proposition: it claimed that it had been in control of the area before 1821 and this doctrine could not therefore apply to Belize. The Anglo Guatemalan Treaty of 1859 declared the boundaries of an area governed by Britain. Guatemala's point of view, developed after the Treaty was signed, was that this constituted a cession of territory by which it gave up its right to land. Claims to Belize by Guatemala throughout the 1970s delayed the former's independence, which was not achieved until 1981.<sup>12</sup>

Belize has also found support and diplomatic succour within the councils of the early integration movement and the Caribbean Community. As Mr. Burnham did in the early years after Guyana's independence when Venezuela's claim to its territory persisted, Belize also signalled to the region the threat posed to its territorial integrity and sovereignty by the Government of Guatemala. For example, in 1967, at its Fourth Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference of the Commonwealth Caribbean held in Bridgetown, Barbados, Mr. George Price, Prime Minister of Belize, drew the attention of his colleagues to the implications of the claim of Guatemala to the entire territory of Belize.

The Caribbean Community was to announce a significant doctrine at its Eighth Heads of Government Conference of the Commonwealth Caribbean held in Georgetown, Guyana in July 1973. This doctrine in effect stated that the preservation of the independence of the member states of the integration movement was a pre-condition for the attainment of the objective of the Community. It therefore proceeded to pass a resolution entitled: 'Mutual Assistance against External Aggression' which recognised, among other things, ' . . . that the political independence and territorial integrity of Member States are essential prerequisites of the achievement of the economic objectives of the Community . . .' The text of that resolution, which was sponsored by Barbados, is important enough for it to be given in extension:

The Governments of the independent Commonwealth Caribbean States, conscious of the commitment of their Governments to the establishment of the Caribbean Community and mindful that the political independence and territorial integrity of Member States are essential prerequisites to the achievement of the economic objectives of the Community gave attention to the need for a regime of mutual assistance against external aggression directed against any Member of the Community. They referred to the Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers to be established under the Community Treaty, the preparation of such a scheme of mutual assistance designed to secure the political independence and territorial integrity of Member States of the Community and the safety and well-being of their peoples.

This doctrine impelled the Community to make a number of significant declarations with regard to the preservation of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of both Guyana and Belize. For example, at the Third Summit

of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Ocho Rios, Jamaica in 1982, resolutions were adopted which indicated strong support for both Belize and Guyana. In the case of the former, the Conference welcomed the attainment of Belize's independence and 'reaffirmed its support' for its 'territorial integrity'. Signifying the source of the problem, it 'regretted that Guatemala has reneged on its agreement to abandon its claim to all territory of Belize and refuses to accept the status of Belize as an independent State.' Efforts were to be intensified 'to guarantee the security of Belize'.

Guyana, having kept the Community abreast of the threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty and the implication of that threat, especially in economic terms, was also a beneficiary of the deliberations of the Third Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community. The relevant resolution, expressing its concern for the sanctity of treaties and demarcated boundaries, reads as follows:

Recalling its concern for the sanctity of treaties and for defined and demarcated boundaries, the Conference noted the grave effect that this controversy is having on the relations between CARICOM States and Venezuela and took note of the unqualified undertaking given by the Venezuelan Government to eschew the use of force as a means of settling the controversy. The Conference also called upon Venezuela to desist from further action or threats of action likely to affect the economic development of Guyana.

The Conference urged Guyana and Venezuela to continue their pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the controversy, in accordance with the terms of the Geneva Agreement of 1966, so as to arrive at a final decision as promptly as possible.

This section could be completed by referring to the sterling work of the Community in defusing tension between two member states, Guyana and Suriname, which had arisen as a result of the expulsion by Suriname of an oil rig, for which Guyana had issued a license, from an area claimed by both countries. The source of this problem is an undefined maritime boundary. Mediation undertaken by the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. P. J. Patterson, played a part in reducing the acrimony and misunderstanding between the two countries, even though the original issue remains unsettled. The Prime Minister of St. Kitts and Nevis, Dr. Denzil Douglas, referred to the 'tolerance and restraint' displayed by both parties to the disputes and expressed his fervent hope . . . that "an equitable and lasting solution awaits in the not-too-distant future."<sup>13</sup>

## ECONOMIC CRISIS

The world economic crisis of the early 1980s is regarded as the worst since the 1930s, a view to which the 1981 United Nations (UNCTAD) Report subscribed.<sup>14</sup> It came at the worst possible moment for the recently created Caribbean Community. In the words of Dr. Kurleigh King, a former Secretary-General of CARICOM, 'the ink was hardly dry on the signatures of the Treaty when the full force of the international economic crisis struck the bottom out of everything we had hoped to accomplish'.<sup>15</sup> Triggered by major increases in the price of oil, first in 1973 and later in 1979, the crisis was to have a devastating effect on the small vulnerable and open economies of the member states of the Caribbean Community. Dreams of economic progress, nationally and within the context of the Caribbean Community, had to be deferred. It was virtually a season of postponed hopes. Member States of the Caribbean Community, such as Guyana and Jamaica, crippled by rising debts, budget deficits, balance of payment difficulties, and increased cost of living, took measures to keep their economies afloat which brought them into collision with other member states, such as Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad, an oil producing state, was noticeably insulated from these problems.

The disagreement between Dr. Williams and Michael Manley over the construction and location of two proposed CARICOM aluminium smelters and a general sense of disarray put a brake on regional development. National and regional economies suffered. It was only after the 1984 Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Nassau, The Bahamas, that the regional economies appeared to settle down and some sense of balance was restored following some policy adjustments.

Differences among the leaders led to a situation where they were unwilling to meet. And while the Community continued to function at different levels, there was no Summit Conference of the Heads for seven years. When the Heads convened, at Ocho Rios in Jamaica in 1982, the world economic crisis was the principal item on the agenda. Consideration was given to the impact of the crisis on the economies of member states. The addresses on this occasion are studded with references to economic difficulties and the need for structural adjustment.

Mr. George Chambers, the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, was to capture this theme at the Fourth Summit when the Heads held a second convocation seven months after the Ocho Rios Conference on its 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary. Having referred to the fact that 'the economies of member states of the Community have been battered by adverse forces of prolonged recession in the world economy', the Trinidadian Prime Minister captured the essence of the crisis in these terms:

We live in an era in which:

- unemployment is at a level higher than at any period since the early 1930s; business failures have become a regular feature of economic life in both developed and developing countries;
- protectionism is rampant and increasing, wreaking its greatest economic toll on the poor and newly emergent states;
- crippling debt burdens overwhelm most developing countries, constricting market growth;
- the number of absolute poor continues to grow, threatening to exceed 800 million by the turn of the century;
- growth rates have been low or negative, world-wide;
- the flow of resources, through official development assistance, the international lending agencies and the private capital market, is dwindling;
- political instability, to which small states are particularly vulnerable, is on the increase and is posing a serious challenge to democratic systems;
- superimposed on all this is the arms race, with the obscene growth in expenditure on weapons of mass destruction in excess of 500 billion US dollars per annum.

These are the harsh realities which must inform the decisions we take at this Conference.

This quotation gives a historical snapshot that sums up the degree and intensity of the economic problems facing the Caribbean Community at the time: unemployment, business failures, protectionism, low or negative growth rates, political instability and superimposed on all this was the arms race.

Prime Minister of Jamaica, Mr. Edward Seaga, at the Fourth Summit, summarised the nature of the difficulties confronting member states in these words:

CARICOM is being tested in a crucible of crises which are a reflection of the severe economic problems which are being experienced by all Member countries leading each of us to the inevitable moment when we must face some hard realities.

The considerable economic difficulties faced by the region were not the only source of discomfort and strain imposed on the Community. The differences in the ideological orientation of the respective governments of the Community were to prove equally testing. Indeed, a combination of these problems was to challenge the Community in a very fundamental way because their resolution was crucial to the long-term success and sustainability of the integration movement.

## IDEOLOGICAL PLURALISM

Ideological pluralism became a controversial issue for the Caribbean Community in the 1980s. A number of governments had embraced the philosophy of Marxism/Leninism in various ways. This had challenged the political orthodoxy of the region. The leaders of the region had devised the concept of ideological pluralism in an attempt to balance these opposed and contending doctrines. Serious efforts were made to find a solution to this problem although they did not have the support of most Caribbean leaders. The report by a Group of Caribbean Experts on 'The Caribbean Community in the 1980s' regarded ideological pluralism as a shield 'against enforced sameness'. The Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers at their Meeting in Saint Lucia in 1980 and the Ocho Rios Summit in 1982 also sought a way out of this difficulty.

Several Heads of the Caribbean Community could not subscribe to the belief that ideological pluralism was 'an irreversible factor of international relations'. They were openly hostile to the idea. For Mr. Tom Adams, the then Prime Minister of Barbados, ideological pluralism meant, 'we can no longer hope to achieve one of the goals of the founders of CARICOM which is to maintain a co-ordinated foreign policy'.<sup>16</sup> Not surprisingly, Mr. Edward Seaga, who had come to power in reaction to the leftward trend in Caribbean politics, argued strongly that ideological pluralism 'should not be the excuse under which we tolerate the violation of essential human rights by such means as detention without charge or trial and the elimination of free speech through the suppression of the independent press'.<sup>17</sup> The issue for him was democracy. Mr. Seaga therefore urged the Community to agree 'that no system be found acceptable to us which is not chosen by citizens in an election that is free and fair, and free from fear'.<sup>18</sup>

The simmering ideological differences burst into the open. The defeat of the Grenada Revolution seems to have removed any ambiguity in the approach to ideological pluralism. The view was expressed that some Caribbean governments would no longer find it possible to work with those to the left of the political spectrum. Mr. Herbert Blaize, who had become prime minister after the Grenadian Revolution had destroyed itself, spoke in the plainest of terms:

My Government will not find it too difficult to work within CARICOM with Governments which have different ideology philosophies. The question for us is not one of ideological pluralism but constitutional compatibility. Once we all must respond to public opinion in our individual territories and once free and fair elections constitute our power base, Grenada will be prepared to compromise to promote regional unity.<sup>19</sup>

Mr. John Compton, the Prime Minister of Saint Lucia, delivered himself of these words which carry a note of finality about the concept of ideological pluralism. He stated:

We no longer indulge in such intellectual sophistry as 'ideological pluralism'. . . All our countries now adhere to our sacred tradition of democratically elected governments.<sup>20</sup>

After the destruction of the Grenada Revolution, the region seemed to have returned to a consensus about its ideological orientation. There was certainly ideological convergence among member states after 'the effects of debt and adjustment in the 1980s', the suppression of the Grenada revolution coupled with 'the collapse of socialist experiments in Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada and the end of the Cold War'.<sup>21</sup>

The bitterness and suspicion generated by the pursuit of different ideological doctrines and systems must not be underestimated. One indication of the strength of feeling on this issue, was the threat that a second CARICOM would be created which would allow for the separation of the states of the Community on an ideological basis.

## **SURVIVAL OF CARICOM**

By the middle of the 1980s, the crisis in the Community, both political and economic, threatened to overwhelm it, but stronger and wiser minds had determined that this situation should not defeat the purpose of integration and unity. Mr. Vere Bird, from the height of his experience and statesmanship, admonished the leaders of the Community: 'If I were to make an appeal to each of you today it would be not to waste an experience of forty years of anguish'<sup>22</sup>

The urgency of the economic crisis facing the Community and the imperatives of survival combined to push the Community in a direction which would ensure its survival. The leaders of the Community recognised that the time had come for CARICOM to be reinvented. The Community had to overcome its problems and prepare itself for new challenges. The world was again on the cusp of major transformations.

There were various straws in the wind. Major changes were occurring in the Soviet Union and regionalism seemed to have gained a new lease on life with the creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and the decision of the European Economic Community (EEC) to dismantle all tariffs by 1992 and create a single market. The time for action had come.

It is a tribute to the leaders of the Community and their capacity to adjust to change and the requirements for the survival of the Community as well as their understanding of the workings of the international environment

that in an eight-year period – 1984-1992 – they had led the Community along the path of structural adjustment, adopted the measures that would begin the process for the establishment of a CARICOM Single Market and Economy, facilitated a thorough examination of the political and economic foundations of the Community based on studies carried out by regional experts, and generally restructured the Community to meet the challenges of a changed environment. But these efforts and initiatives were not often crowned with success. The Food Plan, the CARICOM Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF) and the proposed Fisheries Project did not succeed.

But it was not simply a question of reviving the Community in political, economic, social and in physical terms. There was also the dimension of the need to tap into the more than 300-year history of the Community to find sources of optimism and hope. The 1980s had been a lost decade and the leaders and the people of the region knew it. There had to be a revival which took account of all of the factors that make up Caribbean life. This fact was recognised by the Group of Caribbean Experts when they observed that:

CARICOM is just not a product of regional economic planning. Responsive as it is to the economic and political realities of the post-war world, Caribbean regionalism is the outgrowth of more than 300 years of West Indian kinship – the vagaries of the socio-economic political history of a transplanted people from which is evolving a Caribbean identity.<sup>23</sup>

The need to understand the soul of the region was echoed in an address by the first female Prime Minister of the region, Dame Eugenia Charles of Dominica. She emphasised that the people of the region must understand the significance and purpose of CARICOM. Its reality and potential must be recognised. The leaders and the peoples of the region ‘must see beyond the trials and errors and see CARICOM as an article of faith – an ideal, not sterile, but vibrant and meaningful.’<sup>24</sup>

So armed with an understanding of the importance of the regional integration movement, the Caribbean leaders of the 1980s sought to restore intra-regional trade, unite the Community after a period of acrimony, and prepare the ground for an accommodation with a radically transformed world and one in which the Caribbean Community would have to look outward in order to survive and prosper. New factors had entered the scene. Issues of drug trafficking, the environment, the revolution in technology and information dissemination, added to the challenges facing the region. But above all, there was the emergence of the politics of economic regionalism. This latter issue was remarked upon by the then President of Guyana, Mr. Hugh Desmond Hoyte:

The major challenge to us is being posed by the emergence of the politics of the economic regionalism. Large and powerful economic blocs are being formed or being further strengthened in all parts of the world. We are witnessing this trend in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America, the Pacific. For us in the Caribbean the two most dramatic exchanges that are likely to have far-reaching implications for our economies are the decisions of Canada and the United States to convert the continent of North America into a huge free trade area and that of the European Economic Community to dismantle all tariff barriers in 1992 and create a giant single market.<sup>25</sup>

The North American Free Trade Area and the growing realisation of a global economy were responses to the emergence of globalisation. This issue had compelled the Community, as was stated before, to reinvent and reposition itself. It is the dominant question of modern international economic relations. It therefore merits detailed examination.

### **Globalisation and the Challenges of the New Millennium**

The collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of the 1980s accelerated the factors which led to globalisation.<sup>26</sup> This phenomenon cannot be ignored by any state or group of states or regional entity pursuing national objectives within the existing international system. The Caribbean Community is no exception. Indeed, as early as 1989 when the leaders of the Community met in Grand Anse, they initiated a process leading to the reconstruction of the Community in political, social and economic terms to meet the challenges unleashed by the forces of globalisation. By this time a new generation of Caribbean leaders was poised to preside over the future of the Caribbean Community. There emerged, for example, Mr. Basdeo Panday, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago; Mr. Owen Arthur, Prime Minister of Barbados; Dr. Kenny Anthony, Prime Minister of Saint Lucia; Dr. Denzil Douglas, Prime Minister of Dominica; Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Dr. Keith Mitchell, Prime Minister of Grenada and Mr. Said Musa, Prime Minister of Belize. These leaders, in some ways tempered by a different political, economic and social environment, namely, the era of globalisation, are, in the words of Vere Cornwall Bird, 'the inheritors of a formula for Caribbean survival which lies in the fundamental recognition that our strength is in our unity'.

However, before any attempt is made to look at the response of the Community to globalisation, and what has been said by these current leaders on this subject, it is necessary to attempt to describe the nature of this all-encompassing phenomenon.

## Opportunities of the New Millennium

Caribbean leaders such as the Barbados Prime Minister, Mr. Owen Arthur, have acknowledged that the Caribbean Community faces major challenges in the twenty-first century. But they are equally certain that these challenges are not without their opportunities. The Prime Minister of Belize, Mr. Said Musa, observed at the Twentieth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, which was held in Trinidad and Tobago on 4 July 1999: 'Through CARICOM we must aim to be progressively better equipped to snatch benefits from the changes being thrust upon us'.

The period 1985 to 1999 saw the Caribbean Community preparing itself for the challenges of the new millennium. After the onset of the crisis of the 1970s and 80s, it responded by examining the very foundations of the Community and commissioned studies to ensure the Community's survival. The most important of these studies were the Group of Experts

Caribbean Report (1981), the Bourne Commission Report (1988) and the Report of the West Indian Commission (1992).

In the context of the dawn of the new millennium, it is the West Indian Commission which signalled the measures to be adopted by the Community to prepare itself for the twenty-first century. It recommended six steps towards the kind of integration that could be sustained in the new environment.

1. The freedom of movement of nationals within the Region;
2. Free movement of skilled peoples starting with the West Indian graduates of the University of the West Indies as an aid to the economic development and growth;
3. Work towards establishing a common currency;
4. Launching of a Regional Investment Fund to invest in the Region's stock market;
5. Completion 'as a matter of urgency' of the CARICOM Single Market with the three principal instruments – the Common External Tariff, the Harmonised Scheme of Fiscal Incentives and Rules of Origin; and
6. Mobilisation of 'CARICOM to have a single voice for international negotiations vital to the common interest.'

The West Indian Commission was seeking to prepare the Community to cope with the forces of globalisation and liberalisation. It sought to propel the Community towards the realisation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), which the then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. Basdeo Panday, deemed CARICOM's response to the new international and economic environment. At the Twentieth Meeting of the Conference of

the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community which was held in Trinidad and Tobago in 1999, he said: 'the Regional response to the changing global trade and economic environment is the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. . .' He went on to point out that the Community would have to change its perspective on global trade:

The underlying principle of reciprocity in today's global trade arena is radically different from that of the one-way preferential arrangements to which we have become accustomed, and on which many of us had long been dependent. It is obvious now that our relatively narrow production base, and the limited exposure of our products to international competition require a paradigm shift in our perspectives.

The Barbados Prime Minister, Mr. Owen Arthur, has pointed out on several occasions that the original conception of the Caribbean Community was a limited one; the time has come for the current generation to make it more consistent with the imperatives of the present. He felt that the founding fathers of the Community were unable to go beyond the limited concept of the Common Market. The Community must dare to see itself as a Single Market and a Single Economy.

Addressing the Twentieth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Owen Arthur said that the Single Market and Economy would not necessarily end the region's vulnerability:

What is indeed sobering is that even if we are successful in our endeavour to reconstitute the Caribbean as a single market and a single economy, that economic entity, will still go into the 21<sup>st</sup> century as the smallest, most vulnerable and most volatile economic region in the world.

Mr. Owen Arthur continued that the Caribbean economy could not stand alone. To make the Single Market and Economy a reality 'a new model of regional governance' was required:

I do not propose here any sinister mechanism designed to deny any of us our national authority or sovereignty. Rather, national and regional consensus building and popular consultation and participation must lie at the heart of what I will call the new community.

Other Caribbean leaders gave their perspectives on the prerequisites for the new century. The Prime Minister of Jamaica, the Rt. Hon. P.J. Patterson, considered that human resource development was critical to the survival of the Community in the new millennium. He made this point at the

Eighteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Community at Montego Bay in July 1997:

. . . Breathtaking developments in technology are affecting practically every area of economic life, throwing up requirements for new skills, new production processes, new organisational structures, new management methods new marketing tools. All of these are driven by continuing innovations in informatics leading to far-reaching changes in the composition and distribution of production within countries and across and between countries. The centrality of knowledge and information is at the core of present reality. The Caribbean must be part of the new age, if we are to maintain our present levels of economic activity, let alone improve upon them.

This point was supported by Dr. Kenny Anthony, the Prime Minister of Saint Lucia, when he addressed the Nineteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community which was held in Castries, Saint Lucia in June 1998:

The configuration of challenge and possibility demands the rapid development of our human resources to provide the pool of knowledge and skills. The society of the future propelled by technological research and development will be knowledge-based and in this New World, ignorance will be the currency of poverty and marginalisation. We must pursue with greater vigour and refinement the implementation of our plans for human resource development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

But it was perhaps Dr. Keith Mitchell, Prime Minister of Grenada, who sounded the clarion call for focused attention to be directed towards developing the region's human resources to function at the cutting edge of technology when at the Sixteenth Convocation of the Heads of Government held in Georgetown in 1995, he pointed out that:

. . . economic and social growth of our Community must be linked to its level of scientific research and development, and its ability to apply that research to development, utilising modern technologies. It is incumbent upon us as a Region, to give even greater priority and focus to the attainment of a strong capability in science and technology. As we move into the twenty-first century this must be constantly one critical development goal of our Community.

The Republic of Suriname, through its head of state, Dr. Jules A. Wijdenbosch, at the Tenth Intersessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government held in Paramaribo in 1999, offered an interesting point of view on what is required to succeed in the environment of the new millennium. It was a question of forging strategic alliances:

So as to cope with the challenge of the process of globalisation, which is coming about at a fast pace, it is important not only to form strategic alliances but also to fully realise that CARICOM is a strategic alliance in itself. This position should be both starting position and guiding principle for our activities.

By the middle of the 1980s most of the early generation of Caribbean leaders had passed on or were beginning to slip into the background. Barrow, Williams, Adams, Burnham, Manley, and finally Bird, by the end of the decade had passed on. These men were all deeply concerned about the legacy of unity and Caribbean integration. A generation has spent its energies laying the early foundations of the Movement. The torch had been passed to a younger generation to ensure its survival and prosperity in the new millennium. No one understood this better than that grand old man of Caribbean politics, Mr. Vere Cornwall Bird:

Many of you, who are leaders today, are beneficiaries of the struggle of your predecessors of the 1940s. For that reason, you are obliged to assume the mantle which was left with their passing. You are charged with the responsibility to continue the race to economic self-sufficiency, which they began. You are the inheritors of a formula for Caribbean survival which lies in the fundamental recognition that our strength is our unity.

### **CARICOM SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY**

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the intensification of the regionalisation of the global economy, and the dramatic change in the international political and economic environment, the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community recognised that they were dealing with a completely new situation. At the Grand Anse Summit in 1989, they stated 'the need to work expeditiously together to deepen the integration process and strengthen the Caribbean Community in all of its dimensions, to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the changes in the global economy'. The essential response was encapsulated in the determination 'to work towards the establishment, in the shortest possible time, of a single market and economy for the Caribbean Community'.

The intention of the leaders of the Community was to integrate the economies of the member states in a single market in which people, goods, services and capital can move without hindrance and to establish a single economy and space characterised by co-ordinated and harmonised economic policies. This concept of a borderless community ought to lead to greater efficiency and competitiveness. Certain benefits are expected to accrue: more jobs, lower prices, greater investment, increased growth and diversification of production and services. If the constituent elements of the CSME come

together as expected, then the regional economies ought to grow and render the Community capable of dealing with the challenges of globalisation 'especially the loss of trade preferences from developed countries on which they currently depend heavily and which are being rapidly eroded.'<sup>27</sup>

The programme for the establishment of the CSME is not only a complex one but will also entail major changes: all barriers to trade and the movement of goods and services will have to be removed; the free movement of peoples will have to be considered; the elimination of all restrictions on the free movement of capital will have to be implemented; an appropriate common external tariff and a common trade policy will have to be instituted; and aspects of economic policy will have to be co-ordinated and harmonised. The Treaty of Chaguaramas has been revised to facilitate and accommodate the provisions of the CSME. This revision renders possible a legislative and policy framework for fair access to a single enlarged economic space for nationals and the states of the Community by removing restrictions on the region's resources and markets. This framework also provided more support measures for competitive production and a common external trade policy.

But what about the implementation of this programme? Clearly a number of heads are not happy with the pace at which the CSME is being implemented. As late as last year, the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Owen Arthur, warned:

The clock is ticking for the Caribbean Single Market and Economy. It should have come into existence in 1993. It will now only be a serious force in Caribbean economic affairs up to 2005, when we will essentially become part of a Single Hemispheric Market and Economy. Can we afford to tarry?<sup>28</sup>

The pace of the implementation of the CSME by the Community is not the only source of concern as reflected in the foregoing statement by the Prime Minister of Barbados. The Community must give serious thought to the implications of the CSME and to the creation of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The likely impact of a single hemispheric economy on the CSME has to be faced by the Community. It is a matter that has been raised by Professor Norman Girvan, a leading Caribbean academic who currently serves as Secretary General of the Association of Caribbean States. During an address, given on the occasion of the launching of the book written by Professor Kenneth Hall entitled: *Beyond Survival*, he raised the question as to whether 'the CARICOM Single Market and Economy could be rendered largely irrelevant once the FTAA comes into full effect'.<sup>29</sup> It is more than likely that this question will not go away.

Other important and significant questions have been raised about the CSME. Professor Havelock Ross Brewster, who has as profound an understanding of the integration process as anyone else in the region, in

a study entitled 'Implementation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy' has focussed attention on the 'attempt on the part of the political directorate to create a single Caribbean economy simply by inter-governmental cooperation/harmonisation of the kind that avoids any infringement of national sovereignty.'<sup>30</sup> Clearly, he does not believe that this is a feasible exercise.

There is also the question whether civil society and the private sector are fully seized of their responsibilities in relation to the CSME. It is certainly in the Community's interest to ensure the effective participation of the business sector.

Although some progress has been made in the implementation of the rules and regulations which govern the CSME, for example the free movement of people, much remains to be done. The pace of implementation of the CSME will lend credibility to the efforts of the leaders of the Community to render the Community relevant and effective in the face of the challenges presented by globalisation.

### **Political Unity and Implementing the CSME**

The collapse of the Federation, as has been repeatedly stated, made subsequent generations of Caribbean leaders wary of any form of political union. The Caribbean Community therefore sought to pursue integration by economic rather than political means, but as William Demas had warned, pursuing political integration could well bring about the need for some form of political unity. This has indeed happened.

There is an evident need for a political directorate to drive the requirements for the creation of a single economic space and Caribbean society. It does not appear that such a step can be postponed for much longer, given the imperative need to complete the CSME for reasons which relate to the integration process itself and the requirement to have this done before the inauguration of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

Not surprisingly, it was the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Owen Arthur, who recognised the need for a political framework in order to ensure the implementation of the CSME. He expressed these sentiments at the Twentieth Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community held in Trinidad and Tobago in July 1999. Mr. Arthur, deliberately and purposely, entered a sensitive area of Caribbean politics: the possibility of the political union of the Caribbean Community. In a speech he delivered in the year 2000, he revealed his thinking on this issue for making the CSME a reality:

As Minister of Finance, I know how difficult it is to hold my own economy to a successful course. As Prime Minister responsible for the creation of a Caribbean

Single Market and Economy, I must say to you that the single market and economy in the Caribbean cannot truly become a reality unless we create the political power structures to make it a reality.<sup>31</sup>

Mr. Hugh Desmond Hoyte, the then President of Guyana, at least a decade earlier, recognised 'a timely re-emergence of dialogue about regional political unity'. The dream of political union in all its fullness is not impossible. He concluded:

I take the view that the political experiments of the past are not to be regarded so much as failures, but as lessons in how to proceed with the realisation of an idea which has never died. The idea of a political framework within which to regulate our affairs is inherent in the very nature of our Community. It simply will not go away.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the controversy surrounding the question of political union, other Caribbean leaders, before Mr. Arthur, had recognised the importance and significance of the political union of the English-speaking Caribbean. Mr. John Compton, Prime Minister of Saint Lucia, a year after the establishment of the Caribbean Community, referred to the 'Challenges of Political Integration' and urged his fellow Heads to 'turn our attention and energies to the greater challenge of political integration'.<sup>33</sup>

Before them all was Mr. L. F. S. Burnham. At the Inaugural Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community at Chaguaramas in 1973, the then Prime Minister of Guyana, said:

I hope that they (decisions of the Conference) spell also a determination to achieve political and social unity within the Caribbean without which we shall perish and that is my conviction.

In 1971, Mr. Burnham had put his political convictions to the test when he sought to effect a political union between Guyana and the States of the Eastern Caribbean. Mr. Burnham met with the Heads of Government of Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines in Grenada in 1971 'to seek to establish out of their territories a new state in the Caribbean'. In the Grenada Declaration which followed this meeting, political unity was to be realised through the creation of a Preparatory Commission, a Constituent Assembly, the promulgation of a common constitution by April 22, 1973, and the holding of new elections in each participating state by June 13, 1973. Jamaica, Belize and The Bahamas stood aside. Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados showed little interest and the LDCs themselves which participated in this meeting had begun to express concern about the political and ideological direction of

Mr. Burnham's government which had declared its adherence to 'co-operative socialism'. The idea died on the vine.

At the beginning of the new millennium the idea of political unity is again very much alive. It is kept alive by bold young voices such as that of the Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Mr. Ralph Gonsalves:

Our Caribbean civilisation and the contemporary circumstances of our regional political economy demand, a more profound political expression, institutionally. About this we ought to entertain no doubts. This quest for a deeper union is a cause vital to our progress and cannot be won by doubtful men and women. Let us again put the issue of political union on the agenda and proceed to it with measured practical steps which truly mean something to the people of the region. For my part it is a noise in my blood, an echo in my bones!<sup>34</sup>

## THE CCJ AND INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING

The reform of the existing institutions of the Caribbean Community and the creation of new ones to accommodate the new trends and direction of the integration process necessitated major institutional restructuring. Indeed, the original Treaty of Chaguaramas had to be revised to accommodate changes in the philosophical and economic outlook of the Community. In 1997, the Community took the first steps to restructure its organs and institutions. The process has been quite thorough. The Treaty of Chaguaramas has been revised and has been supplemented by nine Protocols. Protocol I deals with the organs and institutions of the Community.

The Conference of Heads of Government remains the final authority for 'the conclusion of treaties on behalf of the Community, and for entering into relationships between the Community and international organisations and states. The Conference is also responsible for making financial arrangements to meet the Community's expenses, but has delegated this function to the Community Council. Decisions of the Conference are generally taken unanimously.'<sup>35</sup>

The second highest body is the Community Council of Ministers. It consists of ministers responsible for community affairs, and any other minister so designated by the member states concerned. The Council is responsible for designing the Community's planning and co-ordination of activities in the fields of economic affairs, integration, social and functional cooperation and external relations. The Conference of the Heads of Government and the Community Council of Ministers are assisted in their respective responsibilities by the following four Councils of Ministers:

1. The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) manages the internal and external trade regime, policies relating to

- the movement of factors, and the sectoral cooperation programmes. COTED promotes the Community's trade and economic development, and oversees the operations of the CSME;
2. The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) manages relations with international organisations and other countries;
  3. The Council for Human and Social Development (COSHOD) promotes human and social development; and
  4. The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP) co-ordinates economic policy, as well as the financial and monetary integration of the member states.<sup>36</sup>

One other important supporting and reinforcing institutional device is the Bureau of the Conference. The Bureau takes decisions on behalf of the Conference between meetings and entrusts particular Heads of government with responsibilities for promoting and implementing decisions in areas of the integration process on the basis of agreements reached at the level of the Conference of the Heads of Government.

The CARICOM Secretariat is the centre of this web of Community institutions. It has been challenged by developments throughout the Community. Observers are agreed that the institutional capacity of the Secretariat must be increased given the scale and scope of an expanding agenda, which has to be implemented with a sense of increased urgency. The implementation of the CSME, for example, emphasises such urgency. Additionally, issues such as good governance and macro-economic convergence have grown in importance and are already part of the work and activities of the Secretariat.

The Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Owen Arthur, has sought to express his vision of the Secretariat in the twenty-first century:

The CARICOM Secretariat that can truly serve our interests in the 21<sup>st</sup> century must function in a modern, accessible and technologically advanced environment. It must have human and financial resources commensurate with the heavy load of responsibilities we continue to entrust to it. It must have an in-house capacity for strategic analysis to support decision-making in a dynamic environment.<sup>37</sup>

The other Protocols of the Community are as follows:

- II Establishment, Services, Capital;
- III Industrial Policy;
- IV Trade Policy;

- V Agricultural Policy;
- VI Transport Policy;
- VII Disadvantaged Countries, Regions and Sectors;
- VIII Competition, Policy, Consumer Protection, Dumping and Subsidies;
- IX Dispute Settlement.

Protocols II and IV have increased the Community's capacity to formulate and implement decisions in the area of trade by seeking to affect a link between intra-regional trade to developments in the realm of external trade policy. The Common External Tariff (CET) is related to trade policy by making provision for the application of common tariffs on imports that originate from outside of the region. The obligations which are necessary under Protocol IV have been made in conformity with regional commitments. Under the new provisions, notifications to the WTO must be conveyed to COTED.

Protocol III deals with the question of the Community's industrial policy and supersedes Articles 41, 42, 44, 45 and 46 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. Its central consideration is allocation of resources and industrial competitiveness. Under this Protocol, policy measures are expected to be backed by an appropriate macro-economic framework, investment incentives, harmonised legislation and the required administrative practices.

Protocol V deals with agricultural policy and is intended to bring about a market oriented and internationally competitive regime to the agricultural sector. The objective is to increase production, boost exports, and effect the diversification of primary and processed agricultural goods as a result of effective management and the sustainable exploitation of the region's natural resources. COTED and other relevant institutions of the Community are expected to collaborate in the implementation of these measures.

Protocol VI relates to the issue of safe, adequate and internationally competitive services for the development and consolidation of the CSME. The transportation policy of the Community aims at efficient, reliable and affordable services. It also envisages the expansion of air and maritime transport capacities. Corporate arrangements are also a source of interest. COTED is expected to play the primary role in implementing this Protocol.

Protocol VII – Under this Protocol measures are adumbrated to address the issue of disadvantaged states, regions and sectors in order to help them to become economically progressive and competitive as a result of appropriate economic mechanisms. These include technical and financial assistance to cater for dislocations as a result of the implementation of the CSME. Special

measures are intended to attract investment and industries. COTED and COFAP are expected to administer and monitor these measures.

Protocol VIII – In terms of this Protocol, the Community seeks to shield itself against anti-competitive business practices which could undermine benefits accruing under the CSME. COTED is the main institutional body for implementation of this Protocol.

Protocol IX – This Protocol is self-explanatory and comes within the purview of the Caribbean Court of Justice.

The Revised Treaty now has provisional application and is indicative of the new direction of the integration movement. The main purpose of the revision of the Treaty has been stated clearly by the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Owen Arthur, who had lead responsibility for this issue:

The purpose of the Treaty revision process currently being undertaken is the establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), whose long-term goal is the creation of one economic space stretching from Belize in Central America to Suriname in South America.<sup>38</sup>

The question of a single economic space and the creation of a new Caribbean society were to engage the attention of the leaders of the Community in the decade of the 1990s and beyond. This is their present task.

In addition to the Revised Treaty, two institutions have been created: The Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ). A Charter of Civil Society has also been formulated and adopted.

### **Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians**

The ACCP is intended to give regional representatives of both the Government and the opposition a greater say in the affairs of the integration movement. It was established as a consultative and deliberative body for the deepening of the integration movement and its objectives are clearly set out in Article 4 of the Agreement:

- to involve the people of the Community, through their representatives, in the process of consolidating and strengthening the community;
- to provide opportunities for involvement in the issues of the integration process by Members of Parliament in each Member State and Associate Member, in addition to those who now participate;
- to provide a forum for people of the Community to make their views known through their representatives;

- to provide more frequent contact in the monitoring of the policies of the Community;
- to provide enhanced opportunities for the co-ordination of the foreign policies of Member states;
- to promote greater understanding among Member States and Associate Members for the purpose of realising and safeguarding the ideals and principles of democratic governments in the Community and facilitating the economic and social advancement of their peoples;
- to encourage the adoption by the Government of Member States of the Community to a common policy on economic, social, cultural, scientific and legal matters deliberated upon by the Assembly.

The functions of the ACCP are found in Article 5 of the Agreement in which it is stated that it is 'a deliberative and consultative body for the discussion of policies, programmes and other matters falling within the scope of the Treaty.' However, in terms of paragraph 4 of that same article, the ACCP cannot 'discuss or adopt any resolution on any matter which is exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state or an associate member of the Community.'

The ACCP, a brainchild of the then Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. L. Erskine Sandiford, is regarded by at least one legal expert as 'a radical departure in terms of institutional profile and stated regional objectives'<sup>39</sup>Mr. Sandiford had urged the establishment of the ACCP as early as the Ninth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, which took place in Antigua and Barbuda in July 1988, when he stated:

Last year in Saint Lucia, I appealed for the establishment of an Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians to associate the Caribbean people and their representatives with the administrative arrangements now in place. I shall be pursuing this idea more fully in due course, for I think it is imperative that every opportunity be taken to deepen the integration process and make it more meaningful for the broad masses of the Caribbean people.

This appeal for the widening of the decision-making apparatus to encompass the contributions of the people of the region was underscored by the Prime Minister of Saint Lucia, Dr. Kenny Anthony, at the Eighteenth Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community held in Montego Bay, Jamaica in 1997 when he observed that:

... for the regional integration movement to become revitalized we [the Heads of Government] need to develop full consensus on the fundamental agenda that must be consistently advanced. Such a consensus can only emerge through

broadening of the decision-making apparatus to include opposition parties in the region and to involve social partners, not only out of diplomatic courtesy but out of a profound commitment to dialogue in the search for common answers.

These positions held by both Prime Ministers Mr. Erskine Sandiford and Dr. Kenny Anthony represent the sentiments of the former president of Guyana, Dr. Cheddi Jagan who considered the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians to be an important structure of unity. At the Seventeenth Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community, which was held in Barbados in July 1996, he made the following point:

The Assembly [of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians] is undoubtedly an important component in the Community's structures of unity, not least of all because it is a welcome step towards increased people participation in the affairs of the Community, though, in the first instance, their elected representatives and, eventually, I hope, through the involvement of the social partners in what should essentially be a regional forum of the people.

It is important to note that the ACCP should play an essential role in relation to the functioning of the CCJ. The CCJ would only be effective if it is underpinned by partisan support within national jurisdictions. This is an important consideration in view of the fact that the decisions and proceedings of the CCJ will affect all stakeholders of the Community across the political spectrum. As it stands, the ACCP is the only institution capable of garnering such bipartisan support.

The ACCP is a reality. Convocations of this Assembly have been held in Barbados on February 15, 1996; in Grenada from October 14–15, 1999; and Belize from November 17–20, 2000.

In contrast to the ACCP which was the brainchild of the then Prime Minister of Barbados, the Charter of Civil Society grew out of the recommendations of the West Indian Commission and was seen as an instrument for improving governance in the region. A Special Meeting of the Heads of Government in Port-of-Spain in 1992 accepted the recommendations of the West Indian Commission. That Conference also determined that the Charter would address such issues as 'a free press, a fair and open democratic process, the effective functioning of the parliamentary system, morality in public affairs, respect for fundamental civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, the rights of women and children, respect for religious diversity, and greater accountability and transparency in governance'.<sup>40</sup>

The Draft Charter, embodying 28 articles, has been subject to national consultations and as a result, revisions have been made. However, the

Charter was finalised when the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community affixed their signatures to a resolution adopting the Charter of Civil Society on February 19, 1997 at St. John's, Antigua. The finalisation of the Charter has enabled several encounters with civil society in at least two states. The first civil encounter occurred in Trinidad and Tobago and was followed by a similar event which preceded the Twenty-third Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference in Georgetown, Guyana in July 2002. The Communiqué issued at the end of the encounter stated, among other things, 'the need for more constructive participation of civil society representatives in appropriate decision-making Organs of the Community such as the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), the Council for Human and Social Development (COSHOD), etc.'

The civil encounter recommended the establishment of a Task Force, consisting of a small representative group of civil society, coordinated by the CARICOM Secretariat 'to develop a comprehensive regional strategic framework for carrying forward the main recommendations' of the Encounter . . . 'and report to the Conference of Heads of Government at its next Intersessional Meeting in 2003'.

### **Caribbean Court of Justice**

The Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community decided in 1998 to establish a Caribbean Supreme Court, under the new appellation of the Caribbean Court of Justice 'with original jurisdiction in respect of the interpretation and application of the Treaty of Chaguaramas'.

The establishment of such a Court was a recommendation of the West Indian Commission. In establishing such a Court, the heads recognised that there were 'constitutional requirements which might constrain some Member States from participating initially in the appellate function of the Court and expressed the desire that some time in the near future, this vital CARICOM institution would be able to perform this function to all CARICOM member states.'<sup>41</sup> Account was taken of the difference in legal systems among Member States, as is the case with Suriname and now Haiti.

The CCJ is established as a Court of Appeal with appellate jurisdiction and is analogous to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. It is also 'structured to be an international tribunal employing rules of international law and interpreting and applying the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the Caribbean Community, including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.'<sup>42</sup> The Court will therefore exercise 'original' and 'exclusive jurisdiction' as far as interpretation and application of the Treaty are concerned.

The President of the court will be appointed by the Heads of Government on the recommendation of the Judicial and Legal Services Commission. All other judges will be appointed by the Commission on the basis of 'open competition' from among candidates of the Commonwealth. In the view of one legal authority, this guarantees the independence of the functionaries of the Court.<sup>43</sup> The independence of the Court and the perception that it is an independent legal entity is vital to the question of a stable and acceptable investment climate in the region.

Legal commentators have remarked that the non-retention of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is one area where there is likely to be some controversy. The acceptability of the CCJ as a replacement for the Privy Council is not yet an accepted fact. Duke Pollard has observed that, 'there appears to be no regional consensus about the need to replace the Privy Council'.<sup>44</sup> There continues to be debate about this issue in the Caribbean. Among the attractive arguments for the replacement of the Privy Council, and there are many, is that of the completion of the process of independence of the member states of the Caribbean.

The argument is characterised in the following manner by Mr. Justice Telford Georges:

Starkly put, it appears to me that an independent country should assume the responsibility for providing a Court of its own choosing for the final determination of legal disputes arising for decision. It is a compromise of sovereignty to leave that decision to a Court which is part of the former colonial hierarchy, a Court in the appointment of whose members we have no absolute say.<sup>45</sup>

It is an argument that has a certain resonance in the region. The Prime Minister of Saint Lucia, Dr. Kenny Anthony, who is also a lawyer, supports the contention of Mr. Justice Telford Georges: 'I find it incomprehensible that any citizen of our region, valuing his independence, should still wish to see our highest court perpetually domiciled within the erstwhile colonial capital'.<sup>46</sup>

But this is not the only area of controversy. Issues such as the insulation of the Court from political interference and its funding are still attracting the attention of the leaders of the Community and the legal Community of the region.<sup>47</sup> The CCJ is nevertheless absolutely essential to the implementation of the CSME.

## **CARICOM EXTERNAL RELATIONS**

The Caribbean Community external relations are pursued with the express purpose of maximising benefits to the region. Such efforts also facilitate

cooperation with other groupings and states which share similar objectives as the Community. Special importance is attached to the following relations:

### **US/UK/CANADA**

Relations with the United States are now pursued within the framework of the Bridgetown Declaration of Principles and the Caribbean/United States Plan of Action. Within this framework, issues such as security, drugs, debt, and the environment are the subjects of deliberation and decision. In particular, there is provision for annual meetings between the American Secretary of State and the Caribbean Community. The first such meeting took place on February 2002 in Nassau, the Bahamas. Among the issues discussed were terrorism and its impact on the tourist industry. Relations with the United Kingdom have also improved measurably. The framework for these relations is the UK/Caribbean Ministerial Forum.

The third meeting was held in Georgetown in April 2002. The relations themselves were reviewed and the possible impact of international developments on them were considered. Regional security and law enforcement, trade and investment issues, terrorism and HIV/AIDS were examined. A notable decision was that 'the Caribbean appealed to the UK to give favourable consideration to the request for further strengthening of small states in the WTO. The UK confirmed that it would continue to provide specific support to the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM)'

Relations with Canada have been governed by annual Summits between the leaders of the Community and the Prime Ministers of Canada. Six such meetings have been held. At the last meeting in Jamaica in February 2001, it was decided 'to negotiate a new Free Trade Agreement with Canada to replace the existing 15-year-old pact.' The new arrangement will include trade and services which were not in the original agreement. Canada agreed that 'differential treatment should be given small states in the FTAA negotiations, as many worry about the impact of lower tariff on the fragile economies.'

### **CBI-EAI-NAFTA**

The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), promulgated by the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, was a security as well as an economic package. It was a direct response to the perception that American hegemony had come under threat as a result of insurgencies in Central America, and experiments with socialist forms of government, as was the case with the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the influence of the Cuban model of development. The CBI was announced in 1981. It provoked interest on the part of Caribbean

leaders who were quick to identify its weaknesses. After due deliberation, leaders of the Community concluded that the CBI excluded products which were important to the region's industrial programmes. Ten members of the Community, therefore, joined together and penned a letter to the then President of the United States, Mr. Ronald Reagan. This is what they said in part.

The view was expressed that the CBI provisions contribute to the expansion of trade between the beneficiary countries and the USA, and, create a channel for stimulating the development of the countries of the Region. It is, however, also widely acknowledged that the CBI excludes products, which are important in our industrial programmes. Besides, development planning on the basis of some benefits already conferred under the CBI are being made virtually impossible by pending Congressional actions which threaten to erode benefits already established under the CBI and understanding reached with your Administration.

The region was not only concerned about exclusion of products from the American market but also by the general perception that the CBI represented an attempt to reassert American dominance and hegemony over the region. For Reagan had come to power in reaction to 'weaknesses' of the Carter Administration and in seeking to project American power, his Administration operated on two pillars: that of 'militarism' and 'monetarism', the beginning of the new liberal assault on global politics. The CBI in effect was based on a mixture of consent and the possible threat of coercion.

Those who were prepared to accept American leadership were amply rewarded, and those who rejected such leadership faced the prospect of censure. Not unexpectedly, therefore, two CARICOM member states, Guyana and Grenada, were excluded from the CBI. This exclusion rankled and was a matter of concern to the Caribbean Community. The CBI ultimately did not bring the expected benefits to the Caribbean Community or to the rest of the region. In any case, it was overtaken by the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA).

If the CBI was essentially targeted at Central America, where insurgencies were raging at the time, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) announced by the first President Bush was more concerned with Latin America. The EAI therefore was intended to realise certain specific objectives of the United States Administration. It never came to fruition but it laid the foundation for NAFTA. Not being among the NAFTA beneficiaries, the Community had to devise a policy and plead its case that it should be given similar access as the NAFTA countries. This has been achieved. However, when NAFTA first came into being, the Caribbean Community was forced to consider the implications of the Agreement. This

concern was reflected in a statement made by the Prime Minister of Grenada, Dr. Keith Mitchell:

As you are all aware, a topic of particular concern in the area of international economic relations is the issue of Trade and Investment. Here in our hemisphere, we are now confronted with the reality of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). While all the implications of NAFTA are not yet known we nevertheless must seek to position our economies to interface with the new environment.<sup>48</sup>

The implications of NAFTA were soon clear. It was confined to the US, Mexico and Canada. The exclusion of the states of the Caribbean Community and other states of the Americas, meant that separate means had to be found to obtain benefits for the region. The Caribbean opted for NAFTA parity which would give it similar preferential access to that enjoyed by Mexico under NAFTA. This was conceded by the United States Government. The US Congress passed the relevant Bill in May 2000 which was signed into law by President Clinton. It gives preferential access arrangement to a range of products from October 1, 2000 until September 30, 2008.

### **FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS**

The FTAA is intended to integrate the economies of the Western Hemisphere into a single free trade arrangement. The first step was taken at the Summit of the Americas which was held in December 1994, in Miami. The Heads of State and Government of thirty-four countries agreed on that occasion to construct a FTAA in which barriers to trade and investment would be progressively eliminated and to complete negotiations for the Agreement by 2005.

Four Ministerial Meetings took place during the preparatory phase of the FTAA. The first was in June 1995 in Denver, USA, the second in March 1996 in Cartagena, Colombia, the third in May 1997 in Belo Horizonte, Brazil and the fourth in May 1998 in San Jose, Costa Rica.

At the meeting in San Jose, recommendations were made to the leaders of the Americas for the initiation of negotiations. Based on the San Jose Declaration, the FTAA negotiations were launched in April 1998 at the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile. At the fifth meeting, which took place in Toronto in 1999, the ministers instructed the negotiating groups to draft the text of their respective chapters to be presented at the sixth meeting at Buenos Aires in 2001. Groups responsible for market access issues were directed to discuss the modalities and procedures for negotiations in their respective areas. Ministers also approved several business facilitation

measures, designed to facilitate commercial exchanges in the hemisphere, especially in areas of custom procedures.

At the sixth meeting held in Buenos Aires and the third Summit held in Quebec City in 2001, key decisions were taken regarding the FTAA negotiations. Ministers received from the negotiating groups a draft text of the FTAA agreement which was made public.

As explained previously, the FTAA poses particular challenges to the Caribbean Community. It stands in an uneasy relationship with the CSME. More particularly, at least one Caribbean Prime Minister is uncertain as to the benefits likely to be derived from the FTAA:

. . . some administrations remain acutely sceptical about the benefits to be derived from WTO compliance as well as accession to the FTAA. We are asked whether the gains significantly outweigh the impending risks and inevitable costs. We are being asked to confirm whether our acquiescence is driven by political expediency or by a fundamental determination to fashion a new trading environment more conducive to growth and prosperity . . . While some are marching ahead purposefully and confidently toward the dawn of the FTAA, others are having serious doubts. We have some difficulty seeing the practical benefits that are to result from our participation and Saint Lucia is saying that we cannot continue to follow in a wake of blind faith.<sup>49</sup>

Dr. Anthony's unhappiness over the prospective benefits from the FTAA for his country and the Community is matched by the lack of progress in this process on issues which are important to the Caribbean Community. The Community is clearly not happy with the lack of progress on the proposal for special consideration for countries with small and vulnerable economies in the FTAA. The Miami Declaration of 1994, the San José Declaration of 1998 and the Toronto Declaration of 1999, all enshrine commitments to take account of the different levels and size of economies within the FTAA process. However, no progress has been made beyond some acknowledgement that there is need for technical assistance to be provided to these countries. Apart from special provisions for small economies, the Community is also seeking longer periods of transition so that they can meet the appropriate obligations and complete their own regional arrangements. It is also seeking to win support for these issues in other fora such as the WTO and the forthcoming negotiations between the EU and ACP states.

As in the case with the global negotiations, the Caribbean Community is working steadfastly within the FTAA working group on smaller economies to protect its interests and to ensure implementation of the commitments of the Miami Declaration of 1994, the San José Declaration of 1998 and the Toronto Declaration of 1999, which are important to ensure the long-term prosperity of the peoples of the region. One of the principal difficulties that will face the Community as a whole are the adjustments required to build the necessary

economic capacity to cope with the new global realities and, in particular, the end of the non-reciprocal preferences which it has enjoyed. To overcome these difficulties, the Caribbean Community will have to find the resources to ensure its effective and decisive participation in the completion of the FTAA.

Ambassador Richard Bernal, Director-General of the Regional Negotiation Machinery, at a seminar on February 28, 2002, hosted by the Organisation of American States, identified four factors which would affect smaller countries in the FTAA process. The first, he said, is the fact that countries involved in the FTAA process 'vary widely in size and development'; secondly, 'in some small economies, trade capacity is limited so it can be difficult to participate meaningfully' in far ranging trade negotiations; thirdly, there is the question of the lack of resources, 'this is very evident in poorer and small countries' and fourthly, there is a 'lack of awareness not encouraged so much in governments' as in the private sector and civil society because ordinary citizens are often unaware of the implications of trade issues that could affect their well-being.<sup>50</sup>

### **World Trade Organisation (WTO)**

By far the most international forum for the negotiation of trade issues is the WTO. It will be the framework within which all multilateral agreements will be considered. The CARICOM Single Market and Economy, for example, will have to be compatible with various WTO agreements, including the GATT Agreement on Trade and Goods, the Accord on Services, the Agricultural Agreement and the Agreement on the Settlement of Disputes. It is important to note that the Treaty of Chaguaramas has been judged to be consistent with WTO requirements, even though a number of Member States of the Community retain quantitative and other restrictions which are not considered to be consistent with WTO commitments.

The Caribbean Community has already discovered the significance of differences in size and economic capacity within the WTO. A case in point is the position taken by the United States in conjunction with certain Latin American States, challenging the preferential access for bananas accorded the ACP Caribbean States under the COTONOU Agreement. The Banana Protocol which governs this arrangement allows the ACP Caribbean States preferential access to the EU market. The United States, supporting the non-ACP suppliers, challenged Europe's banana marketing regime and won its case in the WTO.

The decision produced shock and dismay in the Caribbean. An emergency meeting of the Windward Island banana-exporting countries held in Dominica issued a strong condemnation of the WTO. The banana-exporting countries in a subsequent statement stated that they felt

'betrayed' by the WTO. It was their belief that the primary purpose of the organisation was to bring about 'improved living standards and equity and fairness in international trade . . .' <sup>51</sup> These countries did not expect the rule of the jungle' in which 'the powerful ride roughshod over the smaller members of the trading community . . .' <sup>52</sup>

Despite the disadvantages posed to small countries such as those of the Caribbean Community, some benefits can be obtained if they are pursued with the required commitment and vigour. 'The WTO, for example, has proposed the creation of a Legal Bureau to offer reasonable rates for countries that cannot bear the cost of litigation.' <sup>53</sup> While this provides some grounds for optimism it might not provide a complete solution to the problems which face the Caribbean and other developing countries, given the high cost involved in pursuing litigation in the context of the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO. More generally, the Community in conjunction with countries with similar vulnerable economies:

have pressed in particular for recognition of the needs of small economies focusing on: adoption of a development-driven work program and a work program on smaller economies within the WTO; a binding arrangement to offer special and differential treatment to developing countries; approval of the much-delayed waiver for the COTONOU agreement; and greater transparency in WTO decision-making. In the WTO, small developing states are now covered by the provisions on special and differential treatment that relate to developing countries as a whole.<sup>54</sup>

In other words, the thrust of the activities of CARICOM countries within the WTO is to seek to gain acceptance for the creation of a category of vulnerable economies which specify special and differential measures. However, such measures would probably be less than those offered to the LDCs. The measures must nevertheless meet the needs of the countries with vulnerable economies. Some progress was made in this regard at the Doha Ministerial Meeting held in November 2001, which agreed to set up a working group to review the needs of small economies.

The vulnerabilities of the CARICOM states, in the context of the global economy and the negotiations within the WTO, did not escape the attention of Mr. Basdeo Panday, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. He felt nevertheless that the failure of the international community to reach consensus on a number of issues at the WTO Conference in Seattle, provided an opportunity for the Community to regroup:

We need now, to gear up for the new round of negotiations, so as to ensure that World Trade Organization Member States will be sensitive to the special vulnerabilities and development needs of small economies such as those of CARICOM.<sup>55</sup>

By and large, the CARICOM and other developing countries lack the financial and human resources to pursue their objectives by utilising the various instrumentalities of the procedures of the WTO. It has been observed for example, that apart from Jamaica, the countries of the Caribbean Community do not have a high profile at WTO meetings and are forced to rely on the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) to defend their interests.<sup>56</sup>

This is not the only disadvantage. Even within the developing countries themselves, including the member states of the Caribbean Community, co-ordination of activities and implementation of decisions necessary for effective participation in a global economy are far from perfect. Moreover, the lack of intellectual and bureaucratic inputs and the inability of local NGOs to determine and promote the agenda on global economic issues within developing states is a serious handicap. Similarly, organisations such as the Group of 77, which traditionally articulated and sought to protect the interests of developing countries, are now less effective than in the early 1970s and, in any event, are discouraged from participating in the WTO under this umbrella. The following quotation explains this problem:

In contrast, the developing countries are not well organised within their own countries. The government departments dealing with the interface with the global economy are understaffed, especially in relation to the rapid developments in globalisation and in global negotiations. The academic sector and the few think-tanks which exist are not geared up to obtain and assess information on globalisation trends, and less still to formulate policy proposals that governments can make use of. The links between these intellectual sectors, the NGOs and governments are also often weak. The business and financial community are not organised well enough to monitor global trends or to lobby governments on global issues. At the regional level, there is increasing collaboration among the countries through regional groupings. However, cooperation is still not as sophisticated as in the European Union. At the international level, the South is organised through the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement. These groupings often perform reasonably, effectively within the UN framework and at UN meetings and conventions. However, they are not adequately staffed and are unable to keep track adequately of events and developments, or to formulate longer-term policies and strategies. At the WTO, IMF and World Bank, the collective strength of developing-country members has yet to be manifested in a strong way, although there are encouraging signs of more collaboration, for example at the WTO.<sup>57</sup>

## Latin America

Relations between the Caribbean Community and Latin America intensified during the 1990s. Although such relations had existed, they had never

been characterised by major developments in political or economic terms. Indeed, trade between Latin America and the Caribbean Community has been at a minimum. However, within recent times, there seems to be a clear determination, based on common interests and goals on the part of both regions to forge greater trading links with each other and to lay the institutional foundation for greater cooperation.

One observer has described the building blocks to greater cooperation and integration:

This follows a process of opening higher levels of competition (the priority given to the Caribbean Basin) and, simultaneously, greater integration into the hemi-spheric and world economies. The Caribbean Basin is at the core of that building block process, particularly the 'inner Caribbean', comprising the islands in the Caribbean Sea and Central America, Venezuela and Colombia.<sup>58</sup>

The FTAA will certainly compel the Caribbean Community to seek greater integration with the rest of Latin America. The Agreements signed between the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean Community will serve as building blocks for increased cooperation between the two regions. In addition, in the context of the FTAA, and given the Community's limited resources, relationships with Central America, the major countries of Latin America, the Andean Community and MERCOSUR, could redound to the advantage of the Community.

Based on the foregoing, it is important to review the existing trade relationships between CARICOM and a number of Latin American countries including countries in Central America.

The Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Central America, Mexico, Brazil and Cuba, all have various forms of relations with the Caribbean Community. The Dominican Republic signed a basic Agreement with CARICOM on August 22, 1998. A Protocol to give effect to some of its provisions was signed on April 28, 2000. It involves reciprocity with five CARICOM MDCs and non-reciprocity with the LDCs until 2005.

An Agreement on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation was signed with Colombia on July 24, 1994 and entered into force on January 1, 1995. It began on a nonreciprocal basis but Colombia's constitutional provisions made it necessary to introduce some reciprocity in the Agreement after a period of four years.

The Caribbean Community signed a Trade and Investment Agreement with Venezuela on October 30, 1992 which became effective on January 1, 1993. It was concluded under the facility for a non-reciprocal partial scope Agreement. This is a one-way preferential accord which seeks to promote CARICOM exports to Venezuela on the basis of duty free or duty reduced

access for specified products. The agreement is subject to review every five years.

CARICOM and Central America in recent years instituted the mechanism of Joint Ministerial Meetings to explore the possibility of further collaboration. The basis of such collaboration owes its origin to the cooperation between these two entities in the context of the CBI and the pressure for the integration of the region as a whole. Mechanisms for cooperation between CARICOM and Central American countries function within the framework of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). There have however been few developments in respect of trade between CARICOM and Central America. Only Trinidad and Tobago has forged ahead in this regard. The dispute over the Banana Protocol has been an obstacle to better relations with Central America. The position taken by Central American countries in the WTO provoked objections from Member States of the Community dependent on banana production. Interest between the two regions converged nevertheless, in relation to the issue of the status of small states in the FTAA, the future of the G-3 and the potential of the ACS.

Relations between Mexico and the Caribbean Community have been governed for the past decade by the CARICOM/Mexico Economic Cooperation Agreement. This Agreement does not make provision for trade concessions and is largely concerned with strengthening commercial ties, such as information exchange, trade promotion and cultural and technical cooperation. Proposals have been made to conclude a trade accord with Mexico which is similar to that which exists with Venezuela and Colombia. It should be noted here that Trinidad and Tobago is discussing a Free Trade Area (FTA) with Mexico.

Following discussions between the Group of 3 (Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico) and the Caribbean Community it was agreed in 1992 that the Caribbean Basin FTA should be established. However, no significant progress has been made in this area, largely because of the inability of Venezuela and Mexico to push the idea. The Community has no particular interest in establishing a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico. As is the case with Central America, the Caribbean Community might nevertheless find renewed interest in further cooperation with the G-3 in view of the need to promote increased regional integration.

The Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between the Caribbean Community and Cuba which was signed on July 5, 2000 was expected to come into force on January 1, 2001. This Agreement takes account of the differences in development between Cuba and the CARICOM LDCs and makes provisions to accommodate these differences. It also seeks greater free trade between Cuba and CARICOM. Provision is made for a limited number of tariff concessions in well-defined areas and increases the number of products receiving duty free and MFN reduced rates. The

Agreement, is not expected to have any major impact on Cuba-CARICOM trade as this is minimal at the present time. The Community and the Government of Cuba are however seeking to increase their commercial links. Cuba itself has shown interest in reintegrating itself into the region. It is also interested in the expansion of an integrated market which could improve the collective bargaining position of the Caribbean.

CARICOM relations with the countries of the southern cone of the continent have been limited. The implementation of the CARICOM-Brazil Cooperation Agreement which is concerned mainly with cultural and technical matters has been slow. The Community sought non-reciprocal arrangements from Brazil in the 1980s and Brazil is a member of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB). Generally, Brazil has been slow in expanding links with the Caribbean.

The Community has recently signed an Agreement with Chile to establish a CARICOM-Joint Commission on Cooperation, Co-ordination and Consultation, as well as an Accord on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. A similar Agreement with Argentina is being considered.

The Community has not given clear signals about its objectives in relation to MERCOSUR and is therefore unlikely in the immediate future to have any effective participation in the integration process in this part of the continent.

### **Widening of CARICOM: The Association of Caribbean States (ACS)**

From the very inception it has been an objective of the Community that it should be deepened through increased economic and functional cooperation and widened through the inclusion of other states in the Caribbean region. In the past, the emphasis appeared to be on the deepening rather than the widening of the Caribbean Community. This position has changed. The Community, in response to the imperatives of globalization, has moved quickly to create greater economic space for itself and to forge alliances with a number of other Caribbean states. This has been institutionalized in the form of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), which so far has sought to co-ordinate Caribbean positions on tourism and transportation. The creation of the ACS represents a shift towards increased cooperation with the countries of the Caribbean Basin.

The West Indian Commission had in fact recommended that the Community should intensify and extend its relations with the countries of Latin America. This has occurred with the creation of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). In his address to the Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community which was held in Guyana in July 1995, Mr. Edison James, Prime Minister of the

Commonwealth of Dominica, explained the relationship between CARICOM and the ACS:

Substantively and directly, the ACS is a grouping of the wider Caribbean States for concertation, consultation and cooperation and for making recommendations to its Members. CARICOM on the other hand, is a smaller grouping of Caribbean States whose mandate includes binding decision-making and implementation in pursuit of social, cultural and economic development.

The Caribbean Community has opened its doors to Suriname, which became a member in 1995 and Haiti which acceded to the membership of the Community in 2002. Mr. Manuel Esquivel, the then Prime Minister of Belize in his address at the Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community welcomed this development and noted, on the occasion of Suriname's accession, the expansion of the number of mainland states in the Community. As he stated:

The entry of Suriname into CARICOM brings to just three the number of nonisland States in our membership, Guyana and Belize being the other two. We welcome the President of Suriname and his delegation and look forward to his full participation in the affairs of our Community.<sup>59</sup>

Bermuda and the Cayman Islands now have associate membership of the Community. The other Associate Members are Anguilla, British Virgin Islands and Turks and Caicos. The Community now has two non-English-speaking countries and has forged associations with several Latin American and Central American states. Aruba, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico and Venezuela enjoy observer status.

## Security

The significance of the impact of the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attack in the United States found expression in the statement made by the Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Mr. Hubert Ingraham, at the Thirteenth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held in Belize on February 4, 2002. He noted that the 'horrific attacks of last September' necessitated an emergency meeting of the Community and pointed out that tourism around the world 'had contracted by as much as 30 per cent'. The impact on the economies of the member states of the Community would be 'daunting' as 'tourism generates the majority of our foreign exchange and provides the most jobs.'

The consequences of September 11 were felt in the Caribbean in terms of the damage inflicted on the tourist industry of the region. This event

has also alerted the region to new dangers in the international system. The Caribbean Community now faces the dilemma that resources which would normally have gone into the development effort must now be diverted to combat terrorism in its various forms.

Issues such as crime, the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and firearms, and transborder criminal activities are increasingly being pushed to the top of the agenda. These activities present a number of complex challenges for the region. In the words of the current Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Mr. Perry Christie, the region is 'caught in the middle'. It is caught in the middle because it straddles the sea-lanes and is in the flight paths between countries which produce drugs in South America and the vast consumer market in North America. The region will need to be vigilant and pay increased attention to questions such as secession, insurrection, the possibility of coups and other related security issues, given the increased volatility of the political situation in some countries. The region must do so because as the Bahamian Prime Minister has also stated 'security and stability across the Caribbean region is critical to the quality of life of our people.'<sup>60</sup>

The security problems of the region have been exacerbated, in the words of former Prime Minister, Basdeo Panday, by 'the flood of seasoned, ruthless criminals who are being deported to the Caribbean home-lands' from the United States. This is being done despite the fact 'those criminals are entirely the product of the United States of America's penal system, dumped on Caribbean societies with woefully inadequate coordination, and without adequate assistance for us to cope with this new contagion of violence that was manufactured in the United States of America.'<sup>61</sup> With the imminent establishment of the CSME, the borders of CARICOM countries will be relatively open to highly mobile criminal elements schooled in the art of crime in North America. Indeed, the crime wave in several Caribbean countries has increased significantly. Mr. Bharrat Jagdeo, president of Guyana, has expressed concern at the increase in arms and drug trafficking which was severely impacting on the security and economy of the state.

In his words:

The problem of increasing crime and insecurity which are now holding people and our economies to ransom must be addressed promptly and fully at this meeting. All of our States, to one degree or another, have been caught up in the spiral of arms and drug trafficking rampaging throughout the hemisphere. Our societies once safe and secure from violence, are now exposed to a multiplicity of threats.<sup>62</sup>

September 11<sup>th</sup> succeeded in putting security matters at the top of the Caribbean agenda. Apart from the impact on the economies, it forced Caribbean leaders to look at the implications of the transnational nature

of drug-related crime for their economies and societies. Prime Minister of the Bahamas, Mr. Hubert Ingraham addressed the topic at the 13<sup>th</sup> Inter-Sessional Meeting which was held in Belize on February 4, 2002:

We must be innovative in addressing the terrible traffic in illicit drugs and firearms. The threat of trans-boundary organised crime to the Caribbean is real. We must be diligent to attack the causes of crime as vigorously as we address the curtailment of criminal activities.

### **CARICOM Intervention**

The commitment of the Caribbean Community to democratic principles and good governance has led to a renewed interest in the region in promoting democracy and human rights. In keeping with these principles, the Community has sought to advance formulae aimed at resolving political difficulties in Haiti.

CARICOM has kept faith with Haiti as it struggled to build a democratic state and culture. During the period 1977–1999, CARICOM mounted several missions to Haiti to determine how the Community could support that country in the holding of elections and in promoting its membership in the Caribbean Community. This concern for Haiti is reflected in the speech of Mr. Edison James, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica, when he addressed the Sixteenth Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference held in Guyana in July 1995:

One of the prospective members of the Association of Caribbean States, Haiti, is a country with which we have had a long relationship. Its recent history is well chronicled and the latest phase of its struggle towards stability has been able to be assisted by CARICOM. President Aristide had returned but much must be done to the return of our beleaguered neighbour to normalcy. Dominica has played its part in providing law enforcement agents to help in stabilising the country. We feel a special affinity towards the Haitian people, sharing as we do a French Creole or patois. That commonality of linguistic culture renders empathy easier and so we are offering our services to help in the task of confidence building among a people whose hopes have been shattered by so many unfortunate events.

The Community also became involved in developments in Guyana when it appeared that the elected Government was being challenged and there was the perception that the democratic basis of the state was being undermined. What appeared to be at risk is the capacity of the Community to ensure the existence of the rule of law, good governance and respect for constitutional procedures as norms in some of its member states. CARICOM sought solutions to Guyana's political problems in 1998 and again in 2000. The

Community also played a role 'in ensuring the integrity of the democratic process in St. Vincent and the Grenadines . . .'<sup>63</sup>

## Social Issues

The issues addressed by the Community in the late 1990s and the early part of the millennium are indicative of the expanded agenda that is being pursued which ranges well beyond the political and economic sphere and extends into the social field. Issues such as health, education, the environment, and immigration are now closely monitored by the leaders of the Community.

The issue of HIV/AIDS is of particular concern to the region. The Caribbean now has the second highest rate of infection after Sub Saharan Africa. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago has summed up the situation in the following manner:

When we are told that the Caribbean now ranks second among all regions of the world in the incidence of HIV/AIDS per capita, we must recognise the inescapable obligation to treat AIDS as a pressing regional issue that calls for immediate and serious attention and action at the highest regional level.<sup>64</sup>

The concern expressed by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago can be readily appreciated. The spread of HIV/AIDS will have a negative impact on the health of the population and therefore on the economy of the Caribbean. Since it is a tourist destination, controlling the epidemic is also extremely important for the survival of the industry. Moreover, Prime Minister Denzil Douglas has warned that if the AIDS plague is allowed to go unchecked, it could effectively wipe out the economic gains made over the past four decades.

The negative impact of drugs on the social structure of the societies of the Community has become all too obvious. The drug culture has spawned anti-social behaviour, crime, and a 'get rich quick' attitude to life. Values of hard work and thrift and the postponement of consumption are being undermined. Urgent action will therefore need to be taken to stem the tide of drug use and traffic lest it overwhelms the countries of the region.

Education is regarded not only as a tool to protect Caribbean society from the onslaught on its traditional values but also as a critical element in promoting development. The lack of education also places the society at a disadvantage in terms of its capacity to compete in an increasingly knowledge-based culture. It also breeds poverty. On the latter point, The Prime Minister of Belize, Mr. Said Musa, has put the issue in perspective. 'Poverty is not simply the lack of material resources, but more fundamentally the lack of access to knowledge – technical knowledge, scientific and cultural

knowledge, sociopolitical and economic knowledge. It is our duty to provide this access to our peoples.’<sup>65</sup> Education is also necessary to ensure that people understand that unless the environment is properly protected, there will be degradation, which would in turn have an adverse impact on the region’s development.

## CONCLUSION

Reading the speeches collected in this volume was an instructive as well as an educative experience. They provided useful insights into the thinking of the leaders of the Community as they set out to build an integration movement that could respond to the historical ethos of the region and to bring to the people of the region, who had previously been buffeted by the harsh experience of history, the hope of a future based on progress and prosperity.

The Caribbean leaders courageously wrestled with the challenges facing the region and never relented or allowed themselves to be deflected by temporary failures or the intractability of the problems which they faced. From 1973 when the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed, through the vicissitudes of the 1980s, and into the new era of globalisation, in each period they kept their sights firmly on the goal of regional integration.

In several ways the Caribbean is a unique region and has developed a dynamic political culture. Its statesmen have consistently sought to articulate a vision of the evolution of the Community and have proceeded to translate that vision into action. This is what the leaders of the Caribbean Community have been doing over the last quarter of a century. Although, as may be expected, there have been failures, there have nevertheless also been conspicuous successes. The Caribbean Community remains one of the oldest integration movements in this region and continues to attract the attention of other leaders and institutions in the hemisphere. This is due to the fact that the region is still seen as a serious and dynamic agent for change and transformation.

I have written about the issues which the leaders of the Community have addressed over time. I need also to mention what was not given systematic consideration. There are two main issues which come to mind. If the Community is to realise its goal of occupying a single economic and social space, then it will have to give serious consideration to the establishment of a monetary union. Over the years, proposals for the establishment of a monetary union have appeared and disappeared from the regional agenda. On the occasions when it had been put on the agenda, it was not given in-depth treatment in the speeches of the leaders. In my view, serious thinking will have to be given to the question of whether the single economic space that is envisaged, with its attendant political implications, can be realised, if

the Community seeks to achieve this objective merely as an aggregation of sovereign states. Consideration should therefore be given to the creation of an English-speaking Caribbean Union.

All that has been said in the foregoing paragraphs are reflected in the speeches compiled in this volume. Eloquent, focussed and informative, they should become an integral part of the historical record available to the people of the region. This is the task I set out to accomplish in compiling the speeches of the Heads of Government of the region. The intention is to let the people and all those concerned with the integration movement understand what was conceived, what was actually accomplished and what was not.

The publication of these speeches is an important undertaking. It is the first time that some of the key speeches of the younger and newer leaders of the Community have been published in a single volume. I am confident that the people of the region will find them both informative and inspiring. There is also much in the speeches to suggest that the fate of the Community is in good hands.

One last word. Every so often in these speeches one finds an inspirational paragraph or the expression of an idea which not only defines the optimism reflected in the approach to the building of the integration movement but also captures a sense of the resilience and determination of leaders who are struggling to build a Caribbean House of Unity. The following paragraph aptly illustrates this point:

This state of affairs need not be seen as totally negative. The Caribbean is an area of the world that has managed to defy historical analysis. It has proved the pundits wrong in everything from political skills, to cricket, to educational achievement. Surely the leadership possesses the ingenuity required to chart harmonious pathways to that cherished goal of regional integration, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding.<sup>66</sup>

## ENDNOTES

1. Owen Arthur, 'From Chaguaramas to Port-of-Spain'— Address to the Twentieth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, July 1999.
2. Eric Williams, *Inward Hunger: The Education of a Prime Minister* (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1969), 176–7.
3. Owen Arthur, Address to the Twelfth Intersessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Barbados, February 2001.
4. Christoph Müllerleile, *CARICOM Integration: Progress and Hurdles: A European View*, (Kingston: Kingston Publishers, 1996), 37.
5. Ken Gordon, *Getting it Write: An Autobiography* (Kingston: Winning Caribbean Press Freedom.) (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 1999), 42

6. Ibid. 41.
7. Ibid
8. I wish to bring to the attention of Conference a report which appeared in the Trinidad Express of July 16, 1974, crediting me with having made certain statements which by themselves would appear to be calculated to militate against the success of this Conference. From time to time all of us have been made painfully aware of the mischief irresponsible reporting in some organs of the Press can create among the Governments and peoples of the Region. We are all also aware that there are forces working assiduously against the integration movement in the Caribbean and that these forces have redoubled their efforts in recent times as the success of our efforts becomes more apparent. It is in this context that I ask the Conference to view that article in its references of the leadership in the Region, and more specifically to my brother from Guyana. First of all, let me say categorically that I regret any pain which this report may have caused my co change his mind'.  
lleagues in general and my good friend Prime Minister Burnham in particular. I wish it to be recorded that we in St. Lucia fully appreciate the admirable efforts which Guyana has made in furtherance of the integration movement in the Caribbean and the many personal contributions which Mr. Burnham has made to its successes. The report which is given the appearance of a recent statement is in fact the result of an interview given some time ago and long since forgotten. This is not the time or place to go into the details concerning the remarks attributed to me; but let it be noted that the juxtaposition of questions and answers can be so presented to give a picture entirely different from that intended. All of us who have had the privilege of hosting the Heads of Government Conferences are aware of our duties as hosts and St. Lucia would never be guilty of deliberate discourtesy to any of her guests, especially when they are here as representatives of our sister States. I trust that these remarks of mine will lay to rest any misunderstanding which may have arisen among my colleagues.'
9. Guyana Chronicle, June 14, 1974.
10. L.F.S. Burnham, Address to the Third Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community. Mr. Burnham's actual words were 'Guyana's commitment to regional integration brooks no question. We should also, I suggest, Mr. Chairman, consider what we are going to integrate geographically. How many of us realise that Belize stands to lose the whole of its territory and we stand to lose two-thirds of Guyana and CARICOM runs the risk of being deprived of 67% of its geographic territory right now?'
11. The 'Good Officer' procedure, sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nations now governs the Guyana/Venezuela controversy. Under this procedure both countries have identified 'facilitators' who, reporting to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, are mandated to find a solution to the controversy. To date, there have been two 'Good Officers': Sir Alister McIntyre, a former secretary-general of the CARICOM Secretariat, and more recently, Mr. Oliver Jackman, a Barbadian lawyer and diplomat.

12. Both Guatemala and Belize have accepted a proposal presented by facilitators for both countries to the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States on August 30, 2002 for a resolution of their border dispute.
13. Denzil L. Douglas, Address to the Twenty-first Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Canouan, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, July 2000.
14. The UNCTAD Trade and Development Report described the crisis as 'the gravest economic crisis since the Great Depression'. 1981.
15. Dr. Kurleigh King, Address to the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Caribbean Development Bank, April 25–26, 1979.
16. Tom Adams, Address to the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, July 1983.
17. Edward Seaga, Address to the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, July 1983.
18. Ibid.
19. Herbert Blaize, Address to the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, St. Philip, Barbados, July 1985.
20. John Compton, Address to the Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Castries, Saint Lucia, July 1987.
21. Norman Girvan, 'Rally Round the West Indies' Remarks at the Launch of *The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival* edited by Kenneth O. Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001) Mona, University of the West Indies, August 31, 2001.
22. Vere Bird, Address to the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Nassau, The Bahamas, 1984
23. *The Caribbean Community in the 1980s: Report by a Group of Caribbean Experts: 1981*, 1.
24. Dame Eugenia Charles, Address to the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Ocho Rios, Jamaica, 1982.
25. Hugh Desmond Hoyte, Address to the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Grand Anse, Grenada, 1989.
26. That globalisation is not a new phenomenon is epitomised in the following quotation from Maynard Keynes' classic, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1920), 11 'The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trouble, in their prospective fruits and advantages; or he could decide to couple the security of his fortunes with the good faith of the townspeople of any substantial municipality in any continent that fancy or information might recommend'. What is new is the complex way in which globalisation brings

together different regions and social classes and the manner in which it has generated an exponential increase in trade, financial and production activities.

27. INTAL CARICOM Report No. 1 p. 23.
28. Owen Arthur, Address to the 22<sup>nd</sup> Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Nassau, The Bahamas, July 2001.
29. Norman Girvan, 'Rally Round the West Indies': Remarks at the Launch of The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival edited by Kenneth O. Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), Mona, University of the West Indies, August 31, 2001, 4.
30. Havelock Ross Brewster, Thomas Dolan, Taimoon Stewart, Implementation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy: Work in Progress. Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development (CGCED): 2.
31. Owen Arthur quoted in Norman Girvan's, 'Rally Round the West Indies' Remarks at the Launch of The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival edited by Kenneth O. Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publications, 2001), Mona, University of the West Indies, August 31, 2001.
32. H. D. Hoyte, Address to the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, July 1986.
33. John Compton: Address to the Expanded Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in Castries, Saint Lucia, July 1974.
34. Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, 'Forward, Together Now': Address to the Twenty-Second Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Nassau, The Bahamas, July 2001.
35. INTAL CARICOM Report No.1: op cit p. 67.
36. The other Institutions of the Caribbean Community are: the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA); Caribbean Meteorological Institute (CMI); Caribbean Meteorological Organisation (CMO); Caribbean Food Cooperation (CFC); Caribbean Environment Health Institute (CEHI); Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI); Caribbean Regional Centre for the Education and Training of Animal Health and Veterinary Public Health Assistants (REPAHA); Association of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP); Caribbean Centre for Development Administration (CARICAD); and Caribbean Food and Nutrition Institute (CFNI). The following are associate institutions of the Community: The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB); University of Guyana (UG); University of the West Indies (UWI); and Caribbean Law Institute/ Caribbean Law Institute Centre (CLI/CLIC).
37. Owen Arthur, 'From Chaguaramas to Port of Spain' – Address to the Twentieth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, July 1999.
38. Owen Arthur, Address to the Nineteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Castries, Saint Lucia, July 1998.
39. Duke Pollard, Revisiting Chaguaramas – Institutional Development in CARICOM since 1973: in The Caribbean Community – Beyond Survival edited by Kenneth O. Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), Mona, University of the West Indies, August 31, 2001, 223.

40. Communiqué issued at the end of the Special Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community – Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago, October 28–31, 1992.
41. Communiqué issued at the end of the Nineteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community – Castries, Saint Lucia 1998.
42. Duke Pollard, *The CARICOM System: Basic Instruments* (unpublished manuscript).
43. Duke Pollard, *The CARICOM System: Basic Instruments* (unpublished manuscript).
44. *The Caribbean Community – Beyond Survival* edited by Kenneth O. Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001) Mona, University of the West Indies, 227.
45. Duke Pollard, 'The Caribbean Court of Justice: Challenge and Response' in *The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival* edited by Kenneth O. Hall (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001) Mona, University of the West Indies, 278.
46. Dr. Kenny Anthony, Address to the Twenty-third Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, July 2002.
47. The judgement of the West Indian Commission on this matter makes for interesting reading: 'A CARICOM Supreme Court will require the provision of resources but, in one sense, this is like straining at a gnat when we have already swallowed a camel in terms of national expenditure on the judicial system. Even so, we should find ways of reducing costs. One way, we feel, is to locate the court in one place. We have already referred to the generous offer by Trinidad and Tobago; that is a great help. Another device might be to allow some of the members of the Court to remain in their home locations – other perhaps than the Chief Justice. Communications have improved so greatly, both physical communications and telecommunications, that savings can be explored in new and imaginative ways. Where the resources will be most needed will be in attracting and retaining the very best of our judicial talent for service on the Court. On this we cannot skimp; but it will be one of the most productive investments the Region can make in the interest of making CARICOM work and in the wider cause of civil society throughout our Region'.
48. Dr. Keith Mitchell, Address to the Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, July 1995.
49. Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana July 2002.
50. US Department of State: *International Information Programs: Sustainable Development: 'Developing Countries Need Assistance to Participate in Trade Talks, Say Experts'* March 01, 2002.
51. Anthony Payne & Paul Sutton, *Charting Caribbean Development* (Macmillan Education Ltd. 2001), 265.
52. *Ibid.*, 266.
53. IDB INTAL: *CARICOM Report 2002: Juan Jose Taccone and Uziel Nogueira (Coordinators)* p. 64.

54. INTAL CARICOM Report No.1: op cit p. 4.
55. Basdeo Panday, Address to the Eleventh Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis, March 2000.
56. INTAL CARICOM Report No. 1: op cit p. 61.
57. Martin Khor: Rethinking Globalization: Critical Issues and Policy Choices: 2001 pp. 22–23.
58. INTAL CARICOM Report No.1: op cit p. 56.
59. Manuel Esquivel, Address to the Sixteenth Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, July 1995.
60. Perry Christie, Address to the Twenty-third Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, July 2002.
61. Basdeo Panday, Address to the Eleventh Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Basseterre, St Kitts and Nevis, March 2000.
62. Bharrat Jagdeo, Address to the Twenty-third Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, July 2002.
63. Owen Arthur, Address to the Twenty-second Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Nassau, The Bahamas, July 2001.
64. Basdeo Panday, Address to the Eleventh Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis, March 2000.
65. Said Musa, Address to the Twenty-third Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Georgetown, Guyana, July 2002.
66. Dr. Denzil Douglas, Prime Minister of St. Kitts & Nevis, Address to the Twenty-first Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Canouan, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, July 2000.

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10.

## RE-INVENTING CARICOM: The Road to a New Integration



### INTRODUCTION

BETWEEN THE TIME OF ITS ESTABLISHMENT IN JULY 1973 and the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Caribbean Community has undergone profound change. It is in the process of transition from a Community to a Single Market and Economy. This transformation has proceeded from the recognition that the political and economic philosophies which underpinned its original structure are no longer applicable and could not accommodate the forces released by globalisation. This publication shows, through the study and analysis of the resolutions, communiqués and other documentation concerning the decision

taken by the Heads of Government of CARICOM for the period 1973 to 2000, how such a transition has come about.

These documents assume both validity and importance by virtue of the fact that, in the absence of a deliberative forum, they originate from the highest decision-making forum of the Community.

A greater appreciation of the task at hand is obtained by a brief description of the situation antecedent to the establishment of the Community. The Community arose out of a general trend of countries associating to form powerful economic blocs. In Europe which led the way; in Central America where the Central American Common Market (CACM)

was founded; in Africa where the East African Economic Community (EACM) was created; and in Asia where Asian blocs came into being, this phenomenon was pervasive. The significant implication of this development did not escape the Caribbean Leaders. One of the founding fathers, Dr. Eric Williams, then Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, noted in July 1963 that the Caribbean was about to:

enter a world dominated increasingly by regional groupings, both economic and political. Western Europe has succeeded, Africa is succeeding, and efforts are being made to translate the political association in the Western Hemisphere into Regional Economic Groupings the Latin American Free Trade Area and the Central American Common Market. Small countries like ours encounter great difficulty in establishing their influence in a world dominated by power and Regional Associations.<sup>1</sup>

In studying the history and documentation of the establishment and evolution of CARICOM, an important point emerges: A point which scholars, decision makers and other interested parties to Caribbean history and development must ponder upon. I first made this observation in the introduction to the publication *Integrate or Perish*: that while the movement towards the first phase of integration had a pronounced West Indian bias, everything that happened subsequent to the demise of the Federation has had a pronounced Caribbean orientation. Thus, we have moved from the West Indies Federation bias (which involved only those countries within the West Indian archipelago) to the Caribbean Community (which strives to include all the countries of the region). It is a matter that Dr. Norman Girvan has also taken up in his article 'El Gran Caribe'. This is how he has characterised it.

The new awareness seeped into the popular consciousness. By the 1960s, in the aftermath of constitutional independence, Anglophones had started to call themselves and their institutions 'Caribbean' rather than 'West Indian'. Note how the West Indies Federation gave way to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Today we have a host of other 'Caribbean' organisations: the CXC, CAREC, CARIRI, the CTO and many others. No matter that the membership of most of these institutions is exclusively or mainly Anglophone. What is significant is the subtle shift in proclaimed identity.<sup>2</sup>

It was not only a question of establishing the influence of the Caribbean States in international affairs, it was also the determination to avoid the looming threat of marginalisation and the challenges of economic development generally and specifically those associated with poverty and unemployment. This was and is beyond any single State in the Region. Unity had to be forged. The single objective of a unified and economically dynamic Community had to be sought. No credible alternative offered itself.

Recognising the need to proceed as a united entity, the Leaders of the Caribbean Community launched a set of initiatives which saw the region move from a Free Trade Area in 1968 to a full-fledged Community five years later. As was to be expected, this Community, politically, economically and institutionally, was coloured by the existing philosophical trends of the time. In consequence, the Community aimed primarily at self-containment and self-sufficiency.<sup>3</sup> This is well summed up by Arnold McIntyre when he says: "Traditionally, regional integration arrangements have tended to be inward-oriented with the expansion of trade and investment among Member States behind protective barriers."<sup>4</sup> CARICOM was not an exception but the difficulties encountered by the Community in the 1980s and the fundamental changes in the international system demanded a restructuring of this paradigm. The Nassau Understanding of 1984, the Grand Anse Declaration of 1989, in particular, and subsequent decisions of the Heads of Government Conference were to effect major and fundamental change in the political, economic and institutional architecture of CARICOM. This matter will be given greater treatment further on in this introduction.

Thus far, the developments of the Community have been sketched against a background of the zeitgeist of the period as defined by the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s. With the onset of the forces of globalisation, the leaders of the community understood that their approach to international affairs and its institutions had to undergo a major transformation. Beginning in 1989, a number of wide-ranging decisions were taken, with the intention of bringing the Community into the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

But the economic difficulties encountered by the Community in the 1980s, in particular and the radical and seminal developments of this decade, as characterised by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the forces of globalisation, demanded its restructuring. The leaders of the Community demonstrated that they were equal to the task. Two documents, the Nassau Understanding of 1984 and the Grand Anse Declaration of 1989, lay the foundation for a shift from a Community that was defined by the zeitgeist of the 70s to one that was equipped to face the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It would be pertinent to point out that at all times the nature of the task of taking the Caribbean into the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been understood. An example of this recognition is contained in the following Declaration:

We are convinced that as our people have uplifted themselves from the conditions of abject poverty to improving social and economic conditions, that they have risen from subjection to established democratic governance in free societies. As they have responded to the challenges of the last fifty years, they have summoned from within themselves the strength and creativity to succeed over the next fifty years and more.<sup>5</sup>

A fact that has been remarked upon is the return to a consensus on the internal arrangements of CARICOM. Before the tragic but seminal events surrounding the invasion of Grenada by the United States the first time it had done so to an English-speaking state in this hemisphere the Agreement that made the smooth working of CARICOM possible appeared to be disrupted by what was called "ideological pluralism". (A phrase coined by CARICOM leaders to indicate the varying ideologies of Member States of the Community. Ideological pluralism became pronounced in the 1980s after states such as Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada opted for socialism in contradistinction to the rest of the region which maintained a political and economic system based on traditional Western liberal democratic principles). After Grenada, this issue disappeared from the agenda and the Community returned to consensus on political arrangements characterised by a form of liberal democracy. It is this consensus that made possible the major shift in the approach to the development of a unified Community as compared to the competing path to development which some states had adopted.

Dr. Girvan got it right when, in explaining the revival of CARICOM in the 1990s, he noted

. . . the tendency towards ideological and policy convergence among Member States due to the debt and adjustment crisis of the 1980s; to the collapse of the Socialist experiments in Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana, and to the end of the Cold War... These developments paved the way for a regional consensus on the necessity from market-oriented policy reforms in domestic, economic management and for its correlate, 'Open Regionalism' as the model of regional integration. The shift was initiated in the Nassau Understanding of 1984.<sup>6</sup>

The Nassau Understanding is a remarkable document and quite emphatic in its purpose: "The governments are determined to steer the economies away from a situation of economic and social breakdown."<sup>7</sup> It sets out the task undertaken: "It essentially involves a conscious and determined shift to a new development path to accelerate development while adapting to major external or interior shocks in the economic system."<sup>8</sup> The Nassau Understanding also recognized "the intricacies of the development problem in the Caribbean."<sup>9</sup> While incomes per head may appear to be high in comparison to other developing countries, "these rest on rather fragile foundations."<sup>10</sup>

Having set down these general markers, this document is frank in its assessment as to where the Community is in economic terms. It identifies a 'sudden and sharp deterioration in the terms of trade'; 'an abrupt increase in external debt servicing'; a 'decline in the volume of major agricultural exports and local food production'; 'the depletion of major natural resources'; 'protracted fiscal deficits'; 'contraction on imports and economic growth'

and a paramount need for 'increasing deficiency of traditional sectors and developing non-traditional sectors.'<sup>11</sup>

Despite progress in industrial development, 'the manufacturing sector has not yet developed linkages with the rest of the economy, local entrepreneurship is not broadly based and the export capacity of this sector is rudimentary.' The productive sectors of the Caribbean. Norman Girvan: Rally Round the West Indies: Remarks at the Launch of the *Caribbean Community Beyond Survival*, edited by Kenneth O. Hall, Kingston: Ian Randle Publications, 2001. Mona, August 31, 2001 7 The Nassau Understanding: 5<sup>th</sup> Heads of Government Conference, Nassau, The Bahamas, 4-7 July 1984. economies 'are not yet in a position to provide sufficient employment opportunities for the growing labour force.'<sup>12</sup>

The Nassau Understanding saw solutions to the problems of the Caribbean Community in a better educated population, the harnessing of technology for productive purposes, a vital and vibrant private sector and an efficient public sector. In particular, the Region is urged to place emphasis on self-sufficiency in food. Good nutrition was also recognised as an important factor.

The Nassau Understanding represented a budget of the ills of the Caribbean Community and a prescription for its revitalisation and regeneration. The Grand Anse Declaration which had undertaken to "strengthen the Caribbean Community in all of its aspects" built on the Nassau Understanding as did several important documents issued by the Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community. From here on, the Community recognised that development is a multi-faceted exercise involving such critical questions as education, technology, health, nutrition and the environment.

In consequence, there was great emphasis placed on these matters in a number of the major declarations issued after the Nassau Understanding. The Kingston Declaration of 1990, for example, spoke to the importance of fostering human resources and sustainable development, while the Barbados Consensus promulgated entrepreneurial skills as being vital to the task of economic development. The education system, too, was regarded as an area that has to be completely revamped:

"The fundamental changes at the global level have created conditions in which economic well-being has become increasingly dependent on the availability of a highly educated and high skilled labour force capable of being re-trained to meet changing demands."<sup>13</sup>

The new approach to development and the revitalisation of the economies of the Caribbean Community must take place in the context of a democratic framework. Democracy in the new dispensation of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the Caribbean, as in the rest of the world, has come to be regarded as a facilitator for development. In addition, democracy is seen as

the principal link to that of “human rights, good governance, human dignity and the rule of law.”<sup>14</sup>

With these developments, CARICOM has put itself on the threshold of a new era of existence. A new concept of regionalism has emerged. The centrepiece of the new, or ‘open’ paradigm of integration is the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), whose completion the leaders of the Community have set different target dates. According to the latest six Annual Report of the Caribbean Community “Parliamentary Counsels of Member States had made significant progress in integrating the Nine Protocols into a single revised Treaty, with the anticipation that the new Treaty will be completed in 2001.” What does the Single Market involve? The intention is to create a single economic space for the five million people of the Community characterised by the freedom of movement of goods, services, labour and capital, with supportive fiscal, monetary and administrative arrangements.

Structurally, the Community has also undergone an institutional transformation. In order to involve the people more fully in the integration process, the Assembly of Caribbean Parliamentarians (ACCP) has been created. The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) has been established to mediate disputes and other misunderstandings which may occur among Member States of the Community.

In seeking to deepen its relations with Latin America and also to create opportunities in the context of the ‘new Regionalism’, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) has been established and significant players in the sub-region have subscribed to the Agreement. The belief is that the ACS can improve the bargaining power of the Caribbean Community both in the context of the factors of globalisation<sup>15</sup> and the creation of the Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA). It represents one of the significant developments of this period in that it seeks to expand regional structures of the Anglophone Caribbean to include non-English speaking countries. Dr. Norman Girvan in his “Notes on CARICOM, the ACS and Caribbean Survival” has noted:

The expansion of CARICOM’s membership and the establishment of CARIFORUM and of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) were key institutional expressions of this trend. Expansion of regionalism represented one of the responses to a changing external environment.<sup>16</sup>

The creation of the ACS is significant; a few words ought to be said about it. The concepts of ‘deepening’ as opposed to ‘widening’ have challenged the leaders of the Community. Before 1992 the former was the preferred option. However, with the establishment of the West Indian Commission, there was a change. It recommended the deepening of the Community while widening functional cooperation with the independent and non-independent States

of the Caribbean Basin. This idea became institutionalized with the coming into being of the ACS in 1994.

Given the structural transformation that the Community has undergone and the consequential orientation it has assumed political and economic the consensus has emerged that the Community ought to be equipped to respond to the challenges of the new Century and to take advantage of the opportunities offered.

A point needs to be made. In order to give some structure to the material covered, it has been necessary to arrange it according to periods. Periodisation has its difficulties but it is the only rational method which could bring some order and consistency to this documentary account of the journey that CARICOM has made from a Community to a Single Market. It would be in order to say also, that the periodisation is not uniform. For example, it makes sense to refer to the establishment of the Community as occurring between 1973 and 1975. However, when it comes to the critical phase of the Community's existence, during which the leaders of the Community were pre-occupied with economic matters, it makes eminent sense to give the end year as 1991, when a new phase of CARICOM was about to begin. The sections on functional co-operation and foreign policy are not susceptible to similar treatment, however, and the relevant periods are therefore set down in a uniform way.

The structure of this publication will follow the lines of the three main pillars of the integration movement: Economic Integration; Functional Co-operation; and Foreign Policy Coordination. Extracts from the Communiqués and Declarations will be given under the respective headings. Also, despite the general introduction, some attempt will be made to summarise the events which highlight the developments in the context of these three headings.

## **ECONOMIC INTEGRATION**

The economic integration envisaged by the Treaty of Chaguaramas in 1973 involved the removal of trade restrictions and the abolition of migratory constraints among CARICOM countries. Since the creation of the CARICOM, what quickly emerged was an emphasis on the question of free trade among the individual Member States. It is to be noted that with the establishment of the Community, there was a clear movement from the position where tariff and quantitative restrictions were abolished in order to boost trade, to one which incorporated the removal of restrictions on the freedom of movement. This should be borne in mind for when it arises later in the discussion on the creation of a single economic space, minus the restrictions on the movement of capital and labour.

Economic integration is one of the principal aims of CARICOM. It is provided for in the Annex to the Treaty of Chaguaramas. Five areas of activities are specified under the Treaty and these constitute the Common Market arrangements: Trade Liberalisation; the Common External Tariff (CET); the Common Protective Policy (CPP); Factor Mobility; Co-ordination of Economic Policies and Production Integration.

Despite these prescriptions of the Treaty, the emphasis as it evolved fell squarely on the question of Free Trade. The Community did and does experience many problems with the foregoing four of the five areas of activities. However, as the documents under review clearly establish, the main emphasis and concern of the leaders of the group was with Free Trade. Indeed, the expansion and deepening of the integration movement was linked to the question of Free Trade. In the period under consideration, that is, from 1973–2000, the question of Trade was liberally mentioned in the documents issued by the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community. In fact, those documents issued contained approximately 30 references to the question of Trade.<sup>17</sup>

The Free Trade Regime outlined in Chapter Three of the Common Market Annex is similar to that which obtained in the CARIFTA Agreement. The difference was that provision was made for concessions to the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) of the Community. Initially, intra-regional trade, which was intended to give effect to the implementation of a Free Trade Area, and which predated CARIFTA, had an auspicious beginning: It has been estimated that the value of intra-regional trade ballooned from US\$35.5 million in 1968 to US\$247.7 million in 1974, an increase of 700 per cent.<sup>18</sup> However, after the initial spurt in free trade, there was a precipitous decline. This was a consequence of the world economic crisis which was triggered by a substantial increase in the price of petroleum and its related products in the early seventies. The deliberations by the leaders of CARICOM underscored their deep concern about this matter and the need for corrective action. They recognised that a possible destruction of the Free Trade regime would have negative consequences for the larger issue of regional integration.

When the meetings of the Community resumed at Ocho Rios in Jamaica in 1982, Member States had been urged “to remove completely by the end of 1983, quantitative restrictions imposed on inter-regional trade since the establishment of the Common Market.”<sup>19</sup> The urgent need to revitalise intra-regional trade and to arrest its deterioration again seized the attention of the leaders of the Community, a fact dramatised by the expansion of extra-regional trade.<sup>20</sup> Measures to retrieve this situation were urged; practical steps recommended. Nevertheless, the Heads of Government at the 1987 Summit were constrained to note “with deep concern the continuing serious decline in the level of intra-regional trade and the fact that the value of intraregional imports in 1986 had declined to less than 50 per cent of the 1981 level.”<sup>21</sup>

The Nassau Meeting in 1984 in fact crafted the Nassau Understanding, which constitutes a comprehensive review of the economies of the Member States of the region and the recommendation for structural adjustment. The implementation of the measures identified under the Nassau Understanding, among other things, was expected to revitalise intraregional trade.

Intra-regional trade has not recovered the levels of the early days after the founding of the Community. But the point here is that its leaders did make every effort to ensure its revival and stability. It was not an easy task. Mechanisms such as the Caribbean Multilateral Clearing Facility (CMCF), which facilitate intra-regional trade, had a rather unfortunate existence as it folded after being in operation for several years. The consequences of the world crisis meant that most of the Member States of the Community were distracted from questions concerning intra-regional trade and focused on their survival (that is trade beyond the region). However, by the end of the century, there was some indication that intra-regional trade might have a better lease of life in the context of the Single Market and Economy.

One of the bugbears of intra-regional trade and the overall process of economic integration was the supervision of the question of debt. This issue of the debt burden came sharply into focus with the onset of the world economic crisis as it constrained economic growth. At Deep Bay, Antigua, in 1989, the Heads of Government reflected on

the intense nature of the debt crisis and took cognizance of the position now generally accepted by the international community that external debt of the developing countries could not now be paid as at present structured, given the prevailing economic realities.<sup>22</sup>

Previously, at Nassau, the Heads had recognised the gravity of the situation. The debt question therefore came under scrutiny in the Nassau Understanding and there too it was recognised that structural adjustment was an essential step in the resolution of this difficult problem. The debt question can be said to have abated in the late eighties and early nineties, but re-emerged as a matter of particular concern towards the end of the decade.

The solution to the problem of debt is usually cast in terms of the developed states making concessions to the developing states. However, in the context of CARICOM, there was a development which turned this generalisation on its head and which needs to be recorded. Most of the resources available under the CMCF had been utilised by Guyana to purchase petroleum products. As a result, the country had incurred a massive debt of US\$500 million to Trinidad and Tobago. The debt stood for a long time, but in 1996, Trinidad and Tobago was congratulated for "writing off a substantial proportion of Guyana's bilateral debt under Naples Terms."<sup>23</sup> The lesson,

here, is that the countries of the Caribbean should look among themselves for possible solutions to their own problems.

A study of the documentation shows that the economic integration of the Community has not proceeded as well as would have been expected; a situation that is common to all integration exercises, given the inherent fragility and weaknesses of the constituent states and the unpredictable nature of the international environment. The integration of production which was expected to be so fundamental an aspect of the integration process seems to have fallen off the agenda from the early days of the movement. Yet it was recognised as an essential element of the integration process. At the 7<sup>th</sup> Meeting of Heads of Government of Commonwealth Caribbean Countries in October 1972, for example, it was noted "that steps should be taken to integrate production within the Region by creating linkages between such activities in the various Territories of the Region."

It should be stated, however, that a definite move was made in this direction when Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Jamaica sought to set up an aluminium smelter. It was scuppered, however, when Jamaica signed agreements with Venezuela and Mexico to establish their own smelters. This brought on the anger of the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Dr. Eric Williams. Williams regarded the Jamaica Agreement as a violation that affected the three CARICOM MDCs (More Developed Countries).<sup>24</sup> The impact of this agreement should not be underestimated. It appears to have put to rest any further notion of the integration of production. There are no further references to this issue in the documents.

There are other issues that the Community has neglected to the detriment of the integration process. Food production, an important matter for the Caribbean, after its initial treatment by the Heads, has been left in abeyance.<sup>25</sup> The Regional Food Plan was first announced at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held in St. Lucia in 1975. An agreement was reached at that meeting:

"The Conference adopted proposals for a preliminary work programme for the Corporation including the development of a proposed livestock complex relating to milk and dairy products, mutton and lamb, pork, poultry, and hatching eggs."

The Regional Food Plan failed to achieve its objective even though the Region continues to expend substantial sums of money on the importation of food items, most of which are geared towards the tourist industry.

What is said in relation to the Regional Food Plan, also applies with equal force to the fate of the Regional Energy Plan, Regional Air Transportation and other schemes intended to promote the economic integration of the Region.

The failure of the Federation casts a long and gloomy shadow in the sense that any suggestion of a supranational authority or effective mechanisms for the implementation of decisions taken by the Community are carefully avoided. An example of this remarkable fact can be found in the document. The Secretary General of the Community Secretariat was mandated at the Fifth Heads of Government Conference, "to conduct a study, in consultation with Member States, of the system of decision making in the Community in respect of which consideration could be given to the introduction of the voting procedure other than by unanimous vote."<sup>26</sup> Nothing was done and this matter was raised again at the Sixth Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference but still failed to become a major consideration until the publication of the West Indian Report.

Monetary Union is also an important aspect of any integration process. This was demonstrated recently when 12 European States covering some 300 million people agreed to accept a single currency. Commentators observed that this development constituted a major fillip to the cementing of the integration of the European Union. The importance of a single currency has also been the subject of deliberation by the Heads of Government Conferences of the Caribbean Community. However, the treatment of this issue does not appear to have been consistent or vigorous.

The first substantive reference to this matter came at the 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference held in Trinidad & Tobago in July 1992. At that meeting the Heads received a report from the Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago on the progress made towards monetary union. "They noted that the Report however proposed that the movement towards monetary union to take place in three phases with the goal of attaining full union by the year 2000."<sup>27</sup> Former Presidents Burnham and Hugh Desmond Hoyte of Guyana, and the Prime Minister of Barbados, Mr. Owen Arthur,<sup>28</sup> have raised the question of the political direction of the integration movement quite frontally. In this regard, it is instructive to note what was published in the booklet produced by the Ministry of Finance of Trinidad & Tobago in September 1959 and which is widely regarded as having been written by Dr. Eric Williams:

Only a powerful and centrally directed economic co-ordination and independence can create the true foundations of a nation. Barbados will not unify with St. Kitts or Trinidad with British Guiana or Jamaica with Antigua. They will be knit together only through their common allegiance to a central government.

Going into the issues which make for economic integration in great detail is not the objective of this exercise. Some of the important issues have been selected and discussed. The related documentation gives an idea of the scope and complexity of economic integration.

## FUNCTIONAL CO-OPERATION

Functional cooperation has enjoyed a measure of success, but here again this important aspect of the Treaty of Chaguaramas predates CARICOM; it existed at the time of the Federation. Functional co-operation has made important contributions to the life of the Community and its peoples. It has done so in the areas of education, health, meteorology, culture and sports.

In the field of education, the University of the West Indies, predating CARICOM, is an outstanding regional achievement. The University has played an important part in undertaking studies essential to the creation of the first phase of the Integration Movement and continues to be a valuable pillar of support. In recent times, it has been at the forefront of improving, sustaining the resource base of the Community. These activities are most likely to be beneficial to the Caribbean Community in the long term.

With the help of the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO), an array of Regional Institutions has been established. Member States have benefited accordingly. In the 80s the Caribbean Environmental Health Institute (CEHI), based in Saint Lucia, came into being. It coordinates a number of environmental projects supported by Donor Agencies. The Caribbean Epidemiology Centre hosted by the Government of Trinidad and Tobago, co-ordinates the epidemiological surveillance throughout the Region and recently, there has been co-operation in the area of dealing with HIV/AIDS, health protection and maternal and childcare efforts. The Caribbean Regional Drug Testing Laboratory, established in Jamaica, provides common services aimed at securing the safety of pharmaceuticals consumed in the Region. These are only a few of the areas in which much progress has been made regarding Functional co-operation. Others can be added. In the words of the Report of the West Indian Commission: "The work of coordinating regional endeavours, sponsoring and supporting Community Institutions, and providing common services across the Region continues to be pursued through all the vicissitudes of the CARICOM experience."<sup>29</sup>

However, it is debatable whether the potential in this area has been optimised. There are particular areas of failure, or, perhaps more accurately, zones of mixed fortune. This can be gleaned from a reading of the declarations, resolutions and communiqués issued by the Conference of Heads of Government. Functional co-operation in the areas of sports, labour, tourism, health, transportation has taken place but there is a school of thought which believes that the activities in this regard can be broadened and expanded.

In the area of culture, in particular, the Community can still take advantage of the cultural dynamism of the Region and transmute its obvious potential into a source of major economic benefits. The documents studied do not convince an understanding that the Region has a major cultural

product which could be available for markets beyond it, or that there is an appreciation that culture is an important and serious component of development.

## CO-ORDINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Article 17 of the Treaty of Chaguaramas provides for 'the fullest possible co-ordination of foreign policies within their respective competencies.' Article 34 of the Common Market Annex includes provision for Member States to "seek" progressive co-ordination of their trade relations with third countries or a group of third countries.

The Community has been successful in particular areas. It is a well-known fact that it played a leading role in establishing the ACP Group. In the words of the Report of the West Indian Commission, the Community has been outstanding in its role of "conceiving, designing and negotiating the Lom Convention which has become by far the most important conduit of benefits from the EEC to a large part of the developing World."<sup>30</sup> In this regard, it should be noted that the following observation was made in 1974 before the signing of the Georgetown Accord by which African, Caribbean and the Pacific States agreed to negotiate with the EEC as a single entity: "Conference reviewed the progress of the negotiations between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and reaffirmed its commitment to a joint Caribbean approach within the ACP Group."<sup>31</sup>

Decisions taken by some leaders of the Community in 1972 prepared the ground for the recognition of Cuba and co-operation with that country, which continues to this day a CARICOM/Cuba Joint Commission crisis. The Community took this position, despite the fact that the major power of the Region, the United States, sought Cuba's isolation. Space does not permit a detailed account of the Foreign Policy successes of the Region. Suffice it to say, the Community has been a valued shield in assisting Guyana and Belize in protecting their sovereignty and territorial integrity and enabling both Member States to exercise their right to sit in the Councils of the Organisation of American States (OAS), from which they had been debarred for many years.

The Community has also successfully asserted its position on major regional economic questions such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), the Enterprise of the Americas Initiative (EAI) and more recently the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). A new relationship appears to have been with the leading hemispheric power, the USA, and institutions have been created to mediate that relationship.

The trade relations between the United States assumed a more serious character after the Caribbean USA Summit on May 10, 1997, in Bridgetown,

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Barbados, at which the Bridgetown Partnership for Prosperity and Security was adopted. This document envisaged, according to the decision reached at the 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting of the Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Community held in Trinidad and Tobago in July 1992 that emphasis would be placed on “the importance of expanding trade relations with the USA”. The next meeting between the US Government and the Caribbean Community “welcomed the arrangements for annual consultations between the Foreign Ministers of the Caribbean and the US Secretary of State and recognised the need for urgent and intense follow up to the decisions adopted at the Caribbean USA Summit.”<sup>32</sup>

The Community has had a long association with Latin America. The advocacy has always been to pursue closer ties with this region. Apart from being a member of the Rio Group, the Community has Mixed Commissions with Mexico, Cuba and Colombia. At the 12<sup>th</sup> Heads of Government Conference, Caribbean Leaders “noted the intensification of relations between CARICOM and Latin American states at both the bilateral and regional levels.”<sup>33</sup>

The Community has also engaged the Central American region at the highest level. Notable in this regard is the following Declaration in July 1992 in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago: “They (HOG) particularly welcomed the developments aimed at the strengthening of relations between the Caribbean Community and the countries of Central America, particularly the convening in Honduras in January 1992 of the First Ministerial Conference between CARICOM and the Countries of the Central American Isthmus.”<sup>34</sup>

The Community has also maintained good relations with the major international organisations and institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Discussions have been held with the Heads of these institutions at various times. The Presidents of Mexico and Venezuela have also engaged the Community Leaders in discussions, the results of which are reflected in the documents issued by the relevant conferences.

But the Grenada imbroglio demonstrated that competing national interest and different strategic perceptions could undermine the Community’s ability to present a united front to the World. Also, the fierce national pride that goes with the spirit of nationalism has been an obstacle for joint representation. Failure to co-ordinate the Foreign Policy of the Community has led to disappointment and psychological setback, as in the case of Grenada. This is aptly described by the West Indian Commission: “With disappointing frequency we fail to combine our disparate voices when it would be appropriate to do so, yet we have had sufficient success when acting and negotiating together ...”<sup>35</sup>

## END NOTES

1. Dr. Eric Williams: Address to the First Conference of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago, July 1963.
2. Norman Girvan: El Gran Caribe: John Clifford Sealy Memorial Lecture, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, April 5, 2001. [www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/3954/](http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/3954/)
3. Arnold McIntyre: The Caribbean Community and External Negotiations: The Caribbean Community – Beyond Survival edited by Kenneth O. Hall: p. 682
4. The leaders of the Community in 1983 were seeking ‘self-sufficiency through inter-regional trade’. Fourth Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 4–8 July 1983, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.
5. Montego Bay Declaration: 18<sup>th</sup> Heads of Government Conference, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 4 July 1997. Two more assertions of this kind are worth noting:
  - (i) “The entire history of the Region, notably from the phase of emancipation to political independence, has represented a triumph of human assertiveness over deeply entrenched prejudices and powerful institutional and political constraints.”
  - (ii) “The Region must once again demonstrate its capacity to shake loose from traditional modes and practices in assuming responsibility for its destiny.”
6. Norman Girvan: “Rally Round the West Indies”: Remarks at the launch of the Caribbean Community Beyond Survival, edited by Kenneth O. Hall, Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001. Mona, August 31, 2001
7. The Nassau Understanding: 5<sup>th</sup> Heads of Government Conference, Nassau, The Bahamas, 4–7 July 1984.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Creative and Productive Citizens for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century c.f. The World Bank’s assertion: “Until the primary schools can significantly improve the performance level of their graduates, and secondary Schools and tertiary institutions offer a sound education for a much larger proportion of the age group than is currently the case, it is unlikely that most Caribbean countries’ labour force will be capable of supporting a developing strategy dependent more on human than natural resources.” (Norman Girvan: Societies at Risk? The Caribbean and Global Change: p.29 [www.unesco.org/most/girvan.htm](http://www.unesco.org/most/girvan.htm).)
14. Bridgetown Declaration of Principles, Bridgetown, Barbados, 10 May 1997.
15. Dr. Anthony Bryan in his testimony to the American House Committee on International Relations stated that “...the ACS have a population of 216 million, an accumulated GDP of US\$506 billion, and does approximately US\$180 billion in merchandise trade. In a real sense, these statistics are an indication of the economic potential of a Caribbean bloc that is emerging.”
16. Norman Girvan: “Notes on CARICOM, the ACS, and Caribbean Survival”: Prepared for the Conference on “Caribbean Survival and the Global Challenge in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century” Institute of International Relations, University of the

West Indies, Trinidad and Tobago, March 20–22, 2000. [www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/3954/](http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Library/3954/)

17. Further references to Trade will be found in Section IV
18. Boxhill, Ian, *CARICOM: Its Shortcomings and the Case for Ideology of Regionalism*, German Common Market Studies.
19. 3<sup>rd</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 15–18 November 1982, Ocho Rios, Jamaica.
20. 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 4–7 July 1984, Nassau, Bahamas.
21. 8<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 29 June–3 July 1987, Castries, St. Lucia.
22. 10<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 4–8 July 1989, Deep Bay, Antigua.
23. 17<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 3–6 July 1996, St. Michael, Barbados.
24. Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad were given equity shares of 33%, 33% and 34% in an aluminium smelter which was to be established in Trinidad. Jamaica, however, sought Bauxite supplies from Venezuela. The Project never got off the ground. Eric Williams objected to this course of action because he believed that it represented an assault on the agreement to build the smelter. The conflict clearly arose from different views of the States of Latin America. Williams saw them as a threat to the integrity of the Region; Manley saw them as a partner in development. Williams' position is polemically set out in his address to the PNM entitled "The Threat to the Caribbean Community in the Seventies."
25. The Caribbean imports some US\$35 billion worth of food and as late as 1982.
26. 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 4–7 July 1984, Nassau, The Bahamas.
27. 13<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 29 June–2 July 1992, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago. It is to be noted too that "Steps towards a Single Currency" was one of the recommendations of the West Indian Commission. The Prime Minister of Trinidad & Tobago had reported to the Third Inter Sessional Meeting on the 19<sup>th</sup> February 1992 in Kingston, Jamaica, and had indicated "that the relevant technical issues are under study."
28. *Integrate or Perish: Perspectives of Leaders of the Integration Movement 1963–1999* edited by Kenneth O. Hall p.xvii.
29. Report of the West Indian Commission, p 41.
30. *Ibid*, p. 42.
31. Inaugural Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community held on 15–18 July 1974 in Castries, St. Lucia.
32. 8<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 30 June 4–July 1997, Montego Bay, Jamaica.
33. 12<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 2–4 July 1991, Basseterre, St. Kitts
34. 13<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, 29 June–2 July 1992, Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago
35. West Indian Report Op cit p. 42

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
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# 11.

## CONTENDING WITH DESTINY: The Caribbean in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century



### INTRODUCTION

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, THE Caribbean stands literally at the crossroads of history, reflecting upon its past while contemplating its future and seeking in the process to fashion its destiny. In fact, the region faces the dual challenge of formulating suitable national and regional policies and strategies designed to accelerate the pace of development, to strengthen governance structures, to promote social stability and to nurture its cultural creativity while at the same time, seeking to respond effectively to the challenges presented by the phenomena of globalisation and economic liberalisation which

have exercised a dominant influence on the structure of contemporary international relations.

In terms of domestic economic policy, beginning in the 1980s, most of the countries of the region embarked at one stage or another, on IMF/World Bank sponsored economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes. The programmes emphasised increased private sector involvement in the economy and a corresponding reduction in the role of government, together with increased reliance on market forces in the regulation of the economy. The adoption of a viable exchange rate regime and an appropriate interest rate policy geared to controlling inflation

constituted essential elements of the overall adjustment framework. The results of the various adjustment programmes were, however, mixed. While some governments have succeeded in controlling inflation and reducing public sector deficits, the achievement of a sustained level of growth has proved elusive and the social impact of adjustment has borne heavily on the population in these societies.

Against this background, there is an urgent need to revisit conventional economic policies and to adopt creative strategies capable of generating higher levels of growth with equity. This will require not only the formulation of more expansive macroeconomic policy framework but also the adoption of specific strategies geared to increase economic diversification based on the identification of new patterns of production of goods and services, including the promotion of niche manufacturing and other knowledge-based industries. Such a strategy would also require the development of adequate human resources and the incorporation of new and innovative forms of technology and also the application of techniques for the organisation of production, such as flexible specialisation and cross functional management principles, in order to increase productivity and the overall competitiveness of the economies.

At the political level there is a growing debate on the need to re-orient existing governance structures by promoting effective constitutional change and suitable public sector reforms designed to modify some elements of the Westminster Model which has served as the dominant constitutional form in the region since political independence. Indeed, the establishment of an effective system of governance, based on people empowerment and increased decentralisation of decision making, is seen as a critical element in promoting an optimal level of human development.

Similarly, the demand for increased social equity as a basis for social stability will require that greater attention be paid to the equitable distribution of the benefits of development and the adoption of specific measures to ensure the increased allocation of resources to the poor and vulnerable in the society.'

In the area of culture, the region has developed vibrant and dynamic expressions of art and music which have achieved international recognition and acclaim. This cultural vitality must therefore be sustained and enriched through the adoption of suitable policies designed to promote art and culture as an integral aspect of the overall development of the region.

The challenges facing the Caribbean have been further complicated by the fundamental changes that have occurred in the traditional structure of international relations during the past decade. The end of the Cold War, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a hegemonic order in which the USA as the sole remaining superpower, exercises virtually unchallenged power and influence, has fundamentally

altered the overall power equation in the international system. This development has, in turn, diminished the geo-political and geo-strategic significance of the Caribbean region, and has therefore reduced its bargaining position in both the hemispheric and the wider global system. As a result, the Caribbean is faced with increased competition for scarce resources and already there is evidence of a significant decline in external resources made available to the region.

The implication of this development is that in the future, the bulk of the resources for development would need to be generated from domestic sources, hence the need is not only to optimise the use of such resources but also to adopt suitable investment strategies that will generate increased returns to the region.

At the same time, the process of globalisation which exercised a profound influence on international economic relations also has major implications for the Caribbean. A number of the philosophical elements of the newly emerging global order are in fact embodied in the series of far-reaching agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations on issues such as investment, services, intellectual property rights and agriculture which, if the developed countries have their way, are likely to be supplemented by additional agreements on new issues such as competition policy, environment, labour standards and procurement. At the institutional level, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), has been established as a forum to facilitate negotiations on trade-related issues and as an instrument for the promotion of a liberalised global trading regime. The process of globalisation and liberalisation, which together define the content and orientation of the emerging global order, is therefore likely to result over time in the creation of a predominant reciprocity based on international trading systems and thus progressively erode the preferential trading arrangement previously accorded to the Caribbean and other developing countries in recognition of their special needs and circumstances.

These developments have important consequences for the Caribbean which has benefitted from a wide range of preferences under the ACP/EU Lomé Convention, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the Caribbean/Canada Preferential Accord (CARIBCAN). Indeed, the strictures contained in the WTO ruling against the preferential arrangements for Caribbean banana exports to the European Union are likely to have an adverse impact on banana exports which play such a central role in the economies of the Eastern Caribbean.

However, as recent events in East Asia have shown, globalisation is not an unmixed blessing and in fact has major implications for the Caribbean and other developing countries, particularly in terms of the liberalisation of financial markets. In light of the East Asian experience, which sent ripples throughout the international financial system, serious concerns have been

raised regarding the efficacy of the neo-classical economic assumptions which inform the process of globalisation. In view of the importance of these issues and their implications for the region, the Caribbean cannot afford to stand aside from the debate but must instead become intellectually engaged in the process in an effort to influence the content of international development policy.

Given the realities described above the Caribbean is forced to deal not only with the broad issue of globalisation in the context of the WTO but would also need to address, simultaneously, its specific relations with the European Union in the context of the ACP/ EU Lomé Convention and also its participation in the negotiations on the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). In so doing, the region would need to reconcile its commitment to the integration process within CARICOM with the obligations to be incurred in the context of the various arrangements mentioned above. In this regard, it should be pointed out that CARICOM remains an important instrument for optimising the development potential of its member states. However, there is an urgent need to make the transition from trade integration to production integration in order to rationalize the use of resources within an integrated development framework and thus strengthen the capacity of the region to deal with the external economic environment.

Indeed, faced with these challenges, the Caribbean would need to pursue a policy of concentric diplomacy systematically aimed at reinforcing its relations with economic and trading groups as well as function cooperative arrangements involving the countries of the wider Caribbean, the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), Latin America as a whole, the hemispheric system as well as extra-regional groupings and ultimately, the global system. At the political level, the countries of the region would also need to participate actively in the work of the Group of 77 which exercises important diplomatic influence in the international system. The forging of such alliances without groupings will not only enable the region to secure economic benefits from such arrangement but would also enable it to pursue joint diplomatic initiatives with such groups aimed at influencing the shape and content of the emerging global order in a manner consistent with its interests. Finally, the region would need to strengthen its negotiating capacity both at the national and regional level based on arrangements such as those embodied in the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) or an appropriate variation of it.

The Caribbean therefore faces a number of major challenges in the twenty-first century in seeking to ensure that it not only survives economically but that it lays the foundation to participate as a viable actor in the international system.

Apart from adopting appropriate macroeconomic policies geared to the promotion of an accelerated pace of development, it will also need to address on an urgent basis, specific issues such as production and employment, education, health, human resources development, environmental protection and poverty eradication as well as social stability and cultural cohesion, particularly in societies such as Guyana and to some extent, Trinidad and Tobago, which are characterised by ethnic polarisation and the strengthening of governance structures designed to improve efficiency in decision-making and promote increased popular participation, all of which are critically important in the promotion of the well-being of the people of the region, who are the ultimate beneficiaries of development. In addition, the region would need to fashion increasingly, sophisticated strategies for dealing with the external environment which exercises an important influence on its economic viability and political survival.

All of these issues are addressed in one way or another in the various papers which make up this publication. Indeed, the papers cover a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from broad philosophical concerns relating to the conception and definition of the Caribbean, the validity of conventional assumptions and categories of analysis, to more specific questions such as economic policy options, governance structures, science and technology, including information technology, education, social integration, political theory, international relations, gender, art, literature and the creative imagination.

**Part I** which is entitled *Strategic Perspectives for the Future* sets out the ideas expressed by Prime Minister Basdeo Panday of Trinidad and Tobago, Prime Minister Percival J. Patterson of Jamaica, Prime Minister Owen Arthur of Barbados and Edwin Carrington, Secretary-General of CARICOM, on strategies that should be adopted by the Caribbean in the future. In this regard Prime Minister Panday sees the creative imagination of the Caribbean people as is reflected in the contributions of Sir Arthur Lewi, CLR James, Vidia Naipaul, Derek Walcott, Bob Marley, The Mighty Sparrow and others, as the region's greatest asset. For this reason, he laments the fact that despite its tremendous creative talents, the region is dominated by the hegemony of the American media. He therefore poses the question whether the region should not contemplate the establishment of a major film and video production industry, with the University of the West Indies providing appropriate training in this area. Prime Minister Panday also emphasises the importance of the development of human capital in order to enable the people of the region to contribute to the development of twenty-first century technologies. He therefore calls upon the University of the West Indies to lead the way in effecting this vital transformation of Caribbean societies.

Prime Minister Patterson underlines the fact that in the face of increased competition at the global level, the Caribbean would need to improve

economic efficiency and also develop new lines of production designed to production capitalise on niche market opportunities. He also identifies technological change as a critical element of the overall development process and therefore calls for increased attention to be paid to the training of science and technology personnel by the University of the West Indies and other tertiary institutions in the region. Prime Minister Patterson calls upon the region to harness the creative energies of its people in order to lay the foundations for increased economic prosperity in the twenty-first century.

Prime Minister Arthur believes that the Caribbean faces unprecedented challenges as it enters the twenty-first century which would require a number of strategic responses. In seeking to formulate such responses, he rejects many of the assumptions of the Washington Consensus with its uncritical reliance on market forces and the imposition of a number of limitations on the role of the state in the economic sphere. On the contrary, Prime Minister Arthur feels that the role of the state is critical in putting in place the necessary infrastructural and institutional arrangements to ensure the development of a competitive capacity in the economies of the region. Similarly, he argues that current approaches to the globalisation also threaten a number of Caribbean economies with marginalisation. He therefore advocates a more strategic approach by counties of the region towards integration in the global economy. In the faces of these challenges, Prime Minister Arthur identifies a number of elements that could form the basis of a comprehensive strategy, namely the adoption of long term strategic planning instead of crisis intervention, the abandonment of the primacy accorded to the traditional North Atlantic economic relationship, based on preferential arrangements, in favour of a new global focus, the adoption of a 'managed market' approach in the formulation of economic policy, the pursuit of new forms of governance based on consensus building and increased popular participation as key elements of the overall political culture.

Edwin Carrington, Secretary-General of CARICOM highlights the profound nature of the changes that have occurred in recent years at both the regional and international level. He feels therefore that the Caribbean will need to master the art of managing change which will involve major adjustments in the polity, economy and culture of the region. He believes that a successful response to the challenge of change will also depend on the mobilisation of the human resources of the region which will in turn require the removal of the obstacles that have traditionally stood in the way of the more effective participation of women in all aspects of the society. Carrington also emphasises the need for the Caribbean to establish creative relationships at the regional, hemispheric and international level in order to deal effectively with the challenges that it will face in the twenty-first century.

It should be pointed out that all four of the papers call upon the University of the West Indies to play a leading role in assisting the region to articulate a vision for coping with the challenges of the twenty-first century.

In **Part II**, dealing with *The Caribbean – Geography, Culture, History and Identity*, Norman Girvan raises a number of questions regarding the traditional conception of the Caribbean as a geographical entity. He argues that in the future, it may be more appropriate to conceive the Caribbean as an 'ethno-cultural zone' encompassing not only the countries within the purely geographical limits of the region but also the Caribbean diaspora located in various metropolitan centres. Havelock Ross-Brewster advocates the creation of a Union of West Indian States based on the 'cultural capital' existing in the region. He nevertheless sounds a pessimistic and cautionary note since he questions the efficacy of the Single Market and Economy on which CARICOM governments have embarked. For Ross-Brewster, the region would need to fashion a common vision and philosophy to give direction to the various negotiations being conducted in the context of the ACP/EU Lomé Convention, the FTAA and the WTO. Byron Blake, on the other hand, feels that the Caribbean governments should give priority to the management of the Caribbean Sea and that they should also seek to widen the current integration process in CARICOM. Moreover, he feels that the University of the West Indies should spearhead the development of a programme of educational exchange between universities in the anglophone Caribbean and those in the Spanish and French Caribbean as well as in Central America. Verene Shepherd, focusing on a somewhat narrower aspect of the Caribbean reality, deals with the 'identity crisis' within the Afro-Caribbean segment of the population, which she feels will need to be resolved urgently if the region is to enter the twenty-first century with a truly liberated psyche. She feels that this could be achieved by ensuring that history education is not based solely on Eurocentric texts of the imperial historians but is instead grounded in the alternative perspectives of the new generation of historians who bring a more indigenous appreciation to bear on the interpretation of the Caribbean historical experience. For her part, Jessica Bryon identifies migration as an integrative force in the region. She feels that the focus on intergovernmental structures as a means of promoting regional integration has distracted attention from the possibilities of migration as an instrument for the promotion of Caribbean integration. Byron also believes that the integration effort has focused too narrowly on the English-speaking Caribbean and has therefore tended to perpetuate the divisions of the colonial past.

In respect of **Part III**, *Economic Policy Options in the Twenty-first Century*, Omar Davies sees the challenge of economic policy in terms of the establishment of a balanced relationship between the government and the private sector in support of development objective. In fact, he believes that economic progress will depend critically on the forging of a creative

partnership between government and the private sector. Davies also argues that the increased emphasis on individualism has detracted from the commitment to a national and Caribbean regional identity which he feels is an important issue to be resolved during the twenty-first century. Clive Thomas, on the other hand, advances the proposition that in response to the changes in the global economy, Caribbean governments have adopted a model of macroeconomic management which impacts adversely on the trajectory of growth and threatens the reversal of development priorities with negative consequences for mass-based democratic politics. He feels therefore that urgent steps will need to be taken to correct this policy stance if the Caribbean is to realise its full potential in the twenty-first century. Reflecting a private sector perspective, Felipe Noguera argues that the profound scientific and technological revolution that has occurred in recent years has spawned a new social formation in the form of the Info-Media Society grounded in the concept of a borderless world in terms of communication and commerce and has also created new modes of production. He feels that in order to respond to these challenges, the public and private sectors as well as civil society in the region must forge a 'smart partnership' and that a transformed education system, under the leadership of the University of the West Indies, should serve as the engine for innovation and the transformation of the economies in the region into high quality, competitive exporters of refined products.

**Part IV**, which deals with *Science, Technology and Sustainable Development* highlights the importance of human capital formation and technology in the development process. Han Reichgelt points to the fact that the 'open nature' of the internet and the comparatively low cost involved in setting up e-business operations, offer new possibilities for the region. However, in order to exploit these possibilities, it will be necessary for the region to make a concerted effort to put in place arrangements for the training of programmes and software engineers who are currently not available in sufficient numbers. Anthony Clayton examines the impact of technological change on higher education, with special reference to the development of the multi-media mega-university along the lines of the model of the Open University in Britain which was designed specifically to deliver mass distance education. He advances the provocative thesis that these developments could lead to the demise of the traditional teaching university with lectures and students in a fixed location, who are likely to lose market share to powerful consortia of research universities and communication corporations which increasingly see themselves as having a role in knowledge distribution. Clearly, the region would need to monitor closely, developments in these areas which are likely to have a profound impact on the model of knowledge creation and distribution in the twenty-first century. Similarly, Mohammed Ahmad emphasises the importance

of biotechnology and predicts that the twenty-first century will witness a struggle between information technology and biotechnology in terms of their relative importance and their overall impact on development. Based on the experience of the experiments in biotechnology carried out by the University of the West Indies, Ahmad argues, that in order for the region to capitalise on this technology, it will need to focus attention on the rapid commercialisation of successful research in an effort to achieve what Ahmad has termed the 'bio-industrialisation' of small economies. Anthony Johnson advances the thesis that the main challenge facing the region in the twenty-first century is to apply scientific methods to improve the standard of living of the people of the region on the basis of long-term sustainability.

**Part V, *Social Integration and Disintegration***, focuses upon the important issue of social cohesion and stability which have come under increased pressure in a number of ++societies in the region as a result of increasing levels of economic and social deprivation and also, in some cases such as Guyana, as a result of ethnic rivalry. Ralph Premdas starts from the proposition that 'Caribbean people are new arrivals who have had to reconstruct their identities, having lost most of what they had in the transmigration from the Old World'. Like Girvan, he sees the Caribbean as extending beyond the confines of the Caribbean Sea and also embracing Caribbean communities located in various metropolitan centres, mainly the USA, Canada and the UK. He feels therefore that the region will need to make a special effort to overcome the imperially constructed barriers and differences that have been consolidated into ethno-linguistic compartments in order to achieve a viable social integration. Taking a cue from Philip Curtain, Barry Chevannes analyses the problem of social integration in the context of his conception of 'two Jamaicas' separated by wealth, class and culture. In so doing, he rejects the validity of MG Smith's concept of 'cultural pluralism' as well as the Marxist praxis as satisfactory explanations of this complex reality. Instead, he advances the concept of 'code-switching' to explain how the two Jamaicas 'have not only coexisted but have together formed an apparent status quo which gives the appearance of social integration through a common value system' although, in his view, the reality is quite different. In his paper, Tyrone Ferguson focuses on the issue of social integration in the context of adjustment and globalisation. He argues that the implementation of structural adjustment programmes in Caribbean societies has proved to be socially disruptive, particularly in multi-ethnic societies such as Guyana in which it 'introduces serious tensions in inter-ethnic relations'. He therefore asserts that, in the context of the negative impact of a reliance on market forces implicit in adjustment programmes, the government should play a critical role in promoting social integration and cohesion in order to avoid the dangers of social disintegration. What is required in his view, therefore, is a 'new functional synthesis of state,

market and civil society'. In examining gender roles in the Caribbean in the context of a process of increasing urbanisation, Patricia Mohammed asserts that the quality of human life is the fundamental question that should preoccupy the region in the twenty-first century. She feels that urbanisation and technological innovation have blurred the traditional sex-based division of labour and therefore new approaches will need to be adopted in order to further clarify gender roles in Caribbean society as a basis for promoting social integration. Carol Narcisse, in reflecting upon contemporary social realities in the region, identifies a number of factors such as race and ethnicity, political tribalism and patronage, economic crisis and widening income gaps, which have contributed to social disintegration. Given this reality, she documents a number of survival strategies that have been adopted by various segments of the society, most notably the poor and vulnerable, to cope with economic and social deprivation.

In **Part VI** dealing with *Caribbean Thought and the Political Process*, Trevor Munroe affirms the virtues of transparency, accountability, participation and consensualism as the foundation of effective governance. He also confidently asserts that in the same way the Caribbean contributed to the transition from political dependence to political independence during the course of the twentieth century, so too will the region succeed in the twenty-first century, in transforming globalisation from a system delivering benefits to a privileged minority to a more regulated and managed process with the potential to benefit the majority of mankind. In his review of the history of Caribbean political thought, Selwyn Ryan boldly asserts that 'with the possible exception of Rastafarianism, Caribbean political thought has not distinguished itself by its originality'. Instead, he points to the proliferation of various 'isms' which have been indiscriminately transferred from other contexts and applied as an explanation of the social experiences of the region. Ryan poses a fundamental question as to whether in the twenty-first century, Caribbean societies should continue to structure their political systems along Westminster lines or along consociational lines. Ryan argues persuasively that, based on the experience with the 'winner takes all' politics in Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago, that these societies should probably re-examine the merits of the Westminster model and opt for the consociational formulas proposed by writers such as Arend Lijphart, W. Arthur Lewis and others. Ryan's eloquent exposition of the merits of the consociational model as opposed to the majoritarian ethic of the Westminster model is certainly instructive and will doubtless inform further debates on the nature of the constitutional architecture to be constructed in the Caribbean in the twenty-first century, particularly in ethnically plural societies such as Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago where, in the words of Clive Thomas, electoral politics in effect, reflect 'ethnic censuses', given the demographic realities of the societies in question. Ryan also concedes the

need to ensure the involvement of civil society in restructured governance arrangements but, unlike some who see their role as central to the democratic equation, Ryan believes that their role should be complementary to that of government. Based on his overall analysis of the political challenges facing the region, Ryan systematically documents a number of recommendations for constitutional change which are quite pertinent to the Caribbean reality. In his usually provocative style, Lloyd Best posits that the 'fractal societies' in the Caribbean face the double problems of 'chronic unviability' and 'endemic illegitimacy' of the political regime, regardless of their ideology or method of installation. Best is also disdainful of the 'new imperialism of the self-avowed neo-liberals who preach the merits of globalisation with its soaring inequities'. Like Wilson Harris, who advocates a new philosophy of history, Best asserts the need for 'independent, innovating thought to meet the reality' in which the region finds itself. David Panton argues that the profound changes that have taken place in the international economic system under the broad rubric of 'global liberalisation' have important implications for the Caribbean in that they have limited the scope of national policies. He feels therefore, that while seeking to strengthen the integration arrangements within CARICOM, the region should also seek to establish wider alliances with other groupings in an effort to improve their development prospects. Moreover, he feels that in responding to the challenges facing the region in the new century, Caribbean leaders should adopt what he terms the 'politics of principled proactive pragmatism' (PPP) which is based on the notion that political decisions should be guided not by prior ideological assumptions but whether the decisions make sense in terms of promoting the national interest.

In **Part VII** which deals with *The Caribbean in the International System*, Richard Bernal advances a number of innovative but controversial propositions regarding the strategies to be pursued by the countries in the region in response to changes in the international economic system. Bernal argues that the end of the Cold War produced a period of 'ideological entropy' but rejects Fukuyama's 'end of history thesis' as an accurate characterisation of the new global reality. He states that the revolution in the global economy during the past two decades or more has resulted in increasing disparities, as evidenced by a widening development gap, economic concentration and increasing heterogeneity of national economies. Moreover, he notes that the decline in the strategic importance of the Caribbean has led to an increased attack on the preferential arrangements traditionally accorded to the region. Bernal therefore advocates a strategic global repositioning based on the increased diversification of exports and the pursuit of new patterns of international economic and political relations. In this context, he advances a new paradigm of small states in international relations which is premised on the assumption that the increasing differentiation among the developing countries has rendered

less effective traditional developing country groupings such as the Group of 77. He therefore urges the formation of a collation among small states and also a 'new transnational strategic alliance' between small states and small firms in the developed countries which he sees as going beyond the limits of the 'old North-South and South-South axes'. Bernal also advocates significant changes in the approach to regionalism. His ideal is the creation of 'a seamless regional economic space conducive to globally competitive economic activities' and based on 'market-driven corporate integration' which should take precedence over 'government-induced market integration'. In this context, he proposes a 'flexible integration' which would allow governments to integrate beyond the core agreement. He also argues that small states should pursue a policy of 'niche diplomacy' based on the concentration of a select number of priority issues. In order to pursue such a strategy, Bernal proposes a radical transformation of the existing orientation of the Foreign Service of the region, geared towards its greater involvement in commercial and financial negotiations and also based on the increased professionalisation of staff.

Although innovative and well argued, the strategy advanced by Bernal is quite problematic and will certainly provoke debate and controversy. For one thing, the alliance of small states which he has proposed is likely to be diplomatically insignificant without the support of the larger developing countries. Secondly, the assumption of an inherent commonality of interests between small economies in the developing world and small firms in the developed countries is debatable. Finally, while there are stresses within the Group of 77 based, for example, on the existence of differing views on current approaches to globalisation, which are not unrelated to differences in economic structure and overall levels of development, many would argue that the Group of 77 is still a viable entity, as is evidenced by the fact that the first Summit of all the developing countries will be held in Havana in April 2000.

In his paper, Vaughan Lewis raises the question of the nature of the evolution of the traditional relationships between the Caribbean and Europe and whether the region will continue to benefit from this relationship in the future. He feels that in light of its declining strategic significance and potential loss of markets for its traditional exports, the region could lapse in to a period of benign neglect. Moreover, the Caribbean is also likely to face increasing pressures to 'dissolve the traditional and defining regional boundaries that they have partly inherited and partly constructed for themselves'. Faced with these challenges, Lewis believes that the small states of the Caribbean will need to reassess the effectiveness of the strategies they have pursued in respect of regional integration in order to determine whether changes in the international system have rendered them irrelevant. By way of a solution, Lewis proposes, on pragmatic grounds, a 'cession of elements of state sovereignty in favour of a new regime (or new regimes) of

regional governance' and the reinvigoration of the Association of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP).

In reviewing the political economy and the security dimensions of contemporary international relations of the Caribbean, Anthony Bryan notes that the economies of the region have been historically integrated in the international economic system based on product specialisation, but that what is different in the present era is the increasing vulnerability of the economies of the region under the impact of globalisation. Moreover, given the fact that traditional preferential arrangements are likely to disappear, he points to the possibility of pursuing 'niche market' opportunities as part of a strategic response to globalisation. Bryan also advocates the adoption of a new integration culture based on corporate integration which he states involves a fundamental 'paradigm shift' in traditional integration theory from a virtual preoccupation with North America and Europe towards the establishment of horizontal links between the wider Caribbean and Latin America. He also feels that the region faces increased vulnerability deriving from drug trafficking and threats to the environment, which also pose major security problems. For this reason, the region will need to embark on a new diplomacy based on recognition of the relative decline of national governments.

Hilbourne Watson's exposition on global neo-liberalism in the context of technological change is premised on the notion that the Caribbean has been forced to function in 'an international environment shaped largely by the decisions of the World Bank and key agencies of the US government which in fact serve as surrogates of a global state and ruling class'. He feels therefore, that it will be important to counter the central assumptions of the neo-liberal ideology as a pre-condition for articulating a strategy geared to promoting the interests of the region in the international economy.

Cedric Grant's paper focuses on the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) as an experiment in supra-national governance. Grant examines the factors which led to the establishment and elaboration of the functions of the RNM and its relationship with the CARICOM Secretariat structure and other key sectors including individual member states in the negotiating process. Against this background, he also presents a critical assessment of the functioning of the RNM acting as an interpositioning authority. Grant's analysis contains a number of controversial propositions and is therefore likely to generate debate on the subject.

In reflecting upon the Caribbean diaspora, Orlando Patterson sees the existence of large West Indian communities in North America and, to some extent, in the UK as offering important political and economic opportunities on which the region can capitalise. He feels that at the political level, these communities can be mobilised to lobby Congress in the case of the US, to support Caribbean positions. Moreover, he feels that the existence of what he terms the West Atlantic diaspora can also make an important contribution

to the economies of the region through remittances. Patterson believes that the proximity of the region to the USA provides an opportunity to establish in the region, nursing home facilities to cater for clients from the USA, given the latter's inability to provide an adequate quota of nursing personnel in the context of the development of an increasingly aging population. In fact, Patterson emphasises that Caribbean countries should seek to train an increasing number of nurses to cater for domestic needs as well as those of the external market, bearing in mind that nurses working in metropolitan countries will be in a position to send back remittances to the region. In Patterson's view, the opportunity exists to establish a large number of private educational institutions to cater for the education of children in the West Atlantic diaspora, given the unsatisfactory nature of education in some of the public schools in the USA which the children of migrants are often forced to attend. In elaborating his argument, Patterson suggests that such opportunities will allow the Caribbean to leap-frog the industrialisation process and to specialise in high technology and other service areas. He points out, of course, that these proposals assume an increased level of investment in education. In passing, Patterson also advances the notion that the traditional model of the nation state is no longer relevant and therefore the Caribbean must think increasingly in transnational terms. Clearly, this is a controversial proposition which is unlikely to find universal acceptance in the region.

In **Part VIII**, Kenneth Ramchand examines the role of the creative imagination, defined in terms of literature, music, dance, song, story, painting, carving, sculpture and many other forms, in engendering 'self-knowledge, cultural confidence and regional self-affirmation'. He therefore advances specific suggestions designed to retrieve the literature of the region currently located in a number of different places and to minimise the loss of and non-recognition of current literary output. He also sees the need for a complete revamping of the region's education system with a view to ensuring that every person is tri-lingual in order to widen communication and create the possibility of accessing the rich literature of the region. A major recommendation advanced by Ramchand is the need to establish departments of Philosophy and Intellectual History on all the campuses of the University of the West Indies in order to stimulate a culture of thought and to consolidate a philosophical tradition in the region. Ian McDonald, for his part, makes a powerful plea for the systematic preservation of Caribbean literature and artistic output which he feels face the danger of being lost to the region. He argues that this effort is critical to ensuring the expression of an integrated vision of the Caribbean through the arts. Similarly, Jean Small laments the disadvantage faced by the region in terms of the lack of access to the resources necessary for the full expression of the creative imagination. In his paper on 'Change and Prophecy in Trinidad and Tobago Calypso Towards

the Twenty-first Century', Rohlehr analyses the role of calypsonians in dealing with societal change. He sees calypsonians as prophets in a universe where social class relations are characterised by inequality. He reviews the work of calypsonians such as the Mighty Spoiler, Stalin, Chalkdust, David Rudder, and the Mighty Sparrow to support his thesis. Rohlehr, in effect, sees calypsos as 'texts of survivalism' and argues that millennium economists, sociologists and political scientists might learn much from a study of the attitudes that are engrained in the calypso. Finally, Bernadette Persaud presents a critical appraisal of the evolution of art in the region. She expresses a clear preference for the postmodernist tradition based on its eclectic character, its democratic definition of art as well as its accommodation of the figurative and the use of a wide range of innovative techniques. In her view, its importance is further accentuated by its appropriateness for articulating the peculiar existential conditions of Caribbean man – 'isolated, restless, marginalised, with his multiple perspectives of reality, more varied than Picasso's'. She also feels that the avant-garde school of art, which has emerged in Jamaica and also Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, fits neatly into the postmodernist theoretical framework and can, in fact, become a major area of focus for Caribbean art in the new century, despite Veerle Poupeye's famous work on Caribbean art which provides a comprehensive review of major trends in the development of art in the region. Persaud argues that the region itself must seek to provide an 'insider's mapping of the inner landscape of its own territory'. In other words, she sees the post-modernist task in terms of an effort to construct an indigenous interpretation of the region's artistic heritage.

The various papers contained in this volume present a rich array of ideas and practical suggestions covering a wide range of topics. It is clear, however, that the papers reflect differing perspectives and interpretations of the Caribbean reality. Be that as it may, taken together, the papers constitute a solid basis for formulating strategies for advancing the interests of the region in the twenty-first century.

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
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## 12.

# GLOBALISATION – A CALCULUS OF INEQUALITY: Perspectives from the South



### INTRODUCTION

**DURING THE PAST DECADE OR MORE, THE PHENOMENON** of globalisation has exercised a profound influence on the structure of international economic relations. At the same time, the concept has generated considerable debate and controversy between those who proclaim its merits and those who point to its negative consequences for the economies of the developing countries.

Although the terms are conceptually distinct, globalisation has become inextricably linked to economic liberalisation in the context of the recent evolution of the global economy. The latter concept, which is underpinned by neo-classical economic principles and which emphasises increased private sector development, the primacy of market forces and unfettered trade liberalisation, provides the theoretical rationale for the creation of an increasingly integrated and interdependent global economy. It therefore serves as the legitimising ideology of globalisation.

Viewed in this context, globalisation may be seen as a natural outgrowth of the economic policies applied under IMF/World Bank sponsored economic stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes implemented during the 1980s which reoriented the economies of the developing countries

towards increased integration into the global economy. The programmes were premised on an explicit abandonment of the traditional approach to economic policy based on the notion of a developmental state orchestrating widespread interventions in the economy. Instead, they asserted the primacy of market forces and an increased role for the private sector in the economic sphere as the basis for ensuring an optimal allocation of resources, with a corresponding retrenchment of the functions of the state, based on a minimalist conception of government.

The proponents of globalisation which, as stated earlier, is founded on the philosophical bedrock of neo-liberalism, have argued that the removal of trade barriers and the creation of a liberalised global trading regime will produce substantial benefits through a significant increase in global trade, variously estimated at US\$250 to US\$500 billion a year, although some critics of globalisation have argued that the actual benefits from trade expansion under a liberalised regime are likely to be much more modest, perhaps ranging from US\$150 to US\$250 billion a year. More importantly, however, they have pointed to the fact that, even assuming a significant expansion of global trade, the benefits of such an expansion are likely to be unequally distributed, with the bulk of the benefits accruing to the developed countries which have a sufficiently developed productive capacity to compete effectively in the global economy. On the other hand, the developing countries, particularly the least developed countries in Africa, given the undifferentiated nature of their economic structure and their relatively underdeveloped productive capacity, are likely to suffer significant economic marginalisation as a result of globalisation. In fact, it has been estimated that the majority of the countries in Africa, mainly the least developed countries, are unlikely to benefit significantly from the Uruguay Round agreements in view of the low level of manufacturing in the overall composition of output in their economies.

Notwithstanding the reservations expressed by its critics, the process of globalisation has continued apace and has in fact become formalised in the series of agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, most notably the Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the General Agreement on Tariffs in Services (GATS). What, in effect, these agreements have done is to 'multilateralise' a number of principles espoused mainly by the developed countries and imposed upon the developing countries. This is best illustrated by the TRIPS agreement which is based largely on a restrictive US national standard that is much more favourable to the owners rather than the users of technology. This is not surprising, given the fact that the negotiating brief of the United States on the subject was heavily influenced by corporate lobbies, in particular the major transnational pharmaceutical corporations, which pushed for the adoption of the measures

to prevent the unauthorised use of their patents. While, therefore, the principles embodied in the Uruguay Round agreements have been projected as 'neutral' and 'universal' in content, they essentially reflect the interests of the developed countries, with modest concessions to the developing countries.

What is also significant is the fact that the new international 'rules of the game', which have been incorporated in the various multilateral trade agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round, are enforceable by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which was established in 1995 at the end of the Uruguay Round to serve as a forum for ongoing trade negotiations and as an instrument to monitor compliance with the agreements concluded under the Uruguay Round. This latter function has major implications, since countries are subject to sanctions for failure to conform to the provisions of the various agreements which, in many cases, impose a number of onerous responsibilities which many developing countries are not capable of fulfilling without significant external assistance.

Notwithstanding the negative impact of a number of the provisions contained in the Uruguay Round, agreements on the majority of the developing countries, the developed countries, in keeping with the logic of neo-liberalism, continue to press for a new round of trade liberalisation in areas such as competition policy, procurement, labour and environmental standards on the ground that further liberalisation in these areas will bring additional benefits to all countries. Needless to say, the developing countries have been sceptical about the advantages to be derived from a new round of trade negotiations, and therefore a majority of these countries are opposed to the new round on the terms proposed by the developed countries, before undertaking a thorough review of the impact of the agreements previously concluded during the Uruguay Round.

In addition, the developing countries have been concerned about the undemocratic nature of the negotiating process adopted within the WTO, whereby, under the so-called 'green room' process, only a small number of countries are invited to participate in the negotiations on particular issues, to the exclusion of the majority of member countries of the organisation, particularly the developing countries. This approach is therefore perceived by the developing countries as lacking in transparency and therefore of questionable legitimacy. This consideration was a major factor in the rejection of the efforts of the developed countries, during the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle in December 1999, to push through an agreement on a new round of trade negotiations; although a number of other elements were involved in the so-called 'debacle in Seattle', some of which, such as the US labour movement and environmentally-oriented Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), embraced different, and sometimes conflicting, agendas, despite being united in opposition to the WTO.

The experience of the East Asian crisis, together with the 'Seattle debacle', has prompted increased questioning of the validity of the assumptions which underpin current approaches to globalisation and economic liberalisation. As a result, a number of critics of globalisation have called for the 'strategic' integration of the developing countries into the global economy. In this approach, integration into the global economy would occur on a selective and phased basis in terms of the liberalisation of those sectors which are capable of competing in the global economy. Strategic integration is also premised on the development of a suitable institutional capacity to manage the process of liberalisation, particularly in respect to short-term capital flows, which have a considerable potential to generate financial instability.

It is also argued that, given the underdeveloped nature of their economies, developing countries would need to defend the principle of special and differential treatment and other suitable economic arrangements in order to ensure their viability in a rapidly globalising world.

More generally, based on the East Asian experience and its adverse economic impact on the developing countries, there is a general tendency in some quarters, including mainstream academic circles in the developed countries, to revisit the assumptions of globalisation and economic liberalisation and to argue in favour of a more interventionist approach to economic management in order to ensure international economic stability and the equitable distribution of the benefits of the process of globalisation. In a sense, the opposition is not so much against globalisation per se but against the current approach to globalisation, which is seen to be inimical to the interests of developing countries.

Indeed, in this context, the assumptions of a resurgent neo-classical economic orthodoxy which underpin globalisation and economic liberalisation, tend to be seen as above challenge. However, viewed in terms of the evolution of economic theory, neo-liberalism gained a similar ascendancy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, only to be discredited following the 1929 stock market collapse in the US, which was seen as a conspicuous example of market failure and which therefore gave rise to the interventionist approach embodied in Keynesianism.

Moreover, many of the developed countries which currently espouse a policy of economic liberalisation have historically pursued highly protectionist policies at an earlier stage of their development in an effort to stimulate the growth of their productive capacity. Particularly noteworthy is the example of the United Kingdom which pursued for centuries a policy of mercantilism, as illustrated by the adoption of the famous Navigation Acts of the seventeenth century, to consolidate its control over the colonies in an imperial division of labour between the metropole and the colonies which were clearly biased in favour of the former. It was only after it had

undergone an industrial revolution in the nineteenth century, which was funded in part from the profits derived from centuries of mercantilism, that the United Kingdom became a major advocate of free trade during the second half of the nineteenth century, as was evidenced by the activities of Richard Cobden and John Bright, the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League who, in proclaiming the merits of free trade, essentially reflected the interests of the rising industrial classes in Britain. A similar pattern of economic development was evident in the United States which, in the early years of the Republic, and indeed for most of its history, subscribed to protectionist Hamiltonian economic principles, notwithstanding the triumph of a Jeffersonian conception of governance.

It should also be noted that the Smoot-Hawley Trade Act, adopted in the US in 1930, is generally regarded as one of the most restrictive trade measures ever imposed by a country. In other words, the enthusiasm for free trade in both countries was inspired largely by the development of a productive capacity capable of competing in the global arena and, more importantly, a perception of the national advantages to be gained from the pursuit of such a policy.

Given its extensive ramifications, it is clear that globalisation will continue to provoke debate on its merits and demerits. The papers presented in this volume deal with various aspects of the phenomenon, ranging from an examination of its philosophical foundations to more practical concerns, such as the formulation of counter strategies as well as with specific issues which have arisen in the context of the negotiations taking place in the WTO.

Against this background, Branislav Gosovic, in his article entitled 'Intellectual Hegemony in the Context of Globalisation', points to the fact that during the past decade the developed countries have succeeded in imposing an intellectual hegemony based on the assertion of a neo-liberal ideology which reflects their geo-political and economic interests. This in turn, he argues, has led to the virtual intellectual disarmament of the developing countries, thus preventing them from effectively advancing an alternative development philosophy capable of countering the assumptions of neoliberalism. In Gosovic's view, the paradigm imposed by the North has tended to downplay the relevance of concepts such as development, equity, self-reliance and exploitation and has also sought to side-line the United Nations (UN) organisations and agencies, particularly UNCTAD which has historically played an important role in articulating the development needs of the developing countries. Moreover, the intellectual dominance of the North has strengthened the role of the international financial institutions (and, more recently, the WTO), which have imposed a number of restrictive multilateral norms and conditionalities on the developing countries. He therefore argues that the developing countries have an important responsibility to challenge the intellectual hegemony of the North by posing

an alternative vision of development. He believes that, in order to do so successfully, the South would also need to seek to restore the primacy of the UN in the economic sphere and also to establish an alliance with academics and other groups in the North which are sympathetic to the position of the South, as prerequisites for the creation of a truly democratic international community.

Clive Thomas, in his article entitled 'Globalisation as Paradigm Shift: Response from the South', takes the position that although some commentators have argued that globalisation is not really new, he believes that the world is experiencing an unprecedented transformation and therefore the current expansion of globalisation represents a genuine paradigm shift. In this context, he points to 'the dynamic interconnectedness of contemporary global society' which he sees as far more intense than it has ever been. As he puts it, 'more than in any previous era, human endeavours are conceived, designed and implemented as global projects'. Thomas feels, however, that the emphasis on unrestricted market-led development, which is explicit in the neo-classical theoretical underpinnings of globalisation, can be destabilising and contradictory and can also lead to polarisation and conflict. He therefore asserts the need for the political and social determination of global markets as a necessary condition for pursuing a successful programme of globalisation. In terms of practical strategies, he feels that the South would need to advance constructive options from which programmatic formulations on the way forward might be forged. More specifically, he advocates three-pronged strategy based on support for the UN, and in particular the extension of its influence over global, social and economic affairs; the promotion of South-South co-operation; and the strengthening of regional and sub-regional co-operation, and even bilateral relations, between the countries of the South. Thomas believes that there is danger that under Tent approaches to globalisation the market will be seen as an end in itself. He also feels that there is a need to maximise the benefits from the operation of the Transnational Corporations (TNCs), which have become dominant actors in the global arena, with a corresponding emphasis on efforts to minimise the social costs of their operation. To do so, it will be necessary to ensure that they operate within a political and social framework not of their own making but of citizens and their preferred political institutions. Thomas believes that if this were to be done, globalisation would be made to serve the needs of all humanity, rather than humanity serving the interests of the few.

In the paper entitled 'Globalisation and the North-South Divide: Power asymmetries in Contemporary International Economic Relations', Denis Benn argues that, although globalisation is facilitated by technological change, it is essentially a product of conscious economic policy on the part of the developed countries in support of their economic interests, based on the creation of expanded opportunities for trade and investment on a global

scale. He also argues that the current approach to globalisation, which is reflected in the principles embodied in the multilateral trade agreements concluded during the Uruguay Round, most notably the TRIMS, TRIPS and GATS agreements, together with the operation of the WTO itself, has led to significant power asymmetries between North and South and also growing income disparities between the two groups of countries. He points out that the process of globalisation has been accompanied by an increasing shift in physical production to the developing countries by transnational corporations from the North, in an effort to maximise the returns on capital through the exploitation of cheap labour and in the reaping of increased value to the North derived from the sale of the products produced by such labour at considerably increased prices. This trend is also likely to reinforce, in the long run, the existing economic disadvantages faced by the developing countries in terms of the operation of the global economy. However, Benn notes that the East Asian crisis and the negative impact of globalisation on some developing countries have raised serious questions about the validity of the assumptions regarding the efficacy of unfettered market liberalisation which underlines globalisation. Moreover, he argues that the market cannot by itself guarantee economic stability and social equity, therefore some form of multilateral intervention by governments is necessary to ensure economic rationality in the operation of the international economic system. He feels that the developing countries should seek to systematically deconstruct the neo-classical economic theory underlying the current approach to globalisation with a view to formulating an alternative development paradigm aimed at ensuring a more rational ordering of the international economic system.

In dealing with the topic, 'The South in the Era of Globalisation', John Ohiorhenuan identifies the impact of globalisation in respect to trade, finance, and investment with special reference to the expansion of the role of the TNCs in the process. According to Ohiorhenuan, the growth of globalisation has led the developed countries to challenge the relevance of the traditional North-South divide, which they see as a legacy of the Cold War, and to argue instead that international relations should be based on the concept of a partnership between North and South. He also points to the declining role of the state in the new dispensation. Ohiorhenuan believes, nevertheless, that an intensified programme of South-South co-operation could form the basis of a strategy to ensure the effective integration of the developing countries in the global economy.

In focusing on 'The Recent Systemic Crisis and the Management of the International Financial System', Manuela Tortora argues that the economic vulnerability of Latin American countries cannot be treated as a purely regional problem, since the phenomenon of globalisation has had a major economic impact on the region. She also emphasises the 'systemic' nature of

the East Asian crisis, in terms of its impact on international capital markets, trade flows, and recession, and also its implications for the stability of the international financial system. Tortora therefore calls for an integrated approach to international financial management and emphasises the need to give priority attention to the establishment of an early warning system and the provision of an adequate level of development financing. She also emphasises the need to put in place an effective system of international financial governance, although she considers that such an endeavour would encounter a number of obstacles and, therefore, the redesign of the current international financial architecture will not be easy, given the various interests involved and the need to secure widespread political consensus on the subject.

In his paper on 'Globalisation and Counter Globalisation; The Caribbean in the Context of the South', Norman Girvan distinguishes between globalisation as an ideological term and globalisation as a substantive process. In his view, the former implies the organisation of the world according to the principles of neo-liberal economics and in accordance with a presumed inevitability of the process leading towards the formation of a single world economy, society and culture driven by technology and the transnationalisation of investment and finance capital. For Girvan, globalisation is based on a coherent political, institutional, theoretical and ideological order and embodies a set of prescribed practices and a convenient and easily recognised label. In contrast to these assumptions, Girvan posits the notion of counter-globalisation, which implies a critique of the market-oriented, corporate-led globalisation process and which advocates alternative ways of managing national and international exchange. Counter-globalisation therefore challenges the neo-liberal assumption that markets are 'free and fair' and that they lead to optimal outcomes, which are the theoretical underpinning of global and regional trade liberalisation. In his view, instead of a blanket approach to trade liberalisation, there should be selectivity and sequencing of the process, complemented by strategies to build up technological and managerial capabilities among producers at the micro-level, and to empower the poor and the marginalised. According to Girvan, 'universalistic neo-liberalism' should be replaced by diversity and acceptance of the principles of pluralism, particularity, and learning. Counter-globalisation therefore questions the theory, the ideology, and the policies of neoliberal globalisation.

In reflecting upon the impact of the international financial crisis, Girvan believes that the growing consensus among mainstream economists on the need for government regulation of financial systems and, more generally, of the market economy as a whole, provides a window of opportunity for the developing countries to formulate a counter strategy to the current approach to globalisation. He argues, however, that the increasing heterogeneity among

the countries of the South would necessitate new approaches and innovative strategies for reconciling differences within the Group of 77. In this context, he feels that the Caribbean countries would need to review their position within the overall setting of the South and the broad currents of the counter-globalisation movement. From a strategic perspective, Girvan suggests that an effective response by the Caribbean countries to the challenges posed by globalisation should be based on a strategy of 'walking on two legs', which involves the strengthening of the bargaining position and negotiating capacity of the states in the region in their external relations. It also requires a strengthening of the productive capacity of regional producers to participate successfully in markets that are increasingly hemispheric and global in scope. Moreover, he argues that the Caribbean, together with other regions in the South, should challenge the principle of 'universalistic neo-liberalism' on which current international trade and economic negotiations are based.

In his contribution entitled 'Globalisation and Small Developing Countries: The Imperative for Repositioning', Richard Bernal sees globalisation as a multi-dimensional process which encompasses economic, political, technological, social, cultural and psychological factors. In this context, he sees the small developing countries as particularly exposed to the effects of globalisation. He identifies several disadvantages faced by these countries in terms of their dependence on a limited range of commodity exports, high trading ratios, diseconomies of scale and structural vulnerabilities. Bernal believes, nevertheless, that these countries could reduce the adverse implications of globalisation and take advantage of opportunities offered by the process on the basis of a strategy of 'global repositioning'. He feels that the extent to which these countries could seize the opportunities offered by globalisation will depend on the implementation of a comprehensive process of structural transformation, not merely structural adjustment. In advocating a policy of strategic global repositioning, Bernal states that such a policy should be based on the consolidation and improvement of existing production structures and the reorientation of the economy based on the creation of new types of economic activities. It would also require policies aimed at improving the competitiveness and efficiency of enterprises by stimulating the creation of an entrepreneurial environment. In addition, the strategy should be based on selective trade, fiscal and credit policies supported by medium-term education and technology policies focused on strategic sectors as well as on close co-operation between government and the private sector. He believes that the capacity of small countries to capitalise on the opportunities offered by globalisation would also depend on the adoption of a stable macroeconomic policy framework conducive to the encouragement of investment. It should also include a policy of diversification of exports. Bernal believes, however, that the small economies would also need to

focus on the services sector, which represents the fastest growing sector in the global economy, instead of manufacturing, which he feels has lost its dynamism. In this regard, he feels that small economies should be innovative in pursuing the establishment of new industries based on strategic corporate alliances and the modernization of international marketing techniques. At the same time, Bernal believes that, at the international level, the existence of disparities in size must be addressed by ensuring that international regulatory regimes and institutions take account of the needs of the small economies. In other words, the international community must mediate the encounter between small countries and their larger counterparts in the global market place.

In the paper on 'Globalisation and Regional Economic Integration', Byron Blake points to two potentially contradictory and overlapping trends, namely, globalisation and regionalisation, which have dominated international economic relations during the last decade of the twentieth century. Against this background, Blake describes the evolution of regional integration and also the philosophical assumptions and institutional arrangements underpinning globalisation centred on the Uruguay Round agreements. He goes on to argue that globalisation has undermined some of the objectives of regional economic integration, most notably in terms of the granting of certain advantages to member states and the opportunity to obtain non-reciprocal trade advantages in the markets of the developed countries which are not available to third world countries. Moreover, the tendency to form integration and cooperation arrangements embracing both developed and developing countries has also served to undermine the traditional integration arrangements involving only developing countries.

In her article, the 'Impact of Globalisation on the Caribbean', Jessica Byron's analysis makes special reference to the experience of small states of the Eastern Caribbean. Following Scholte, she acknowledges that globalisation has introduced qualitative changes in the organisation and capabilities of the nation state. Moreover, she sees globalisation as producing new manifestations of marginalisation and inequality. In the specific circumstances of the Caribbean, she points to the fact that, in spite of the continuing structural vulnerability of the small economies of the region, the advent of globalisation has led to the reduction in the level of preferences previously enjoyed by these countries, a decline in their export earnings as well as financial flows. According to Byron, as a result of these developments, the OECS countries have experienced growing vulnerability to external factors. Consequently, there is an urgent need to strengthen their competitiveness in the global economy and also to capitalise on their proximity to the US market, in order to avoid marginalisation in the global economy. However, the disruption in the marketing of bananas in the European Union, caused by the challenge to the traditional preferential

arrangements enjoyed by the OECS countries and the WTO ruling on the subject, could lead to social and political upheaval. Byron states that, in confronting the challenges facing them, the small states of the region should seek to reapportion administrative, technical and management functions among national, regional and other sectors. In addition, the state should play a proactive role in promoting human resource development, infrastructure development and in cushioning the social impact of adjustment in order to prevent social disintegration. At the international level, Byron asserts that it will be necessary for the Caribbean microstates to radically rethink their diplomatic strategies and their international relations, in terms of improved training for Foreign Service personnel and their strategic location, to deal with issues such as those discussed within the WTO. Moreover, given the prospect of the creation of a western hemispheric free trade arrangement (FTAA), increased resources would need to be allocated to strengthen diplomatic and commercial representations. These countries would also need to identify opportunities for promoting South-South solidarity and co-operation.

Finally, Charles Ross, in his paper entitled 'Globalisation and the Private Sector', unapologetically embraces a private sector perspective in pointing to the opportunities offered by globalisation. He sees great possibilities for combining the capital and technology of the North with the labour and natural resources of the South in order to increase output, employment, and overall living standards in the developing countries. He points to the increased openness of markets in the developed countries as an important feature of globalisation, which provides market access for exports from the developing countries. As he sees it, the challenge facing the developing countries is to organise their economies in such a way as to make them attractive for investment geared to the production of internationally competitive goods and services. However, in his view, the creation of such an environment in the developing countries would require the adoption of policies which do not distort prices and resource allocation in the economy, while at the same time encouraging domestic earnings and investment instead of consumption. He concedes that globalisation does harbour some dangers for the developing countries, but he feels that the developing countries should make a conscious effort to take advantage of the opportunities offered by globalisation. He also feels that the encouragement of foreign direct investment is the most constructive way of achieving this objective. However, Ross does not believe that the developing countries should continue to base their development on preferential access for their commodities to traditional markets in Europe and North America, but that they should instead seek to engage in reciprocal trade. Consequently, they should focus on the production of tradable goods and services on an internationally competitive basis. Indeed, Ross sees the increase in the rate of

economic growth in the developing countries as the most sustainable way of achieving poverty reduction. He recognises the need, nevertheless, to ensure that capital entering the developing countries is used for investment in the productive sector and that as little as possible enters as short-term speculative capital.


It is clear that the papers presented in this volume reflect a number of different philosophical and ideological perspectives on globalisation and economic liberalisation and the type of strategic responses that should be adopted by the developing countries in seeking to deal with the challenges posed by them. For example, while Bernal and Ross tend to support a private sector-led, market-oriented approach to development as a response to the challenges posed by globalisation, Girvan and Thomas argue in favour of a managed approach to economic policy, based on a more balanced relationship between the state and the private sector. Moreover, in contrast to Bernal and Ross, who embrace, to varying degrees, elements of a neo-liberal policy stance, Girvan and Thomas subscribe to a structuralist/institutionalist approach which recognises the need to take account of the specific circumstances of the countries involved, in grappling with the problem of globalisation. Furthermore, whereas the former are prepared to abandon the traditional preferential arrangements enjoyed by the developing countries, the latter see the retention of such preferences as a necessary part of a rational multilateral trading system. However, they all acknowledge, in one way or another, the need for the international community to extend some concessions to the smaller economies in order to enable them to function effectively in the global economy. Moreover, the majority of the contributors recognise the need for the developing countries to seek to recapture the intellectual initiative in order to ensure the formulation of a strategy designed to make globalisation more consistent with their development needs and priorities.

These differences notwithstanding, all of the essays are written from the perspective of the developing countries and should therefore enrich the ongoing debate on the merits and demerits of globalisation. Even more important, however, is the fact that the articles in the volume offer important insights which could contribute to the formulation of alternative approaches to globalisation, consistent with the establishment of an enlightened global order in which economic benefits are more evenly distributed among all countries.

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
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13.

## GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALISATION: Caribbean Perspectives



### INTRODUCTION

**DESPITE CONTINUING DEBATE ON ITS IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS AND** the persistence of a variety of definitions regarding its specific content, there is increased recognition that the concept of good governance, broadly conceived, is an important prerequisite for the promotion of an optimal level of development, the guarantee of human rights and freedom, and the maintenance of social and political stability. As a result, there has been extensive theorisation on the subject in an attempt to further clarify its philosophical content and also to identify suitable strategies for its effective application in practical

political contexts. In keeping with this thrust there has been a noticeable tendency in recent years to broaden the conception of governance beyond the theoretical focus on the role and functions of the state and to encompass instead, the activities of both state and non-state actors within the polity as well as the impact of the dynamics of their inter-relationship in shaping the political culture. Moreover, its subject matter has been expanded to include not only traditional political concerns, but also issues relating to economic management and social organisation. Consequently, governance

is now generally defined as “the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority to manage a nation’s affairs”. It should be pointed out that the new emphasis on governance, as opposed to government, reflects a conscious ideological thrust which is informed by neo-liberal philosophical assumptions. In contrast to the previous focus on the functions of the state which were a central feature of traditional political science literature, neo-liberalism is premised on a minimalist conception of the role of the state in the economic sphere with a corresponding emphasis on the primacy of the private sector operating within the framework of a market-based economic system. This conception of governance is clearly reflected in contemporary economic and social policies sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank and which, collectively, are embodied in the so-called “Washington Consensus”. This philosophical orientation has exercised a dominant influence on the overall conception of governance since the beginning of the 1980s. The new conception of governance, embodied in the neo-liberal paradigm, provided the philosophical rationale for the growing trend towards privatisation which has occurred in the developing countries in recent years. This resulted when governments sought to relinquish their ownership of economic enterprises which, prior to the 1980s, was quite a common feature of the economic model embraced by these countries.

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
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# 14.

## PRODUCTION INTEGRATION IN CARICOM: From Theory to Action



### INTRODUCTION

A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE Caribbean is the need to promote an accelerated pace of development and to ensure the well-being of the population by mobilising the resources and capacities of the region within an integrated framework. In pursuit of this goal, the past few months have witnessed an intensification of the pace of regional integration, as is evidenced by the launch of the CARICOM Single Market (CSM) in January 2006 and the proposed establishment by 2008 of the CARICOM Single Economy (CSE) as important steps in the construction of the overall edifice of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME)

contemplated in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

The formal launch of the CSME will however not automatically generate economic prosperity in the region since it will be necessary to adopt a suitable strategy specifically aimed at accelerating the pace of development. For this reason, increased emphasis has been placed on production integration which is seen as an important strategy for optimising the development possibilities of the region through the pooling of its resources.

It should be pointed out in passing, that in the discussions on Caribbean integration there has been a tendency in some quarters to focus on the trade

aspects of integration, particularly on the comparatively low level of intra-regional trade, as the measure of the success of the integration movement. But this is misleading since the existing pattern of trade is a function of the structure of production in the region which for historical reasons has been oriented to extra-regional markets. A reorientation of the structure of production, which is contemplated in the concept of production integration, would significantly alter the existing pattern of intra-regional trade. As Demas and McIntyre noted in 1977, 'One cannot repeat too often the well-known proposition that the main benefits from integration are derived not so much from the freeing of trade as from the development of complementary structures of production and demand'.<sup>1</sup>

This proposition may be illustrated by reference to the proposed aluminium smelter to be built in Trinidad and Tobago based on the utilisation of Trinidad and Tobago petroleum/natural gas and bauxite from Jamaica and Guyana. If bauxite were to be exported from Jamaica and Guyana to Trinidad and Tobago, which does not take place at the present time, it would result in a significant expansion of intra-regional trade. Similarly, if the aluminium produced were to be exported from Trinidad and Tobago to Jamaica and Guyana as inputs for downstream manufacturing of aluminium products, it would result in a further expansion of intra-regional trade. To these benefits must be added, of course, significantly increased returns that will accrue to the participants in the aluminium smelter as a result of the localisation of value added, on the assumption that the bauxite supplied by Jamaica and Guyana would be provided on the basis of equity participation in the venture.

The concept of production integration has, of course, a well-known intellectual pedigree and represents a development paradigm which has been the subject of extensive theorisation, both in the Caribbean and in the wider international community. In the case of the Caribbean, it can be traced back to the early formulation by McIntyre on 'resource combination'<sup>2</sup> which was subsequently built upon by Brewster and Thomas in their path breaking work on the Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration<sup>3</sup> published in 1967.

Since then, Girvan and others<sup>4</sup> have carried out specific studies on production integration in the Eastern Caribbean which have made an important contribution to the debate on the subject. More recently, Farrell<sup>5</sup> has published a number of studies on cross-border investment in the Caribbean which are broadly relevant to the theme of production integration, although as that author has pointed out, the pattern of investment reflected in these arrangements has been driven mainly by a desire for market expansion and diversification rather than by an effort to promote factor complementarity in the pattern of production.

At the international level, UNCTAD has also prepared studies which have emphasised the importance of production integration. In a study

published in 1976, the Secretariat in commenting on the merits of industrial complementation, noted that factor complementarity 'would lead to better use of resources, diversification of production, economies of scale and specialisation . . .'<sup>6</sup>

At a more practical level, integration movements such the Andean Group and ASEAN have adopted specific measures aimed at promoting production integration or industrial complementation arrangements.

However, as commentators such as Cable<sup>7</sup> and Wonnacott<sup>8</sup> have observed, such programmes have not only proved difficult to negotiate but, once agreed, have made slow progress and in some cases have not been effectively pursued.

In the specific case of the Caribbean Community, efforts were made during the 1970s to promote specialisation and complementary production within the framework of a programme of industrial allocation in the Community. A number of projects were actually identified for implementation within this framework. In addition, the Community adopted a Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy (RFNS) in an effort to stimulate regional food production and thus lessen the significant dependence on food imports. The Caribbean Food Corporation was established as the main mechanism for implementing the strategy but was subsequently wound up.

In retrospect, it may be said that while these efforts were commendable, they were perhaps too exclusively government-oriented and failed to involve, to a significant extent, the private sector which should have been considered a major partner in these efforts. However, in an era in which the concept of a developmental state, orchestrating widespread interventions in the economy was in vogue, this oversight is perhaps understandable. With the shift towards greater reliance on the market and private sector initiatives, the situation has changed significantly since the 1980s. Consequently, the private sector is now seen as a major partner in the promotion of Caribbean integration.

It should be noted that Article 52 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas emphasises the importance of production integration and outlines a number of possibilities for promoting such a strategy. In fact, the article defines production integration as follows:

(i) the direct organisation of production is more than one member state by a single economic enterprise; (ii) complementary production involving collaboration among several economic enterprises operating in one or more member states to produce and use required inputs in the production chain; and (iii) cooperation among economic enterprises in areas such as purchasing, marketing and research and development.

Although the definition emphasises the bulk of what may be considered production integration, it can be further refined by specifying that (ii) should be interpreted to include 'the organisation of production in regional

enterprises utilising inputs from different member states, based on factor complementarity'. This interpretation is necessary given the importance of emphasising factor complementarity as an important element in production integration.

In any event, in an effort to advance progress in this important area, the CARICOM Heads of Government, at the thirtieth Anniversary Conference held in Montego Bay in July, 2003, called for the convening of a Group of Experts to identify suitable opportunities for production integration and the policy and institutional support arrangements necessary to achieve this objective. In response to this decision, the University of the West Indies at Mona convened a High-Level Seminar on Production Integration: From Theory to Action from January 26–27, 2006 which brought together representatives from governments, the private sector, the academic community as well as regional institutions to exchange views on the subject and to make specific recommendations designed to translate theory into action in this important area of integration policy.

This volume, which is based on the presentations made at the seminar, covers a wide range of issues relevant to the theme of production integration.

In the first chapter, Shridath Ramphal describes the events leading to the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) in 1965 which was initially signed by Antigua, Barbados and Guyana and emphasises its importance in laying the foundation for the subsequent establishment of the Caribbean Community and Common Market and more recently, the CSME. Ramphal makes the important observation that the private sector in the form of the Incorporated Commonwealth Chambers of Industry and Commerce played a significant role in the creation of the Association. He also notes that, even then, there was a debate as to whether the integration process should emphasise 'market integration', initially espoused by Demas, as opposed to 'production integration' advocated by Brewster and Thomas. Ramphal believes however that the decision to establish the CSME, underlines the necessity of production integration. Moreover, he draws an interesting parallel between the fact that just as only three countries had initially subscribed to CARIFTA, so today only six of the member states of CARICOM have signed the agreement establishing the Caribbean Single Market (CSM). Ramphal notes, however that 'the lesson of CARIFTA is that it will be a beginning, not an end' of the process of promoting close economic integration.

In Chapter 2, Norman Girvan states that the available data suggests that production integration in CARICOM is relatively limited. He notes, however, that the goal of the CSME is to promote increased production integration in respect of goods and services. He argues that in pursuing this goal, increased policy coordination will be necessary in order to reduce the risk and uncertainty as well as the transaction costs involved in operating within

a regional framework. In fact, Girvan posits that policy integration at the regional level is a critical precondition for promoting production integration which he argues will need to be pursued on a phased basis within a time frame covering the period 2006–2015.

In Chapter 3, Maurice Odle analyses the causes of the failure of the early attempts at production integration, which he attributes to the fact that they involved, among other things, a government centred, rather than a private sector focused, approach and moreover, were mainly resource based and inward-looking. He believes that the possibilities for promoting production integration may be constrained by the restrictions imposed by the provisions of the WTO Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) which prevent countries from imposing mandatory local content ratios on foreign investment. He also points to other limitations within the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas itself deriving from the excessive prolongation of the suspension of Community origin treatment on imports on grounds of production in one or more of the less developed CARICOM countries and also from the tendency to abuse derogations from the Common External Tariff. Odle also sees some tension between regional integration and global economic integration. He concludes that while the provisions of the Revised Treaty generally cater for increased production integration, at the present time CARICOM is experiencing only a limited form of such integration.

In Chapter 4, the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) offers a business perspective of production integration in the CSME. It argues that unless the business environment across member states is harmonised and that the resources are available to pursue strategic opportunities of a regional nature, the achievement of production integration under the CSME will present challenges for the private sector. It believes however that the CSME has the potential to promote a pattern of production integration which can benefit manufacturing conglomerate, provided that raw materials and semi-finished goods emanating from one-member state can be easily utilised in production facilities in another member state. It argues moreover that some constraints are likely to be imposed by the existence of different currency regimes, potential conflict between politically-motivated considerations and the economic rationale of business decisions as well as by difficulties posed by geography and inadequate air and maritime transportation facilities to overcome these constraints. It concedes nevertheless that, despite these potential constraints, production integration is feasible but that it will require the adoption of a pragmatic approach.

In Chapter 5, Trevor Farrell argues that although the conventional wisdom, three to four decades ago, was that production integration, based on resource combination, was seen as the foundation on which production integration would be built, this form of integration never really got off the ground. He notes that since the 1970s industrial production has focused

mainly on the processing of raw materials for extra-regional markets and, moreover, services, particularly tourism, have grown much faster than manufacturing. Despite the challenges facing the manufacturing sector in the Caribbean, he identifies, tourism-related manufacturing, energy-based manufacturing, food and beverage, building materials and marine related production as having some potential. He therefore outlines a strategy to promote regional manufacturing based on the combination of 'capital and talent' across the region, the regional cross listing of firms, the creation of a single regional securities exchange, the development of high-quality design, the adoption of strategies to establish links with Latin America and the promotion of entrepreneurship capable of operating across borders. He believes, however, that the exploitation of opportunities in these areas will depend more on organisational techniques and on people than on natural resources.

In Chapter 6, Vanue James revisits Arthur Lewis' theory of 'unlimited supplies of labour' to assess the implications for the Caribbean labour market of structural change in the use of domestic capital and also the creation of externalities deriving from the use of domestic capital in the generation of additional capital. He identifies two broad types of industry in Caribbean economies, namely imported-capital-intensive industries and domestic-capital-intensive industries. He observes in passing that investment in domestic capital facilitates horizontal integration without precluding vertical integration. Based on his overall analysis, he asserts that Caribbean countries should encourage the development and integration of their industries, based on investment in capital intensive production 'without losing any of the opportunities for domestic capitalisation of its import-intensive consumers and intermediates industry'. He believes that such an approach will serve to overcome the limitations deriving from the small size of domestic markets and firms in some economies. Finally, he argues that industrial integration in the Caribbean can be facilitated by an increase in the supply of money on a regional basis through the more effective provision of credit and by the expansion of occupational training, which he sees as the most important form of domestic capital.

In Chapter 7, Richard Bernal argues that in the context of globalisation, international trade dominates domestic production, investment and trade and therefore the creation of internationally competitive firms holds the key to growth and development. He believes that with the intensification of globalisation and multilateral trade liberalisation, the small firms in the Caribbean will face increased competition. Bernal asserts that firms in the Caribbean are so small by international standards that they may be referred to as 'nano firms' and therefore the enlargement of such firms is critical to their achieving international competitiveness. In this regard, Bernal believes that the enlargement of small firms can be encouraged by, among other

things, the freedom of movement of capital throughout the CSME and can also be facilitated by the creation of a regional capital market. He sees the facilitation of the enlargement and consolidation of CARICOM firms as an urgent need in order to improve their international competitiveness.

In Chapter 8, Gregory McGuire and Trevor Boopsingh note that natural gas has outstripped oil as the most important commodity in the Trinidad and Tobago economy and thus the price at which it is sold will have a major impact on the country's future economic fortunes. At the same time, they point to the fact that most of the other countries in the Caribbean depend on crude oil and refined petroleum products and are therefore burdened by the increasing cost of these products. They believe therefore that natural gas will become a key commodity in meeting the electricity generation needs of the countries in the region. In this regard, they see the proposed Eastern Caribbean Gas Pipeline project, which is designed to transport gas from Trinidad and Tobago to the small islands of the Eastern Caribbean, up to Guadeloupe via Barbados and Martinique, as an important element in ensuring security of the energy supply of these countries and also a means of reducing the costs of energy while at the same time contributing to the preservation of the environment. In their analysis, McGuire and Boopsingh also examine the implications of the Petrocaribe Initiative in terms of the possible need for new shipping infrastructure and the debt likely to be incurred by the Caribbean beneficiaries of the Initiative. They therefore point to the need to ensure the early resolution of these issues to the satisfaction of the Caribbean countries.

In Chapter 9, Carlton Davis traces the history of bauxite production in the Caribbean and highlights the current discussions taking place between Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica regarding the latter's participation in aluminium smelter to be established in Trinidad and Tobago. Davis believes that the establishment of such a smelter will be a major boost to the Caribbean Community. He expresses the hope therefore that the project will come to fruition and that regional cooperation in this important area will be pursued in the true interest of the region as a whole.

In chapter 10, Patsy Lewis expresses some concern about the impact of the CSME on the OECS countries. She calls for special concessions to be made to these countries, including the financing of the Regional Development Fund which is intended to assist these countries in coping with any adverse impact resulting from the implementation of the CSME. She also states that the OECS countries which have supplies of unskilled labour have an interest in ensuring that the free movement of labour in the context of the CSME is broadened to include such unskilled labour. On the specific issue of production integration, he believes that the concept should focus not only on goods but on services. Expressing fears about the potential marginalisation of the OECS countries, she asserts that the regional integration process will

be judged by its ability to promote equitable development and by avoiding the marginalisation of these countries.

In Chapter 11, Joseph Isaac observes that the merit of production integration is based on the fact that, among other things, it can take advantage of physical space to gain economies of scale, share management expertise and learning, mobilise financial resources and promote competition between value/supply chain networks, as opposed to generating competition between companies. He notes, however, that companies in the region face a number of constraints, including a lack of strategic planning, outdated technology, high production costs, the absence of standards, limited access to market intelligence and high utility costs. He believes that the existence of a critical infrastructure based on industrial/export zones, pack houses for fresh produce, an adequate distribution network, and shipping with cold storage capability, is necessary for effective economic integration. He also asserts that adequate business systems and techniques for process implementation as well as improvements in management skills constitute critical preconditions for advancing the integration process. He concludes that despite low asset utilisation in many OECS companies, the regionalisation of manufacturing will generate economies of scale and scope.

In Chapter 12, Urlie Lemen examines production integration from a Surinamese perspective. She focuses on the legal implications of Suriname's membership of the CSME and identifies a number of bottlenecks facing production enterprises in Suriname, including insufficient technical knowledge, inadequate infrastructure, limited production capacity, and the high cost of transportation. She believes however that Suriname is committed to putting in place the legal and institutional arrangements necessary to ensure its effective participation in the regional integration process.

In Chapter 13, Neville Duncan focuses on the so-called 'under capacitating' and 'capacitating' factors impacting on production integration. In terms of the former, he sees among other things, the simplification of business start-ups, the streamlining of customs procedures and trade documents, improvements in bankruptcy laws and a reduction in crime and corruption as some of the major issues to be addressed. In respect of the latter, he believes that the states should seek to reduce the influence of powerful interest groups and exclude partisan interests from policy making in an effort to strengthen public capacity for promoting development. He argues that inter-organisational networks are a valuable form of governance for production integration, particularly in the case of small states operating on a region-wide basis. He believes therefore that a new form of governance, based on these principles, is required for the promotion of an effective programme of production integration.

In Chapter 14, Dennis Lalor examines the role of the insurance company in the regional integration process which he argues has assumed a vanguard

role in the private sector in terms of providing individual security and facilitating investment and growth. He poses the question whether the promotion of production integration in CARICOM will require additional services by the life and general insurance sectors or whether it will require that existing services should be provided differently. He expresses the view however that for the regional insurance to contribute more effectively to production integration, it will need to become more competitive, provide services more cost effectively across national boundaries and generate sustainable profits that can be invested in expanding production capacity. Based on an examination of the relevant provisions governing financial institutions within the CSME, he also believes that although the arrangements are a step in the right direction, they do not go far enough and therefore the region will need to take a strategic look at the regulatory environment with a view to rationalising the capital and deficit requirements and also standardise the reporting and regulatory environment.

In Chapter 15, Eleanor Brown points to the benefits that will accrue from the effective integration of financial services in the region, including a reduction in the cost of accessing capital, the realisation of increased opportunities to engage in cross border investment and the increased access of consumers to a wider range of competitively priced products. She points to studies carried out in the context of the European Union which estimate the potential increment of the GDP deriving from a fully integrated European Union at 1.5 percent. She also points to the trend towards increased mergers and acquisitions in the financial services industry in the Caribbean, the increase in joint ventures and strategic alliances, and the increasing concentration of financial services in the largest institutions operating in that market which she notes, however, reflect similar trends in North America and Europe. In projecting trends in the future, she argues that further consolidation in the sector is likely to continue, although there is also likely to be increasing specialisation through a break-up of the supply chain via outsourcing of certain activities such as internet services. She believes, however, that a number of legislative and policy changes will need to be put in place, including, among other things, the establishment of a regional supervisory institution with responsibility for regulating financial institutions that have operations in several markets; the harmonisation of cross-border rules on the prevention of insider trading and market manipulation; the harmonisation of disclosure requirements for issues across the Caribbean; the introduction of standardised accounting rules for banks and other financial institutions; the establishment of cross-border standards for approvals of mergers and acquisitions and a harmonised approach to the free movement of electronic commerce. She also believes that the conclusion of a financial services agreement will represent the first and critical stage in

building the necessary regulatory framework for overseeing financial services in the region.

In Chapter 16, Christopher Malcolm examines the legal framework underpinning the financial sector in the OECS countries with special reference to the role of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. He argues that harmonisation of the financial sector has made a positive contribution to the economies of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean by ensuring the coordination of monetary policy and the maintenance of a stable currency. He believes therefore that the experience of the OECS should be studied by policy makers in CARICOM with a view to promoting increased harmonisation of financial legislation and regulations in support of a programme of production integration.

In Chapter 17, Jean Holder examines the current state of air transportation in the Caribbean against the background of an insightful analysis of the financial performance of the global air transportation industry. He argues that because of its contribution to the overall development of the countries of the region, government support for the industry, by way of subsidies, is justified. He believes nevertheless that the three regionally owned airlines, namely, Air Jamaica, BWIA and LIAT, will need to restructure their operations in an effort to restore their profitability although, in his view, this could only be achieved if the airlines do so in close collaboration with one another. As a solution to the rationalisation of air transportation in the Caribbean, he proposes the establishment of a Caribbean International Airways (Holding) Company Ltd. (CIAH), under which Air Jamaica, BWIA and LIAT will maintain their separate identity but become one operation under the CIAH which would combine all revenues and pay all bills. In addition, he proposes the establishment of a Common Air Transport policy for the CSME.

In Chapter 18, Andrew Downes examines the impact of production integration on the labour market in terms of employment, labour mobility, labour costs, human resources development, and regulatory/institutional arrangements. He identifies varying impacts of these effects on the different economies in the region. Based on his overall analysis, he concludes that the challenges facing policy makers in the region is to develop a strategy of production integration which would have a positive impact on the labour market while at the same time seeking to ensure that the labour market supports the process of production integration.

In Chapter 19, Benn analyses the formation of growth triangles in Asia with a special focus on the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore (IMS) triangle, and assess the relevance of the concept to the current realities of the Caribbean. He points out that growth triangles have had both a positive and a negative impact in those cases in which they have been applied but the general consensus is that the positives out-weigh the negatives. In the case of the

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Caribbean Benn argues that Trinidad and Tobago, by virtue of its significant petroleum/natural gas reserves as well as its financial surplus, can serve as a 'pivot' or growth zone catalyst' for the elaboration of a strategy of integrated development in the Caribbean. Specifically, he sees Trinidad and Tobago serving as the basis for two major growth triangles in CARICOM; the first linking it to the resource rich countries of the region, such as Guyana and Suriname and, possibly, Jamaica; and the second linking it to Barbados and the OECS countries in terms of the development of an expanded services sector. Benn further argues that the formation of these triangles can serve as a base for tapping into niches in markets of emerging economic powers, such as China and India, and thus enable the region to pursue a strategy of diversification both in terms of its production structure and its external market orientation at a time when its traditional preferential arrangements are coming under increasing threat. Moreover, he states that it will also provide a strategic basis for the economic integration of CARICOM into the wider Latin American region, with Guyana and Suriname, for example, serving as a bridge between CARICOM and neighbouring countries such as Brazil, leading ultimately to the establishment of a cooperation arrangement with MERCOSUR. He concludes that the formation of growth triangles in CARICOM should be further explored as part of a strategy for promoting an integrated pattern of production in keeping with the provisions of Article 52 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.

Finally, in Chapter 20, Edward Seaga argues that the recently launched Caribbean Single Market (CSM) will have great difficulty proving its worth since Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, by virtue of their competitive productivity, will benefit to a much greater extent than Jamaica and the OECS countries. He concedes, nevertheless that production integration is feasible in selected areas, notably in the case of the proposed aluminium smelter in Trinidad and Tobago which will utilise bauxite/alumina supplied by other countries in the region. He also states that there are many areas such as medicine, music and fashion design, sports, agriculture, biodiversity, research, promotion and marketing in which the Caribbean can engage in useful patterns of cooperation, which he feels should be the essence of CARICOM, as opposed to economic integration. For this reason, he argues that CARICOM needs rethinking.

As can be seen from the foregoing, a number of interesting ideas are advanced on a wide range of issues relevant to production integration which is seen as a key element in optimising the development possibilities of the region. The volume should therefore serve as a valuable reference for policy makers, the government, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, the academic community, and also the general public on a subject that will assume increased importance in the context of the further evolution of the CSME.

## ENDNOTES

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15.

## CARIBBEAN IMPERATIVES: Regional Governance and Integrated Development



### INTRODUCTION

**THE PERIODIC REVIEW OF HISTORICAL PROCESSES OFFERS A** unique opportunity to identify the factors which shape these processes and also to determine the likely direction of change in the future.

Viewed in this perspective, the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in 2003 marked an important milestone in the historical evolution of regional integration in the Caribbean. It therefore provides an excellent opportunity to assess progress made in the integration movement, to identify the challenges which lie ahead, and more particularly, to advance policy options for dealing with

these challenges.

Since its establishment in 1973, a number of significant developments have taken place within CARICOM and the wider international system within which it functions.

Within the Community itself, important steps have been taken to widen its membership and to deepen the process of integration. In terms of the former, the accession of Suriname and Haiti as members has increased the size of the Community from 13 to 15 members. This development has a

number of implications since not only has the accession of these countries resulted in a significant increase in the population of the Community (from just over 5 million to approximately 14 million) but it has also, for the first time, expanded the membership of the Community beyond its original English-speaking core, given the fact that Suriname is Dutch-speaking and Haiti French-speaking.

Regarding the deepening of the integration process, a number of decisions have been taken which are designed to strengthen the process of economic integration as well as functional cooperation among the member states of the Community. In this context, efforts have been made to strengthen the coordination of foreign policy within the Community, including the joint sponsorship of candidates for elective and/or appointed positions in international bodies. Similarly, the Community has embarked on a number of major initiatives designed to promote a comprehensive programme of human and social development which encompasses activities in areas such as education, health, labour, youth development, HIV/AIDS, reduction in drug use, crime and violence. Special attention has also been paid to finance and planning, given the importance of these issues in the economic development of the Community. Finally, trade and economic development have received increasing attention both in terms of intra-CARICOM relations and in respect of relations between the Community and the rest of the international system, as is attested by the expanded agenda of the Council for Trade and Development (COTED).

With regard to intra-CARICOM relations, two of the most important initiatives being pursued by the Community relate to the proposed establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).

The CSME is of special significance since it not only provides an opportunity for further trade expansion in the region, but also has considerable potential to promote an integrated pattern of production based on the optimal utilisation of the human and physical resources in the region and thus to maximise its development possibilities. In this context, it should be pointed out that, while a strict focus on the size of the population of the Community might suggest that it is still relatively small compared to other integration movements, judged by its national endowments (oil, natural gas, bauxite/ alumina, gold and diamonds, agricultural and forestry resources) together with its considerable tourism infrastructure, few other economic entities of comparable size could boast of such a wide range of resources. This reality points to the significant potential for the Community to embark on a dynamic strategy of production integration that could be the key to its future economic prosperity.

The CCJ is also seen as a necessary complement to the creation of the CSME since it will be responsible for the arbitration of trade-related

disputes among member states a pre-requisite for the effective functioning of the Single Market and economy. While the CCJ has provoked debate in some countries on issues such as the constitution entrenchment of the Court as well as the possible need for a referendum on whether it should be established (and if so whether it should have an original as well as an appellate jurisdiction) arrangements are actively being put in place for its establishment in 2005. The integration process is taking place within a rapidly changing international economic environment shaped inexorably by the twin forces of globalisation and economic liberalisation and in the context of ongoing negotiations in respect of the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement with special reference to the proposed Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) for the Caribbean, the proposed hemispheric free trade arrangement to be embodied in the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA); as well as the negotiations in the wider international arena taking place within the WTO.

The move towards the creation of a liberalised global trading regime implicit in the various negotiations which is premised on the removal of the preferential trading arrangements traditionally granted to the member states of the Community, has forced the countries of the region to seek to reinforce their solidarity in order to defend special and differential arrangements that are considered necessary to protect their interests in an increasingly competitive global economic system. This effort has placed considerable pressure on the negotiating capacity of the region both to coordinate its position within the several negotiating arenas and to carry out the necessary substantive technical preparations to sustain the effort. Fortunately, the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM), created by the government for this purpose, has facilitated this process.

The past 30 years, and more particularly the last decade or so, have witnessed a significant evolution of the institutional arrangement within the Community. In addition to the annual Heads of Government Conference and the Community Council, which constitute the principal organs of the Community, during the past decade the Community has also established the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) the Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD), the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP) and the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED). In addition, while the Heads of Government of the Community previously met annually, it has become the custom to convene an intersessional meeting and, more recently, a number of special meetings of the Heads have also been convened. Moreover, the Heads of Government have constituted a Bureau, comprising the current chairman, the outgoing chairman and the incoming chairman to serve as a steering committee for the management of the affairs of the Community. At the same time, individual Heads of Government have been assigned responsibility

for specific issues such as agriculture, environment, health and external relations. Prime Ministerial Sub-Committees have also been formed to deal with issues such as the CSME and external trade and economic negotiations.

In the specific context of the external negotiations carried out in the various international forums, a select number of countries have been assigned responsibility for particular aspects of the negotiations at the ministerial level for example, at the present time, under the overall authority of the Prime Minister of Jamaica, who chairs the Prime Ministerial Sub-Committee on External Negotiations, the Senior Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Barbados is responsible for the coordination of external negotiations at the ministerial level, while Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica have been assigned responsibility for coordinating at the negotiations under the Cotonou Agreement, the WTO and the FTAA, respectively.

As was mentioned earlier, the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) has been established as the technical instrument to support the external negotiations of the Community. In recent years, it has been restructured to work closely with the CARIOCM Secretariat and to function under the authority of the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED).

Against this background, it will also be necessary to seek to further strengthen the relationships within CARIFORUM which comprises CARICOM (except Montserrat), together with the Dominican Republic, and which was created as a regional mechanism for identifying and implementing joint programmes funded under the ACP-EU Lomé Convention (now superseded by the Cotonou Agreement). Similarly, new and constructive links will need to be explored between the Community and the Association of Caribbean States (ACS) which provides a useful framework for cooperation with a number of major countries in Latin America bordering the Caribbean Sea, including Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.

Apart from the major trade and economic issues, crime, drugs and security have featured prominently on the CARICOM agenda, given the challenges which they present to several countries in the region. Continuing attention will need to be given to the report of the Task Force on Crime and Security in order to counter the serious threat posed to the viability of Caribbean societies from this source.

Bearing in mind their ecological fragility and susceptibility to natural hazards such as hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and floods, environmental preservation and natural disaster reduction constitute ongoing priorities for the Community. Indeed, the experience of the devastation caused by Hurricane Ivan in The Bahamas, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica and other countries and territories of the region, emphasises the need for the region to promote disaster reduction strategies with a greater sense of urgency.

The convening of CARIFESTA in Suriname in August 2003, which coincided with the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of CARICOM, served as a timely reminder of the role of culture not only in projecting the identity of the region, but also in sustaining the regional integration process during the past 30 years. For this reason, culture, in its various manifestations, should continue to be nurtured as a central priority of the region.

In terms of supporting institutional arrangements within the Community, a number of new institutions, such as the Regional Organisation for Standards and Quality (CROSQ), have been established. However, with the establishment of the CSME, additional institutions dealing with issues such as competition policy, intellectual property rights as well as overall regional development, will need to be established which would clearly make the institutional configuration of the integration movement increasingly complex, given the significant number of institutions which already exist. This suggests the need for a review of the overall institutional infrastructure of the Community with a view to effecting appropriate rationalisations in its structure and operation in order to promote greater efficiency.

In the context of the proposed rationalisation of the institutional arrangements in the Community, increased attention will need to be given to issues such as the decision-making process, including the increased delegation of authority from the Heads of Government to Ministers, to officials and to the CARICOM Secretariat itself, as well as the improved implementation of decisions taken at the various levels. The issue of the funding of the integration movement will also need to be addressed in this context. Beyond the formal structures of integration described above, a number of informal processes have been at work in promoting closer linkages among the people of the region. Historically, there has been considerable movement of people among the various countries as is evidenced by the ongoing migration from Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines to Trinidad and Tobago. Similarly, persons from the Eastern Caribbean migrated to Guyana during the early decades of the twentieth century to work in the gold mining industry in the interior of the country. Traditionally, Guyanese have in turn migrated to Suriname, by virtue of its proximity to work in the sugar industry and in other sectors of the economy. More recently, in the face of economic difficulties and political instability at home, Guyanese have also migrated in fairly large numbers to countries such as Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados and St. Kitts-Nevis, in search of employment as teachers, construction workers and service providers.

The movement of artistes and entertainers throughout the region, particularly from Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, has served not only to popularise indigenous music such as reggae and soca but has also contributed to the development of a common Caribbean cultural heritage. In other words, the process of Caribbean integration has been strongly driven

by the activities of the people themselves in advance of the completion of the formal institutional arrangements to facilitate this process.

In addition, since its establishment, the University of the West Indies has played an important role in fostering a sense of Caribbean identity by bringing together on its various campuses, students from different countries in the region, although this trend was much more pronounced in the early days of its establishment. More recently, the university has provided ongoing analysis of Caribbean regional issues and has sought to identify common approaches to these issues, in recognition of the existence of what Michael Dash,<sup>1</sup> echoing Edouard Glissant, has described as the 'shared heritage, parallel sensibilities and commonality of interests' of the people of the Caribbean.

The foregoing review of the evolution of the regional integration movement over the past thirty years suggests that the region faces a number of fundamental challenges in accelerating the pace of regional integration while seeking to protect the interests of its member states in a rapidly changing international economic environment. However, even while it seeks to achieve these objectives, the Community will need to look beyond its current preoccupations and begin the process of charting the next 30 years of its existence in order to lay the foundation for the increased prosperity of the people of the region in the years ahead.

A major challenge facing the Community in the future is the need to develop a new and imaginative system of regional governance as well as strategies aimed at optimising the development possibilities of the region based on the integrated development of its resources. This will require the identification of new modes of integration better suited to the realities of the region. In this regard, it should be noted that over the years there has been an increasing body of literature on regional integration. Based on a review of this literature, five major theoretical approaches may be identified, namely, the neo-functional<sup>2</sup> model associated with Haas, Nye and Schmitter, among others; liberal inter-governmentalism<sup>3</sup> pioneered by Moravcsik; new institutionalist approaches,<sup>4</sup> advanced by Armstrong and Bulmer; network analysis<sup>5</sup> promoted by Peterson and Bomberg; and transactionalist analysis<sup>6</sup> made famous by Karl Deutsch. While all of these theoretical frameworks are relevant in varying degrees to an understanding of integration processes, the reality is that most of them have been influenced to a large extent by the experience of integration arrangements among contiguous territories, mainly in Europe and Latin America. However, the attempt to integrate non-contiguous territories as in the case of the Caribbean, which comprises mainly islands, presents a number of special challenges. The region will therefore need to fashion new theoretical constructs that would better enable policy makers to identify creative possibilities for the integration of small non-contiguous entities separated by a wide expanse of sea, which

itself breeds insularity and particularism. Clearly, this effort will require a conscious commitment to move beyond the prevailing mindset towards an embrace of regionalism.

Moreover, in analysing inter-governmental relations in the context of regional integration, two broad categories of political bargaining have been identified by Lewicki, Saunders and Minton,<sup>7</sup> namely, 'distributive' bargaining and 'integrative' bargaining. The former describes a situation in which the parties confront mutually irreconcilable goals while, in the case of the latter, the interests of the parties are not mutually exclusive. An appreciation of this distinction is essential to an understanding of the dynamics of the integration process in the Caribbean.<sup>8</sup>

Integration processes are also characterised at different points by contradiction, competition and complementarity. In the case of contradiction, the interest of two or more member states are seen as mutually exclusive with little prospects of reconciliation unlike a situation of competition in which two or more countries might seek the same objective in a context in which only one would succeed. Finally, complementarity implies a meshing of interests within the framework of the regional integration effort. Obviously, complementarity presents the ideal scenario for strengthening the integration process, but clearly contradiction and competition are inevitable and therefore have to be managed in order to preserve the integrity of the integration effort.

More generally, the Caribbean Community, as an expression of interstate relation, may be said to be a microsm or sub-system within the wider international community, both in terms of its intra-regional dynamics and its relations with other actors in the international system. As such, it can be analysed in terms of international relations theory – influenced over the years by a wide range of theoretical perspectives embedded in the assumptions of realism, neo-liberalism, structuralism, rationalism, idealism, critical theory and constructivism (to name some of the most important ones). Notwithstanding the recent dominant influence exercised by neoliberalism, it would seem that the Caribbean reality can best be understood and explained by the adoption of an electric theoretical perspective that is selectively informed by the assumptions of realism, which recognises the centrality of state power, exercised individually and collectively; structuralism, in terms of its focus on the critical interconnection between politics and economics; and rationalism, which emphasises the importance of promoting an 'emancipatory politics' in international relations, which is clearly favourable to the interests of the small states of the region.

Many of the issues relating to the challenges identified above are dealt with in one way or another in this volume. The most salient points contained in the various chapters are highlighted in the following section.

In **Part 1** which deals with the Reconceptualising of the Caribbean Community, Eddie Greene analyses the evolution of the integration movement and highlights in the process the institutional arrangements elaborated over the years in search of a more effective system of regional governance. He also distinguishes between the federalist, functionalist, transactionalist and multilateralist approaches to regional integration. Against this background, he advocates a reconfiguration of the Community on the basis of the principle of shared sovereignty.

Cuthbert Joseph argues that the adherence by CARICOM countries to the doctrine of state sovereignty is no longer viable. In his view, given international trends towards federalism, the survival and growth of the Caribbean Community demand that member states construct new institutions to reconcile individual and collective sovereignty in order to advance the self-determination of the Caribbean people.

Boxill, for his part, observes that individual and collective sovereignty are not irreconcilable and that the experience of the European Union suggests that the latter could make countries better off. He believes, however, that it will be necessary for the Community to articulate a vision in which political integration is seen as a means of achieving greater economic welfare for the people of the region.

In a somewhat novel vein, Carolyn Cooper contends that, paradoxically, the Federation dream might have become a reality had its proponents been able to translate the globalising rhetoric of regional integration into meaningful local dialects in each country. Cooper concludes that for integration to be truly successful, the collective imagination of the people of the region must be engaged in the process of formulating solutions.

Robert Buddan argues that while the first 20 years of CARICOM were preoccupied with economic integration, the next phase of the evolution of the integration movement should focus on the sharing of experiences designed to improve governance. In order to make this a reality, he sees the need to build an appropriate governmental machinery with a view to expanding democratic norms throughout the region.

In focusing on the links between national and regional governance, Trevor Munroe asserts that conceptions of regional governance must rest on the foundations of sub-regional and national governance systems. He notes that the imposition of regional governance arrangements from above, however rational or elegant in design, is not sustainable, unless accompanied by at least moderate levels of support from below. He goes on to argue that the necessary levels of support involvement and satisfaction with sub-regional and national governance in the region do not exist and therefore need to be urgently strengthened. In passing, Munroe also identifies 'majoritarianism' based on the 'winner takes all' principle, excessive forms of political patronage and clientelism, which leads to political violence, as

well as corruption, as exercising a negative influence on governance systems in some of the member states of the Community.

Shridath Ramphal traces the recent genesis of the proposed CARICOM Commission, based on the decision of the Heads of Government at their twenty-fourth session for proposals to be elaborated on the subject. He states that although the Heads of Government had declared that the functions of the Commission should be confined to the CSME, they nevertheless wanted to give it a substantial field of responsibility since the CSME will cover the whole gamut of regional economic relations. He also points to the fact that the Commission was to be assigned two primary functions in terms of initiating proposals and implementing of decisions taken by all the organs of the Community. In Ramphal's view, in order to be effective, the Commission must have a frontline responsibility for strategic thinking in the Community'. He also believes that the structure of the Commission should be guided by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas in terms of its broad subject areas. Finally, Ramphal asserts that the most fundamental requirement in carrying forward the process of Caribbean integration is the will to sustain the political enlightenment that found primacy at Montego Bay in the vision of the Rose Hall Declaration.

Roderick Rainford also sees the establishment of the proposed CARICOM Commission as a major institutional innovation in the governance structure and processes of the Community. But he notes that although the Commission is supposed to deal with the 'implementation deficit' in CARICOM, it will also need to address the deficit in the quality of decision making in the Community. Rainford believes that a Commission that is appropriately conceived would probably increase the salience of CARICOM issues in national politics, thus helping to overcome the several deficits affecting the Community. He also believes that in the design of the Commission, it will be necessary to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the alternative options of giving legal force to Community decisions via the principle of automatic absorption, for example, through the operation of an omnibus CARICOM Law at the national level, or through the process or application, in which member states take legislative and/or administrative action on a case-by-case basis to give effect to Community decisions. Rainford affirms that the Community must mobilise at the political and technical levels to arrive at a definite and authoritative conclusion regarding the establishment of the Commission.

Havelock Brewster attributes the slow pace of implementation of the CSME to the fact that the provisions of the Treaty of Chaguaramas are subject to the discretion of national sovereignty. He argues therefore that supranational decision making can accelerate the process of integration in chosen policy domains and, moreover, that sovereignty is a dynamic concept that is divisive and customisable according to the needs and desires

of participating states. Brewster believes that the proposed CARICOM Commission can function effectively if the Community itself with the Conference of Heads of Government at its apex, is constitutionally empowered by the member states to make decisions, to legislate and to implement decisions. He feels that a Commission without such powers is likely to be little more than an expensive duplication of CARICOM organs. Brewster also sees the principle of 'automatic transfer of resources' for the financing of the institutions of the Community as a critical need at this stage of its evolution, bearing in mind the large number of institutions likely to be established as a consequence of the CSME.

P.I. Gomes provides an interesting synopsis of the main initiatives pursued in search of an appropriate institutional mechanism to support decision making and implementation within CARICOM. He recommends that the CARICOM Secretariat should be assigned executive authority, delegated from the Conference of Heads of Government, as a necessary prerequisite for meaningful integration in the context of a 'mature regionalism'.

He therefore questions the usefulness of the proposed CARICOM Commission, particularly since, as currently conceived, it will not exercise supranational authority. Indeed, Gomes argues that if the proposals for restructuring the Secretariat, on the basis of the exercise of executive functions, were to be implemented, then even the quasi-Cabinet that has been established by the Heads of Government would in fact become superfluous. Gomes also states that the assertion of the principle of individual sovereignty by member states gives rise to an operations dysfunctionality by which the secretariat is confined to a purely administrative role. He argues moreover that the CSME cannot be realistically accomplished without supranationality and original jurisdiction that is to be attributed to the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).

Edwin Jones and Ivan Cruickshank provide a number of interesting analytical insights into the decentralisation of decision making, institutional building and leadership in CARICOM. They argue that the rationalisation of governance and administrative strategy in the 'integrationist' framework entails situational analysis and the reshaping of decisions, institutions and instruments to meet the overall demands of meaningful implementation. They note that a major deficiency of the Community derives from the fact that its building process started without a widespread understanding of a relevant theory of integration. In their view, this 'theoretical innocence' has constrained the transformational approach to integration. They believe that the notion of CARICOM as 'an association of sovereign states' has been a formula for administrative immobilism. They wholeheartedly support Brewster's observation that the recent 'reaffirmation of sovereignty' in the Rose Hall Declaration represents a 'regrettable step backward in Caribbean

integration and an incomprehensible statement in the context of an edict intended to create more mature regional governance'. In their view the record of policy implementation in the Community has disappointed collective expectation since the decisional machinery continues to be beset by a 'culture of critical delays in implementing Community commitments and important decisions'. Jones and Cruickshank therefore advocate a framework for concerted action based on a multilevel or polycentric approach involving the dispersion of authority away from central institutions, upwards to the supranational level, downwards to sub-national jurisdictions and sideways to public-private networks. In their view, multilevel or polycentric governance represents a distinctive way of organising activities in the political, social and economic spheres which reflects 'sovereignty' as a single source of power and authority.

Neville Duncan uses the experience of St. Kitts-Nevis as a basis for proposing a model of governance that he believes would be effective for that state as well as other countries. Duncan advocates a new 'transactional' relationship between St. Kitts and Nevis under a restructured federalism.

In this context, he proposes that all powers should be conferred on the unit governments, save and except in respect of those specifically assigned to the federal government. More generally, Duncan observes that the CARICOM countries are now obliged to achieve social, economic, political and cultural transformation under a liberal democratic regime with all the conflicts and contradictions that this entails. He feels, however that, notwithstanding this difficulty, the situation provides an opportunity for CARICOM countries to prove that an enduring pattern of development can occur with more participatory forms of government and under significantly revamped governance systems.

In **Part 3**, which deals with the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, Alvin Wint examines the impact of regional integration on economic performance within the Caribbean region and identifies the factors that appear to be responsible for the striking difference in intra-regional performance across the Caribbean. He argues that economic integration in the Caribbean has not had the level of economic impact hoped for by its architects, due mainly to the inherent structural similarity of the economies, which is in part reflected in the lack of significant increase in intra-regional trade. He concludes that policy makers in the region will need to emphasise self-determination and national development as important goals if the regional integration process is to deliver economic benefits to the people of the Caribbean.

Sandra Shirley also assesses the future possibilities for capital and financial markets within the CSME. She argues that the capital market is an important means of mobilising investment funds into long term assets or through the sale or trade of long-term investments, such as fixed income

securities and debt. She notes that as small and relatively poor countries, investment in capital and access to the world's financial markets have been the mainstay in the region's ability to improve the living standards of its people. She believes therefore that the financial sector must become more involved in the negotiations on the CSME to ensure that their strategic plans reflect the changing economic reality.

In **Part 4** which deals with the issue of production integration, Byron Blake discusses the subject in the context of the CSME. He points to the fact that various studies have concluded that 'there is a range of sectors and sub-sectors in which production integration is both technically and economically feasible', yet little progress has been made in this area. He identifies a number of policy and institutional factors which have operated as obstacles to cross-border investment and hence production integration. He believes however, that the right of establishment provisions of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas are directly relevant to the promotion of production integration. More generally, Blake feels that despite the slow progress that has been made in this area in the past, the Revised Treaty has succeeded in laying the basis for a much more rapid pace of production through the creation of the CSME.

On the same theme, Trevor Farrell provides an empirical analysis of intra-regional investment trends, much of which is accounted for by Trinidad and Tobago and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica and Barbados. He observes that much of the intra-regional direct investment flows take place through some form of inter-corporate linkage, based on joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances rather than through the setting up of new operations. Quite interestingly, Farrell states that cross-border investments have involved mainly 'market extension diversification' rather than production integration. However, he sees portfolio investment as a new dynamic in regional economic integration. Similarly, he points to the emergence of a regional capital market as well as the development of off-shore financial centres in various countries in the region as positive developments. Farrell notes that much of what is happening falls within the area of services rather than trade in goods. He argues, however, that the region should seek to 'identify strategic industries' in which it has the best chance to build a competitive advantage. He also believes that while the CSME is important, if the region is to develop its full potential, public policy will need to be better targeted in the future.

For his part, Randy Cato traces the evolution of thinking on production integration from the Brewster/Thomas study of 1967 to the subsequent elaboration of their thesis by William Demas and Norman Girvan. He points to the fact that the manufacturing sector in the OECS faces a number of constraints deriving from, among other things, small size, high costs of production, inadequate investment in technology, low labour productivity

as well as poor management, marketing and planning skills. He believes these constraints could be addressed through production integration which could lead to a rationalisation of activities across the OECS and between the OECS and CARICOM. He feels however, that for production integration to take place in OECS, the area must be treated as a single production space, in which entrepreneurs must be prepared to forge strategic alliances and establish joint ventures. He believes that the OECS countries have an advantage based on the existence of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank and the fact that they share a common currency. While his analysis focuses on manufacturing, he feels that the same approach should be applied to the service sector.

Clive Thomas reflects on his path-breaking study, co-authored with Havelock Brewster, on the Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration as a basis for addressing some of the central mechanism which have in the past shaped, and will continue to shape, the pattern and rhythm of growth and underdevelopment in CARICOM-type economies. Thomas starts by correcting two major misconceptions regarding the thrust of the study, namely, that it ignores the demand side of the regional economy and that it advocates autarky. He goes on to make the point that the book is both a theoretical model and an empirical study and that it explicitly seeks to advance and develop the theory of economic integration. Thomas also analyses the changes that have taken place since the publication of the original study, notably in terms of the 'momentous transformation in the global economy' with special reference to the impact of innovation. In this context he advances the concept of an innovation-driven model of regional cooperation.

Thomas further examines the way in which the insertion of CARICOM-type economies in the international system places constraints on their capacity to pursue an independent growth path. He also notes the challenges involved in macroeconomic policy formulation, given the centrality of trade in terms of the fact that the export of goods and/or services is the main source of livelihood for the population of the region. He argues that regional economic integration by seeking to widen the domestic market and the pool of domestic resources, skills and entrepreneurship, provides a platform for integration into the global economy. He believes that the creation of national policy space in CARICOM-type economies requires the judicious blending of orthodox and heterodox approaches to macroeconomic regulation. He concludes that, as a result, there must be a highly sceptical attitude to market fundamentalism as the guiding regulatory, allocative and redistributive principle for economic growth and development.

In **Part 5** which addresses the theme, 'The Caribbean in the International System', Gail Mathurin advances the provocative, though pragmatic, proposition that the countries of the region should vest their

negotiating authority in a central regional institution, based on a treaty obligation, in order to improve the efficiency of their external trade negotiations. Similarly, David Jessop calls upon the region to rebalance its external trade policy and also to employ new strategies for advancing its interests, including the repositioning of its diplomatic representation abroad and mobilising its diasporic communities in the USA, Canada and the UK in support of its economic interests. Furthermore, Rosalea Hamilton argues that while there is general support for integration in the Caribbean, the governments did not explicitly seek the prior approval of the people of the region before embarking on the venture. She feels therefore that there is a 'top-down approach' to integration. For this reason, she advocates the establishment of a major mechanism in each CARICOM country to enable the people of the region to get to know one another and to facilitate a strategy of 'integration from the bottom'. She believes that regional economic integration in CARICOM is now a central imperative and a key strategy for CARICOM in its effort to ensure global competitiveness and the improved economic well-being of its people. She feels however, that in order to achieve these goals the region will need to develop new institutional mechanisms to integrate the 'whole CARICOM family'.

In his focus on foreign direct investment in the Caribbean, Stephen Vasciannie notes that despite some reservations in the past, the predominant view today is that foreign direct investment is beneficial to developing countries and the countries in transition and therefore efforts should be made to encourage such investment. He points to the general trend towards economic liberalisation and the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties (BIT), both of which facilitate foreign direct investment. He also notes that in the context of the conclusion of BITS, the developing countries have generally conceded the principle of national treatment for foreign investors which means such investors are granted the same conditions as national investors. Moreover, bilateral investment treaties contain provisions which tend to safeguard the interests of foreign investors by guaranteeing certain minimum legal standards, even though in practice this undermines the scope for policy initiatives by the government of the host country. He suggests therefore that host governments may need to consider whether safeguards concerning labour and environmental standards should not be included in bilateral treaty arrangements in order to protect host country interests. Moreover, he believes that individual host countries can ensure, for example, that transparency in the decision-making process is honoured in observance rather than in the breach by integrating investment rules within a single coherent structure.

In **Part 6** which focuses on Multilateralism in International Relations, Rudy Insanally observes that in the current radically changed context of international relations, which is characterised by unipolarity, the developing

countries feel increasingly threatened by growing tendencies towards unilateralism and also by the forces of globalisation and trade liberalisation. He believes, however that, despite its shortcomings, the United Nations remains the 'flagship of the great multilateral enterprise'. In this context, he asserts that the principles and purpose of multilateralism can be best served by revitalising the General Assembly, which is the most representative of all the UN organs. He also believes that the prospects of developing countries, like those in CARICOM, could be significantly enhanced if more coalitions of like-minded countries could be built to promote their common interests and concerns. He feels therefore that the countries of the region should seek to consolidate their relations not only within the hemisphere through organisation such as the ANDEAN Group the Central American Common Market, and MERCOSUR, but also in wider groupings such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. More generally, he feels that CARICOM should strive to safeguard the principles and purposes of the UN Charter which is the bedrock of multilateralism and which, for small states, is the principal armour against threats to peace, security and development.

In a similar analysis, Don Mills argues that the increasing complexity in international relations presents a special challenge for CARICOM states and other small developing countries. He believes that in a world with one surviving superpower, the existence of the United Nations and the multilateral system in general represent a major asset. He notes, however that the controversies surrounding the Iraq War have put considerable pressure on multilateralism. He feels therefore that the member states of CARICOM together with other developing countries must help to promote the central role of multilateralism in international affairs. He also believes that the multilateral system needs the informed support of the public, in particular because of its importance to small countries.

Tyrone Ferguson asserts that all CARICOM countries subscribe multilateralism but that they favour a 'reconstructed multilateralism', involving both the UN system and the core multilateral economic institutions. He notes that we are living 'in a world that has lost its way' and which is characterised by increasing 'global disorder' According to Ferguson, we are living in a global context in which 'the familiar anchors of the immediately precedent order have been pulled away and where settled consensuses have dissipated'. He believes that the Caribbean should develop clearly framed strategic objectives with respect to a project of reconstructed multilateralism. He also believes that the time is ripe for the Caribbean to develop stronger institutional and operational processes of regional governance and therefore feels that the short-sighted insistence by the small CARICOM states on individual sovereignty is misplaced in the contemporary global environment. He cautions that the post-Cold War – and post-September 11 – world is an increasingly dangerous place generally, but

more so for small states like those in the Caribbean. The danger, he notes, is compounded by the unilateralist tendencies of the world's only global power. He believes therefore that Caribbean diplomacy has to be actively and purposively engaged on behalf of multilateralism in the existential self-interest of the region.

Christopher Hackett examines the challenges and threats to multilateralism in contemporary international relations. He notes that the establishment vision of the multilateral system of the second half of the twentieth century is being challenged by unilateralist tendencies on the part of the USA as the sole surviving superpower. He asserts that multilateralism will continue to be the only viable option for CARICOM countries, given the international challenges they face. He believes that multilateralism can best be served by reforming and strengthening the United Nations to enable it to pursue its original objective of monitoring peace, security and sustainable development.

Finally, John Rapley argues provocatively that the policies of the Bush administration have, paradoxically, had a beneficial effect in that they have served to prod the rest of the world to revivify multilateral resistance to unilateralism. He observes that while multilateralism may not have stopped US action on Iraq, it has raised the opportunity cost to the Bush administration. Rapley goes on to state an equally controversial thesis by arguing that although in the eyes of policy makers in the developing world, globalisation has failed to deliver the expected benefits, these countries should continue to globalise even more aggressively in an effort to exercise greater leverage on the US economy which is becoming increasingly linked to the developing countries through the relocation of the production enterprises in those countries. He also advocates the forging of strategic alliances with constituencies in the developed countries and also exploiting differences between these countries. He argues that the perceived failing of multilateralism derives not so much from the inherent flaws in the 'system' but from manipulation by the dominant player at a time when conditions in the global economy render assistance from just about any quarter insufficient. He therefore believes that while the future remains uncertain it arguably presents more opportunities for developing countries than it has in a good while.

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the volume contains a number of important ideas which are extremely relevant to the needs of policy makers in the Caribbean seeking to address the challenge of regional governance and integrated development.

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## 16.

# CARICOM SINGLE MARKET & ECONOMY: Challenges, Benefits, Prospects



### INTRODUCTION

THIS IS THE COMPANION VOLUME, TO VOLUME 1, CSME: Challenges, Benefits and Prospects. It is intended as a Reference collection of texts of Agreements, Speeches, Addresses, Research Papers, and Proposed Timetables relevant to the conceptualisation and implementation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy. These documents give insights into the views of leading Politicians, Ambassadors, Academicians, and Technicians on various important aspects of matters relating to the CSME.

Together, the documents should constitute a useful starting set of easily accessible documentation that facilitates

understanding of this vitally important Caribbean experiment, the evolutionary process, called CSME. Taken together, these texts should help to indicate that there exists no blueprint for establishing a Single Market and Economy, that no model can simply be copied as the 'right' one since it worked for some other Region, and that for the Caribbean we should welcome the interplay of ideas and criticisms of current efforts. We should not be deterred by the legitimate scepticisms of nations each dealing with the uncertainties of its own future, or by the resultant hesitations in actions of members. There is no royal road to a Single Market and Economy, certainly not for the Caribbean.

This study commenced in the latter part of 2005 and was completed in May 2006. It has two main objectives that are related: first, to bring together in a single place, material relevant to an understanding of the CSME beyond the text of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas; and secondly, to seek to expand on the information available to the regional public on the CSME, particularly its perceived benefits. The study has benefited from views expressed by academics, bureaucrats, former diplomats, the private and civil sectors as well as political leaders. Inevitably, it mirrors deep fears and scepticism in these sectors of society. But its real aim is to broaden understanding so as to lay a basis for future assessment of the progress of CSME.

In the face of claims that there is only a low level of popular understanding of the CSME as a phase in the integration process, Prime Minister Arthur, noting that it dates back to a decision of the Heads of Government in 1989, recently responded as follows:

“The continuous assertion by many that they were not aware of the CSME is to my mind the most unfortunate recent evidence of our willingness to carry ignorance as a badge of honour.”

Despite this understandable reaction, there is no alternative to addressing the concern for a better understanding of the CSME. This is even more important as the claim of ignorance may in fact be partly a way of expressing the significant uncertainties being experienced over how and at what pace to buy into the CSME and its key institutions. While it goes beyond the issue of trade, the failure of twelve of the members of CARICOM to date, to empower the CCJ to be their final court of appeal is one manifestation of this uncertainty—not entirely due to automatic oppositionist of the party-political process. The sustained opposition of the Trinidad and Tobago Law Association and of a large segment of the legal fraternity in Jamaica to breaking ties with the Privy Council, combined with reluctance in the OECS countries, feed this uncertainty. But the case of the CCJ is simply one of several in which uncertainties have replaced the old certainties relating to the image and direction of the region and its international partnerships. The position of some members of the OECS sub-group, in effect, questions the advisability of the requirement under the CSME of full liberalization in services, especially the removal of alien landholding laws in such small territories. Trinidad and Tobago appears to be reaching toward the USA for its primary form of international integration, while encouraging wider relationships in the Caribbean Basin. Belize’s location sets it in a position of tension between the CARICOM alignment and the Central American pull, on the determination of its identity. Processes of economic differentiation between the countries, as well as apparent differences in

philosophical orientation are tending to create other cleavages, which could lead to divergent alignments with extra regional states. In summary then, the establishment of a Single Market will be no automatic guarantee of a unified region. It would require sustained commitment to a vision of the Community as a geopolitical space, Herculean efforts to maintain cohesion and aggressive efforts to ensure the fundamentals of regional social and political stability.

This study therefore is part of a wider effort to enhance the level of understanding in the population at large, without which the CSME can never hope to be successful.

For the convenience of readers, the study is being published as two separate volumes. Volume 1, entitled **CSME: Challenges, Benefits, Prospects** deals with the second objective of the study (i.e., seeking to expand on the information available to the regional public on the CSME, particularly its perceived benefits).

Volume 2, entitled **CSME: Readings and Analyses** is more in the character of a reference manual of appropriate reading intended to satisfy the first objective of the study (i.e., to bring together in a single place material relevant to an understanding of the CSME beyond the text of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.). Accordingly, Volume 2 is more voluminous than Volume 1, and should satisfy the appetite of those who, having read Volume 1, want deeper insights into the history of, and issues related to the CSME. Volume 2 contains views expressed on aspects of the CSME by academics, bureaucrats, former diplomats, the private and civil sectors, as well as by political leaders. The Appendix to Volume 1 gives the Table of Contents of Volume 2, and should therefore serve as a guide to readers about how deeply they wish to delve into the complexities of the construction and implementation of the CSME.


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17.

## THE CARICOM SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY: Towards a Single Economic Space



### INTRODUCTION

THE OFFERING OF ESSAYS THAT THIS BOOK CONTAINS, represents an attempt to satisfy the needs of at least four, possibly overlapping, groups. These groups may be categorized as: **Laypersons**, busy with the daily survival-and-progress issues of their lives, who need to have a feel for what is developing in the milieu in which they are trying to survive; **Students**, seeking to garner a more than cursory appreciation of the nature of the evolution towards a CARICOM Single market and Economy; **Academicians**, interested in the comments of their peers, of leaders of Caribbean Governments, and of leading

opinion formers associated with the nascent institutions of the CSME, about where we seem to be heading; and **Politicians**, needing to improve the acuity with which they perceive the efforts of, and prescribe actions for, their individual countries as participants in the trek towards to the CSME.

The selections begin with a presentation on the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas the framework that underpins the concept of the CSME. That selection is followed immediately by a Progress Report that indicates where the evolutionary process stood as of 30 May 2006. The Report indicates for the fifteen countries where they each stood in relation to implementation

of key elements of the project for establishing the CSME. Thus, the genesis of the CSME and the progress achieved towards its full implementation are dealt with in the first section of the book.

The last section of the book has a crystal ball aura. It contains selections looking both backward and forward, like Janus, seeing where we have come from, and giving visions of where we appear to be heading.

The intervening seven sections deal with important dimensions of the actual evolutionary process – a kind of informed visit to the engine room of implementation led by informed commentators. The issues covered highlight current problems of execution, suggestions of solutions, and prognoses of problems, deriving partly from solutions proffered and from systemic trends. With respect to this aspect of problems associated with systemic trends, the section entitled ‘Putting Gender on the Agenda’ contains essays that merit special attention. The servings in that section provide a platform for ongoing consideration of the gender dimensions of the evolutionary process aimed at establishing a functioning CSME. Those essays highlight: some gender realities of the milieu in which integration initiatives are being taken; some current and possible consequences, not necessarily intended, of those initiatives; and, by implication, the importance of eschewing an androcentric stance in decision-making within the Region.

The Chapters that deal with the Caribbean Court of Justice provide insights into what is perhaps the most important recent phase of the Caribbean’s evolutionary journey towards the CSME. In this respect, those Chapters probably provide a necessary complement to the crystal ball servings of the Chapter entitled ‘Way Forward.’ Taken as a whole, the essays should contribute to satisfying the curiosities of interested lay persons, the memory refreshment needs of busy participants in the process towards a CSME, and the cautionary requirements of all who wish, or need, to pronounce on where CARICOM is going.

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18.

## CARICOM MARITIME SPACES: Disputes & Resolution



### INTRODUCTION

ONE FEATURE OF THIS POST-COLD WAR PERIOD IS that the dissolution of the Soviet Empire has released a new wave of nationalism and particularism sentiment that had been previously suppressed. It is evident not only in the Balkans where its intensity has been the most trenchant but also in other areas of the global community. The change, which seems to be still unfolding, has been critical to the existing system of nation states in that conflicts, armed and otherwise, take place less between states than within states or the community of member states. Change has fed on the existing disparities, inequalities and the widening gulf within societies and

on renewed aspirations to confront the status quo. In association with the structural transformation in the global trading regimes, inspired by like projections and dominance of particular interests, a disruptive period has been taking form that will demand the closest attention from our small societies.

Change has been constant in Caribbean society; for it has not differed elsewhere. Transition connotes change; and change, even when things appear to remain the same, foments conflict. And conflict is rarely far off in the horizon. In this first decade of the new century, the Caribbean Community

is obliged to look as seriously and soberly to its future as it has done when it took steps to consolidate further the integration movement.

As the Community secures a single market and economy, it has to grapple with the erosion, really the beginning of the end, of the preferential arrangements that had their roots in the colonial connection. It has to continue to strive imaginatively for a future for its "sensitive" and pivotal banana exports. And in the case of the historic ties to sugar, some members have Intervention, already taken the bold decision to abandon future production; a few, the even more daring venture to continue production in a highly uneven and competitive market.

Moreover, while the region negotiates a new Economic Partnership Agreement with Europe, it has to cope with an expanded Europe, the eastern half of which, apart from being somewhat disdainful of the survivals of imperial trading, is a major competitor for investments and aid programmes.

Of the identifying features of the period, of signal concern to the region should be the incidence of intra-state conflict. As CARICOM society advances beyond the first generation of political independence, the contest for political power in small electorates where a paucity of votes can confine a grouping to opposition, provides the environment for internal disruption and adverse impact on the Community at large. In the multi-ethnic societies, the realities of exclusion contest vigorously the declarations about inclusion. When joined with other sources of conflict, the ability of member states to maintain peace, stability and security in their respective territory, stretches the resilience of the entire Community to the limit.

This collection of papers, therefore, deals with a set of issues relating to conflicts which have emerged from domestic political crises and from the process of delimiting land and maritime borders; both Community and neighbouring states being involved. The conflicts between member states over land or maritime borders are especially dangerous to existing cordial bilateral relations, and to the Community generally, in their accentuation of the interests of individual states. The conflicts over the land borders have their roots in the colonial inheritance and were passed on unresolved to the independent states. Other conflicts have inhered in the small political framework, some from multi-ethnic structures that are also the result of colonial policy, where a fractional difference in electoral support can confine a group, sometimes an ethnic grouping, to the opposition for any length of time. Those conflicts relating to the Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) are of recent vintage.

When the issues implode into conflict, they have a potential to be disruptive and have taxed the energies and expertise of the political leadership in the search for resolution. Molding and consolidating units into a single integrated space may not take place without discord. Striking a harmonious balance with the self-interests of individual states, therefore,

becomes a supreme effort that takes time. Yet, it has to be done if the Community is to progress. The European Union is being constructed against a turbulent history of dynastic rivalries, large-scale armed hostilities among some of its member states, some in recent memory, and strongly competitive states' interests. Indeed, it is because, and perhaps despite this compelling history and the interplay of sovereignty, that the dictates of integration and union have been so irresistible.

The Caribbean Community, so far, has not traversed that path of rivalry, mutual distrust and suspicion among its members. Yet the major conflicts that inform the set of papers have tested the goodwill and ability of both member states and the Community to find the common ground at the level of the leadership and of the existing institutions. How the Community has responded is the subject of some of the discussions; and where the divisive cracks have appeared has been indicated. The diversity of the approach to resolution, which certainly is not extraordinary in such developing institutions, has had its effects on the making of consensus within the Community as much as inciting extra-regional observers to intervene.

When the Community fails to resolve a conflict among its members, the next course may possibly be the resort to extra-Community third parties. That approach can be made jointly by both, or together, by all the parties engaged in the conflict. It can also be a unilateral act that exposes the depth of differences. A more serious implication in the Community's failure to contain conflicts is the invitation, in whatever form, to outside powers to intervene directly, in one instance militarily, into the affairs of the Community. Such intervention would divide the Community with one group openly supporting the venture and another in opposition to it. Put plainly, this development impairs the security of the Community, subverts its incipient "sense of Community" and offers more argument to the sceptics about the essence and vulnerability of our West Indianness.

Would the structural and institutional achievements that proffer, for example, a single market and economy and a Caribbean Court of Appeal be taken seriously? Would the existing super power to the north and the vibrant petro-power at the southern perimeter of the Caribbean Sea basin seek to manipulate one state, or a group of states, against another? Would regional and other extra-regional powers always be on the alert for fissures to be exploited to breach regional solidarity? Partly in reaction to this potential for interference and intervention, some of the papers offer recommendations for the resolution of internal conflicts, suggesting, in some cases, a reference to international and/or hemispheric agencies or strengthening existing Community mechanisms. In proposing internal or internally generated resolutions of conflict, the broad objective is to avoid inciting external interference in any form.

It ought not to be ignored that the Caribbean Community exists in a geostrategic area enclosing the Caribbean Sea basin that has experienced intervention in all its forms for centuries. Even before the European powers who had established colonies and social and economic systems in the Caribbean had fully accepted the United States as the major power in the western hemisphere, the United States was declaring its right to intervene at will in the affairs of the existing Caribbean states dismissively described as being in the United States backyard.

Intervention is not a phenomenon of modern times. It is well-established in ancient history by the strong and the acquisitive. As negotiation fails, war follows as another instrument of foreign policy, albeit a more demonstrative one. Then, another round of negotiations has to take place to effect a cessation of hostilities. It was largely for these reasons, at the end of another period of war that the European powers of the day met at Westphalia, Germany, during 1648 to lay down some principles for the conduct of states. Principal among them were the concept of the sovereignty of states, the legal equality between states and non-intervention in the internal affairs of another state. The arrangement marked the beginning of the modern system of nation states.

Geography and the protection afforded by two oceans have generally supported the United States in asserting the unilateral right to determine the existence of a conflict in the western hemisphere, and later anywhere else in the globe, as constituting a threat to its national security. From such determination follows the corresponding right to take whatever action was deemed necessary without any concern about any disproportionality.

No other American President before or since Woodrow Wilson has resorted to military interventions as frequently and passionately as an act of policy as he has done. Elevating military intervention with his acknowledged eloquence and strong sense of mission, Wilson intervened twice in Mexico, in April 1914 and July 1918; in Haiti, in July 1915; and in the Dominican Republic, in May 1916. In Haiti, U.S. forces would remain in occupation until August 1934, as an instrument in the eventual derailment of the governance that almost all acclaim for Haiti. The first black republic in the Caribbean was already a playground for intervention, commencing with the French under Napoleon in 1802 and United States support to deny diplomatic recognition to free Haiti from 1804–1864.

Numerous other acts of military intervention have since taken place, despite the universal acceptance of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states to cause the victorious powers to reassert the principle in the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2.7. That principle has remained a fundamental tenet in international law and in the conduct of states. A number of other reaffirmations of the principle have been made in other United Nations resolutions, the most acclaimed being the Declaration

on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, A/RES/36/103, adopted in December 1981. Both Rashleigh Jackson in his reflections on: "CARICOM in Action—Grenada 1979 and 1983" and the late Professor Cedric Grant, in his paper on: "CARICOM: Non-intervention and Intervention", advert to this guiding principle.

In the developing globalized community, given a strong impetus by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the primacy of the sovereignty of the state at the core of the relationship among states and even non-intervention, began to be modified. The Westphalian system of sovereign states would undergo some change as a wider and vaguer obligation to its citizens began to be attributed to the state. Stronger emphasis would be placed on human security than on the sanctity of states and sovereignty would be considered as also carrying the obligation of responsibility. Indeed, apartheid in South Africa had tried to shelter under this rubric of Westphalian sovereignty, when African states began to challenge its abhorrent system of apartheid at the United Nations. It was this energetic and long debate on apartheid which opened the fissures in the nation states system and offered some precedent for a variety of "humanitarian" intervention.

Accordingly, the articulation of the equation that sovereignty did not only shield the state from unwarranted external intervention but also obliged the state to respect the basic rights and interests of its humanity. When that objective was broken, humanitarian or liberal intervention was justified. Or, in another sense, the recourse to a "just war" was acceptable. Pursuing this option, however, has been controversial. Proponents for this type of intervention maintain that it is legally and morally justified in its objective to establish peace, justice and democracy. Intervention of this type may also include the imprimaturs of the multilateral financial institutions whose conditionalities attached to the loans practically erode the sovereignty of the state.

Those opposed to humanitarian intervention keep to the traditional position about respect for the sovereignty of the international states system and for the inviolability of the state and see no difference in the older imperialist ventures. They note that such intervention is often driven by the same national interests to obtain territory, or some strategic advantage, or more likely, access and control over some natural resources and end in the subjugation of peoples.

The Caribbean Community experienced its first, and so far, only military intervention of the old style in the region in Grenada in 1983. A coup d'état led by Maurice Bishop had ended the somewhat mystic government of Prime Minister Eric Gairy. It was the first successful coup, not the first attempted, in the Community. Another military intervention was contemplated for St. Vincent and the Grenadines during the political crisis of 2002, utilizing the Regional Security System, but this did not materialize, as

both of the parties in St Vincent and the Grenadines did not think that it was a proper course of action.

Ambassador Jackson and Professor Grant give accounts of the intervention in Grenada; the former, from the perspective of an eye-witness being the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guyana, at the time. The CARICOM states took strongly adversarial positions on the matter of the United States military engagement; some members were openly in support and eventually participated in the intervention. Member states also differed, though not initially, in their attempt to establish some principles to promote a resolution of the conflict within the ambit of the Community. Those expressed principles have retained their validity for future application.

Perhaps, the earliest intervention of the liberal type, prior to that of Kosovo, was in Haiti in 1994, when President William Clinton sent U.S troops to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency after he was driven from elected office in 1991. The United States intervention in Panama in 1989, to seize President Manuel Noriega was of the old school. The intervention in Haiti in 1994 was quite unusual in Latin America in its objective to restore a democracy that had existed, though only for the brief period of one year during 1990 to 1991. The intervention was not supportive of the old style Latin American tyrannical rule and may not be viewed as upholding any cherished principle, since the United States would not have been comfortable with a flood of Haitian refugees appearing in Florida. For that matter, no such intervention took place during the same year in Rwanda, when one of the worst instances of modern genocide took place before the attention of the international community, including the United Nations.

Since the intervention in Haiti was the earliest demonstration of the culture of the postCold war period, it was viewed with much optimism and attracted fair support. The CARICOM states stood fully behind the undertaking. That optimism would not last long. For Aristide would shortly, in 2002, be driven from office again not without some logistic assistance from the United States and CARICOM would again be seized of the predicament of conflict resolution in Haiti in the immediately following years.

The divisive debate in the international community on the question of a right to intervene, essentially for human protection, did not abate. The United Nations General Assembly in 1999, expressed the concern of its membership.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan refined it the following year when he asked the central question: "If humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?"

To find a consensus on the basic questions of the principles and process of humanitarian intervention, Canada announced in the General Assembly

in 2000, the establishment of an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The Commission was requested to examine the contradictions in the concepts of state sovereignty and the right to intervene. Its report therefore charted the evolution of the process that sovereignty also carried responsibility and proposed a number of credible and enforceable standards to guide states in humanitarian intervention.

Professor Grant went on to state that later, a High-Level Panel (UN) acknowledged that the tension between the “competing claims of sovereign inviolability and the right to intervene has yet to be overcome.” The final report endorsed the “emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercised by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort.” Hence, the Millennium +5 Summit at UN Headquarters accepted the need that the international community, through the United Nations, should “take collective action in a timely and decisive manner . . . on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate”.

The potential for debilitating intra-and inter-state conflict and the pressures exerted upon state and regional security seem to require the Community at the highest level to elaborate some basic guidelines for the resolution or attenuation of conflicts. Indeed, the Community is constrained to intervene early and decisively to forestall any external intervention. Professor Grant has shown where at the domestic level, two factors have stimulated the course of the crises. First, the small societies and corresponding small electorates mean that the slightest shift in political support can upset the legitimacy of the government and feed a political crisis, and second, the multi-ethnicity of certain member states has led to recurring conflict in three states resulting in the diplomatic intervention by CARICOM Heads. In Guyana, there was a substantial intervention; others have occurred in Trinidad and Tobago and in Suriname. Belize is the lone multi-ethnic Member State that has not exercised CARICOM diplomacy of this kind in its domestic affairs.

At the same time, Belize and Guyana have had to react continually to the territorial claims from their respective larger and militarily powerful neighbours. Whereas, Guyana and Suriname have a continuing dispute over their unsettled borders both in the land and maritime areas. In the latter instance, the two CARICOM member states had a brief naval encounter in 2000, off the waters of eastern Guyana in the area of overlapping claims; this was the first instance of the use of force by one-member state against another.

The set of papers offers a range of issues and responses. Ambassador Jackson and Professor Grant deal frontally with the subject of intervention and non-intervention; Professor Grant also considers, in another paper, the external relationship that has developed among the three Guianas; Duke Pollard (now Justice), the late Dr Tyrone Ferguson and Dr. Thomas Donovan

deal with different aspects of the territorial and maritime border conflict between Guyana and Suriname; Professor Clifford Griffin reviews the dispute between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago within the framework of competing national interests; Carl Dundas and Dr Barton Scotland comment specifically on maritime issues with special reference to the delimited maritime borders in CARICOM; Ambassador Cedric Joseph deals with the impact of border controversies, including the delimited maritime borders, and their implications for the stability and security of the Caribbean Community. There is also a joint opinion on the question of title to the territory of Belize by Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, Q.C. and Dr Derek Bowett, Q.C.

The recommendations envisage diplomatic intervention by CARICOM or, where necessary, resolution by third parties of certain categories of border conflict. Generally, conflicts or disputes arising with the member states of a political nature fall within the ambit of the Community; conflicts between two member states, particularly the inherited controversies, are suggested for reference to third parties, regional or international. Venezuela's territorial claim against Guyana is not dealt with in the collection. It is apt to note that the re-opening of this controversy, settled by an arbitral award in 1899, was itself the result of the diplomatic encouragement that afforded Venezuela the facility to question the award in the so-called exigencies of the Cold War. The United States had adopted the position then euphemistically styled as non-intervention

CARICOM's approach to internal political crises in member states has been essentially through informal diplomatic persuasion, utilizing at best the eminence and respect of its political leadership. It has held its hand about overt interference in the domestic political affairs of the member states. This might not have been always due to the observance of any hallowed principle. Member states have strong and vocal opposition parties and must be wary of advancing a position that can be perceived as supporting the opposition in another state.

Thus, CARICOM leaders have been very reluctant to participate as observers, independent of external observer organizations, in elections in member states. They have also been distinctly averse to venturing adverse public comment on the conduct of elections or on the electoral practice in member states, particularly in the case of Guyana, where the opposition has made a number of allegations about the nature of the elections. When that opposition, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), attained office in October 1992, it brought to office some misgivings about the entire Community not condemning the past electoral practices and its seeming support for the governing party, the People's National Congress.

Yet the PPP was not entirely accurate in believing that the Community did nothing about the allegations about general elections. This writer can recall two instances, about which the PPP might not have been aware, when

heads of two member states, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago, intervened by dispatching letters to President Desmond Hoyte, so carefully drafted. The communication from St Vincent and the Grenadines addressed the general issue of the allegations about general elections and that from Trinidad and Tobago, forwarded under seal of a highly trusted envoy, spoke to the matter of a CARICOM observer team which was still anathema at the time. The interventions achieved a measure of success in the reforms which were completed for the elections in October 1992 and particularly in the spirit in which they were received in Guyana and the Community at large.

The core issue that ought to concern member states is what Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves, then in opposition, had described as the "fiduciary relationship" between the government and the people; a Rousseau-type social contract. Grant places this implied contract at the heart of his analysis. This fiduciary relationship deepens the encroachment in principle in the inviolability of sovereignty by affording the facility or right to intervene on humanitarian grounds. This can trigger the other issue about intervening to abort the term of an elected government as occurred in Guyana and St Vincent and the Grenadines. The debate is still open, for the ramifications are too profound.

Professor Grant has proposed, against the background of three of the four multi-ethnic states that have been prone to societal crisis, that CARICOM should examine this issue of diversity in some member states with a view to devising measures for building and strengthening consensus in those member states. Moreover, while encouraging CARICOM to seek to depart from the *ad hoc* approach, some criteria for formal intervention should be elaborated.

Whereas in the situation in Grenada, where military intervention occurred, Ambassador Jackson recalled the consensus announced by Prime Minister George Chambers of Trinidad and Tobago at the meeting in October 1983. Some general principles were outlined in accord with the general principle of non-intervention, although some OECS countries, particularly Saint Lucia, were unhappy with some aspects:

- i. No involvement of any external elements in the resolution of the Grenada situation;
- ii. The resolution of the Grenada situation should be wholly regional (CARICOM) in nature;
- iii. The regional solution pursued should not violate international law and the Charter of the United Nations;
- iv. Any proposed solution should have, as its primary focus, the restoration of normalcy in Grenada.

In the circumstance of the land and maritime border delimitation, there is a body of recommendations that takes appropriate account of the nature of each case. The land border issues are among the mainland states; in the case of Guyana and Suriname, both states are members of CARICOM with Guyana being a founding member; and in the case of Belize, the question is with the Central American State of Guatemala. In both cases, along with the Venezuelan territorial claims against Guyana, the disputed land borders have expanded to require maritime border delimitation.

The delimitation of the maritime borders is quite complex and, in most cases, antedates the integration movement. Where the Community is concerned, however, the claims of member states, island and mainland, to their EEZ's in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which came into force in 1994, occasion disputes and/or delimitation. The claims involve member states, as in the instance of the dispute between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago in which an arbitral tribunal, convened in accordance with the UNCLOS, issued an award on April 11, 2006. Guyana has also sought third-party settlement through the UNCLOS, of its maritime border with Suriname.

Professor Griffin explores the Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago maritime dispute, identifying its two main elements of controversy, maritime delimitation and fisheries. He examines the strategic interventions and particularly the impact of the clash of the self-interests of the two states in the declaration of their respective rights. He clarifies the reasons for the unilateral approach by Barbados to the UNCLOS and offers explanations for the failure of Barbados to gain access to the EEZ of Trinidad and Tobago and to "historical" fishing rights; this latter issue was deemed to be more appropriate for bilateral negotiation.

Carl Dundas assesses that there are forty-eight potential maritime borders in CARICOM to be delimited; whereas, Dr. Scotland gives a figure of "over sixty states", both Intra-CARICOM and CARICOM/Extra CARICOM. From the example of the UNCLOS arbitration, involving Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, Dundas has concluded that bilateral negotiations are far more likely to produce a win-win outcome than third-party solution. Although the cost to each state of third-party arbitration is not known, it is likely to be very expensive, amounting to several millions of United States dollars. Financing this expenditure, as perhaps in the Guyana-Suriname case, might be undertaken by interested private oil companies who could seek to offset this expenditure in the exploration phase.

More importantly, Carl Dundas argues persuasively that exorbitant claims in boundary negotiation delimitation cases that cannot be justified in international delimitation law would not be maintained. Extravagant political considerations would not be enough to sustain weak claims and exuberant advisers would not succeed in masking poor judgment by espousing

unrealistic and unsupportable claims. He claims that there should be greater determination in CARICOM to achieve negotiated settlements in maritime boundaries. The relevance of this recommendation can hardly be challenged among the OECS in CARICOM states with some seven potential maritime boundaries to be settled and in the instance of the unresolved maritime border between Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. The quality and historical depth of the relationship among these states should aid the bilateral process.

The OECS Authority has already responded realistically to the situation. At its 43<sup>rd</sup> meeting in June 2006, in accord with an understanding with the Venezuelan President, the Authority has mandated its Foreign Ministers to commence discussions with their Venezuelan counterpart about maritime boundary delimitations between the two entities. The Authority would also be defining its maritime space under the proposed Economic Union treaty.

Dr. Ferguson, on the other hand, makes a sound argument for third-party settlement in the case of the unresolved Guyana-Suriname boundary. He has drawn on the post-colonial experience to show the animosity and competition that have been nurtured within two relatively weak states, each with a contentious and divisive society that has impaired the quality of governance and has militated against a bilateral resolution of the border. Professor Grant, in another paper on "The Three Guianas: Their External Relations", has developed the case that despite being neighbours, the links between the two states have been tenuous and undeveloped. Colonialism, he shows, has dictated that the lines of communication in the critical aspects of human contact run not horizontally towards each other but vertically and outward from the continent to the respective metropolitan centres.

This outcome has been well demonstrated in the tone and bonhomie of the discussions between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands on the delimitation of the border during the pre-independence period.

The shift in style and understanding and the indications of rivalry and bellicosity took form immediately during the critical early days of Guyana's independence, when Venezuela unleashed its aggressive intent, commencing with the seizure of Guyana's portion of the island of Ankoko. Suriname exploited the situation by its stealthy occupation of the New River triangle. The subsequent expulsion of Suriname personnel from the area left a bitter taste in Suriname's consciousness and the memory of "Tigri", as Ferguson recalls the comment of a Suriname parliamentarian, "still sticks in our throats", has to be avenged.

Notwithstanding, a period of exceptional good neighbourliness was cultivated on both sides during the 1970s to 1990s, but that momentum was quickly lost. Perceptions in Suriname that Guyana, in the throes of political crises following the change of government in October 1992, was becoming vulnerable, soon upset the equation and incited the compulsion to avenge Tigri. The crisis of 2000 followed. Mediation by CARICOM

failed in the storm that rose out of Suriname's expulsion of the CGX oil rig from the overlapping zone. Against the background of the historic relationship between the two states and particularly in view of the strongly held contention in Suriname that Guyana, by virtue of its long membership and advantages of language and culture, enjoyed significant comparative advantages, the inability of CARICOM to strike a bargain was predictable.

Thus, Dr. Ferguson has argued that, in the circumstance, the prospects for thirdparty intervention were quite good for the entire territorial conflict. It is, however, arguable that the third-party approach has a greater bearing on the maritime border than on the land. In detaching the maritime issue from the land border, Guyana cedes a comprehensive response and some tactical advantage in delimiting the entire issue. Yet, this has to be balanced against an earlier arbitral decision, hopefully acceptable by both parties, on the maritime border and good returns in prospecting if the positive estimates of oil-bearing areas hold.

Bilateral negotiations of the land border with Suriname remain the best option. The aim should be to seek consensus rather than pursue the exposition of fine legal points and precedence of an arbitral process. The prevailing climate may not be propitious for such exercise.

Therefore, foremost in Guyana's foreign policy should be to start restoring the amity and mutual respect that existed during 1970s to 1990s. Only then might the common interests of both parties be fully recognized to yield a more practical and equitable boundary in the Corentyne.

Dr. Thomas Donovan appreciates this distinction in relation to concluding the boundary agreement in the Corentyne, though in the end he settles for international arbitration. In his paper: "Suriname-Guyana Maritime and Territorial Disputes: A Legal and Historical Analysis" he concludes that it would be beneficial for the dispute in the maritime area, the land border along the Corentyne and the New River triangle to be adjudged through international arbitration, either at the International Court of Justice or by a specialized institution provided by the UNCLOS. Since the submission of both papers Guyana has invoked the third-party option in February 2004, and referred the maritime border to the International tribunal under the UNCLOS. Barbados had taken similar action against Trinidad and Tobago just some days earlier.

Both Drs. Ferguson and Donovan have also considered a credible process for boundary making in the Organization of American States, utilizing some funding available under the OAS Peace Fund. They both cite the achievements of the third-party process in the Belize-Guatemala and Peru-Ecuador cases. The latter has been the most intractable border dispute in Latin America in which the two sides had gone to war repeatedly and as recent as 1995. However, the Rio Protocol of January 1941 which forged a settlement through establishing the precedence of four Guarantor states

legally obligated to mediate and arbitrate on all aspects of the border dispute was subsequently challenged by Ecuador claiming that new geographical information had come to its attention. This has left the validity of the Protocol in doubt.

Also, in the instance of the Guatemalan territorial claim, the promise of resolution during 2002 has not matured. Although progress has been made, the situation is still delicately poised. A framework agreement between Belize and Guatemala and the OAS, signed on September 7, 2005, has called on the parties to negotiate. It also gave the OAS Secretary General the responsibility to declare at any time that negotiations were not likely to result in agreement and to recommend that the claim be submitted to international arbitration for final adjudication.

Latin America, more than any other geographic region, has resorted to legal processes, essentially adjudication and arbitration, to resolve territorial disputes. Almost every border in Latin America has been disputed. There have been some twenty-two cases of legally binding third-party rulings in Latin America as compared with eight in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, the Far East and the Pacific combined. Of the twenty-two cases, there have been twelve instances in which one party did not comply with the ruling;<sup>1</sup> one of these being Venezuela's contention after six decades that the arbitral award of 1899 is null and void.

CARICOM does not have the specialized institutions to resolve conflicts over the borders among its member states, almost all of which would be maritime in nature. Neither does it need to establish any. These institutions have already been established by the United Nations, apart from the facilities available in regional bodies like the OAS. Resort to these institutions can be expensive, and sometimes cumbersome, as Carl Dundas carefully reminds. Cases require extensive historic and legal research, often probing deep into the colonizing activities of the European powers and in the developments in international law.

The Guyana-Suriname border issue will continue to tax the acumen of Guyana and Suriname for a superior diplomacy to avert any future hostilities and the use of force. At the nub of the difficulties lies the evolution of the bilateral relationship between the two neighbours over the decades. It is in this quarter that CARICOM can be forceful by encouraging the two Member States to continue developing areas of common interest as they have done in the past and to extend the close personal relationships that have developed between their peoples over many years.

It was this partnership of mutual trust and understanding which Forbes Burnham had set out from the outset on the eve of independence to establish and to expand with his Suriname colleague Henck Arron; Ambassador Jackson refers to this existing close friendship, that would go a long way to establishing the climate to delimit finally the border. Until

this accomplishment, there will continue to exist a potential threat to the long-term development of cordial bilateral relations between the two states with a corresponding concern for the larger security of the Community. That this continuing inherited conflict could leave the parties vulnerable to political exploitation by domestic factions and convenient for external interference, cannot be dismissed. CARICOM can lend another hand by inviting Suriname to join in a “good offices” process in other issues to deepen its confidence in the Community.

## ENDNOTES

1. Beth Simmons, *Territorial Disputes and their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru*, United States Institute of Peace, April, 1999, [www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks.pwks27/chap2\\_27.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks.pwks27/chap2_27.html).

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
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19.

## COPING WITH THE COLLAPSE OF THE OLD ORDER: CARICOM'S New External Agenda

“Together We Can Prevail, And Must Prevail”<sup>1</sup>  
-The Honourable Bruce Golding – Prime Minister of Jamaica



### INTRODUCTION

ON JULY 4, 2009, THE REGION CELEBRATED THIRTY-SIX years as a formal Caribbean Community (CAR- ICOM). The analyses contained in this publication in the “The Integrationist Series” all tend to suggest that CARICOM now, more than ever, needs to transform its experiences over these years into a more structured foundation for maximising the multiplier effects of collective representation, and for leveraging CARICOM’s diplomatic efforts and resources in a more coordinated and integrated manner. This imperative is necessitated by the rapidly changing

international environment which has far too often impacted negatively on small developing countries, leaving them increasingly vulnerable and marginalised.

In their relationships with developed countries, the latter is shifting emphasis from commitments to fostering programmes for economic and social development; greater concern is now being placed on security in all its dimensions including drug trafficking, deportations and money laundering.

Additionally, there appears to be less disquiet at the political level for ending preferences and subsidies, following the signing of the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) as countries become compliant with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. New trade agreements seem to emphasise market-based solutions, without much concern for ending poverty in small developing countries, with the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) being lofty expectations that are, unfortunately, beyond the reach of many developing countries, including some in CARICOM, where progress with the MDGs has been uneven. In this regard, Ambassador Edwin Laurent finds that even though the performance in attaining these goals is commendable given the circumstances, he asserts that this should not be a basis for complacency, adding that there is room for improvement. He notes, however, that since foreign aid budgets have been cut, it is likely that funding for the MDGs will have to be sourced from domestic economic growth and particularly, from expanded production and exports.

When all these issues are conflated, it is clear that a new approach to managing CARICOM's diplomatic efforts must be considered. The old ways of setting policy and managing CARICOM's Diplomacy are obsolete. The benefits from past diplomatic initiatives at the bilateral level may no longer outweigh the benefits to be obtained from collective and synchronised action at the regional, hemispheric and global levels. Furthermore, speaking with one voice and voting collectively on issues that matter to the survival of small vulnerable economies, is critical for CARICOM's success in navigating this very fluid global environment. A cohesive CARICOM Foreign Policy should promote the collective interests of CARICOM in the area of economic prosperity and advancement. It should support political, cultural, religious and social freedoms; it should emphasise peaceful cooperation, regional security and environmental sustainability; it should accentuate the value of human rights, equity, fairness and good governance; and it should seek to integrate the Diaspora into its programming framework so as to bolster its leverage with third States.

No less important should be the notion that CARICOM's Foreign Policy coordination can provide the platform for optimising the gains from diplomatic efforts, especially when the constraints of size and influence matter in the international arena.

This publication addresses these and other related issues aimed at finding a new dispensation that are central to shaping CARICOM's progress in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In particular, the critical questions CARICOM policy makers should answer are:

1. What should be the nature, focus and institutional arrangements for a successful CARICOM Foreign Policy in a globalised world?

2. What sort of collective governance structures and communication mechanism should be in place in order to inform our collective diplomacy and representation, while maximising the use of our valuable resources in the CARICOM Diaspora?
3. Above all, how do we distribute the benefits of an integrated CARICOM in a tangible, accessible and equitable manner to CARICOM citizenry? Finding answers to these questions, among others, must be central to informing the new CARICOM Diplomatic focus.

In this regard, the paper by Professor Benn is instructive. He argues that CARICOM's Foreign Policy was structured on a framework that applies the theory of concentricity in which the imperatives for community action are determined within a series of concentric relations, radiating from the CARICOM Core and expanding to the wider Caribbean, Latin America, the hemispheric system, and the global South. He also advances the promotion of 'growth triangles' as adopted by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore and asserts that a similar arrangement can be the foundation for the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME). In this context, he outlines a number of specific measures designed to enable the Community to optimise its development possibilities and also to ensure its more effective participation in the international system.

Buttressing this framework is a governance mechanism that seeks to enhance the decision-making process within which collective action can be institutionalised. The papers by Ambassador Gomes and Professor Hunte address this issue. Ambassador Gomes notes that CARICOM is seen as a dubious mixture of elegant declarations, nebulous benefits, limited practical gains and mechanisms that are, unfortunately, accompanied by a paralysis of policy-implementation. He asserts that to re-energise CARICOM, there is the need to embrace a political vision that includes supranational institutions and the need to implement institutional transformations that could enhance the operation and effectiveness of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the CSME.

Professor Hunte, in turn, argues that perhaps the pull-factors of sovereignty may have forestalled deeper collective CARICOM Agreements, restricting Heads of Governments and Legislative Bodies from moving too far ahead of their constituents and beyond their political mandate. He also claims that there is a trade-off between sovereignty and unanimity and that much can be learned from the OECS model, contending that it has begun to build supranational institutions, that leverage resources, provide executive authority and shared responsibility, while working in a transparent and accountable manner. Consequently, reducing the pull of sovereignty will enhance unanimity that is vital for CARICOM transformation. Such a

transformation will facilitate the delivery of more public goods and services to CARICOM citizens; it will encourage intra-CAR- ICOM investments; and it will support a mechanism for combining diplomatic services in third states. Above all, by including the Diaspora and civil society in diplomatic efforts formulated under supranational institutions, this approach will strengthen coverage in developed countries, deepening outreach, creating new alliances, eschewing unnecessary replication and improving intergovernmental coordination. Small CARICOM states have no alternative but to embrace supranational institutions at a time when the global environment responds more favourably to multilateral rather than unilateral action.

To understand more succinctly the global environment and its impact on CARICOM, papers by Professor Sir Kenneth Hall, Sir Courtney Blackman, and Drs Davies, Meighoo, Herisse and Insanally present perspectives that corroborate the need for collective action. Professor Sir Kenneth notes that “. . . the most significant impact of globalisation on Caribbean development is the destruction of the consensus that has guided policymaking since the end of the Second World War and particularly during the 1960s. Small Caribbean States have sought to respond creatively to the challenges facing them by embracing a strategy of regional integration (OECS), while at the same time pursuing a pattern of concentric diplomacy aimed at expanding their trade and economic links with other countries . . .”

Reflecting on the complexity of the world economy, both Sir Courtney Blackman and Dr Omar Davies examine the indicators that have caused the global financial crisis and address the implications for the Caribbean. In the case of Sir Courtney, he identifies the factors leading up to the current “melt-down” in the United States financial system and posits that the crisis is the result of the failure of the neoliberalism and the shareholder maximisation paradigms. As a way out of this difficult environment, he recommends, “Caribbean scholars should move with dispatch to develop a paradigm that meets the needs of regional decision-makers . . . and identifies some critical areas where considerable economic gains might be made . . .” Dr Davies provides an analysis of the global financial crisis in the context of several institutional failures, including laxity in regulation, collusion, mismanagement of credit and credit rating agencies, and identifies failures by fiscal and monetary policymakers. He further contends that completely free market forces, without government oversight and regulation in some markets, goes to the heart of the financial crisis and is highly critical of the Multilateral Financial Institutions which adopt different standards for developed countries as compared with developing countries. For example, providing financing to bankrupt financial institutions in developed countries while recommending the closure of similar financial institutions in developing countries, is one observation made by the author, where it would appear that ‘too big to fail’ is perhaps a preserve of only developed countries.

Dr Kirk Meighoo, like Sir Courtney, contends that a new paradigm is needed for CARICOM progress. He asserts that the current model is flawed, adding that, "securing market access through preferential trade agreements and quotas, increased foreign investment in vertically integrated multinational industries, and development assistance through aid and soft loans for governments . . . perpetuate(s) underdevelopment and poverty in the Caribbean". This has been the path chosen for the last thirty years and it has not fostered development, but has indirectly contributed to the high unemployment rate and the increasing migration rate of skilled labour in an ever-expanding Caribbean Diaspora. He advocates less government dominance and supports "an innovative entrepreneurial onshore economy . . ."

One of the distinguishing features of the changing global environment, especially after the Cold War, is the increasing importance and relevance of India, China and Brazil. These countries account for a large share of the world population and economic activity; and collectively, have the potential for dominating world affairs in a significant way in the not-too-distant future. Permanent seats for India and Brazil on the Security Council at the United Nations are not beyond their grasp; so too, are their expected elevated status in the corridors of power in international financial institutions. Being holders of nuclear technology and armaments (India and China) certainly enhances their claims on the world stage. These factors alone suggest that CARICOM must have serious diplomatic relations with these countries as they can empathise with the issues in developing countries as they were and are still leading members in this group.

Furthermore, China has expanded its Caribbean outreach; and is a major player in world trade, acquiring significant balance of payment surpluses with the US and many CARICOM countries. India, in contrast, has a similar colonial past to the English-Speaking Caribbean; it has a significant pool of skilled workers that are engaged in producing technology and information products and services; and it has been a source of training and skills development for some CARICOM countries. Brazil launched a successful energy programme that makes use of sugarcane in the production of ethanol and is a leading player in world markets for this commodity, but only a few CARICOM countries have benefitted from this new technology. Papers by Tingle-Smith, Hall, Benn and Rigobert provide useful information on the partnerships India, China and Brazil share with CARICOM, while Erikson and Wander describe some of the political dimensions on issues related to the One-China Policy, linking it to the nexus between China and Taiwan and some Caribbean countries. They also allude to the likely concerns the US may have with China in the Western Hemisphere. Additionally, Tingle-Smith examines CARICOM-Brazil relations and describes potential opportunities for trade. Given these favourable circumstances, it may be argued that the

friendship CARICOM has with these countries augurs well for the future, once sustained diplomatic efforts and resources are applied to the tasks ahead of greater cooperation and coordination in the international arena.

CARICOM's diplomatic relations in the Western Hemisphere during the early 1970s were set against the backdrop of the Cold War, where the United States considered the region a part of its sphere of influence; and anything that was perceived to be antithetical to American interest drew swift reaction from Washington. For example, the central point of the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere centred on Cuba; and establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba was seen as an affront to the interest of the United States. Professor Vaughn A. Lewis captures in his paper some of the early actions by Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados which established diplomatic relations with Cuba, contrary to United States' wishes. He also describes the political environment at that time, incorporating the events of Chile, among other countries, and presents a partial narrative explaining how political and economic events have changed since then. Dr Cotman presents an equally important piece on the recent diplomatic relationships since 2002 between Cuba and five CARICOM countries, namely, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Grenada and Barbados. He examines the convergence of foreign policy agendas in these countries with that of Cuba; he describes the South-South co-operation in human development; and discusses how certain factors propel or retard bilateral relations.

On the subject of South-South cooperation and trade, Professor Girvan provides a detailed description of the Bolivarian Alternative (ALBA) and the PetroCaribe programme initiated and funded by Venezuela for countries in the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, the Bolivarian Alternative and PetroCaribe are unique programmes in which Venezuela is cast as a donor country and all other participants are seen as recipients of aid flows that in many ways are different from the standard programmes negotiated between developed and developing countries or even with multilateral agencies. Professor Girvan further describes the conditions under which countries would be eligible for membership and be able to access the subsidised Oil Programmes. He also identifies potential areas of concern and conflict for CARICOM countries, given the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas and the outstanding territorial issue between Venezuela and Guyana.

Rashleigh Jackson, a former Foreign Minister of Guyana, provides a discussion on effective foreign policy coordination that has been used collectively by Jamaica, Trinidad & Tobago, Guyana, Grenada, and Barbados on several issues that affected Cuba, Guyana and Belize at the Organisation of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. He refers to the path-breaking work CARICOM undertook in finding a mechanism to advance the common interest of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group in their relations with Europe. He also takes into account several other

contributions that CARICOM has made through effective Foreign Policy Coordination, achieving positive results that no single CARICOM country working independently could have achieved.

Even though CARICOM Heads of Government have signed the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), several writers, including academics, have raised a number of concerns that signal their disagreement with the signed EPA. Many lament that the EPA is not a well-balanced agreement, as it does not foster development, but may even retard it. For example, Professor Brewster contends that the EPA does not adequately address investment, development finance, infrastructure, trade and technical barriers, among other issues. No less poignant is a paper on investment in the EPA by Gus Van Harten, who argues against the foreign investment provisions, claiming that it could hinder development and regional integration and may even restrict the use of domestic instruments that policy makers can offer. Equally compelling is the paper by Professor Clive Thomas who presents a detailed analysis of the EPA. He not only generically identifies proponents and opponents by their positions, but he also focuses on the costs and benefits of the EPA. He analyses the institutional weaknesses in the design and architectural flaws leading up to the preparation and signing of the EPA; and bemoans the lack of learning from previous negotiations and agreements, as well as the poor communication with CARICOM citizens.

Noting that CARICOM external trade negotiations, be it the EPA or CARICOM-USA Trade, should rest on an approach that succinctly draws its focus from a CARICOM development agenda, Ambassador Collins argues that this was not the case for the EPA. He also expressed disappointment that the essential nexus between foreign policy and the community development process, though fully recognised by CARICOM Leaders, was lacking in recent trade negotiations. In view of this concern, and in order to address other global issues, he advances the idea that the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) should be restructured, building an effective programme aimed at deepening the CARICOM development process.

There are, of course, counter arguments that lead to the opposite view suggesting that the EPA was the best that could have been obtained in the current environment. Arguing this case in the publication is the former Prime Minister of Barbados, the Right Honourable Owen Arthur. He makes the point that: decisions had to be made in a changing environment that de-emphasised preferences; embraced diversification away from mono crop cultivation; ended trade protectionism as part of the World Trade Organisation rules; and which saw a reduction in the commitment from our traditional support base, especially in Britain. In this regard, he states that in today's world, the war on terrorism, a Europe of twenty-five, a new development focus on Africa, and the changing global economic balance

of power consequent upon the end of the Cold War have marginalized the Caribbean in European circles. Britain's perspectives have also changed. It has, Arthur notes, reordered its global political outlook and the priorities of its foreign policies in a manner that has diminished the significance of the ties of a shared history with the Caribbean. That the Caribbean is very much on the margins of thinking in Whitehall is borne out in the UK's Foreign Policy Document of 2003 which placed emphasis on a number of cross-cutting global themes, and the strengthening of a number of key relationships. The Caribbean scarcely generated serious mention. He concludes that the specific point to be noted is that an Economic Partnership Agreement with Europe has been negotiated in a climate within which Europe, in its dealings with the Caribbean, would rather focus on security issues, including the illicit drug trade, tax avoidance, migration and money laundering, rather than on development.

That an appropriate development framework is lacking, especially for small developing countries, is an issue that needs further study and this is certainly beyond the scope of this publication but pertinent, nevertheless, to finding solutions to the investment and development problems in CARICOM.

Meanwhile, Katharina Serrano in her paper proposes several suggestions that can address some of these problems, even as she acknowledges that the EPA has its limitations and recommends that ways must be found not to abandon the EPA, but to limit its negative impact on CARIFORUM countries. Among the suggestions is the need to harmonize the regional investment rules in order to make them coherent with international investment standards. She proposes the establishment of a Regional Standardization for Development Office and recommends the deployment of well-trained CARIFORUM negotiators who will build capacity for negotiating agreements that satisfy CARIFORUM development requirements, even as they study and monitor the standard-setting behaviour of International Organisations. The recently approved Office of Trade Negotiations can be tasked with this responsibility.

Building capacity is also tied to working cooperatively with countries that have similar experiences and expectations as well as employing protocols that allow positions to be heard and endorsed in international meetings that matter. CARICOM needs protocols and coalitions to advance its positions in trade negotiations in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and working with other small vulnerable economies (SVEs) is one approach that is explored by Andrea Ewart in this publication. She examines the evolution of a coalition of SVEs within the WTO and addresses how agenda setting is undertaken in the "Green Room" at the Ministerial Conferences. She posits that CARICOM and SVEs should focus their efforts only on those proposals

that would be favourably considered by the WTO, as this would advance their collective interests.

In a similar approach, Emalene Marcus-Burnett examines the strategies employed by CARICOM countries in the Uruguay and Doha Rounds of Trade Negotiations and supports in many ways the strategies outlined by Andrea Ewart, especially with respect to CARICOM speaking with one voice and building coalitions. She notes, however, the level of CARICOM fragmentation and identifies the situation in Geneva, where there are four CARICOM countries (Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Haiti) operating more or less independently of each other with separate representations. Present also in Geneva is the joint representation for six members of the OECS and a separate representation by the Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), with the possibility of one more representation by another CARICOM country under consideration. Given this kind of fragmentation, it is clear that if CARICOM had integrated national and regional trade programmes and strategies that could be defended by CARICOM negotiators, then there would be no need for so many separate missions. Instead, only one representation would suffice, releasing thereby scarce human and financial resources, while capturing important synergies and leveraging the diplomatic influence of a group of SVEs.

With the loss of EU preferences and subsidies, CARICOM-US Trade has become the single most important market for CARICOM Trade, accounting for a significant share of CARICOM exports and imports. Dr Petrick examines the trade agreements in which the emphasis has changed over the years from financial aid and government intervention to a new focus on free markets, with less trade barriers, and less subsidies and preferences in most cases. He discusses the importance of import duties as a source of government revenue for several CARICOM countries and recommends that CAR-ICOM should plan for the time when preferences will end, adding that the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is not sustainable and it may be plausible for CARICOM to seek a trade agreement similar to what obtains under NAFTA.

Land borders, the contents and boundaries of the sea and ocean, natural vegetation, including the flora and fauna, forest, minerals, fresh water and a pristine environment, together with air and sea transport infrastructure and airplane and boat services all contribute in no small way to the salubrious tapestry of CARICOM. A cursory examination of these resources will suggest that there is much to maintain and preserve in a sustainable way for future generations. For example, the CARICOM tourism industry can be severely damaged, if pollution degrades the quality of the sands and seas of the Caribbean. Likewise, over-fishing and above optimal harvesting can decimate a renewable resource, generating our own 'Tragedy of the

Commons'. The poor use of chemicals can contaminate fresh water sources, damaging the environment and endangering the life of many.

Obviously, managing such a vast collection of assets is not only complex and expensive for CARICOM States, but it requires collaborative efforts and diplomatic initiatives that involve both CARICOM and non-CARICOM countries. Above all, it requires a governance mechanism that is supported by international law and United Nations dispute settlement protocols. It also requires management and security systems that are both national and regional in scope, while fostering at the same time employment opportunities for sustainable economic development as well as preserving the environment and reversing the negative effects of climate change.

In this publication, Mr. Francois Jackman and Dr Barton Scotland tackle the issues related to the ocean and fisheries; Dr Ulric Trotz probes the questions related to climate change and the environment, while Hilton McDavid and Dr. Jessica Byron address national and regional security. Specifically, Jackman posits that countries must work cooperatively in order to avoid marine degradation, as unilateral action in one's environment is useless when contiguous borders are involved. He acknowledges, however, that CARICOM has concluded some important regional agreements in this area, but suggests that much more work must be done, especially at the technical and diplomatic levels if sustainability and improved governance of these resources are to be achieved.

In keeping with Jackman's contribution, Dr Barton Scotland's paper contains the parameters for a CARICOM Fisheries Agreement that is based on a decision by CAR- ICOM Heads of Government. Scotland notes that the rationale for the fisheries draft agreement stems in part from an understanding that certain living marine resources which are relied upon for food and livelihood are highly migratory, straddle national boundaries, and are also harvested by fishers other than those of the CARICOM Region, without any benefit flowing to States of the Caribbean or to the Region as a whole. This reality, he asserts, obliges the beneficiaries of the living marine and aquatic resources of the Caribbean Region to band together, to pool their abilities and resources in order to more efficiently and effectively develop, manage and conserve the living marine and aquatic resources of the Caribbean Region.

Dr. Scotland also presents a brief overview of the issues related to the fish species that populate the waters shared by Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. In this regard, he explains the need for collaboration in order to ensure an efficient and sustainable management and conservation system, adding that it should be consistent with the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.

Dr. Trotz posits that environmental change can have a negative impact on low-lying coastal and island states that include many CARICOM

countries. Noting that we are already vulnerable to the ravages of hurricanes, floods, landslides, drought, water and vector borne diseases, as well as the destruction of mangroves, reefs, wetlands and infrastructure, Dr. Trotz outlines what is being undertaken to raise awareness and build capacity through education at the University of the West Indies. Above all, he advocates that policy-makers need to become more proactive in this difficult but important regional and worldwide concern, given that the Caribbean has natural resources that can be employed in a more efficient and practical manner.

Regional integration in the Caribbean has always had an implicit security dimension. Dr. Jessica Byron discusses this in her Paper, noting that since 1973 a number of regional institutions have evolved to provide responses to national security, dispute settlement and conflict management initiatives. She addresses a conceptual framework for security governance in her analysis of CARICOM's role in fostering regional cooperation.

Mr. Hilton McDavid argues that CARICOM's security can be based on an institutional structure that is similar to what has been used by the Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery, noting that it should be supported by a pool of trained mediators and conciliators, instead of it being managed by Heads of Government as a first line operation by them. He presents the recent cases of effective regional security in relation to World Cup Cricket and the Summit of the Americas, where all aspects of the security system were tested without any catastrophic failure being detected. He, nevertheless, laments the absence of a cohesive regional security strategy that is targeted at eliminating regional threats and acknowledges that an efficient regional security system is a requirement for economic stability and development.

Meanwhile, a CARICOM security system must have, among other attributes, the support of a legal framework and a transportation network. On the subject of a regional transportation network, Natasha George provides an important perspective on the airline industry. She argues that air travel in CARICOM is important, as it provides significant revenue and employment opportunities regionally, otherwise without it, not only is the tourism industry dead, but the economies of the Caribbean will be in a serious downward spiral at a time when EU subsidies and preferences have ended. Yet, evidence suggests that the air travel industry is not a stable and financially viable operation, due to a number of factors, including its fragmentation, instead of its integration, where almost every CARICOM country wanted to have its own flag carrier. Ms. George presents an alternative approach in which she explores whether elements of the European Air Transport Model can be modified for CARICOM purposes. She also supports creating a CARICOM Single Aviation Area and Air Space, asserting

that such an area would create market opportunities for the aviation industry, strengthening thereby the CARICOM integration movement.

In relation to the legal framework, Justice Duke Pollard examines CARICOM treaty practice as compared with that of advanced economies. He focuses on some of the problems associated with multilateral treaties, and begins his discussion with the treaty practice of the United Kingdom. He draws attention to the fact that in CARICOM many ratified treaties remain unimplemented, being honoured more in the breach than in the observance. This could be a result of limited human and financial resources resulting in uneven experiences and fragmentation. In fact, he notes some CARICOM countries do not have lawyers who are trained in international law, rendering thereby, less than the optimal responses to concerns that may arise, and points to a number of CARICOM cases where lapses have occurred. That greater attention has to be paid to this area of Treaties and their obligations is certainly an area where policy makers need to allocate more resources to ensure a unified approach is adopted in CARICOM.

Interspersed throughout this publication are commentaries and arguments for having a more positive role for the Diaspora in the regional integration process and in the Community's management of its external relations. Professor Hunte makes the point that Caribbean Development cannot be successful without the contribution of the Diaspora, as it provides the Community with simultaneous links to almost every available cultural, economic, religious, technological and economic setting. In his view, the potential of the Diaspora is enormous and irreplaceable and can no longer be peripheral to the Diplomatic process. Consequently, the role of the Diaspora in CARICOM Foreign Policy is a crucial component in any successful foreign policy framework—a viewpoint supported by Dr Riyad Insanally as he addresses the role of the Diaspora in contributing to the lobbying efforts for the Sugar Lobby in 2004–2006.

The paper by Dr Herisse also addresses the concerns and contribution of the Diaspora, describing the governance structure and accountability requirements for the Diaspora Political Action Committees (PAC), a critical institutional mechanism required for interfacing with the political process in North America. These examples of the positive input of the Diaspora can no longer be the peripheral to CARICOM cause, for to do so would result in missed opportunities that traditional diplomatic services cannot provide.

This brief introduction has some of the core concerns and issues that have negatively impacted CARICOM states and particularly diplomatic efforts that depend ever so much on an integrated foreign policy to meet the challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These challenges cover a wide spectrum of concerns and it is up to all CARICOM citizens, including the institutions that represent them, and those in the Diaspora committed to the success of the regional integration movement, to begin the process of finding a new

path that seeks to end insularity and extend the process of coordination and cooperation.

## ENDNOTES

1. 'PM Golding Calls for CARICOM Unity to face Global Challenges', Georgetown, Guyana, Caribbean Press Release, May 8, 2009.

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20.

## CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION: From Crisis to Transformation and Repositioning



### INTRODUCTION

“OUR COMMUNITY DESPERATELY NEEDS A FLOW OF OXYGEN to keep it alive”, so said the Rt. Hon. Percival J. Patterson at the conclusion of a Conference on *The Caribbean and the Commonwealth: Collective Responsibility for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, which was held at the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, in February 2011. The former Prime Minister of Jamaica issued an appeal for a renewed and unwavering commitment to regionalism by the region’s leadership failing which, he cautioned, everything else would be undermined, under resourced and ineffective. He shared the ongoing concern

and perplexity of many of the Conference participants regarding the future of the Caribbean Community when he noted that although no one appeared to have set out to destroy CARICOM it was nevertheless in deep crisis.

This collective view of the Conference, which included among its participants political, social and economic experts, senior academics of the University of the West Indies as well as devotees to the cause of regional integration, had inspired the immediate drafting of an open letter to the Heads of State and Government of the Caribbean Community who were scheduled to meet later that month in Grenada. Called the **Mona Appeal** it noted *inter alia* that “the Conference looked to the forthcoming Grenada

Heads of Government Meeting for positive action to address CARICOM's decline and for a return to the spirit of regionalism that inspired its highest moments of achievement". The Conference was of the view that it was time for faith in the onward march of Caribbean civilization and for progressive, enlightened and courageous action by a united region strengthened by that self-belief.

The records do not indicate whether the Mona Appeal was extensively discussed rather than simply noted by the Heads of Government at their Inter-Sessional Meeting in Grenada. What emerged from that Meeting however was a declaration by the region's leaders to convene a Special Retreat to discuss this very concern although couched in somewhat more diplomatic language, to wit:

"to continue their discussions on Prioritising the Focus and Direction of the Community which they initiated at their Twenty-Second Inter-Sessional Meeting held in Grenada in February 2011."

At the conclusion of that Retreat, and reportedly after more than a day of intensive discussions, the regional leaders (unfortunately illustrative of the deep problems is the fact that not all Heads of Government were in attendance at the retreat) issued a Communiqué which in effect acknowledged that the regional integration process and specifically one of its principal engines the Single Market needed more time in recognition of the fact that the process towards full implementation would take longer than anticipated; agreed to postpone the appointment of a new Secretary-General until July 2011, and posited that the current review of the CARICOM Secretariat should take into account the strengthening of the institution to enable it *inter alia* to plan an enhanced role in the area of mobilizing substantial resources for concrete projects in the areas identified.

In effect, after serious back-to-back deliberations, first in Grenada then in Guyana, the regional integration process, as one journalist<sup>1</sup> cynically wrote, was put on pause. To put it more starkly, it was clear confirmation Caribbean Integration from crisis to Transformation and Repositioning that some serious infusion of oxygen had become critically necessary to ensure the region's survival. After almost four decades of Community activity for reform which included a major overhaul of the constituent Treaty of Chaguaramas and several reviews each of which, like the West Indian Commission, acknowledged that it was a time for action, we the proponents and advocates for regional integration appear to be no nearer to marking our balance sheet on the side of progress towards the realization of a viable and effective Caribbean Community. This is not due for want of a significant mass of responsible elites in the region who have, over many decades,

advocated the cause of CARICOM. This collection of essays, along with other publications by The Integrationist and others, gives ample testimony of that.

We continue to express the imperative for a regional integration process based for the most part on the quite valid premise that, in the world of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and increasingly in this Century, the States of the Community need to work as one if they are to survive the challenges of aggressive and powerful forces emanating from various communities beyond our shores. We continually also do so based on the perhaps not so valid assumption that it is historically and culturally natural for us to think and act as one Community.

Regrettably this is not so. Such thinking is both an illusion and a delusion that has influenced and governed our actions for nearly four decades as a Community. Examples abound which demonstrate how such thinking has influenced our actions. When for example, the organizers of the Conference referred to earlier decided on its theme, there was the implied assumption that there existed a reasonably strong and viable Caribbean Community which over the years had developed the capacity and indeed the experience of success to enable it to speak of a "responsibility" which it had acquired and which enabled it to make a positive contribution to the further development and consolidation of the Commonwealth as a powerful active voice in the determination of international events. The thought process in arriving at the Conference theme bespoke of an ambition that should have been made of sterner stuff or at least should have taken more fully into account the realities of the Caribbean integration process as it has evolved to date.

Indeed, the Conference was no more than a presentation or two old, before it became clear from the discussions that CARICOM needed to put itself in order before it could, with any serious justification, lay claim to such an exemplar role. In his Opening Address to the Conference, the Prime Minister of Grenada in his capacity as the current Chairman of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, highlighted prevailing concerns about the state of the regional integration process. It was a concern, he asserted, that was widely felt by the people of the Caribbean Community and he urged that the time had come to cease dealing with lofty abstractions and to provide practical answers to pressing realities. His address also inspired and gave substance to the Mona Appeal that was issued at the conclusion of the Conference and addressed to the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community meeting later that month in Grenada.

It should come as no surprise that neither the Inter-Sessional Meeting in Grenada, nor the Special Retreat in Guyana a few months later convened for the purpose of finding ways and means to re-energise the CARICOM integration process, did not produce much more than a repetition of previous assertions of commitment and intent. Old prescriptions unproductive

of results in the past are unlikely to be any more productive in the future. Perhaps the time has come to rethink the entire premise upon which the integration movement has been 'Caribbean Integration' from crisis to Transformation and Repositioning xiii founded and with it the implied assumption that there was a pre-existing Community which only needed strengthening.

Kirk Meighoo, for instance, has produced an interesting Paper in this context entitled: "West Indian Politics and Government on their own Terms (1625–2011 and beyond)". He has traced the development of government and governance in the various Caribbean territories beginning with the grant of a Charter to the Earl of Carlisle in 1625. What the region has inherited and developed was what he describes as a system, both practical and psychological, which he terms "Proprietorship", following the original commissions. The Governors, under the various sub-charters issued by the Earl of Carlisle, were empowered to make laws, to tax and exact rents, govern either in person or by deputies, and they could execute justice, remit offences and grant pardons. Each had the authority to organize military defence and make full use of martial law in times of crisis. All legislative, executive, judicial and military authority was centered in the person of the Governor exercisable, where applicable or deemed expedient, through his deputies. Meighoo concludes that the West Indian system of Government, far from being a mirror of a Westminster form of Government, was historically premised on the integration rather than on a separation of powers; and it spawned a leadership culture that was authoritarian of itself and in the exercise of power, with notable periods of shifts of authority to popular assemblies, which however have so far always been taken back to the Governor-centred system.

Meighoo's account is interesting in today's context, for taken to its logical conclusion, it describes the West Indian leaders over the past five decades during which Member States of the Caribbean Community became self-governing and independent. In many respects it was an easy road and not the struggle for independence that characterized the journey to independent status for India and many African States that had been colonies within the British Empire. The Montego Bay Conference of 1947 that set the stage for the West Indies Federation a decade later was dominated by the struggle to determine what should be the structure of the proposed federal entity. There was no dispute between the British Government and the region's leaders about whether or not there should be a federation among the territories. All were agreed that the West Indies could not survive as self-governing independent states given their physical size and lack of sustainable economic viability.

An examination of the many pre-federation, regional integration conferences beginning from early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century shows that the

significant impetus for internal self-government, in all its several manifestations, was the desire of the ruling planter class to have an increasing share in controlling and wielding local power. The practical and psychological impact of “proprietorship” has conditioned the minds and actions of our leadership culture in a way that has set the stage, if not already cast in stone, for a region that will remain inherently fragmented. This is a division of an insidious kind for it is not born of enmity nor competing interests nor is it blind to the virtues of integration. It will certainly continue to plague our efforts at integration unless and until we face up to the reality that our oneness needs to be regarded primarily as an opportunity, the existence of which cannot simply be assumed and left to be developed by chance. Anthony Payne (*Political History of CARICOM*) sums it up nicely when he says that regional activity, eye catching though it may have been, has been an essentially superficial phenomenon when set against a backcloth on which there has always been depicted severe political and economic fragmentation.

Sir John Mordecai in his penetrating analysis of the failed federal experiment (*The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations*)<sup>2</sup> has left us with little doubt that national self-interest, as prevalent then as it is today, Caribbean Integration from crisis to Transformation and Repositioning, was the dominating factor in the federal negotiations and a contributing factor to the failure of the federal experiments by the beginning of the 1950s. Virtually all the territories that were to comprise the federation were advancing in various stages towards self-government which essentially meant the transfer of “proprietorship” power into local hands. In addition, both Jamaica and Trinidad were beginning to experience strong economic growth mainly through the process that became known as “industrialization by invitation”, and some of the other territories were also doing well largely as a result of arrangements made for high and guaranteed prices for sugar, bananas and bauxite. The impetus for self-government was clearly, seen now in hindsight, a factor that was operating not in favour of Federation but towards undermining it.

Sir Shridath Ramphal gave an address earlier this year in Grenada in honour of Sir Archibald Nedd, included in this volume. He interestingly enough entitled it: “Is the West Indies West Indian?” For many of us the answer is in the affirmative and we have based our actions over the years on this assumption, but nearly one hundred years after the great T.A. Marryshaw, the pre-eminent regional integrationist, we are still asking the question and wondering why this sense of uniting as a people has not been sufficiently recognized and internalized. In his lecture Sir Shridath made this point:

“The West Indies cannot be West Indian if West Indian Affairs, regional matters, are not the unwritten premise of every Government’s agenda; not

occasionally, but always; not as ad hoc problems, but as the basic environment of policy. It is not so now”.

Why is it not so now? Clearly the traditional answers will not suffice and we may have to look inward to understand better how and where to seek solutions.

Two decades ago, a region wide search for answers was undertaken. “A Time for Action”, the Report by the West Indian Commission that undertook the study remains today, perhaps the best comprehensive analysis of what to do for the Caribbean Community to move forward as a regionally integrated entity. Fundamental to all the prescriptions put forward then, and indeed subsequently, was the imperative not to assume that something called a regional consciousness existed, but to take steps to actively create one and ensure its sustainability and growth. The West Indian Commission spoke to the people of the region and they responded. They wanted a system that put their interests first; they wanted a space to develop and in which to ensure their economic and social growth; they wanted security; they wanted to feel a part of and believe in given symbols of regional unity and so develop pride in being a West Indian. Above all, they wanted to be an integral part of the process through mechanisms and actions that were not in the previous four to five decades of independence where power remained in the hands of the ruling elite. The West Indian Commission did not go this far. The prescribed agent for change was not a call for a political and psychological upheaval within our society, but for the more traditional approach of thinking within the current leadership mechanisms. We therefore continue to appeal to the very people, our leaders, who historically, culturally and psychologically are not by definition predisposed to relinquish or engage in any significant sharing of their power.

In his Paper on “Our Caribbean Civilization and its Political Prospects”, Prime Minister Gonsalves put it differently. It makes little sense, he wrote, for us to proceed in fits and starts in the regional integration movement and dump into the CARICOM and OECS Secretariats a host of functional cooperation tasks without the means or the political super structure to match.

Integration has never and will never be a series of technical functions. It is a profoundly political exercise. It is apposite to add that in both of the above commentaries on the prescriptions for change, neither the sub-theme of Meighoo’s “proprietorship” nor the call for people power inherent in the Time for Action is yet to be fully explored.

This publication “*Overcoming Development Deficits: A Crisis of Regional Integration*” has been divided into three parts. The second part addresses what is described as a Transformation Agenda. The question therefore is “What really needs to be done now to avert the crisis and move the

integration process forward. Do we, the leaders and the people of the region, possess the political will and readiness to go beyond the parameters of the individual nation state and embrace a union deeper than that which currently exists?" It is a question posed by Prime Minister Gonsalves but it evokes considerable resonance among all of us especially when coupled with the other two questions put forward in his Paper referred to earlier:

- i. What is the most advanced model of regional integration that the political market, nationally, can bear?
- ii. What is to be done right now to construct or prepare for the construction of a deeper union between CARICOM countries or at least between those which are ready and determined to go forward?

An obvious and indeed traditional place to start this transformative review would be in the hallowed walls of Heads of Government Conferences. There we would expect our leaders to come up with and implement solutions designed to move the regional integration process forward. The most recent example of the efficacy of this approach were their deliberations at the recently concluded Special Retreat in Guyana. Before them was a Paper entitled: "Re-energising CARICOM Integration" Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang presented by the Chairman of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Prime Minister Tillman Thomas of Grenada, a draft of which had been prepared for him by a group of experts in the field of regional integration.

The experts' draft Paper dealt with the issue of Governance and called for a mechanism that would create a legal basis for the implementation of CARICOM decisions. Under this rubric it also reflected the need for effective management of the CARICOM Secretariat. The Paper also addressed the imperative to prioritise the benefits of economic integration and to focus on such issues as a regional agricultural and food security programme, a regional maritime transport service and a renewable energy production programme. In all of this a specific role was carved out for the Private Sector. Of special significance was the emphasis which the Paper placed on the free movement of Community nationals and it put forward several recommendations to fast track the process. Last but not least, it called for the mobilization of Civil Society in support of regional integration.

Although the Communiqué that was issued at the end of the Retreat made no direct mention of the Chairman's Paper, it has to be assumed that the issues mentioned and others relating thereto must have been fully discussed by the Heads of Government. In addition, the Papers in this Publication cover virtually every aspect of what in the opinion of our regional experts needs to be done to oxygenate a Community in crisis. These make interesting reading and their prescriptions for change are quite valid. There is

no shortage of ideas and no shortage of solutions, both reasonable and viable, for taking the region forward as a cohesive unit.

Then, why are we still talking about a Community in crisis, re-energising the CARICOM integration process and in the recent language of our Caribbean Integration from crisis to Transformation and Repositioning region's leaders seeking greater focus on prosperity for our people?. The answer lies in the widely and freely acknowledged fact that the implementation process with respect to significant decisions taken in the interest of the Community as a whole, falls woefully short of acceptable. Those, who over the years since the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed, took bold and imaginative decisions to strengthen the Community and advance the integration process, were themselves "historically, culturally and psychologically" hapless when called upon to put them into effect.

Is the regional integration process therefore doomed to fail is a question the full impact of which, with respect to both the immediate and the long-term consequences, should challenge us to rethink our current strategies. Failure is not an option that we should countenance with any degree of equanimity. In this regard two complementary strategies present themselves as logical options. The first is to work within the "proprietaryship" context and focus attention on those areas of regional benefit where there is no diminution of the sovereignty exercisable by individual Member States. This is already being successfully done in such areas as health and education, and the field of regional cooperation can and indeed must be expanded if significant progress towards the realization of full regional integration is to be made. The Papers in this Publication deal with some of these areas in which there should be no impediment to the Community moving purposefully forward towards becoming a politically, economically and socially viable, cohesive entity.

The second strategy is to energise the power of the citizens of the Community both in challenging and complementing the authority of Governments. One assumes that Brian Meeke had something like this in mind when he wrote in his Paper on "Caribbean Future" that the first five decades of independence placed power in the hands of the ruling party, the next must place power decisively in the hands of the people.

## ENDNOTES

1. Singh, Rickey (2011, June 11). "Dark Season for Caricom as Regional Integration on pause". *Trinidad Express*.
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21.

## CARIBBEAN CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES: The Diplomacy of Market Access



### INTRODUCTION

IN THE LATE 1980S, H. MICHAEL ERISMAN EXAMINED post-colonial dependency in the Caribbean. He focused on prospects for what he termed “controlled dependency” and explored the scope for assertive bargaining with a view to enlarging a developing country’s policy space. That enlargement of the space for assertive diplomacy, as he argued in his publication in 1992, depended essentially on two factors, namely, capacity for diversification of relations and the assertive use of bargaining power.<sup>1</sup>

After thirty years of independence, in some cases over forty years, it is probably timely to review the region’s experience, especially to examine the extent to which countries have been able to put themselves in positions where third parties have committed themselves to providing market access for CARICOM goods, services and business, and secondly, the extent to which they have made themselves capable, by diversification of relations, of walking away from prospective agreements or offers by traditional powers, that are against their national interests. The latter especially depends on the extent to which states have broadened their relations to create networks of contacts and alliances

that would enable the development of a capacity to make alternative arrangements.<sup>2</sup>

As Erisman argues, the assertive exercise of bargaining power depends on a conducive environment in order to control the outcome of specific events. It also involves reducing vulnerabilities so that a country is in a position to produce at least mutually beneficial results in its interstate relations. However, the edifice of diplomacy requires both a domestic foundation of skills primarily at the level of the government bureaucracy and the commercial elite and capacity to secure acceptance of unpopular but necessary domestic policies which, if required to meet adjustment and capital accumulation needs, must inevitably impact on important social sectors.

It is perhaps the work of Dani<sup>3</sup> Rodrick which best clarifies the importance of conflict management institutions and processes, to the strengthening of the position of a state. Rodrik's work draws attention to the importance of effective institutions to manage internal conflict over distribution issues in countries with deep social cleavages that have to undergo adjustment. As he argues, these institutions are critical, because the absence of a domestic consensus, delays timely economic adjustments, thereby increasing susceptibility to further deterioration as well as to divide-and-rule tactics by external forces. Some key countries in the Caribbean, whose party and ethnic cleavages have recently been exacerbated; have witnessed economic deterioration and significant lessening of external influence. They have been made more aware that their leverage depends on domestic cohesion, as well as the capability to use power and influence externally in alliances aimed at establishing the "governing rules" for international bargaining processes. It is such rules that help determine the choices, opportunities and payoffs available to States.

During the early 1970s, CARICOM Member States, despite the pressure of the first oil crisis of 1973, played an active role in determining international, economic and political relations, helping to shape the proposed new "governing rules". The windfalls from the boom in commodity prices helped considerably in providing the necessary fiscal surpluses to boost state confidence in pursuing this effort. Joining with other developing countries, they formed the ACP Group platform and they helped galvanise the operation of the Non-Aligned Movement.<sup>4</sup> Collectively, they managed, in the first case, to renovate an existing EEC/Africa Association Agreement and extend it into what became a body of principles and practices forming a model development partnership under the Lomé Convention among three regions (the African, the Caribbean and Pacific) and the EEC, then comprising twelve members. In the second case, Jamaica and Guyana in particular, played a key role in the adoption of a number of UN General Assembly Resolutions based on the Group of 77 proposals—which formed

a bedrock of principles directed at the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).<sup>5</sup>

It may be recalled that the assertiveness<sup>6</sup> of the Caribbean, notably the advocacy of Guyana and Jamaica, was particularly significant in the 1970s. Jamaica was influential as the leading developing country, according to the UNDP Human Development Index and the largest exporter of bauxite/alumina. Guyana was a leading exporter of sugar as well as calcined bauxite. However, between the early 1970s and 1992, these countries had massive slippages in their economic performances and international rankings – Jamaica dropping from first among developing countries to 88 and Guyana to 102 on a list of developing countries. Weak or negative economic growth played a key part in this decline.<sup>7</sup>

The success of the coalitions and alliances with which they were involved triggered a major backlash against the central principles of the NIEO process. The three revolutions of 1979—the Iranian, Grenadian and Nicaraguan—provided an incentive for the Western countries to recover ground. Led by the United States, an attack was directed against the UN-centred multilateral system in the 1980s which was manifested in efforts to reverse the role and programmes of the United Nations (UN), especially UNCTAD in trade and investment, and UNESCO in regard to the proposed New Information Order. A second prong of attack was levelled at the geopolitical realm. Efforts were deployed in low intensity conflict or direct invasion to reverse the spread of communism (starting with the invasion of Grenada in 1983). The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 encouraged Western triumphalism in promoting a one-size-fit all approach to development.

A third prong of the attack was directed at the state-led economic management model, and then broadly applied by developing countries. Initiatives were deployed to impose the Washington Consensus principles as a framework for macro—and micro-economic policy reform in return for balance of payments support and financial assistance for sectoral plans under structural adjustment programmes.<sup>8</sup> Essentially, the objective of this attack was to create a system which could secure the payment of debt to external creditors and ensure larger scope for involvement of foreign exporters and investors, through the liberalisation of fiscal and trade regimes. Another clear objective was to reduce the role of the state in the management of the economy and transfer the role of engine of growth to the private sector.

Concurrent with the three strategies above, two complementary strategies were set in motion, having as their objective, major policy reversals in the domestic political system of states. One promoted a concept of good governance of the political system as a condition for new or continued delivery of aid. The other was the promotion of Project Democracy within states by the US Government to open their political systems to accommodate a multiparty, multi-stakeholder system of advocacy and contestation.

William Robinson<sup>9</sup> documented this project, pointing out that its concern was institutional or representative democracy based on the electoral choice of a ruling elite, while it steered clear from the concept of democracy linked to popular, radical social change. Thus, far from being a humanitarian gesture, the creation and funding of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983, was part of a foreign policy programme to provide a tool of the State Department that would promote American strategic interests by means other than support of authoritarian regimes, which policy was proving counterproductive. In this process of 'low intensity' democracy promotion, direct funding, as well as material and logistical support could be openly provided to civil society groups and opposition political parties. It was expected that they could then be persuaded or co-opted to promote neo-liberal policies and severely narrow the space for decision-making once enjoyed by the 'development' state. The attractive, moralistic rhetoric of democracy promotion, now a major conditionality of assistance at bilateral and multilateral levels, could be used as excellent cover for strategic interests including that of opening markets for TNCs and foreign investors.

It should be noted that there are corporate sector strategies that serve to reinforce the foregoing state led strategies. John Perkins, confessing to having been an Economic Hit Man (EHM) for American corporate interests, describes how an elite group of economists and civil engineers (identified by intelligence agencies but on the payroll of corporations) between the 1970s and 2001, created a supporting mechanism of outward market-oriented dependency by encouraging leaders in developing countries to adopt large infrastructure projects based on deliberately inflated forecasts, as justification for excessively large loans. The loans then served to entrap them into a web of debt and conditionalities, and subsequently ensured their loyalty, in return for continuing external support, as part of a vast network that promotes US commercial interests. Through indebtedness to American banks or multilateral financial institutions, they could be relied on to open their markets and reform the policies so as to satisfy US interests in securing access to economic and strategic resources, voting support in the UN and military bases.<sup>10</sup>

As was made clear to Congress in 1995 by Linda Powers, former US Services Negotiator for NAFTA, the US government also supported the private sector making investments in projects that created "action forcing events", which in effect, forced the host government to adopt a policy reform process in incorporating IMF ideas as a condition for investment in sectors such as energy, transport, water and telecommunications. These ideas included regulatory reform, privatisation, and removal of subsidies and enforceability of contracts. Over and above profits, they served to create "commercial infrastructure" tying them to global markets.<sup>11</sup>

The Caribbean economies responded in a way dictated by their vulnerabilities and intense financial and economic difficulties arising out of poor economic performances during the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. Caribbean diplomacy, early characterized by confident assertiveness, even open rejection of the monetarist orthodoxy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), became constrained by deliberate decisions taken by leading politicians such as in Jamaica and Guyana. The Manley-Levitt letters<sup>12</sup> of December 1995 to April 1996 reveal a deliberate turning point in development approach which, from 1979 in the case of Manley in Jamaica, emphasized the value of adopting “whole hog” the market liberalization approach. Although Manley, one of the most charismatic and articulate Caribbean spokesmen, had demonstrated a rhetorical anti-imperialist flourish at the 1979 Non-Aligned Summit in Cuba, it was noted that he had been negotiating secretly with the IMF in 1977 (a year of intense destabilization and violence), to relieve Jamaica’s financial difficulties. During the period 1980–1985, under the Seaga government, Jamaica never sought the external profile of the previous government. Its most significant effort in that regard being its coalition in 1983 with the OECS, Barbados and the US to reverse the Grenada Revolution.

The credibility of Jamaica’s call for self-reliant development and an NIEO was seriously undermined by financial problems reflected in the development of a burden of negative net transfers to international financial institutions. In any event, explicit advocacy of a social democratic path to development had shown its limitations when the then opposition party (JLP) combined with the private media and private sector to undermine such an approach.<sup>13</sup> The effort of the private media, *The Gleaner*, was particularly striking in its capability to unleash psychological warfare, undermine the credibility of the Manley Government, destroy the investment climate and generally weaken investor confidence. The opposition party led the effort to close off capital markets to the government by its overseas missions to the US.<sup>14</sup>

What is striking, perhaps, is that in Guyana, the turning point had already been seen in 1977, only to be concretized following the death of President Forbes Burnham in August 1985, by the adoption of the neo-liberal policies brought about by Hugh Desmond Hoyte, his successor, in his relations with the IMF. It was twenty years later, at the Non-Aligned Summit in Cuba in 2000, that Guyana would seek to present itself afresh by articulating through President Bharrat Jagdeo, the call made earlier by President Cheddi Jagan for a New Global Human Order concerned with poverty eradication. However, by Manley’s return to power in February 1989, the change in approach and assertiveness externally was clear in the pragmatic adoption of neo-liberal approaches in his vision of securing international competitiveness for Jamaica. The rhetoric in which he argued

the new case opened him to the charge of ideological betrayal, although he rejected this in his 1995 letters to Kari Levitt.

In the mid-1980s, Jamaica's debt/export ratio was 273 per cent, among the highest in the world. In 1991 Jamaica had, in fact, taken what has been seen as the precipitate step of foreign exchange rate liberalization with devastating effects. By 1992, annual debt service after forgiveness and Paris debt rescheduling was calculated at US\$540 million. It became totally impossible therefore to service the debt without further borrowing and the acceptance of the conditionalities related with international financial institutions which do not reschedule their debt. So, economic difficulties in Jamaica, along with similar difficulties in Guyana, combined with loss of articulate leadership of Burnham (1985), deprived the Caribbean of the basis for its advocacy. Change of ideological direction and loss of international assistance created conditions for diplomatic changes which seemed to downplay the importance of sovereignty in a borderless world. On top of this came the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

This backdrop is important to note because, from the mid-1990s, the web of constraints grew even tighter as autonomous policy-making in trade policy (already undermined in 'conditionality-based' loans of the IMF and the World Bank) were reduced by commitments to lock-in reductions in tariffs and non-tariff barriers to imports, while enforcement powers were invested in the WTO—the first time for an international organization. Provision was made, on the other hand, under The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) for a contrary type of regime which strengthened monopoly property rights of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in copyright and plant-variety legislation, extending this to computer programmes, integrated circuits and pharmaceuticals as never before.

In the period since 1995, the diplomatic and policy space for Caribbean Governments was even further reduced by an expanded arrangement of cross-conditionality linking the newly established WTO to the IMF and the World Bank. As Greg Palast points out, in effect they became part of an international governance system based on cross-conditionalities among themselves in which they used "triggers" or requirements to ensure conformity of government policy with international requirements. Thus, a loan in education from the World Bank could trigger a requirement to accept a condition laid down by both the WTO and the IMF. Furthermore, under the WTO, specifically GATS Article VI.4, provision was made for a "necessity test" in which the final arbiter of a state's decision is the WTO Disputes Settlement Panel, which can determine whether a state's policy is "more burdensome than necessary" in respect of matters of interest to foreign investors.

The economic conditionality framework, within which Caribbean countries have had to work, set clear limits to their options. Greg Palast

provides a sketch of what this has been like for developing countries. Based on interviews with Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Palast distilled a 4-step framework imposed on countries seeking access to financial market resources through the World Bank:

- **Privatization:** selling off state assets, including utilities such as water, gas, electricity, to strengthen government capacity to repay debts;
- **Capital Market Liberalization:** relaxation of regulations governing inflows and outflows of money, including speculative flows of 'hot money' fleeing at the sign of economic difficulties. (This has often drained national reserves, led to demands for substantial increases in interest rates—sometimes above 30%, and consequential devastation of industries);
- **Market-based Pricing:** reduction of subsidies on food, education, gas, water, to enhance cost-recovery and improve government's payment capacity;
- **Free Trade:** relaxation of barriers to imports and promotion of export-oriented production, all in the effort to secure gains from trade and to reduce poverty.

In terms of commodity market access the most significant impact on Caribbean diplomacy has probably been the repercussions of the establishment of the WTO. Its promotion of what Graham Dunkley has called "the Free Trade Project" has led to the drastic erosion and breakdown of the Caribbean's preferential arrangements with Europe, aided by the US in the case of bananas, and by Brazil, Australia, and Thailand in the case of sugar. Thus, the diplomacy of coalition with ACP States that provided for the presumed sanctity and 'indefinite' duration of the Sugar Protocol, and Europe's recognition of its moral obligation to deal justly with the Region, had failed to secure the continuation of these achievements, although it had made Europe at one and the same time the largest importer and exporter of sugar in the world. In the case of bananas, Caribbean diplomacy of access relied, on the one hand, on establishing preferential rights and market share, and on the other, on denying Latin American lower-cost bananas easy access beyond certain tariff quotas. By 2005, this diplomacy, despite its insignificant market share, had failed to produce a coalition with Latin American countries to secure the Caribbean position. Moreover, the challenge to the Caribbean will be all the greater as remaining quotas are to be phased out after 2006.

The emergence of the WTO with its Disputes Settlement Panel has proved to be critical in this situation since, by its rejection of the EU claim that its regimes were WTO-consistent, it led to severe undercutting of pricing

arrangements for sugar and bananas. Another impact is the abandonment of the old 'development partnership' with Europe—now further enlarged to twenty-five members—that would now have to be WTO-consistent. This inevitably means the rejection of the principle of special and differential treatment by way of non-reciprocity, and the introduction of reciprocal market liberalization with Europe against a situation where duty-free access was formerly non-reciprocal. The Caribbean is quite unlikely to obtain better than asymmetric liberalization where time schedules for market opening for different sectors may be stretched over a period of several years. US pressure on Europe and Brazil's pressure against subsidies, have combined with Europe's own self-interest in benefiting from free trade arrangements with Latin American groupings (to offset US Free Trade Area ambitions) to give precedence to WTO free trade objectives rather than historical and moral obligations under Lomé and Cotonou.

The EU itself, has recently added to the Caribbean's problem when, in its search for wider support among developing countries, it made a decision to grant duty and quota free entry for all least developed countries for 'everything but arms' (EBA). This decision is to be phased in for bananas (2002–2006), rice (2006–2009) and sugar (2006–2009). The effect of this decision is the further erosion of Caribbean market access benefits in the EU and it was apparently offered as an enticement for support of EU positions in future WTO negotiations. The Caribbean's problem is compounded by the fact that production of bananas has been declining, as a result of which the Region could not easily hold on to its share of the European market. Even if Europe were to set a single import tariff of about £275 per tonne, the fear was that this could be insufficiently high to limit expansion of the Latin American share and consequently lead to economic dislocation.

Other key commodities have also experienced difficulties of access, some of which have nothing to do with the establishment of the WTO. Nevertheless, from the perspective of this study, developments with respect to some of these are instructive and should inform the considerations that would influence a Caribbean diplomacy of market access.

In respect of rice, both Guyana and Suriname have had to face difficult problems based on the virtual closure by the EU of the use of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) as a means to increase exports from the Caribbean ACPs. This has combined with the adverse effect of a price decline from US\$412 per tonne to US\$230 per tonne in 2000. Furthermore, by Europe's decision, Caribbean countries would be faced with the result of providing the least developed countries with an annual duty-free quota (from October 2001), which is to be increased annually by 15 per cent up to 2009 under the EBA decision. Furthermore, diplomacy has not succeeded in preventing the process of liberalization of markets from creating difficulties

owing to Caribbean imports of extra-regional rice, notably under US Public Law 480—food aid scheme.

Unlike the banana industry, the rum industry diplomacy has been reasonably successful. The industry secured 70 million in assistance from the European Union (EU) in 2002 to be matched by its own resources. David Jessop has lauded the achievement and argued that the demarche of rum advocates is a good model of the needed commodity diplomacy. The rum assistance campaign to modernize Caribbean distilleries involved:

- regular meetings, by WIRSPA, with permanent representatives of EU States in Brussels;
- meetings with senior officials of sympathetic countries (France, UK);
- development of intelligence capacity to track early relevant developments;
- briefings of NGOs and journalists in Brussels;
- keeping Caribbean Ambassadors in Brussels fully informed;
- engaging in direct dialogue with the ACP Secretariat to ensure ACP States non-rum producers are also informed;
- creating an informed public opinion in Caribbean States;
- closely working with Caribbean negotiators and the CARICOM Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) on establishing back-channels to the European Community.

Successful diplomacy of market access in this area is not unrelated to the fact that rum provides employment for about 10,000 persons; is the fourth largest non-service earner of foreign exchange; and provides excise duties valued at US\$250 million annually. This diplomacy also took into account, and placed emphasis on, the private sector and other autonomous agencies. Market access for other products may require Caribbean diplomats to engage in similar actions.

The discovery of significant natural gas has placed a new dimension of regional diplomacy in the hands of one of the major players in CARICOM, namely Trinidad and Tobago. This country has set in train the study of a project to provide support for an East Caribbean Pipeline estimated at US\$510 million, with an overall capital cost of \$1.5 billion. The pipeline concept had its origin in a 1955 World Bank Study. It was agreed that, with proven technology, gas could be delivered at US\$3 a million BTU to substitute for diesel-powered companies on smaller islands. If this could be achieved, it could result in 40–50% reduction in the cost of fuel for power generation.

It has been noted by one observer that pipeline projects have been successfully implemented in various parts of the world. Linda HutchinsonJafar draws attention to:

- the Caspian Sea Project bringing gas from Russia to Southern Turkey;
- the Algeria-Spain undersea gas pipeline;
- the Chad-Cameroon overland gas pipeline from landlocked Chad to the Atlantic Ocean;
- the Bolivia-Brazil gas overland project.

The generation of gas contracts among multiple partners—in the context of a market with multiple suppliers, but providing for third party access to infrastructure and a regulatory system to support a pricing regime—provides new challenges to regional diplomacy. It is anticipated for example that such pipeline diplomacy could involve contentious negotiations, including issues of ‘national treatment’ for CARICOM Members.

Since the pipeline would have to cross several legal jurisdictions, most of which have no transit laws, the situation would require negotiations on a ‘pipeline treaty’. McGuire points out a fundamental problem that also needs to be addressed:

“The Trinidad and Tobago gas market is characterized by dominance of one major supplier, bundling of the merchant and pipeline businesses, pricing regimes that vary across sectors, different supply arrangements for domestic and export markets.”

Thus, a major diplomatic challenge lies ahead before the prospects of the energy sector could be realized.

In the manufacturing sector, the textile/apparel industry had enjoyed a prominent position for many years, with Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica leading the way. However, in Jamaica the industry which had been thriving for several years, has declined under the impact of the phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Agreement (2005) and competition from the Dominican Republic, Mexico and Central America. Although it had grown rapidly from US\$10 million in 1980 to US\$570 million in 1995, Jamaica’s textile industry declined significantly to US\$360 million with female employment falling from 50,000 to 7,888. It may be recalled that this industry was first stimulated by the success of Caribbean diplomacy reflected in the Caribbean Basin Initiative, (CBI 1983) with the USA and the CARIBCAN Agreement (1986) with Canada.

Access to the resources of sea space has been limited by the Region’s own failures. Sea space has been the source of discord and fragmentation, as issues remained unresolved at the end of 2005. Caribbean countries had been at the forefront of the promotion of new Law of the Sea concepts such as the Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles. Yet they remain in a situation in which access to potential resources is denied because of the failure to

negotiate delimitation treaties among themselves in an area which comprises a set of interlocking EEZs. Not only is the Bird Island issue between the OECS and Venezuela unresolved but also other issues have escalated such as differences between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, which have since been referred to the UN Law of the Sea Tribunal in 2005.

Relations between Guyana and Suriname have been exacerbated, since the expulsion by Suriname of the CGX oil exploration rig in 2000, which added an old maritime boundary of the new river triangle dispute to the land-based border dispute. No shared sense of the sea space has emerged as an economic common in the Single Market. Yet the potential remains for fisheries, mineral, oil and gas. Guyana's border controversy with Venezuela was once again highlighted by its aborted attempt in 2000 to host the Beal Rocket Launching Project at a site in Guyana located in the Waini region on the Equator, but against which Venezuela vigorously protested. The expectation that this Project would open an era of foreign investment for Guyana has been frustrated by a combination of external opposition from Venezuela and internal opposition that followed the evolution of this project which was finally abandoned.

In the field of services, the offshore sector was initially hard hit by the OECD blacklisting of several countries, but Government diplomatic action has been able to fight off unilateral OECD legislation. The sector has been recovering. Nevertheless, there are clear signs that pressure will be brought to bear on successful developments. Antigua has been under threat to abandon internet gambling services and has had to fight the US Government action in the WTO through the Disputes Panel.

OECD pressure has had the intended effect of a falloff in business as a result of the demand for greater disclosure and the threat of economic sanctions, especially from the OECD Harmful Tax Competition Initiative of 1988 and the blacklisting of several Caribbean territories. However, Europe's decision to grant a waiver in respect of transparency and exchange of information to certain small European countries, has provided a diplomatic opening for the Caribbean. Yet, a worsened competitive situation forced the Caribbean to confront the challenge Caribbean Challenges and Opportunities of developing both offensive and defensive strategies for the June 2003, Finance Ministers Meeting in Jamaica. The meeting was urged to strive for both asymmetries in the substantive content and transitional measures under any agreement with OECD members.

Caribbean Governments have had to confront the issue of conforming to international standards regarding the conservation and management of such natural resources as fisheries and forestry. They have often found themselves under pressure either to do so or risk the imposition of trade related sanctions. The following are some examples in relation to fishing:

**Turtles:** In respect of turtles, the threat of sanctions is sharply exemplified. Guyana was obliged to accommodate the visit of US officials who were urging new Turtle Exclusion Devices (TED) in shrimping operations and came to provide practical demonstrations. The previous TED were inconsistent with US Law and requirements as they were not felt to be effective enough to exclude large turtles such as Loggerhead and Leatherback, which can weigh as much as 1300 pounds. In March 2004, the US officials who visited to ensure Guyana's conformity with their national practice, insisted on a comparable programme to protect turtles. It should be noted in passing, that in 2002, Europe set the enforcement of HACCP inspection mechanism as a precondition for entry of seafood into the European market. This requires a specific procedural approach to seafood preparation for exports.

**Dolphins:** Even though Guyana did not have to gain permission under the International Convention on Trade in an Endangered Species (CITES) to trade in dolphins, it was caught in a difficult situation when the London-based head of WSPA dispatched a letter to CITES on 16 February 2004, intending to ensure that no plans went ahead which could be injurious to the wildlife population or to the welfare of individual animals. To avoid adverse restrictions on its trade, Guyana was required to conduct a Non-Detrimental Finding intended to show that the trade was not harmful to the animal population being traded. The essential threat to Guyana was that CITES could take action to stop wildlife trade, including trade in dolphins, in the absence of this study. The problem was compounded by the understanding that such a study could take three years to complete. This raised the question whether trade would have to be abandoned altogether in the meanwhile. The Government's position was that, being animals, dolphins could be traded commercially. Nevertheless, they feared that some other issue could be used as a weapon when the real issue was that of ensuring that trade was within the regulations.

**Commercial Whaling:** The issue of commercial whaling also recently highlighted the extent to which small countries can be pressured to relinquish their sovereign right of decision making. At the 58<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), hosted by St. Kitts and Nevis on 20–21 June 2006, the OECS countries were challenged by anti-whaling nations for allowing their votes to be bought and for prostituting their sovereignty to Japan's interest to resume commercial whaling. A representative of an OECS state spoke of the OECS countries being inundated with calls and letters to change their positions and with threats by Western countries of reprisals through a boycott of the tourism industry. OECS diplomats countered at a joint press conference with rejection of the disrespect and intolerance towards them and with their own charges of hypocrisy and "economic terrorism."

The OECS rejected pressure from a group of anti-whaling countries including United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), Australia, New Zealand and Brazil, to cut off their tourism lifeline and to banish them into economic oblivion if they did not cease their support for whaling. They counterattacked with arguments that land-locked European States with no oceans for whaling or whale watching had been allowed to join the IWC. Furthermore, the US itself had demanded a quota of North Atlantic Grey whales— more threatened than other species—for their indigenous Native American tribes in Washington and Alaska. They insisted that they were accustomed to pressure and that it was their own joint decision to present the Declaration of St. Kitts and Nevis to urge the IWC to return to a science-based approach to sustainable development as it related to whaling and the original mandate of the IWC. They rejected the approach which would be tolerant of gays and lesbians on the basis of respect for their right to choose their way of life, while being intolerant of those people around the world who eat whale meat as a way of life. In dismissing the demands of anti-whaling nations to force OECS fishermen to stop whaling, they joined other countries like Norway, Iceland, the Russian Federation, ten African countries and six Pacific Ocean states (among others) to adopt the Declaration by a majority of one that rejected the idea of placing the use of whales outside the context of science-based management and rulemaking. They noted that the moratorium of 1982, which was intended to be a temporary measure, was no longer necessary as many species and stocks of whales were currently abundant as agreed by the IWC's own Scientific Committee.

The Declaration also rejected as unacceptable that International NGOs should use threats against sovereign governments with a view to influencing or directing government policy. It also rejected the pursuit of an objective that was essentially contrary to that of the ICRW; as well as the absence of respect for cultural diversity and the traditions of coastal peoples. It called for observance of the fundamental principles of sustainable management of resources, and science-based policy and rule-making. The Declaration, originally proposed by host country, St. Kitts and Nevis, was supported by Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Suriname.

The people of the Caribbean, historically proud of their democratic traditions, appear to have become very sensitive to the shortcomings of their political system and, in particular, the adverse effects on social cohesion of continuing unchanged, with the inherited Westminster model of majoritarian, winner-take-all politics. There appears to be internal pressure in Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana for a change, or at least some modification of the inherited model to be more accommodating of local circumstances. In Guyana, strong concern has been voiced over the issue of ethnic security and the avoidance of ethnic conflict particularly since

the elections of 1997. This has led to potentially far-reaching constitutional changes including measures designed to reduce the powers of the President while providing for a number of parliamentary committees with multi-party membership to manage and oversee the sectoral work of Parliament. The call is for a system of political democracy which is consultative and inclusive.

CARICOM has been a proponent of representative democracy and has collectively asserted the need for respect of the Inter-American Democratic Charter by resisting the unconstitutional change of regime attempted in Venezuela against President Hugo Chavez as well as the ouster of President Aristide of Haiti in February 2004, in full awareness that such positions were at variance with those of the US administration and could be used against Member States.

The emphasis on balancing representative democracy with participatory democracy is consistent with the address of President Cheddi Jagan in 1996, at the Sustainable Development Summit in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, where he argued it should not be solely representative, but consultative and participatory. In more and more countries diplomatic efforts are directed at going beyond the superficial nature of the Democratic Charter to help establish greater societal integration in the hope of creating a more just society. The CARICOM Charter of Civil Society (1997), reflects this position.

On the issue of corruption, Transparency International in 2005 has relied on perceptions of academics and business persons to place Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago high on the list of offending countries, thereby potentially inhibiting investor confidence. In Guyana, editorials in the *Stabroek News* and articles by political and social commentators have sought to confirm the existence of a high level of corruption and there have been spirited responses by the representatives of the Government in defence of its performance. The persistence of these charges appears to be partly directed at inviting the donor community to be more exacting in its programmes of support particularly as regards accountability.

In Trinidad and Tobago, the media reports extensively on the issue of corruption including the existence of organised and technologically proficient crime rings and fraud cells said to specialize in cheque, wire transfer, loan fraud, identity fraud, credit/debit card and account take-over fraud. In further media revelations the banking sector was reported to have dismissed 16 bankers in 1999 for fraud, 36 in 2000 and 37 in 2001. At the governmental level, former Members of Parliament have been brought before the courts on corruption charges in relation to government projects.

Another country which faces the issue of corruption as a major challenge to governance is Barbados. In 2002, the Attorney-General, Mia Mottley, in addressing a National Conference on the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and its Implementation organized by the OAS and UWI Law Faculty, called for a battle to be waged on all fronts, including the private

sector, to root out corruption as a cultural problem. The Attorney-General was firm that corruption was not a monopoly of poor countries but it had to be treated foremost as a cultural battle with clear understanding of the harm being done to good governance and democracy. It was noted however, that the instrument could be more useful if it extended to the private sector as well.

In many societies, post-9/11 governments rushed through anti-terrorism legislation giving the security forces sweeping powers. There has been little evidence of an indiscriminate crackdown in the Caribbean so far, although in Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, the Jamaat Al Muslimeen group appears to be closely monitored on account of its external connections and its attempted coup in 1990.

Several international conventions linked to anti-terrorism conditionalities have been open for signature and CARICOM States have been urged to sign on rather than face negative categorizations. In so far as it is linked with port security, the threat of terrorism has added pressure for the Caribbean to conform to US expectations in order to avoid denial of access of ships carrying goods to US ports from the Caribbean.

## MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

During the late '80s and early '90s, the Caribbean still sought to build the type of solidarity at the international level that would help transform global relations. In this way, they supported the South Commission (chaired by Julius Nyerere of Tanzania) which was established in 1987 and presented its report in 1990, entitled "The Challenge to The South". Membership of the Commission comprised individuals in their personal capacities and included Michael Manley (Jamaica) and Shridath Ramphal (Guyana), both being high profile Caribbean personalities.

The report of the Commission strongly advocated a people-centered, self-reliant development model in which policies are aimed at enabling people to realize the full potential of their talents and creativity; giving priority to the basic needs of the people so as to free them from poverty, hunger and malnutrition, disease, illiteracy and ignorance. The Commission argued for enlargement of developing countries' capacity to benefit from advances in science and technology and international support for development with appropriate concern for the environment. The Commission's report also called for pursuit of collective self-reliance, South/South Cooperation to include joint initiatives, and finally, a more just world order.

In supporting the earlier calls of the Non-Aligned Movement and G77 for a New International Economic Order, the South Commission emphasized the need for a more humanitarian dimension to go hand-in-hand with

improved cooperation between developing countries as well as dialogue between North and South in the spirit of a truly interdependent world. The Commission indeed redefined the meaning of development away from simply econometrics to "a process which enables human beings to realize their potential, build self-confidence and lead lives of dignity and fulfilment". In its view, development involved freeing people from want and fear of exploitation as part of a process directed at the fulfilment of human potential and the improvement of the social and economic well-being of the people.

The Commission recognized the need to blunt the impact of the North's domination of the international economic system and reduce the South's dependence on the North for markets, capital and technology. It supported reform of the international system governing flows of trade, capital and technology and drew attention to the gross neglect of the interest of the South on issues such as removal of trade barriers, increased international liquidity and net debt transfers, then amounting to US \$40 billion per year, to developed countries. It called for a change in the functioning of multilateral financial institutions, including punitive conditionalities, so that the needs of developing countries would not simply be relegated to a subsidiary role.

Since 1992, efforts have been made to re-energise South-South cooperation, but many have argued that new issues have emerged to make the North/South divide a less compelling concern as these issues lend themselves more easily to global cooperation. The issues include trafficking in illicit drugs, environmental degradation, global warming, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. Although the old bipolar world has left behind one superpower and eliminated the issue of either/or bloc alignment, the Caribbean has taken the position that there could be a re-oriented Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which could focus on economic development and market access issues affecting developing countries in a world of WTO and globalization.

In the interim, perhaps drawing inspiration from the Report of the South Commission and the 1993 meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government in Cyprus, the Region has supported the call by President Cheddi Jagan (1996), for a New Global Human Order (NGHO) which had some resonance internationally by its adoption in 2000 at the UN General Assembly. At the same time, countries have been prepared to categorise themselves variously as Small Island Developing States (SIDS), or as Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), in order to secure easier access to sources of concessional assistance in a world that has serious difficulty (except for the Nordic countries), in meeting the UN ODA Caribbean Challenges and Opportunities target of 0.7 per cent of GDP. The HIPC countries, which include Guyana, have received comparatively better recognition of their need for debt cancellation. In general, however, the most important task ahead of CARICOM countries is the reform of the agenda of the WTO and that of the UN system to ensure that developing countries have greater space for

their exports and for devising appropriate national policies rather than mere adoption of the straightjacket of the Washington Consensus.

The forum of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provided from the early 1970s, one of the best platforms for projecting the Caribbean identity and strategic thrust internationally. It was important in the political agenda of securing as large a space as possible outside the ideological either/or compulsions of the bipolar world. The Caribbean played a key role in its chairmanship, in 1972, when largely through Guyana's advocacy, the Foreign Ministers agreed to give it the thrust of an economic, South/South agenda. Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago as early members, jointly used it as a forum for internationalizing the threat to Belize's territorial integrity posed by Guatemala. Since 1989, with the end of the Cold War, the NAM has appeared to be less relevant, but CARICOM countries have sought to give it a new role on the international economic agenda. In solidarity with Cuba, they supported its hosting of the South Summit in 2000 in Havana where the President of Guyana made a major presentation on the needs of developing countries in the context of increasing globalization.

Outside of the NAM, the ACP Group was perhaps the most productive platform for the Caribbean's economic agenda vis-à-vis Europe. It allowed the Caribbean, from the early '70s, to foster the type of relationship with Europe that would secure guaranteed, remunerative market access for its key products, in addition to technical assistance. Thus, sugar, bananas, rum, rice as well as bauxite (under Sysmin) benefited from special arrangements. Since the Cotonou Agreement, Europe has clearly intended to split the ACP Group into regional groups with distinct partnership agreements. Given the new assertiveness of Africa, with the establishment of its own Africa Union, it appears to lessen the prospects of ACP-wide solidarity. Yet on the issue of bananas, the group was able to provide support to the Caribbean in 2003, by establishing an Enlarged Bureau of the ACP Sugar Group to try to address the threat to the banana regime through diplomatic missions to Brazil and Australia. Time will tell whether the ACP would have a similar impact as in the past.

The Commonwealth, although with resonances of its historical imperial past, has provided the Caribbean with yet another effective platform. The Caribbean provided its Secretary-General during the 1980s, and through him, steered the organization towards recognition of independence for Zimbabwe and majority rule in South Africa, but Caribbean countries have used it as a body of nations in solidarity to highlight and support the interests of small states in global trade and finance in the new world of competition. The Commonwealth has been quite sympathetic to the call for special and differential treatment of small states, although this has not been accepted worldwide. The Caribbean provides 12 of the 54 members in a body representing one-quarter of world trade, 40% of WTO membership,

and one-third of the population of the world. Outside of trade, the Caribbean uses this multilateral platform for the promotion of democracy, observance of good governance principles and human rights, as well as the principle of respect for territorial integrity. The Commonwealth has established a Committee on Terrorism and a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, which are important instruments in promoting action against the underlying causes of terrorism and expanding the observance of human rights. The Commonwealth has been helpful in other ways as well. It was the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Malaysia in 1989 that provided Guyana with an opportunity to showcase itself and to declare its decision to set aside, for research in sustainable forestry management, thousands of square miles of its interior regions—the Iwokrama Rain Forest Project.

Furthermore, the Commonwealth assumed a leading role in examining ways in which the world order could be made more humanitarian. In Cyprus in 1993, the Commonwealth Heads of Government discussed as the Special Theme of the meeting “The Emergence of A Global Humanitarian Order”. They proposed that the Commonwealth establish a high-level intergovernmental group to examine specific ways in which the group could make the fullest contribution to the work of the international community on this theme. This became a major plank of advocacy in Guyana’s foreign policy.

The Rio Group’s agenda, given the conflicts in Central America in the 1980s, related largely to the Contadora Group at an early stage. This group has expanded its concern with representative democracy and the issue of the creation of the hemispheric FTA. The Caribbean promotes its interest currently through Guyana’s membership. As a platform for projecting Caribbean interests, it has remained somewhat marginal like the SELA organization, but the Rio Group is seen as potentially doing a balancing act between the European Union and the United States.

In respect of G77, the Caribbean played an influential role during the early 70s under Jamaica’s presidency. But since the establishment of the WTO and the passing of President Nyerere of Tanzania, this Group appears to have been marginalized, much like UNCTAD and ECOSOC. Much more weight has been attached to the potential diplomatic influence of G20 (including Brazil, India, South Africa). Yet Brazil’s membership of G77 and Mercosur and its relations with Guyana have not prevented it from attacking the European preferential regime vital to the Caribbean economies, although it has given “assurances” that it means no harm to the Caribbean. In the case of India, it may be noted that the country is a member of the Commonwealth, the G77 and the Group of Five Interested Parties in WTO negotiations. This may provide a basis for future solidarity on the WTO waivers needed by the Caribbean; for example, for the continuation of the annual waiver for the

Caribbean Basin Initiative Agreement, although this should not be taken for granted.

## BILATERAL DIPLOMACY

It would be short-sighted not to consider the impact of Venezuela under President Chavez on Caribbean diplomacy. In the first instance, this is manifested in closer relations between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago in respect of oil and gas reserves lying in submarine deposits between the two countries. Venezuela has also used the bonanza of high oil prices to offer CARICOM countries concessional payment arrangements under PetroCaribe (June 2005). Trinidad and Tobago, initially fearing that its market in CARICOM would be cut by this initiative, has been entrusted with responsibility of working out the type of arrangement with Venezuela that would be a win-win situation, with the approval of CARICOM Members. Venezuela has recently discovered that its oil reserves would place it as the lead country in oil reserves in OPEC and the second in the hemisphere after Canada. This is likely to lend additional diplomatic muscle to its actions and initiatives on alternative integration approaches and its approach to democracy promotion. CARICOM diplomacy regarding affordable energy will therefore require a careful balancing to avoid adverse measures by Western States disturbed by Venezuela's initiatives.

It might be recalled that CARICOM countries insisted on the observance of the principle of rejection of unconstitutional change of regime in April 2000 when President Chavez was briefly ousted. President Chavez visited Guyana in 2004, four years after Venezuela's explicit opposition to the Beal Project as introducing additional foreign elements in the border controversy equation. Yet bilateral relations have enjoyed a less confrontational tone. For its part, Guyana recognizes that much needs to be done under the Good Offices process and the High-Level Border Committees (HLBC) on health, education, culture and trade. The Government of Guyana recognises similarities in the agenda of both countries and supports Venezuela's proposal for a New Social Charter, a Humanitarian Fund similar to former President Cheddi Jagan's proposal for a Global Human Order and Venezuela's proposal for the development of a Northern Guyana Shield which was articulated at an ACS Summit in Venezuela in 2005. The issue of a non-permanent seat for Venezuela in the UN Security Council will perhaps show the sophistication of Guyana's diplomacy.

As Brazil pursues its agenda for change in economic and trade relations, CARICOM is challenged to look at its potential influence in a new light. Brazil recognizes the tri-junction boundary points it shares with Guyana and Suriname, and Guyana and Venezuela respectively, and is not seen as

having territorial ambitions of the traditional type. However, it is perceived to have an interest in using Guyana to access the Atlantic. Both countries have an interest in completing an International Bridge over the Takutu River which would allow a land connection from Bonfim in the state of Roraima to Lethem in Guyana. Brazil has offered to help explore possibilities for joint operations in offshore oil and gas exploration with Guyana and partnerships and investment with Caribbean countries. Interestingly, it has underlined the necessity, in a joint communiqué of 2005, of securing “balanced and equitable results, taking into consideration the different size and levels of economic development among countries”.

Brazil and Guyana have also agreed on the urgent need to strengthen multilateralism and proceed with the reform of the UN System, with Guyana supporting Brazil’s inclusion as a permanent member of a reformed Security Council. Guyana welcomed the Brazilian initiative that resulted in the establishment of the South American Community of Nations in 2004, noting its importance in promoting convergence between regional mechanisms in the areas of economic and trade negotiations and the integration of infrastructure in transportation, energy and communications on the South American Continent. Both countries agreed that political coordination would also allow for a more effective defence and promotion of the interests of South American countries. These areas of agreement were reflected in the Joint Communiqué with Guyana following the visit of President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva to Guyana on 2 February 2005. Thus despite Brazil’s challenge to Europe’s system of subsidies, a way has been found to promote broader Caribbean diplomatic objectives. Through its chairmanship of the Rio Group, Guyana expects to push the Caribbean agenda for reform of multilateral institutions jointly with Brazil and other Latin American countries.

The review of Caribbean diplomacy that follows aims to bring together, in a single place, the range of conditionalities that continue to constrain market access of developing countries, even as the process of opening their market proceeds under the Free Trade Project of the WTO. Hopefully it could become a valuable resource for those engaged in examining the scope for CARICOM repositioning in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## ENDNOTES

1. See Ricky Singh’s article, “Caribbean ‘happy’ with WTO’s failure” Sunday *Guyana Chronicle*, Monday, December 6, 1999 p. 2.
2. See the *Guyana Chronicle*, January 16, 2000.
3. See report in *Takuba News*, February/April 2000, Issue No. 20.

4. See Professor Clive Thomas' article "Achievement and Non-Achievement: CARICOM's future" *Sunday Stabroek*, May 21, 2000, p. 17A.
5. Ibid
6. Ibid.
7. See Ricky Singh's article, "Knocks for CARICOM and its diplomacy" in the *Guyana Chronicle* Saturday, April 29, 2000, in a Report on a presentation by Ambassador Richard Bernal.
8. See Professor Clive Thomas's article "Achievement and Non-Achievement: CARICOM's Future" *Sunday Stabroek*, May 21, 2000, p. 17A.
9. See contributions by Anthony Maingot and Richard Bernal in *Contending with Destiny*, edited by K. Hall and D. Benn, published by Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston, 2000.
10. See Study entitled: "Adjustment and Integration in Small Economies: A Caribbean Community Agenda", prepared by a Caribbean Group of Experts.
11. See Jos Jonckers, *Courier*, May-June 1995.
12. See Odoardo Como, *Courier*, May-June 1995.
13. 75 per cent of global direct investment went to twelve (12) countries in recent years and the peace dividend disappeared partly in the increase in UN resources devoted to peace-keeping from US\$278 million to US\$3.5 billion in five (5) years.
14. See Professor Denis Benn's *Multilateral Diplomacy and the Economics of Change*, Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003.


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## 22.

# INTEGRATION: CARICOM's Key to Prosperity 1973–2002



### INTRODUCTION

THE SYMBOLISM OF '30' HOLDS GOOD AND TRUE for the Caribbean Community – enfolding its progress and regress; explicating its growth and maturity; and displaying its fears and fortunes. Upon it is exhibited the resolve and steadfastness of the Community in changing and challenging times; its triumph over divisive issues and the periodic ascent of partisan national interests, which frequently towered ominously above Community concerns. Thirty is therefore a significant landmark with insightful reminders in the journey of the peoples of the Caribbean Community towards their

evident destiny of greater integration.

In retracing the steps in that journey, we must pause to reflect on the watershed agreement of 1982. There the vigorous efforts of Heads of Government ensured maintenance of purpose and displayed determination to forestall major breakdown in relations and provide new momentum to the movement. Perhaps, we are required to journey back to Grand Anse in 1989 to receive an adequate appreciation of the elevations climbed or to ponder the steep descent possible into valleys of self-doubt, and there rediscover the spirit that has led to the overcoming of fearsome contentions. Or in more recent times, a return to Chaguaramas to experience the renewal of the spirit of 1973 expressed in the Consensus of Chaguaramas which chartered the way forward for the Caribbean Community in the twenty-first century. However,

we interpret these developments in the Caribbean Community, and whatever meanings we assign them, they abound with lessons for our future.

This volume captures the studied reflections and records the penetrating projections of seven of the region's illustrious sons and one of its many celebrated daughters. These Distinguished Lecturers, who traversed from Brooklyn in the North to Suriname in the South bearing tidings of the Caribbean Community, have made their mark in intellectual endeavours while additionally, three have gone on to also record successful efforts at the highest political level in the region.

Inaugurating the Distinguished Lecture Series, Dr. the Honourable Ralph Gonsalves literally, symbolically and significantly transports us back to the 1973 origins of the Community. Within the virtual shadows of Chaguaramas he launches an engaging and worthy discourse about 'Our Caribbean Civilisation and its Political Prospects'. That we of the Caribbean are distinctive as to constitute a civilisation *sui generis*, reaffirmed the pride of place and accomplishment belonging to the psyche of Caribbean people and forged over centuries through the furnace of slavery, the hardships of indentureship, and the deleterious effects of colonialism.

He describes Caribbean Civilisation as being of a 'small island and seaboard civilisation' within a particular Caribbean seascape and landscape, comprising the chain of islands from the Bahamas to Trinidad and Tobago and the countries on mainland South America, Guyana and Suriname, embracing Belize and Haiti and widening to include the island-states of Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Dutch and French Antilles, and all the other Central and South American countries which are washed by the Caribbean Sea.

When considering internal and external reservations to the acceptance of a Caribbean Civilisation, Dr. the Honourable Gonsalves argues that the unfounded reservations arise through the mistaken attempt to resort to established typologies of civilisations, many of which apply to dominant civilisations that have historically tended to be coterminous with empires. He explains that a civilization, as is doubtless the case of the Caribbean, need not possess, nor be in quest of, *imperium* to be acknowledged as such an entity.

While all may not as yet be convinced of the difference and distinctive nature of 'Our Caribbean Civilisation,' there is no ambivalence regarding the success and achievements of the peoples of the region. Many Caribbean citizens have excelled in the domains and traditions of their once oppressors and climbed to the zenith of disciplines such as Economics and Literature – as Sir Arthur Lewis, Deryck Walcott, and V.S. Naipaul – in the global arena which affords little compensation for historical disadvantages and gives no concessions for historical wrongs and setbacks.

It is true that we live within the large and looming shadow of an externally brokered and failed attempt at federation but evidently this has

not diminished our ability to set and achieve goals, determine means of achieving such goals and differentiate times and seasons. So, with a sense of identity, a record of accomplishments, and a place carved in the global community, the Honourable Dr. Gonsalves advocates urgent movement by the Community Introduction to a sturdy, confederal political arrangement described as EUROPEAN UNION PLUS. In this bold suggestion he offers proof that as a region we are not the psychological prisoners of our past. He urges rapid movement to an integrated whole similar, though not identical, to that of the European Union, plus other home-grown variations, additions or evolutions.

If, as would have been expected, the subject of the inaugural lecture awakened the region's sense of pride and place, the august assembly and the peoples of the region also received a severe warning that delay in advancement toward political union through continuation on the post-independence path is likely to lead to absorption by the metropolitan centres within fifty years.

Whether the Prime Minister has assumed the persona of prophet or philosopher; futurist or realist, his contentions cannot be easily dismissed. In fact, the thought of absorption did not appear implausible since our recent history records that British Prime Minister Churchill had extended to the United States of America possession of any of Her Majesty's territories from Newfoundland to British Guiana. The US opted to establish military bases rather than assume full possession of the territories. Further, a well-known diplomat of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago reminds that our absorption was almost a done deal and serendipitously we were saved merely by the fact that the US President of the time did not fully consider the enormous benefits of diversity.

The wisdom that guided the formulation of lecture topics and selection of venues for these discourses became quickly evident. That Professor Nettleford was assigned to explicate our unity in diversity and to do so at the Turkeyen Campus in Guyana between multi-ethnic Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname is remarkable. For while our diversity is largely what defines us, he is forced to admit that the Caribbean itself has struggled for all of five centuries with mastering the management of the complexity of its diversity. However, today it is possible to say we have learned to live together rather than simply living side-by-side, which is the easy solution of peoples of different origins who find themselves in close encounters.

Some manifestations of the accuracy of his contention regarding the complexity of diversity are visible in the political sphere particularly in the grand contest of national elections. Our inability to expertly manage the challenges of diversity then functions to retard development and disturb the stability required for progress on many fronts. These issues, while signalled and implied in Professor Nettleford's lecture, are explored more

fully in Professor Grant's discussion on democratic governance in the region. And while the claim is incontestable that the region at a subliminal level understands and trades on the unity, which underlies the differences like a 'submarine' according to West Indian poet Kamau Brathwaite, Professor Grant, would want to quickly see the submarine surface at port with its abundant treasures from the deep.

And yet there is the persistence of what Professor Nettleford describes as the eloquence of the differences reflected in hyphenated fragmentation (Anglo Caribbean, Dutch-Caribbean, etc.) and which emphasizes the legacy of a heritage of separation and shattered identities. Fortunately, the existence of this creative diversity has been recognized and efforts to ensure that it does not intervene dysfunctionally are reflected at national levels. He notes that Jamaica aspires for '*Out of Many One People*'; Guyana's seeks '*One People One Nation, and One Destiny*'; and Trinidad and Tobago's national anthem proclaims a place where '*every race finds an equal place*.' However, the acknowledged verdict is that these declarations all remain challenging aspirations rather than solid achievements.

Without attempting to minimize the effects of slavery and indentureship, our historical experience is seen fitting us to adapt more readily in the new global environment, which UNESCO identifies as emphasising interdependence of the world's peoples. The Caribbean experience and the region's capacity to manage creative diversity hold global lessons for peoples faced with the need to learn to live together, and to deal with the dilemma of difference in ways that will serve the enhancement of the human life and ensure positive human development well into the third millennium, Professor Nettleford offers.

Further, that the recognition of culture as a point of power by Caribbean dependencies has catapulted them into the twenty-first century because they are in possession, of that which he labels the new sensibility forged over 500 years of encounters making them fully *au fait* with relationships, with texture, with contradictions, with unity in diversity.

The Honourable Maxine Henry-Wilson, following in both logical and thematic sequence, challenges us to revisit the place and power of culture in the development of the region. She brings us the memory that the founding fathers of the Caribbean Community more than thirty years ago at the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government had identified cultural development as an important vehicle for the journey towards greater regional unity. Forbes Burnham had uttered his prophetic challenge to artists and CARIFESTA was born, and Michael Manley had spoken of the necessity of according primacy to the psychological elements.

As Minister responsible for education in the most populous English-speaking CARICOM state, Jamaica, her purview of this sector is most interesting considering present challenges and shortfalls in the Caribbean

education sector. She expresses that the Caribbean education system must be steeped in the culture of the region and provides the knowledge base and attitudinal constructs that will underpin integration and development if it is to serve to create the Caribbean persona and provide the ideological framework for integration. This may require radical shifts in education offerings and delivery modes to include culture in an integrative framework and in a methodology that is intensely Caribbean.

Her exhortations are not entirely new but they are timely. Perhaps next to cricket, which is much older and currently offers little cause for a display of native exuberance, she is correct in pointing to the tremendous success of CARIFESTA. The creative diversity unleashed through CARIFESTA and its attempts and success in transcending the boundaries of the Anglophone Caribbean to include Cuba and others who are washed by the Caribbean Sea must be recognized. It has certainly functioned as a vehicle transporting the peoples of the region to the common stage in order for them to realize their sameness and the power of their diversity.

One of the key challenges of the Honourable Maxine Henry-Wilson to us is for the Caribbean to find the formula to convert its warmth and vitality, which underscores cultural prowess, to the establishment of powerful cultural industries. This is similar to the exhortations of the leading economists in the region to move from agricultural commodity production to agricultural product production. In her view, it is the area where culture can impact directly on regional economic development especially at a time when we are all experiencing economic challenges and the need to expand our tourism products.

This transformation though highly desirable, is evidently not simplistic. Imbued with new enthusiasm and envisioning new possibilities, the Honourable Lloyd Best is apt to fondly remind us that after half a century of experimentation and application of various ideologies and methodologies we have not succeeded in transforming our plantation economies to modern manufacturing economies. Such a reminder is not intended to deter but to make us determined to confront the decisions and accept the choices necessary for building cultural industries. The establishment of support structures and mechanisms, and the catalytic role of culture departments backed by financing strategies both in-country and Community come into focus.

That democratic governance within the region is under threat from external sources may be readily accepted. Professor Grant locates internal and systemic threats which are to be equally addressed in a region that measures its democratic credentials primarily in terms of regular competitive elections which are not always a contest over visions. And more so, the requirements for the smooth functioning of the Westminster parliamentary

system which we have adopted, may not be easily met considering the peculiarities of the region.

He tells us that the challenge that governance presents in small societies and multi-ethnic societies are not to be underestimated. Yet he sees the emergence of measures to improve democratic governance in the Community through the creation of the Justice and Governance portfolio, engagement with civil society, and the extension of the participatory approach to include opposition political parties. He cautions not to underestimate the challenges that governance presents in small multi-ethnic societies.

Professor Cedric Grant observes that it has become increasingly obvious that the inherited governance arrangements fixed in independence constitutions have had their limitations and have not always led us in the direction we have sought to go mindful of our history and consistent with our vision. The tensions experienced in Caribbean societies in recent years served to galvanize efforts at constitutional reforms, for neither implosion nor explosion would be to our profit and stability. The winds that drove our societies to embrace constitutional reform provide an opportunity to design governance arrangements that are inclusive in nature, consistent with international thinking and in harmony with citizens' expectations.

Professor Grant is incisive as he examines the impact of the Caribbean Community on the governance conduct of Member States. Despite the entrenched doctrine of non-intervention and efforts to promote the principle of ideological pluralism, he finds that CARICOM has exerted influence in the realm of governance. He notes that, for example, claims of electoral irregularities in Guyana were not ignored by CARICOM. He tells us that these were treated through reliance upon informal discussions which CARICOM has employed as its preferred method of conferring with Guyana's leaders on several occasions. This disclosure and the other recent examples cited are the highest commendation of the regional grouping and illustrative of its maturity and its preparedness to deal with the fears of citizens of CARICOM in order that their expectations of the CSME could rest on a solid foundation with realistic expectations.

Professor Compton Bourne reminds that our roots of community run deep and have been established over many years with similar desires articulated over various periods of our history. He undertakes to disabuse our minds and calm our insular spirits in the knowledge that the movement of Caribbean nationals is not the major cause of unemployment. He illustrates the increasing importance of intra-Community trade as he shows us the national and Community benefits of the free movement of skills and finance, reminding that the invisible hand of the market is not perfect and so deliberate mechanisms have been created to offset negative impact. Ultimately the goal is mutuality of benefit since that is the glue holding and solidifying a Community. He is convinced that we can build a Community

for all of the Caribbean and one in which citizens of the Caribbean occupy a genuinely common economic space and perceive of themselves as having a common economic destiny.

He points to the 'potential dynamic benefits of labour market integration' and envisions that such relaxation of the labour constraint through the realisation of a Community labour market would confer benefits of lower prices, and larger output on both labour sending and receiving member countries. This would have a positive effect on the financial sector of each Caribbean community territory.

Financial capital in the Community predicts Professor Bourne, if used mutually could be a boost for the borrowing countries and through financial capital and direct investment, which could benefit the sender countries, create a stable economic environment with 'vibrant economic community partners.' Despite the potential for investment and economic growth Professor Bourne writing in 2003 highlighted that the attitudes in the Caribbean countries as recipient countries seems less than welcoming towards Community-origin direct investment. Foreign exchange controls, work permit regulations and the clamour of protective nationalism he noted, constituted formidable obstacles to the potential trans-border investor in the Caribbean Community, prefacing that the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas should be implemented if barriers to movement of labour and capital are not to frustrate cross-border investments, specifically with respect to the rights of establishment, the right to provide services and the right to move capital.

Similarly, foreign exchange controls in the Community Professor Bourne notes, have served to rigidly segment financial markets into national enclaves which minimize the scope for productive employment of financial services in the Community artificially depress interest rates and result in the variation of the quality of financial services across the Community.

Professor Bourne acknowledges that since as early as 1965 McIntyre and 1967 Demas, Brewster and Thomas recognized the need for 'explicit redistributive policies for promoting equal gains in Caribbean economic integration', although this seemed to have been seldom acknowledged by policy makers.

Professor Bourne visits the issue of the policies of the Caribbean Development Bank on CARICOM's Less Developed Countries. One of these policies adopted by the Bank favours the LDCs in terms of the proportion of its financial resources made available to them. He notes however that the CDB's role has been one of intermediating international capital rather than regional capital.

In concluding Professor Bourne observed that geographical and cultural inclusivity along these lines may not be a very distant objective in light of regionalisation trends in the world. As a result, he sees a Community that

extends beyond its present core of Anglophone Caribbean countries to include the other linguistic countries within the Caribbean basin.

This Distinguished Lecture Series would have been incomplete without the region considering the nature of contemporary globalisation and the strategies that are needed to ensure that the Community gains from this process. While many of the subjects of the Lectures considered our collective will and agreements, globalisation compelled our responses. If our creative diversity ensured our survival in the past, a new platform of knowledge and information was needed for the future. Additionally, and surprisingly, our cumulative experiences of the past are assessed as inadequate and therefore the region must build an entirely different platform to ensure current and future success.

Dr. Bhoendradatt-Tewarie does not bring us totally comforting news but a vital message that the future does not always resemble the past and so new strategies are required in the age of globalisation. The Region is caught at a juncture at which post-independence visions have not been fulfilled nor have plantation economies been transformed. In order to succeed in changing a global knowledge-based economy, there is need for an ideological shift in the development of a less inward world-view; and a shift in our mindset.

He informs us that the Caribbean can no longer look to land, labour and capital to secure a sustainable future. It needs instead to focus on information, intellectual capital, knowledge and innovation. For this, it must link intellectual capital formation with ICT technologies in order to integrate into the global knowledge economy since ICT technologies present a new platform for the creation of a new economy.

While that is understandable, meeting its demands is costly. Caught in our struggle to maintain and improve old education systems that are faltering he urges us to stop in order to revamp the education system at all levels with attention to realignment of curricula, teaching methodologies, learning strategies, and research. With a male underachievement in education, and general under-performance at the secondary school level, the region must now pursue the goal of becoming a Learning Society by making education its number one regional priority and making the education sector the driver of its development thrust.

This will undoubtedly be a huge challenge of overwhelming proportions for the region, but one that it cannot postpone except at the risk of being rendered less competitive globally.

Dr Tewarie argues that as a region we will not be able to benefit from the diffusion of new technologies unless a telecommunications infrastructure exists to facilitate low-cost easy access for small societies including microstates. He locates the need for information technology to be infused in the functioning of business, government and institutions in other sectors throughout the society including labour unions and NGOs so that efficiency

gains are made, effectiveness is achieved, and transformation of institutions, work processes and systems are realized.

That the Caribbean extends beyond its geographic confines and includes its growing and vibrant migrant communities has always been intuitively known and recognized. The Most Honourable P. J. Patterson, Prime Minister of Jamaica, in his presentation shares with his audience the tremendous benefits available to Caribbean nationals derived through building upon the existing levels and intensity of Diaspora engagement at the national homeland level to extend to Diaspora engagement with the Caribbean Community itself in a pattern that ensures mutuality of benefit. He sees this being achieved through the building of solidarity between the peoples of the Caribbean a process which would lead to the West Indian Diaspora seeing themselves as belonging to the Caribbean Community.

In sharing information about the tremendous resources and potential of the West Indian Diaspora, Prime Minister Patterson identifies the existence of organized linkages between the Diaspora and the region, actions that augment the financial capital at the disposal of the banking system remittances and the barrel phenomenon as positive contributions of the Caribbean Diaspora to the region's development. He admits that migrant remittances in cash and kind comprise a significant part of the implicit social safety nets of Member States, supporting consumption at adequate levels and thereby providing stimulating injections into various sectors of the economy. He encourages Members of the Diaspora to embrace the wider CARICOM as an enlarged homeland, where synergies for cultural and productive action that generate profitable returns for all, may be located. He persuades us to participate in the construction of the Caribbean Community with its features of freely moving peoples committed to sound democratic principles, the rule of law, the consolidation of civil society in governance, and a Community anchored in a common economic space for investment, production, and trade.

Describing his views as not a definitive blue print for consolidating the Diaspora as an integral part of the life of the Caribbean Community, he calls for further contributions to the ideas from which an action agenda may emerge. He commends research undertaken on the dynamics of West Indian migration and Diaspora behaviour and advocates more work and maintenance of a comprehensive programme of research and analysis on West Indian migrant flows and their communities abroad.

The convening of a CARICOM Diaspora business conference; exploration of ways of securing Diaspora participation, such as admitting representatives of the Diaspora to appropriate fora of CARICOM as the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians; and collaboration to produce a range of multimedia materials that would assist West

Indian migrant homes in the socialization of offspring into West Indian consciousness, are also addressed by The Most Honourable Prime Minister.

Deliberately and strategically positioned in the choreography of the Distinguished Lecture Series, the way forward for the Caribbean Single Market and Economy was set to bring the curtains down. Emphasis on the way forward is testimony that the thirtieth anniversary was viewed as a critical juncture reached along the route to a destination. This sentiment reverberated even when not distinctly expressed. The CSME was woven and suffused into the entire Lecture Series in its myriad dimensions and manifestations. And just like its inauguration was its closure full of challenges and replete with warnings.

The Right Honourable Owen Arthur shows that what appears as sloth in the movement towards the CSME is really attending to the complex changes reaching up to the constitutional level that must be undertaken in some States. For the CSME, which already exists essentially as a legal entity as embodied in the provision of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas to be transformed into a lived reality, we have now to make the Caribbean matter as a major source of our capital, skills, technology, entrepreneurship and front matter, and important in the decision-making process of Governments, enterprises and individuals.

The Right Honourable Arthur is of the view that the CSME is an initiative that will profoundly and fundamentally change the structure of each of the economies involved, the trajectory of their development, their relationship with each other and with economic systems in the rest of the world. It will be the most complex, ambitious and difficult enterprise ever contemplated in the region. He points to the extreme difficulty of conceiving an economy, whether national or regional as a stand-alone entity which embodies and represents a way of life. In addition, the socio-economic climate in which the CSME is being conceived and is to be implemented is not very favourable; and, added to these, is the conviction that any venture to forge deep political integration in the region is inappropriate and impractical at this time.

He stresses that appropriate instruments of communication have to be developed so as not to further deprive the endeavour to create the CSME of a sturdy foundation. There are also new socio-economic tendencies, perspectives and developments across the region that are not creating a climate that is conducive to progress.

While Community citizens may have anticipated, in some measure, the described difficulties and challenges and complexities, they could not have imagined the pervasive and impending impact of CSME on social, cultural, political and economic institutions within member countries. According to Prime Minister Arthur, the CSME represents a way of life and should therefore be seen as an entity that draws its purposes and its dynamics from

the social and cultural norms and values of the region. It is more than its physical and financial resources and includes social assets such as a sense of community, a shared identity and other bonds that inspire individuals to cooperate in the design and workings of the instruments to promote their mutual well-being.

The Right Honourable Arthur remains of the firm conviction that, regardless of any obstacles that may arise, the creation of a CSME is an urgent, inescapable and historic necessity which has the capability and holds the promise of unleashing a new and an unprecedented economic energy in the Caribbean.

And so, thirty years after the Treaty of Chaguaramas, armed with the lessons of the ill-fated West Indian Federation, fortified by the jolting experiences of the international system, and convinced that men and women are masters of their fate and architects of their destinies, the Caribbean has defied the sceptics, assailed the doomsayers, and dared to dream of a Community.

The distinguished lectures leave no room for doubt, for as Professor Kari Levitt eloquently stated and as embraced by the Hon. Lloyd Best, a distinguished Caribbean intellectual, who collaborated with her in conceptualising a Caribbean economy on its own terms:

Development [of the Caribbean Community] cannot be imposed from without. It is a creative process. Its central nervous system, the matrix which nourishes it, is located in the cultural sphere.

Development is ultimately not a matter of money or physical capital, or foreign exchange but of the capacity of a society to tap the root of popular creativity, to free up and empower people to exercise their intelligence and collective wisdom.

Today, in spite of acknowledged setbacks, our strides have been and continue to be confident as we journey towards moulding what Dr. the Honourable Ralph Gonsalves so appropriately describes as a 'Caribbean Civilisation' that dares to be different.

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
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## REGIONAL INTEGRATION: Key to Caribbean Survival and Prosperity



### INTRODUCTION

#### CARICOM: Unity in Adversity

**“IF AS AN INTEGRATION MOVEMENT, WE ARE TO** fulfil the promise and avoid the danger, it will require nothing less than the most steadfast keeping of faith with the inspiration and the vision that engendered the Dickenson Bay Agreement, the Georgetown Accord, and the Treaty of Chaguaramas. If we combine this with the lessons learnt over the twelve years of operation of CARICOM, we may yet show that we have a winning formula for the

practical success of the integration movement.

To my mind, these lessons are three-fold: the first is that for us in the Caribbean, regional integration remains an inescapable imperative; the second is that it is also a fact, at the same time, that integration is a most complex and difficult business; and the third is that each major obstacle that we encounter is not, as such, a matter fatal to co-operation, but is rather something that forces us to proceed more searchingly for the right instrumentalities and the appropriate modalities by which to manage our cooperation”

—Roderick Rainford, Secretary-General, Caribbean Community (1983–1992)

To do justice to the subject of integration, one would have to enquire into the reasons for the survival of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), analyse the factors which enabled it to emerge from the crises of the '70s and '80s, and give consideration to whether it can come to terms with the challenges of the twenty-first century and gainfully utilise the opportunities inherent in the new dispensation the twenty-first century has spawned.

The fate of other economic groupings in the Third World argued against success of any similar grouping in the Caribbean. British efforts to impose a Federation on Central Africa and Malaysia and Singapore had crashed in failure in the '60s. Any thought of such an experiment succeeding elsewhere seemed remote and when the West Indies Federation came to an end in 1962, it seemed that the prospect for Caribbean unity died with it, but the desire for unity outlived the collapse of the Federation. "... the collapse of this political arrangement was not accompanied by rejection of regional integration as a means of accelerating economic development.<sup>1</sup> It is not sufficient to say that the rejection of the Federation was not accompanied by a rejection of regional integration as a means of rapid economic development; an explanation is required, for it will be seen that time and again, whatever the state of the Integration Movement, the desire for unity remained undiminished.

## REASONS FOR SURVIVAL

The explanation usually given for the common desire of the English-speaking Caribbean people for a united existence is that the similarity of their historical evolution—slavery, indentureship, economic and social structures, religious beliefs, a common language—has forged a consciousness, a sense of a common identity among the Caribbean English-speaking peoples.

"The Commonwealth Caribbean does demonstrate, in broad sections, a common or similar historical development. In the course of well-nigh four centuries, there has developed, under the influences and through the miscegenation of Europeans, Africans and Asian forced labourers, as well as voluntary immigrants, a society and culture, which, because of its anthropological roots, displays over political and social barriers, typical traits of a new Antillean World. Common values, attitudes and thought patterns, which can be described as unique, have developed—especially in religion and ideology."<sup>2</sup>

The approximately four hundred years of the existence of the peoples of the English-speaking Caribbean have forged bonds of unity among them and created a web of values and shared beliefs of which the West Indies Federation and the other forms of institutional unity are an expression. It is this sense of unity which did not fall with the West Indies Federation. It is this powerful psychological factor which made it possible for the Region to

overcome the rancour and the bitterness which flowed from the demise of the Federation.

The resumption of the movement towards Caribbean unity so soon after the end of the Federal experiment in 1962, warrants analysis. It resulted from the convergence of many factors. Among them is the long history of the struggle for West Indian unity by such men as Uriah Butler of Trinidad and Tobago, and T.A. Marryshow of Grenada. The work and political activities of these men were influential and effective, for they forced an early recognition by the Caribbean people that unity was essential to the meaningful economic development of the region. It was a thesis that was understood and accepted by the succeeding generation of leaders. Consequently, Eric Williams, and the other leaders of his time, not only wanted the urgent development of the region but also recognised that the growing exigency of external factors rendered such unity imperative.

### CHALLENGES OF THE 70S

These factors became evident in the seventies in an explosion of economic groupings. It was not a world which the Caribbean could face in disunity. Certainly, the prospect of the loss of the preferences enjoyed by many states of the region as a result of Britain's entry to the European Economic Community (EEC) concentrated minds wonderfully. The idea that the British Government was in a great haste to abandon the region must have represented, in the well-known American phrase, "a wakeup call" Alarm bells also rang as the opportunities for emigration dwindled: Britain, Canada and the United States took in the welcoming mat.<sup>3</sup> These developments should encourage the consideration that faced with these challenges and what Martin Carter has called the "heart-fracturing" task of economic development, the Caribbean Leaders opted for unity in adversity.<sup>4</sup>

It is usual to consider the various attempts at unity as separate and discrete developments, but, surely, the continuation of the movement towards Caribbean integration as enshrined in the Conference of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean, which began in 1963, the creation of the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA) in 1968, and the Caribbean Community in 1973, suggest an intellectual, if not an institutional unity. Each one of the political creations represents an attempt to fashion an instrument for unity which could shelter the Caribbean home from the threatening international environment and the persistent demands of the people for an improved standard of living.

The declarations of the early Conferences on Caribbean unity, organised by Eric Williams, the Dickenson Bay Agreement of 1965, the CARIFTA Agreement of 1968 and the Treaty of Chaguaramas of 1973, all seek to realise

the aspiration of the Caribbean people for 'full employment and improved living standards'.<sup>5</sup> These declarations agreed on the need for pooling resources in order to obtain rapid economic development and the need to eliminate barriers to the expansion of the regional economy. In other words, all of the activities of the leaders of the Region were geared to the specific ends of forging unity as a means of promoting economic development: 'The fundamental premise for the idea of regional integration in the Caribbean has been the promotion of economic development.'<sup>6</sup>

It is time now to turn to the establishment and evolution of the Caribbean Community: a development which 'constitutes a considerable advance in the development of Caribbean integration'.<sup>7</sup> At its establishment, July 4, 1973, it embraced areas of cooperation 'which, taken together, extended far beyond the limited commitment to Free Trade represented by CARIFTA'.<sup>8</sup> A common Market was established to facilitate regional integration. Functional cooperation was formulated to include such areas as Health, Education, Transportation and Meteorology, and most importantly, provision was made for the coordination of Foreign Policy. One political commentator is convinced that the Community has gained much success in this area.

"CARICOM has done well with respect to both Foreign Policy co-ordination and Functional co-operation. No other regional integration Group in the Western Hemisphere has demonstrated such a vocal commitment to the co-ordination of foreign policy, despite some notable fragmentation (as in the varied national responses to the US intervention in Grenada in 1983 and the signing of separate bilateral 'Shiprider Agreements' with the United States in 1997 and 1998). Functional collaboration efforts have also resulted in a number of very successful regional ventures."<sup>9</sup>

The Treaty of Chaguaramas, which created CARICOM, also established several institutions for making policy in respect of functional co-operation. Among these are: Caribbean Examination Council (CXC), the Caribbean Meteorology Organisation (CMO), the Council for Legal Education, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the University of the West Indies (UWI) campuses in Jamaica, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago.

There are several other things of note in the Treaty of Chaguaramas. It reflected the fact that the Community Leaders opted for a Community of Sovereign States. Unlike the EEC, on which CARICOM was modelled, and now the European Union (EU), the Community was not regarded as a mechanism for restraining the excesses of nationalism or sovereign states. The Community was marching to a different historical drum. The Federal experiment had cured Caribbean leaders of even tinkering with the notion of a supra-national authority. The Treaty also ensured that the business of the Community would proceed and be controlled by a series of Conferences and Councils "made up of territorial politicians, and is only serviced by

its Secretariat".<sup>10</sup> Decisions were to be taken unanimously and these had to be ratified by national legislatures. Payne has argued that this was a constraining factor in that the Community "has been designed and is run by men who remain, as Stanley Hoffman put it, in 'the mental universe of traditional inter-state relations.'"<sup>11</sup> But, there might be a misunderstanding here. The Caribbean could not have been unaware of the imperatives of integration but opted for a mechanism that ensured that each Member State's particular interest was taken into account when decisions were made. There was nothing to prevent the Community, in its evolution, from making some of its decisions subject to the unanimity rule while others could be reached by majority decision, as is the case in the European Union.

To complete the political and economic physiognomy of the Community at this period, some reference will have to be made to the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States Sub-Grouping. The Sub-Grouping enjoys a special trade regime under the Treaty of Chaguaramas. These States, which were once members of one of the oldest Federations in the Region, joined the Community and have increasingly found that their interests are best served by remaining within it.

But, the concept of the Community as envisaged by the founding fathers was to undergo a fundamental change by the end of the century. It is therefore appropriate to examine the environment and the dominant ideas which influenced the evolution of the Community. The Member States, like all small countries at the time, in responding to the difficulties posed – limited resources, inadequate intra-regional trade, and communication links, etc. – sought to integrate to overcome them. Wider and bigger markets meant increased trade. This understanding coincided with the prevailing economic idea that one of the main reasons for under-development was the dependency of small States, including the Caribbean, on the metropolitan States. The advent of the Integration process in institutional forms, beginning with CARIFTA, was strongly influenced by these ideas: Ideas which did not originate outside of the Region but in the University of the West Indies.<sup>12</sup> The Community which was visualised was one which was to be self-sufficient in relation to the rest of the world:

"They (the founding fathers) saw Caribbean development as an inward looking, import-substitution phenomenon; they refused to believe that the CARICOM Community could survive and prosper based on the unrestricted movement of capital and factors of production. They saw integration in only a limited sense as a limited common market, providing for the free movement of goods, but with no provision for the unrestricted movement of labour, capital and services."<sup>13</sup>

As will be seen, the current generation of Caribbean Leaders has recognised that this limited concept of the Community had to be changed.

They have opted for a “. . . more open, market-based and outward-looking economic model as exemplified by the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA).”<sup>14</sup>

One other compelling reason emerged in the 1970s; the world economy experienced one of its worst crises since the depression of the 1930s. The crisis resulted from the quadrupling of the price of oil by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 and 1974. The impact on the economies of the States of the Community was severe. The increase in the price of oil and the shattering effect on the economies of the CARICOM States, all of which have small open and vulnerable economies, had a profound effect upon the Region. That ended the euphoria which surrounded the launching of the Community. Faith in CARICOM declined and the Community was to traverse a crisis that taxed its capacity for survival.

As one former Secretary-General has noted, the “ink was hardly dry”<sup>15</sup> on the Treaty of Chaguaramas when the crisis struck home. Crippling blows in the form of accelerated inflation, a four-fold increase in the price of oil, and massive dislocations were dealt to the economies of all CARICOM States. Trinidad and Tobago was the only exception. Its oil wealth protected it, but, the other States were wracked by major budgetary and balance of payments deficits, and increased cost of living. To fend off the effects of the crisis, many of them opted for stern economic measures: higher taxation, exchange controls, the imposition of subsidies on vital commodities, import restrictions and reductions in the work force. This crisis created structural adjustment problems for many CARICOM States. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) seemed the only option. Guyana and Jamaica sought help from that institution and had to undergo programmes of varying austerity.

The impact of the crisis on the Eastern Caribbean States was just as severe. Rising costs for food imports, poor commodity prices, budgetary deficits played havoc with their economies. In 1976, the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) “was forced to establish an emergency Eastern Caribbean (EC)\$10 million Fund to make grants and intermediate loans to Governments of the Leeward and Windward Islands for the support of essential national programmes.”<sup>16</sup>

In a situation in which a regional organisation was dominated by nation-states, it was inevitable that any action taken by anyone of them considered detrimental to the interests of the others would provoke controversy and response, and so it proved. Jamaica and Guyana invoked Article 28 of the Treaty to limit imports from the other Member States of the Community. Retaliation ensued and intra-regional trade suffered. By 1975, Eric Williams, a Founding Father of the Community, sounded Cassandra-like warnings about the impact of these decisions on the Community. In a speech to a Convention of the People’s National Movement (PNM) in April 1975, he

“complained that the recent advances in Caribbean Integration were being prejudiced by the way in which many of the impoverished Member States of CARICOM were making bilateral economic arrangements on supplicant terms with wealthy Latin American countries.”<sup>17</sup> Williams was particularly concerned about the Republic of Venezuela, which, he felt, was trying to place itself in a position to dominate the Region. In this regard, Williams was particularly irked by the agreement reached with Venezuela, which, he felt, was trying to place itself in a position to dominate the Region. Furthermore, Williams was also irked by the agreement reached with Venezuela by Jamaica to supply Venezuela with bauxite and alumina for a proposed smelter. Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago had previously agreed to build two CARICOM smelters. As Williams told his Convention: “One can take so much, and I have had enough – to smelt or not to smelt, no big thing.”<sup>18</sup>

The question of intra-regional trade and its critical importance to the functioning of the Community needs some elaboration. Payne has argued that the restriction of imports by Guyana and Jamaica “. . . produced a real crisis in the Community to the point where fears were expressed about the future of the whole integration movement.”<sup>19</sup> In response, Trinidad and Tobago announced its “intention of instituting its own system of quantitative controls on the import of regional goods.”

Eric Williams was too powerful and prestigious a figure in Caribbean politics (apart from the fact that he was in charge of one of the strongest economies in the Region) for his pronouncements not to have an effect on the integration process. Whether stung by Williams’ remarks or frustrated by their inability to find the required solutions to their dire economic circumstances, Burnham and Manley, in the particular ways of Caribbean politics, made known their resentment of Williams’ ex-cathedra pronouncements and the manner in which oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago was dispensing its largesse in the Region. For Trinidad and Tobago had become the major force in the Community, because almost all of the other Member States were stricken by the economic crisis. Good personal relations among the leaders of the Community are essential to its progress. The consequences of the crisis soured these relations. Williams increasingly gave public expression to his disapproval of the ‘socialist’ experiments in Guyana and Jamaica. The upshot was that he saw no need to meet with Manley or Burnham or the other Heads of the Community. Williams retired to his tent like Ulysses. CARICOM – this was 1975 – would not meet for another seven years.

As Manley and Burnham grappled with budgeting and increasingly intractable economic problems, they sought solace in their ideological consanguinity. Relations between Guyana and Jamaica became closer; the People’s National Congress (PNC) and the People’s National Party (PNP) engaged in exchanges over a range of issues. An ideological divide

had occurred in the Community—and when the Gairy Government was overthrown in 1979 and the Maurice Bishop Administration declared itself socialist, the Caribbean Community found itself confronted with an ideological as well as an economic crisis. Inevitably, the Community was adversely affected by these developments, the LDC States in particular. It was no longer possible to separate the economic processes of the Community from those of an ideological nature. This is clearly seen when one surveys the impact of the crisis on the Community. The upheaval in Grenada in 1979 resulted from the profound economic problems confronting the Gairy Government. The resulting Maurice Bishop Administration saw the resolution of them through the instrumentation of a socialist ideology.

Intra-regional trade which is the barometer of any economic grouping was registering negative readings, but even in this crisis, the positive must be noted. Both Jamaica and Guyana, recognising the importance of this trade to the integration process, undertook to restore it to the 1975 levels. By the early '80s intra-regional trade was said to be recovering.<sup>20</sup>

The question now, was whether the Community, or more precisely its Member States, could overcome the four-fold problems of external debt (spawned by the economic crisis), structural adjustment problems, national crisis management and ideological pluralism. The answer seemed to be that it could not; and while the problems of the Community accumulated there was no meeting of the Heads at which they could be tackled. The Secretariat found it difficult to convene meetings. The administrative arm of the Community, the Council which dealt with administrative matters, met only once between September 1977 and December 1978. When Alister McIntyre demitted office in April 1977, he was not replaced for another fifteen months: Kurleigh King only assumed office in November 1978.

A terrible vacuum was created. Into it poured what one political scientist has called a "literature of doom."<sup>21</sup> Editorial writers and intellectuals of the Region<sup>22</sup>, like a chorus in a Greek tragedy, prophesied the demise of the Community. Criticisms ranged from the Community being a 'paper tiger' to the call for the excision of the LDCs from it.<sup>23</sup> But, these criticisms of the Community, when closely read, tell us more about the mindset of leading personalities of the Region than of the inherent problems of the Community itself. Any economic grouping, in particular a community, can only mature and become a factor for political, economic and social change in the long term. The European Union, heir to the trials of the Romans, Charlemagne, and other experiments at integration, is, as yet, no such thing. Yet, the Caribbean Community in less than a decade of its existence was expected, at one fell stroke, it seemed, to retire the problems which had been thrown up by colonialism, slavery and indentureship: problems of poor and slow economic growth, over population, poor communications infrastructure, and the co-ordination of vital economic activities. The point here is not that

some of the criticisms were not valid but that insufficient attention was paid to the capacity of a new found integration movement to effect change across the region in a hostile international economic environment in which it was forced to move and have its being.

## THE 1980S

Christophe Müllerleile has pointed out and Carl Stone had lamented the fact that CARICOM had missed opportunities to develop a think-tank of economists and other experts to indicate options for the region.<sup>24</sup> But, Müllerleile nevertheless regarded the study by Compton Bourne, commissioned by the Heads of the Community in 1986, as providing 'a framework for regional political thought.'<sup>25</sup> One wonders whether the body of ideas, opinions and views of the leaders of the Community enshrined in their declarations, especially from the Third Summit in Ocho Rios, Jamaica in 1982, while not rising, perhaps to the level of political thought, does not constitute a policy or an ideology for survival. For it cannot be denied that in the face of some of the most testing problems, the Community eventually buckled down to finding solutions to them. In particular, they were conscious of the fact that a meeting of the Heads, the supreme organ of the Community, had to occur in order to reverse the fortunes of the Integration Movement.

Through the mechanism of the Declarations of Ocho Rios [1975], Grand Anse [July 1989], the Georgetown Declaration [1986] and the studies in the form of the Report of the Group of Experts, the Mills Report [1990], the Bourne Commission [1988] and the West Indian Commission [1992], the leaders of the Community set about the task of reviving it. It must not be forgotten that the crisis of the '70s had engendered widespread pessimism as to whether it could survive. Enriqu  Iglesias, the President of the Inter-American Bank, felt that 'regional integration was nearly silenced by the overwhelming attention required by the external debt problems, adjustment, and national crisis management'.<sup>26</sup> What the leaders of the Community were under an obligation to do was to end that silence and restart a healthy and productive dialogue about the way forward for the Integration process.

In all of the declarations, particularly those of Ocho Rios, Nassau and the Grand Anse Declarations, there was a close examination of the economic problems of the Member States of the Community. It was generally recognised that there had to be a period of structural adjustment to ensure a recovery of their economies. 'The process of structural adjustment may result in some amount of short-term dislocation. It is acknowledged, however, that failure to adjust structurally will also have the consequence of the even more serious problem of large-scale unemployment.'<sup>27</sup>

The interesting thing about the Group of Experts is that it focussed, as already indicated, on two problems facing the Community: the economic crisis, and the crisis over the different ideologies practised by Member States of the Community. The Report was candid in its analysis of the economic problems facing the Community. It pointed out, for example, that the economic difficulties of the Community had led 'to a serious loss of faith and hope by the regional public and the international community.'<sup>28</sup> While asserting that there was no other option but integration, the experts went on to recommend a series of measures for the strengthening of the Community.

But, in a sense, a most important task was carried out by the Group of Experts. As already described, the Caribbean Community was also facing an ideological crisis, which had to be resolved. The Group of Experts recognised this. It affirmed that the Community was ideologically plural and judged that "ideological pluralism may be a shield against enforced sameness; but should not be a sword against solidarity."<sup>29</sup> The work of the Group of Experts on this question provided the basis on which consideration of this matter was advanced. At the 1982 Ocho Rios Summit, the Leaders of the Community stated that ideological pluralism was an "irreversible trend within the international system" but that it should "not impair the integration process."<sup>30</sup> At subsequent meetings of the Movement, several Heads of Government, including Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados and Edward Seaga of Jamaica, saw the plurally ideological nature of the Community as being linked to the practice of democracy. This was apparently the dominant view. Thus, when the invasion of Grenada put an end to the differences over the ideology of the Community, it seemed that most of its member States were more comfortable with the Community's democratic nature.

The Bourne Commission was a thorough study of the requirements of the Caribbean Community for economic survival. Its economic problems were clearly stated: A backlog of unemployment and a lack of competitiveness were matters for serious concern, but the Bourne Commission was conclusive that the Community could take advantage of technology and the opportunities available in modern international economic relations to develop and prosper.

The Grand Anse Declaration is an important document. It has a justifiably urgent tone. It called for the establishment of a 'Single Market and Economy for the Caribbean Community' in 'the shortest possible time.'<sup>31</sup> As already explained, this was tantamount to a revolution in the architecture of the Caribbean Community. Also, a Single Market and Economy would necessarily be concerned with the mobility of labour, production and capital. From here on the Community would be concerned with what the experts called 'outward' integration. The Community was therefore put on course to grapple with the challenges of the new millennium.

## THE 1990S AND TOWARDS THE 21ST CENTURY

One should pause here to reflect on the changed architecture of the Community. The work and recommendations of the West Indian Commission will be commented upon shortly, but it is necessary at this point in our discourse to refer to one of its creations:

The Association of Caribbean States (ACS). The West Indian Commission had urged that the concept of the Caribbean be enlarged to accommodate its non-English speaking counterparts. Accordingly, on 24 July 1994, the Convention establishing the ACS was signed. One should pause here to reflect on the changed architecture of the Community. The work in Colombia. What are the implications and expectation of the ACS?

The ACS “. . . offers a new regional configuration that provides a framework for closer political, economic, and functional co-operation in the wider Caribbean.”<sup>32</sup> The objectives of the ACS are to strengthen the regional co-operation and integration process in order to create enhanced economic space in the region; preserve the Caribbean Sea; and promote the sustainable development of the region. It is the world’s fourth largest grouping with a population of 231 million and an accumulated GDP of US\$506 billion.<sup>33</sup> The prospect created by the ACS is for greater intra-regional trade and investment.

Although the ACS suffers from a number of disadvantages—poor funding of the Secretariat, countries at different stages of development, for example, —it could become not only an important trade forum for the Community but also “. . . a broader support base for the Caribbean’s FTAA strategy . . .”<sup>34</sup> The ACS could also ‘strengthen the Region’s negotiating position in regional diplomacy.’<sup>35</sup>

Apart from bringing into being the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP), the Grand Anse Declaration also appointed the West Indian Commission whose recommendations had a far-reaching effect on the future of the Community. The Commission, through the Charter of Civil Society, and the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians, sought to improve the quality of government in the Community. In addition, the Commission supported the Mills Report in seeking to improve its institutional framework.

The changes in the structure of the Community required an appropriate institutional adjustment. The framework implied in the Treaty of Chaguaramas could not contain the evolving transformations caused by the decisions and declarations of the Leaders of the Community. The Treaty, therefore, had to be revised. Nine Protocols, covering such issues as transportation, the movement of skills and capital, and covering all matters designed to make the Community forward looking and effective, were approved. A Caribbean Court of Justice was agreed upon to adjudicate differences between Member States.

## CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

By the end of the eighties, few could deny that despite its many problems, the Community had survived. One observer has claimed that that survival had come at the 'cost of stagnation'.<sup>36</sup> This must be a time-bound judgement. Surely, this judgement has to do with the economic condition of the Community. What is clear is that politically and culturally, the Community had not stagnated. Its problems were analysed and decisions taken to address them. More importantly, among the people of the Region allegiance to the integration idea had not atrophied.<sup>37</sup>

The decisions of the Leaders of the Community had led to fundamental changes in its conception and its structure, both of which assisted in the course of its survival, but there are other reasons why the Community survived. The 1980s, in retrospect, will be regarded as one of the seminal periods in human history. The major technological advances which were to sweep the world, began at this time. The age of ideological differences in the English-speaking Caribbean came to an end. The Community had a relatively benign period in which to pursue its activities. No major ideological occurrences disrupted the drive for survival during this period.

In addition to this, nations and institutions had signalled that the preference was that the Community should be dealt with as a single entity. This is true of the United States and such important bodies as the World Bank and IDB. The desire for a unified Community did not end there. Functional co-operation in the legal sphere, education and sport, contributed to the intangible but effective pillars which kept the Community upright.

However, it was not enough that the Community survived the trials and tribulations of the eighties and nineties. Greater challenges and opportunities lay ahead. With the ending of the Cold War at the end of the eighties, the bi-polar world characterised by the resonant antagonisms of the two super powers and ideological clashes in different parts of the world, came to an unexpected end. In this vacuum rushed one of the greatest economic forces known to mankind, subverting established political and social norms and compelling nations to competitiveness, bloc economic existence, and a realignment of their political and economic alliances. In those circumstances, the Caribbean Community had no option but to reach beyond the existing boundaries for its own survival.

It may be appropriate before embarking upon a description or analysis of the challenges faced by the Caribbean Community in the new century and the advantages which could redound to the Region, to make the following observation. The optimism on which the survival of CARICOM is based is not a facile or superficial one. It does not ignore the reality of the problems which the Community must mitigate or resolve: high unemployment, limited intra-regional trade, fragmentation tendencies in some territories, the

sometimes slow implementation of some important decisions, the clashing of national interests to the detriment of the higher interests of the Community, lower than expected involvement of the people of the Region in integration, low productivity, poor work habits, and the rather limited use of technology in the development of Caribbean societies. This list is not exhaustive, but it is generally accepted that there is a recognition that participation in the new dispensation will entail, if not a comprehensive, at least a fundamental re-ordering of Caribbean society, in order to resolve these problems. The Community, as evidenced in the decisions of the Heads of Government in the '80s and '90s, has taken account of the problems facing it and there is no reason why, given unity and the political will, it cannot overcome them or prevent them from being factors which inhibit development.

What is the phenomenon called Globalisation? It has variably been described; it has already given rise to considerable literature. Globalisation might mean different things to different people but at the end of the day, it represents the increased integration of production, trade and finance on a scale hitherto unknown, and is therefore having a profound effect upon the material and non-material aspects of the nations across the globe, especially those of the developing world, of which the Caribbean is a part. For current purposes, it would be interesting to see what effect it is likely to have on the Caribbean politically, economically, socially and culturally. The scope of this exercise does not permit an exhaustive look at this question; the intention is merely to highlight the principal challenges and opportunities that exist for the Caribbean Community in an age of globalisation.

Most descriptions of globalisation are in economic terms. Yet, it is also a profound political doctrine. For globalisation goes to the heart of such questions as national sovereignty, the growing disparity in wealth and power between the small developing states and the rich states of the North, and the governance of the globe.

The Deputy Prime Minister of Barbados, in an interview with the BBC, expressed her concern that in so many ways the World Trade Organisation (WTO) was replacing or had replaced the United Nations. The Deputy Prime Minister's claim might not have been exactly co-terminus with the facts; but one can appreciate her fears. The WTO, along with the IMF and the World Bank, have become a tool of global governance at the expense and detriment of the Third World countries. This development means that the Caribbean must work for the greater democratisation of this organisation and ensure, in conjunction with like-minded states, that the UN, especially the General Assembly, not only remains the 'Parliament of the Poor', but also that it is not diminished by the political behemoths, such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank.

In the context of the United Nations, the Community must also ensure that it is an active participant in the proposed restructuring of the UN

system and the Security Council. The nations likely to play a prominent role in this exercise, such as India, Nigeria and Brazil, have historically been good diplomatic allies of the Caribbean. Representatives of the Caribbean Community should work with them in order to protect the Institution's diplomatic and security interests.

As with global governance, so it is with national governance. The Community must decide where the balance of its interests lies. It is fashionable these days to say that the role of the State should be considerably reduced, but in the context of the Caribbean and certainly in relation to the small States, the State must play a significant role in the environmental, financial and human resources spheres. Poverty also will not be significantly reduced by private sector endeavours but by government policies, initiatives and programmes. To carry out these functions effectively, the States of the Caribbean Community will have to transform themselves into efficient instruments with emphasis on technical and managerial aspects.

The activities of the Community at the global level and the successful functioning of a reformed State could best be served by effective diplomacy. Ineffective diplomacy could mean a loss of prestige and salience at the global level on the part of the Community and this could feed back negatively into the States. For example, an inability to obtain profitable decisions from the international community could cause a disregard for the interests of the Community and weaken it. Caribbean diplomats, especially at the ambassadorial level, will have to be versed in the doctrine of globalisation and the fundamentals of international trade. In particular, there will have to be greater emphasis on regional representation as Regional Economic Groups assume greater importance as a result of globalisation. There will have to be effective representation in most, if not all, regional organisations.

Another political consideration of concern is the strategic importance, or lack of it, of the Caribbean Region. The conventional wisdom is that the Region has lost its salience. In the absence of such salience the Region must be prepared to use the weapon of negotiations to survive the challenges of "the vast external realm" of international affairs, but it may be legitimately asked: to whom has it lost its salience? Some contend that Asia, for example, is strategically and politically more important to the West than the Caribbean.

It must be conceded that the Western powers seemingly have no strategic interests in the Caribbean at the present time. However, there are several factors which could serve to place the Caribbean at the centre of things, and here, the Caribbean must be understood to mean the strategic entity which is greater than the English-speaking Caribbean. The Latin American and Caribbean Region figures prominently in the thinking of major Asian giants such as Japan and China. The Americans still regard this area as its "backyard". It takes no great feat of the imagination to realise that as the

Asian giants move into this region for strategic and economic reasons, there will develop a conflictual situation with Washington.

At the regional level, states such as Brazil and Venezuela are asserting their rights to a leadership position. Brazil is unmistakably a major regional player and what it does in terms of protecting its economic and strategic interests will have a bearing on the evolution of the Latin American and Caribbean region. Also, it must be noted that under the Chavez administration, Venezuela has become assertive and by its activities is challenging the notion that the Caribbean no longer has salience in strategic terms. Contrary to the wishes of Washington, the Chavez administration has formed an alliance with the Cuban government and once this lasts, it will have an important bearing on strategic developments in this hemisphere. Added to this, the Beijing/Cuba axis is assuming a form which is likely to ensure the importance of the Region in international politics.

There is one pitfall that the Community must avoid at all costs: the descent of any of its Member States into ethnic nightmares similar to those which have taken place in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There are three States in which this could possibly happen: Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname. This may be considered a harsh or extreme judgement, but even the likelihood of such a development in the Caribbean must be viewed with great seriousness. The common view is that racial tension and rivalry have been virtually absent from the last-named society; however, it is debatable whether this situation can survive the seemingly intractable economic problems which Suriname faces. Ethnic conflict in any one of these states will have a negative effect on investment and on the region as a whole as a tourist destination. The region's reputation of being racially harmonious will be tarnished beyond repair.

The question of the protection of the cultural autonomy of the Community must be one of the major challenges in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. If the standardisation of culture which is such a marked feature of the contemporary period is allowed to lay its hand on the English-speaking Caribbean to the extent that this region cannot express itself in its unique way and fashion, then one of its greatest contributions to the global civilisation would have been lost. In this article "Intellectual hegemony in the context of Globalisation"<sup>38</sup>, Branislav Gosovic makes a good case for the developing world not to accept intellectual hegemony on which globalisation is premised. That hegemony prevents smaller nations from arriving at their own solutions to the problems faced by their societies and prevents them from bringing their ideas to bear on the global political and economic system. Furthermore, even though he does not make a particular case for developing countries in the area of culture, one can see the relevance to the English-speaking Caribbean. The standardisation of culture would be harmful to the long-term interests of the Member States of the Community.

It would inhibit the free cultural expression of this Region and snuff out its artistic integrity.

Perhaps the greatest challenge to the Caribbean Community is in the area of trade negotiations. Negotiations must be conducted within the WTO to secure the interests of Members of the Community. In addition, trade treaties will have to be negotiated and implemented with the European Union, Canada and the United States of America. In other words, CARICOM will have to adjust to operating in a globalised environment characterised by trade liberalisation.

Reference has been made to some of the challenges likely to face the Community at this period. Some attempt will now be made to deal with the opportunities that globalisation offers. There are a number of areas in which globalisation should be of benefit to the Caribbean Community.

The Caribbean region is generally known for its adherence to democratic ideas and practices. Democracy is the watchword today; in some senses, it is politically averse to the economic doctrines which underpin the globalisation process. If the Caribbean region can refine and improve on its democratic systems, then there is no reason why it cannot become a haven for investment and a major factor in the global dialogue on the principles and purposes of the democratic tradition. This is one area in which the Caribbean can play a leading role and be heard with authority and respect.

In the Region's favour too, is the fact that an important element in the globalisation process is the emphasis on the quality of human resources. For the longest while, the Region has demonstrated beyond peradventure that the quality of its human resources is as good as any in other parts of the world. If the Region can, as it must, marry its quality human resources with the major trends in technology, then, here again too, it can benefit substantially from current developments.

Services will also be important to the Caribbean. It has been noted by many analysts that services are a major growing point in the global economy. Services require quality human resources. As has been noted previously, the Caribbean Community is blessed in this regard. It takes no leap of the imagination to predict that if the Region can take full advantage of the services offered by the service sector on a global scale, then a period of growth and expansion can be ushered in.

The Caribbean Community must also utilise its expertise and those experts who occupy major positions in the international organisations whose activities and decisions are likely to affect its progress and development. Such experts can be guardians of the cause of the Region and ensure that whatever decisions are taken at the global level are to its advantage. The foregoing leads inevitably to the question of using the highly qualified members of the West Indian community who literally dot the globe, to lobby on behalf of the Region when important matters affecting it are placed before particular

international organisations and governments. It might be appropriate here to particularise. Let us say, for example, that the United States Government is about to pass major legislation, which might have a deleterious effect on the interests of the Community. In such a situation, it would be the better part of wisdom for the Governments of the Community to join forces with West Indians of expertise in the United States to lobby and seek to block such legislation to ensure that its re-drafting or re-ordering is consistent with the interests of the Community.

The Caribbean Community has gone through a period of transformation. It has changed itself from an inward-looking institution to one that is increasingly linked to other nations, institutions and organisations, to create the required space for it to grow and develop. By its linkages with such regional organisations as the ACS, it has been able to create the conditions for expansion and growth. This outward expansion of the Community is consistent with the requirements for globalisation. The Community can be said to be on its way. It has been tempered by the challenges and difficulties of its early existence. It has been tested in every crucible of experience. The Community can utilise this experience and the lessons learnt from finding its way in a previously difficult environment to succeed in the current dispensation.

## ENDNOTES

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2. Christophe Müllerleile: *CARICOM Integration Progress and Hurdles: A European View*, p. 21.
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7. Anthony Payne: *The Rise and Fall of Caribbean Integration*, p. 287.
8. Anthony Payne: *ibid.*
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12. Anthony T. Bryan and Roget V. Bryan: *The New Face of Regionalism in the Caribbean: The Western Hemisphere Dynamic*.
13. Owen Arthur: *The Future of the Caribbean Community and Common Market: Third Caribbean Media Conference* p. 16.

14. Anthony T. Bryan and Roget V. Bryan: *The New Face of Regionalism in the Caribbean: The Western Hemisphere Dynamic*, p. 6.
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27. *Nassau Understanding*: p. 3.
28. *Report of the Group of Experts*: p. 3.
29. *Report of the Group of Experts*: p. 7.
30. Christophe M llerleile: p. 73 *Declaration of Grand Anse*: p 2.
31. *Declaration of Grand Anse*: p. 2.
32. Anthony T. Bryan and Roget V. Bryan: *The New Face of Regionalism in the Caribbean: The Western Hemisphere Dynamic*: p. 10.
33. Bryan: *ibid*.
34. Bryan: *ibid* p. 12.
35. Bryan: *ibid* p. 13.
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37. *Report of the West Indian Commission*: p. 519.
38. *Globalisation: A Calculus of Inequality*: Ed. by Denis Benn and Kenneth Hall.

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
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## MANAGING MATURE REGIONALISM: CARICOM in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century



### INTRODUCTION

FROM ITS INCEPTION, *THE INTEGRATIONIST* PUBLICATIONS HAVE SOUGHT to invite regional scholarship, rigorous research and to draw upon the inestimable depth of writings of the region's intellectuals, academics and technical experts on various development perspectives, policy options, analyses and recommendations relative to the Caribbean Community's integration process and its overall development agenda. In so doing, *The Integrationist* offers a rich resource and reference point for Caribbean leaders, policymakers and, ultimately, the regional citizenry on integration, on unique problems faced by the region, on

current realities and solutions or options from which the region may choose on its path to development.

*"The Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival"*, edited by Prof. Kenneth Hall, *"Understanding International Trade: A CARICOM Perspective"* by Ambassador Edwin Laurent and *"The Race for Fisheries and Hydrocarbons in the Caribbean Basin: The Barbados-Trinidad and Tobago Dispute, Regional Delimitation Implications"*, by Dr. Clifford Griffin, are but a few examples of the substantive publications constituting the project's contribution, response and proposed solutions to the fundamental issues confronting the region. Each publication focuses either on a single topic or on a significant theme

of specific interest and concern to the regional integration movement, as for example, the 2008 published work on *Functional Cooperation*.

This issue in the series continues this well-established tradition. The articles are written by persons who are passionate about the Community's success at what a Technical Working Group on Governance (appointed in 2005 by the CARICOM Heads of Government) has described as "managing mature regionalism". The focus is on such diverse areas as the contribution of the CXC to regional integration; human settlements and their relationship to community viability; a role for the Private Sector in the development of the Caribbean Community; human resource development in the region; and the integrative role of the Fisheries Sector.

The reader is asked however, not to view these articles simply as individual outpourings in support of a more mature regionalism. Instead, the articles, as with the others in *The Integrationist* series, should be measured within the context of the social, economic and political developments within the region today and the dominant forces that are impacting and at times impeding progress towards regional integration. Among these latter are the many constraints such as the worsening state of outward migration which results in the considerable depletion of the stock of regional talent and skills available to the region, notwithstanding the enriching effects which accrue through the Diaspora's outreach. This issue of *The Integrationist* takes the opportunity to draw specific attention to this particular phenomenon.

No clearer acknowledgement of the currency of these constraints and the need to remove them can be found than in the statements made by our Heads of Government at their July 2008 Summit in Antigua and Barbuda, when, the incoming Chairman and Conference Host, the Hon. Baldwin Spencer made a forceful and impassioned plea for the revitalization of the Caribbean Community and for deepening and strengthening the integration process. In so doing, he readily acknowledged the many constraints to integration and their impact on the region at large. Among those cited were the state of West Indies cricket; the rise in energy costs and the imperative to search for alternative energy solutions; the devastation presaged by climate change; rising food prices and the need for food security; insecurities within the regional tourism process; the impact of drug use and abuse; and the ravages of obesity, hypertension, diabetes and HIV/AIDS. In respect of all of the foregoing there was a call for re-energizing the integration process through a commitment to action.

It must be readily acknowledged that there are many of our citizens who still harbour concerns about the state of the regional integration process today, the advent of the CSME notwithstanding. This is to be expected during the current global revolutionary process that is taking citizens out of the comfort zone of their traditional and historical patterns of economic and socio-political development, a comfort zone that is being seriously eroded on

an almost daily basis by a globalization process that demands both seemingly radical change and urgent remedial action.

It is in the context of this development that Heads of Government have been meeting over the years and more recently, with unprecedented but welcome regularity and urgency to discuss such crisis-oriented issues as Climate Change, Security, Energy and Rising Food Prices. At their Special Meeting in Guyana in December 2007, to discuss Poverty and the Rising Cost of Living in Member States with a view to “finding solutions, at both the national and regional levels, to the critical issue of poverty and the rising cost of living”, for example, they took note of the several factors which were negatively impacting the issue, many of which were outside the control of the Community. The factors include: “persistently high and rising prices in the global economy that are in turn fuelled by unprecedented high and rising oil prices; climate change which disrupted food supplies from the main producer countries that have suffered droughts and other natural disasters; increasing demand by some emerging economies as a result of massive urbanization and industrialization; the shift in agricultural production from food to bio-fuels; increased cost in ocean freight resulting from high oil prices; and more recently, the sharp depreciation of the US dollar”.

Just a few months earlier, in September 2007, CARICOM Heads of Government met in a Special Session to address the issue of Chronic Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) which was accounting for, among other detrimental factors, over 50% of the deaths in “the poorer countries which carried a double burden of disease”. This response by the Heads underscores a number of important considerations that are relevant to the regional integration process. In the Nassau Declaration of 2001, there was the clear recognition that the health of the region was the wealth of the region and that both national and regional policies should be guided by this principle. It was, in fact, the formalization of an ongoing process within the Community’s health sectors. The September Summit, however, in the face of rapidly changing global developments and their regional repercussions, significantly raised the level of focus and attention which should be placed on the imperative to stop the spread of NCDs. The demand for radical solutions and urgent remedial action went beyond the traditional call for increased national attention and was virtually elevated to the level of a collective regional responsibility. Within this, was the significant and welcome development which recognized and fully accepted that the integration process, in respect of addressing the issue of NCDs as with other issues of a regional nature, would be even better served when undertaken within the context of regional public/private partnership programmes.

These Special Summits are not therefore ad hoc responses to emerging crises. They are made necessary by the rapid changes that are taking place within the international environment and which, fuelled by the swiftness

of information and technology changes and their effects on global action and interaction, have created the imperative for equally swift and timely responses. The challenges which all this poses are:

- how to implement the various courses of action that are demanded in response to the impact of these distinct revolutionary changes; and
- how to effect, not only swift remedial responses, but also how to implement courses of action that will serve to strengthen and advance the regional integration process. The conclusions of the 13<sup>th</sup> Special Meeting of CARICOM Heads of Government, which was held in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2008, have provided us with some answers.

Special attention was focused on a number of significant issues requiring regional responses, including the issue of Governance particularly with respect to decision making; operationalization of the CARICOM Development Fund; the issue of Crime and Security, and how to build on the legacy of Cricket World Cup from the perspective of enhancing Regional Security; regional coordination with respect to the issue of Drug Trafficking; the issue of Deportees and its impact on national regional development; and review and rationalization of Regional Institutions and Organizations. The significance of all this, and it bears repetition, is that even as the regional integration process is being buffeted by the external winds of change, efforts are being concentrated on strengthening the process to withstand these pressures. Making the Community stronger and more viable, improving its structures at all levels and creating an environment for not only citizens' participation but also their better appreciation of the imperative for regional integration, represent the necessary actions for re-energising the integration process.

In "A Time for Action", the West Indian Commission dilated considerably on the various practical and possible measures to be undertaken that would serve to create such a Community. The Commission's analysis and recommendations were based not only on reasoned intellectual hypotheses but also on very sound considerations as reflected in the voices of the people of the Community whose views, opinions, hopes and aspirations were freely expressed to the Commission in their quest for real and sustainable answers.

Reference was made earlier to the "Diaspora's outreach" as a significant contributor to a more cohesive regionalism and the role which the Caribbean Diaspora can play in deepening and strengthening the process of regional integration. It was in June 2007 that a major milestone was recorded in the history of the Caribbean Community in its measured progress towards a state of genuine integration. There was held, in various cities of the United States,

a coming together of CARICOM nationals and descendants of nationals in a collective effort at making a definitive and sustainable contribution towards the integration of the Caribbean Community. Broadly described as the “Conference on the Caribbean A 20/20 Vision”, the region’s Diaspora produced, through a consultative process lasting several months, a series of thought-provoking ideas and recommendations that integrally involved them through various contributions other than, or in addition to, the system of remittances which continues to make such a significant contribution to the region’s several poverty amelioration programmes.

A CIDA study, commissioned in 2007, has recorded that the Caribbean Community has the highest per capita rate of emigration in the world. Many of these migrants are well educated. Indeed, the study notes that an average 73% of college/university graduates have left the region since the sixties and that these figures are even higher in respect of Guyana, Jamaica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These persons comprise the Diaspora in addition to the hordes of skilled and semi-skilled workers who also have left the region in search of a better life elsewhere. No developing country or region can sustain such losses and still maintain a strong foundation for its development. More to the point, no developing country or region can successfully meet the challenges of development unless it seriously addresses the relationship of its Diaspora to its development process.

Much has been said about the value of remittances from the Diaspora to a country’s development. This is not the place to dilate on the arguments for and against this, other than to concede that these cross-border economic transfers contribute significantly to the survival and welfare of the recipients in their home states. The jury is still out however, on whether remittances make any significant contribution to the national/ regional development process, particularly when viewed in the context of the social and economic impact of the ‘brain drain’ on that very development process. Dr. Laura Ritchie Dawson, in her penetrating analysis of this issue, entitled “Brain Drain, Brain Circulation, Remittances and Development: Prospects for the Caribbean”, notes that, “the emigration experiences of China, India, Mexico, Armenia, the Philippines and elsewhere tell a compelling story of how migration can contribute to development for some countries, but produce little in the way of sustainable development for others”.

In treating the Diaspora as an essential element of development—and this was the fundamental premise of the “Conference on the Caribbean A 20/20 Vision” one needs to go much beyond the value of remittances and recognize the Diaspora as a community itself with a clear and positive umbilical linkage to the Caribbean Community. Dr. Kenrick Hunte, in his article entitled: “US/CARICOM: Building Partnerships and Expanding ‘Outreach’”, calls for a more systematic involvement of the Diaspora and recommends the creation of a Caribbean Diaspora Foundation that would be

responsible for implementing a number of recommendations agreed upon, involving skills and talents of the Diaspora.

Dr. Hunte may be correct in calling for a more centralized and focused approach to the deepening of the existing Community/Diaspora relationship. For decades, individual Community States have been implementing quite successfully, programmes with their Diaspora that go beyond the issue of remittances. There is, therefore, some good foundation in Hunte's call to regionalize the effort. It is a call, in fact, which is shared by the Community, as reflected in the recommendations which the CARICOM Secretariat put forward for consideration at the 11<sup>th</sup> COFCOR Meeting in April 2008. In an Agenda item called "Outreach of the Caribbean Diaspora", the CARICOM Secretariat set out a number of recommendations, the more significant of which were as follows:

- Examination of national Diaspora outreach programmes already being implemented by CARICOM Member States with a view to deriving best practices that could inform a CARICOM Diaspora Outreach Programme. This would enhance and expand, rather than compete with national programmes;
- Designation of a Head of Government within the Quasi Cabinet of the Conference of Heads of Government with dedicated responsibility for Diaspora Affairs. This would signal the seriousness and visible political commitment of CARICOM's outreach to its Diaspora;
- Encouraging the disparate Caribbean national diasporic communities to integrate amongst themselves and relate to CARICOM in a structured manner, through the establishment of criteria for accreditation to regional consultative bodies such as the proposed Council for Civil Society;
- As an initial step, focus should be on one or two Diaspora categories, such as youth and/or students. This will allow for integration and contact with existing programmes, such as the CARICOM Youth Ambassadors Programme.
- The inaugural programme launched should have some direct relationship to the implementation of the CSME; and
- Given the outreach to the Caribbean Diaspora by the Conferences on the Caribbean in the United States in 2007 and 2008, there is need for similar Conferences to be held in Canada and in Europe.

In the continuing thrust for a cohesive Caribbean Community, no area has remained unexplored. In addressing the various challenges and in taking advantage of the many opportunities therein created, the Leaders of the Caribbean Community have recognized as well the need to build

partnerships in order to do so effectively—partnerships which include: transferred sovereignty from national governments in addressing some issues; arrangements with the region's private sector and private-sector organizations; the Community's Diaspora; the region's institutions of higher learning; and the informed inputs of such Community institutions as the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians and the NGO's that can give life and meaning to the Charter of Civil Society.

*The Integrationist*, as its track record clearly demonstrates, remains a leader in communicating the virtues, values and, indeed, the absolute imperative for deepening the regional integration process as a contributing factor to the amelioration of our citizen's lives and livelihood. It is a lead which is expected that other communication agencies will follow by integrating within their strategic objectives a commitment as well to regional integration. In "A Time for Action", the people were clear about what they wanted: to be informed, to be educated and to be made to feel a part of a process that is so important to their daily existence. This surely must be the real challenge to the success of the Community's integrated development.

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
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25.

## LLOYD BEST ON CARIBBEAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION



### INTRODUCTION

ASSEMBLING A SELECTION OF THE ESSAYS, OR THE “working notes” of Lloyd Best, the outstanding Caribbean citizen of ideas, leads into a maze of theories, assumptions, interpretations and deductions at varying stages of distillation. These essays/working notes discuss almost every pertinent aspect of Caribbean society. This selection, however, treats with two issues which were dear to him: the development of the Caribbean which he revered as a civilization and its associated ideal of integration. Best was, at best, a visionary, perceptive

and calculatedly provocative. A gregarious scholar, tending effortlessly into the diagnostic, his reasonings appear to be in constant evolution becoming more refined from the wealth of exchanges and analyses he encouraged. Many a time he would seek to test his theories; as he proceeded, he would adjust his emphasis without departing from the core of the matter. Fairly receptive and attentive to the uncluttered mind, that is, the view that is not uncritically aligned with an external source, he brooked no tolerance with transplanted ideas or theories from other climes, standard clichés or categorizations, whatever their eminence.

He can be graceful while summarily rejecting the acclaimed life-work of the best of the region. He stood his ground, generally, upon the pre-requisite

to plumb the depths of the region's history and culture for solutions to the region's development, distilling in the process the rich lessons of five centuries of existence. For, it is the Caribbean region that would remain seminal to his lifelong search to secure its viability and personality. The Caribbean, perhaps his Caribbean, constituted the transported souls of three continents fixed into the submissive plantation economy whose substance was an "off-shore" relationship that was externally driven for metropolitan ends. To change the structure fundamentally during the period of political independence meant comprehending its history and the persuasive influences.

Any tincture of foreign influence or intellectual dependency on externally induced models became an irritant. Whether he ever found the synthesis that accorded adequate or predominant recognition to indigenous factors and autonomous decision-making in company with foreign technological advances remains an intriguing issue. Suffice it to state that his concerns about the reliance on imperial preferences as a significant factor of trade policy would be harmful eventually to attaining a diversified and competitive productive capacity if it were not without merit.

His abiding interest in the development of the Caribbean region led to his strong obsession with the contributions of other giants, or sherpas as he would say, who pursued a similar goal. These scholars were in the forefront of his commendations and censures, particularly Dr. Eric Williams and Professor Arthur Lewis. Somewhat less devastating and with some primary respect he dealt with C.L.R. James, who shared the common birth town of Tunapuna and, still within another tier, his former teacher and later colleague, William Demas.

So germane and expansive were the positions advanced by Best that they have inspired, perhaps provoked, intense consideration and differing judgments, much of it being appreciative or respectful. They continue to provide material for anthologies. As could be expected, there were times when Best stood alone in his diagnoses as colleagues went their separate ways; but that did not seem to trouble him too much for he enjoyed swimming against the stream. He could be cordial and opaque, irreverent and incisive in his summations. But it was his unerring pursuit for models best suited for the comprehensive development of a Caribbean region embarking on an independent political path that stands out in his essays. Setbacks and criticisms only stimulated his search for fresh ideas; loneliness enriched his reflection; for he was driven by his underlying faith in the genius of the Caribbean people.

His was an expansive charter of the geographical Caribbean. His vision and projections for the people would not be restricted by any imperial division that might have been indifferent to the cultural foundations of the region. He would impose his convictions upon its landscape so intensely that

one may hazard the thought that without the Caribbean Best would not wish to exist.

He did not try to reconstruct the region from its disadvantaged and subservient base; what he wished was to exhort the region, rather his Caribbean civilization, to penetrate far into its cultural vitality and to project its unique identity. In the meanwhile, he left an illuminating body of essays, papers, reviews for his successors to ponder and to elaborate. He argued so fervently about the region that there is a sense of some proprietary bond and discomfort over its erring moments. Even during the darkest hours, say, reviewing the collapse of the Federation of the West Indies in May 1962, while his rebukes were strong, his assurance about the future of the region was undiminished and his optimism remained untarnished.

First, Best delimited the Caribbean region as constituting Plantation, or Afro-Saxon, America. Afro-Saxon culture, a term he used variously and not generally in a pejorative sense, described the tradition, habits and attitudes of the Africans who were transported to America and were obliged to exist within the European institutions they found and developed in America. The culture is characteristic of Caribbean America as it is the only place outside of Africa where Africans have political responsibility.

Caribbean America thus becomes the geographical homeland of African civilization in America where, in Best's summation, tradition, culture and history has bequeathed a unique identity. It is this history that distinguishes the largely black West Indies from the African peoples in the United States or Brazil and unfolds in the establishment of the plantation economic system; developed by Best and his colleague Kari Levitt. This large African mass who came before and after slavery, existed within a cosmopolitan society comprising Indians, who were Hindus, Muslims or Presbyterians who came from both northern and southern India, Calcutta and central India; Portuguese from Madeira and Portugal, Chinese and Europeans, and in some parts of the West Indies the indigenous Indians who preceded all the settlers.

In his celebrated paper, *Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom*, first published in the *New World Quarterly* in 1971, Best offered a more precise sketch of the Caribbean (Plantation America) on canvas, much larger than that existing in the colonial mind. He was not the first to delineate the Caribbean region so extensively. It constituted the Greater and Lesser Antilles without exception, including Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, the French Departments of Martinique and Guadeloupe, Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles along with the Guyanas and Belize. These formed the heartland of the system.

To this heartland, Best included the littorals so to establish "links of privilege" between the core group and Louisiana, Vera Cruz (Mexico), north-east Brazil and pockets of Venezuela; along with the Caribbean littorals of

Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, and the Central American states of Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras.

From the beginning of their occupation and settlement, this archipelago of islands, or city states, as Best loved to describe them, and mainland states bred insularity, fragmentation and separateness that became a distinctive feature limiting collective regional action. Populated from different continents and spread over this expanse of sea and land, held by rival European powers, contributed largely to the shaping of this disconnection. Yet, Best found some virtue in this composition. Most important, is that it revealed other options in facilitating that West Indian genius is dealing with differences and existence, side by side, amidst the cultural diversities.

This strong island identification would still generate attempts to forge together a collection by means of politics though at the same time avoiding the rigidities of formal unity and constitutional integration. Moreover, this inherent tendency to fragment had to contend with the legacy of "illegitimacy" and the "politics of autocracy" handed down from the colonial era. Best finds that neither the successive transfers of responsibility following the recommendations of Major E.F.L. Wood (1922), or Lord Moyne (1939) had successfully anchored legitimacy in the political community.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the political community has to be understood from the standpoint of the two contending blocs, on the one hand, the culture of autocracy and illegitimacy and, on the other, the fissiparous disposition of a new migrant society, segmented by race, colour, class, religion and island of origin.

Accordingly, with his native Trinidad and Tobago in mind, Best would conclude that by the time of the transfer of power at Marlborough House in 1962, legitimacy was less the product of constitutional or even political arrangements, but more the property of "doctor politics" and maximum leadership in the communities. This result applied easily to the region in the programmes designed at the top for integration and handed down to the people of the region.

Therefore, any reconstruction of the region, Best submitted, has to begin with a proper exploration of "the career" of the Caribbean: of the way the present was shaped by the past. This career would examine the historical, social, cultural and economic factors that have shaped the region's economy. The economic structures inherited by the region had their roots in the plantation system and predated the society informing its mores. Three phases were identified: the first existing in the slave plantations up to 1838 at the abolition of slavery in the British West Indies; the second is described as the period of plantation economy consisting of sugar and free labour with some domestic agriculture, from 1838 up to the time of the Great Depression (1930's); and the third phase existing during the post-World War II period in the plantation economy further modified and based on organized labour and industrialization with new staples like minerals.

In its general form, Best perceived this Caribbean economy as an overseas economy; one that did not emerge from the free activities of its people. It was a "hinterland of exploitation" created to be externally driven and was a direct extension of the economy of the metropole, its main source of capital, technology and, critically, the centre for decision-making. Its main purpose was to produce a staple for metropolitan consumption and to serve as an entrepôt for trade with third world countries.

Transformation of this economy required significant structural adjustment. Best saw no reason for alarm since, commencing from the mid-seventeenth century, the economy had had to contend with a succession of structural adjustments. There had been the period of the golden age of sugar which saw significant benefits but increased labour costs and soil exhaustion interrupted this trend. Then, from the end of the eighteenth century with the imposition of the blockade of markets during the Napoleonic Wars, there followed the series of disruptions/dislocation that included the emergence of formidable competitors in the beet sugar producers in Europe and the cane sugar producers in the East Indies; the abolition of the slave trade followed by the emancipation of the slaves; the removal of the sugar duties; the reintroduction of imperial preference; the disruption of shipping due to the two European Wars of the twentieth century; and currently, the reorganization of the European market through the Lome Convention.

As a result, the contemporary challenge to the region's viability is already two centuries old. This led Best to suggest that, once sugar had ceased to be a ready and reliable source of employment, for export earnings, for national income and government revenue, the old "off-shore" and externally propelled West Indian economy was challenged to diversify and structurally transform itself. In effect, this meant that the economy was required to create an "inshore" residentiary sector capable of generating its own entrepreneurship. Critically, this required a major shift in locating the decision-making process within the region. This movement from off-shore to in-shore began to take place by the mid-twentieth century and it would eventually place the decision-making process within the region.<sup>2</sup>

Best would return often in his writings to this aspect of the sovereignty of the machinery for making decisions. He was firm on this attribute. Sovereignty, he stated, began as an act of selection and never more than in the global market has selection been so much the issue.<sup>3</sup>

While the sectors were undergoing the modification, particularly during the twentieth century up to the 1930's, adjustment and adaptation of the economy turned on encouraging the growth of an agricultural sector and the cultivation of a variety of new staple crops or cash crops. At the same time, the old staple sugar continued to be supported by imperial preference in the form of sheltered export markets in the metropole after this protection had

been reduced during the second half of the nineteenth century, following the equalization of sugar duties from 1846–1852.

Best finds that no real attempt to establish a manufacturing sector and improve the technical level of the agricultural sector was undertaken until the second half of the twentieth century. This was precipitated in the wake of outbreaks of labour disruption across the region, the high levels of poverty and unemployment, and eventually the resolute repudiation of the old post-Emancipation order. It was out of these upheavals in the society that the programme for economic transformation, industrial development and, critically, the integration of the region would emerge.

The design for this principal adjustment was a paper by Professor Arthur Lewis on the Industrialization of the British West Indies that was published by the Caribbean Commission. That paper, however, was first submitted in 1939 to the Moyne Commission which was appointed by the British Government to inquire into the regional upheavals of the late 1930's which, as noted, had themselves prompted the reappraisal.

Lewis submitted a proposal for industrialisation of the region based on the strategy for economic development, not dissimilar to the Puerto Rican experience in which foreign investment was assigned a major role. Best has accepted that the ideas for economic transformation and industrial development could hardly have been better formulated than by Arthur Lewis. The only problem, in Best's assessment, was that Arthur Lewis had adopted the classical premise of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, prominent English economists of the time.

Best's general reaction to Lewis, and to others, evolved from his general thesis that the Caribbean islands were sufficiently distinct and special to have their own different type of analysis in which the attributes of the Caribbean featured prominently. Later, in 1968, Best developed his counter proposal to the ideas of Lewis based upon his theory of the plantation economy. He was not the first economist to announce this theory and in 1975 he got further corroboration from Kari Levitt.

Lewis had assumed that manufacturing and agriculture would provide each other with sufficient dynamic and be mutually supportive, despite his awareness that agriculture had reached the limits of profitability and would encounter much difficulty in further expansion. Moreover, since the population of the islands was expanding, some other base, particularly manufacturing, needed to be developed to create more employment to absorb the additional labour and the agricultural output. He gave the lead role to the new manufacturing sector being fully alert to the implications of establishing this new base and the general problems of securing markets for the manufactured products. The small size of the Caribbean market would surely present problems in this quarter and Lewis therefore looked in

the direction of the metropole, the United Kingdom, the United States and neighbouring Latin America.

Furthermore, he sought the intervention of West Indian governments to organize energetically the associated markets rather than merely to rely upon market forces but he found that the governments were not prepared to end their policy of *laissez faire*. Best considered this reaction by governments as the principal obstacle to the industrialization policy.<sup>4</sup>

Best was not attracted to the Lewisian structure. He determined that the agricultural sector, both residentiary in shore and staple off-shore, was unable to generate any internal dynamic for the creation of employment. Lewis, he deemed, had failed to uncover, what Best described as, the central Caribbean contradiction between the dynamics of plantation structures and the pre-conditions required for a residentiary take-off for transformation. Further, Lewis's model of industrialization did not treat with the pathologies that lay at the root of the prior failure to diversify and transform since the end of the eighteenth century, at the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars.<sup>5</sup>

Best would conclude that Lewis never really developed an organic Caribbean model that was firmly anchored in the specific history of the region; that is, one that contended with the ramifications of the plantation society. His model of industrialization relied heavily on unlimited supplies of labour while the politics of economic policy of the region were missing; even if the claims that the governments of the region never implemented Lewis's economic prescriptions were accepted.<sup>6</sup>

In a later strident, though refined summary, Best proffered that:

"The tradition of change through the rise of new sectors rather than the transformation of existing ones will in time infect the residentiary sector which matures and, in its turn, loses its dynamic for expansion and for transformation. Industrialization is tacked on by invitation from outside and the process of frustrated mutation repeats itself in the end. The culture is so powerful that the original features of the plantation survive to inhibit the impulse to change even when the adjustments are meant to be structural."<sup>7</sup>

In his series of essays on *Models of Plantation Economy: Origins and Extrapolations* published in September and December 1994, Best had outlined some thoughts about discerning the whole system and its pre-history.<sup>8</sup> To convert the old agricultural civilization into an industrial one:

"We needed to discern the institutional fit being offered by the investing firms; we needed to perceive the link between the business, the economic and the political aspects . . . Was it material that the projection at the time also anticipated a customs Union? The real issue is whether we saw not only the economics but the politics of what would emerge as CARIFTA and then as

CARICOM and to what effect? To what extent has the competition for external investment itself been responsible for the failure at integration?

We should have asked the question before—not after, and we would have asked it had we been armed with any minimum sense of institutional history?”

Best and Levitt felt that the economies of the Caribbean area were only marginally transformed in the post-emancipation era. The islands acquired a few external linkages because of the metropole-hinterland relationship. Fundamental issues remained; foremost was the division of the roles between capital and labour and the corresponding shares of income and product which asked the question about the nature of the economy and society in the Caribbean civilization. When this situation is reached, the issue to be resolved can only be the ownership of the landscape.<sup>9</sup> Best therefore advocated that to ensure the development of the Caribbean region, the islands needed to take over the commanding heights of their economy and regain control over their main resource, new staple or quasi staple.<sup>10</sup>

Lewis's proposals were attractive in the region during the post-World War II period though the results have been regarded as being mixed. Best devoted much attention to his home state of Trinidad and Tobago where both strategies; those outlined by Lewis and those countered by Best, were pursued at different times and in different degrees, with the development of hydrocarbons playing a pivotal role in the expansion of the economy. Although Best's model was not enthusiastically embraced by the governments of the region, his strong emphasis on appreciating the colonial legacies seemed to have had a salutary effect on the official approach to inviting involvement of foreign private investment particularly in Trinidad and Tobago.<sup>11</sup>

The integration of the Caribbean region, especially the English-speaking units, would come intuitively to Best. Integration has been the primary objective to the development of the region ever since the debate about self-government commenced. Indeed, it has dominated Caribbean intellectual activity. At times, the ideal may have been exploited as a rite of passage becoming the politically correct end to advocate. The goal of integration had even preceded the movement for national independence with which it competed for recognition as a preferred model. Closer union among the West Indian islands was promoted early in the short-lived association of the Caribbean League formed by our West Indian soldiers on the battlefield during the first European war, 1914–1918. Volunteering to fight for King and Country, their frustrations drifted to consolidation as they experienced a variety of discrimination in the subordinate role assigned to them by the imperial War Office to the extent of being allocated unheated and sub-standard quarters in contrast to those provided for German prisoners of war.<sup>12</sup>

The early considerations of federation did not embrace the whole region of English, Spanish, French and Dutch speakers. The founding fathers understood the bond of shared history and the common legacy of institutions. The idea of integration meant more than the establishment of a single market and economy, as pragmatic as this objective is to modern thinking. To some, regional integration should also reinforce the strong sense of kinship and cultural affinity that exists among the peoples dispersed across the Caribbean. Contact between the islands and the metropole was easier to achieve and more regular in circumstance than inter-island communication. To a minority that included Best, the end of integration must lead to a unitary state that embraced all the workings and trimmings of union, that would combine socio-cultural and economic factors to the identified disadvantages of size, improve national security and contain the adverse effects of political instability and insular parochialism.

It may not have been ironic that it was from the metropole, the source of earlier proposals that the decision was made to integrate the space encompassing the entire British West Indies. In the context of post war ethos, it seemed like an expedient decision for the colonial administration to take. It was inspired less by any altruistic recognition of fitness to rule than by preparing the ground for decolonization and withdrawal.

The motive being the progression as a self-governing Dominion would have provided the English-speaking West Indies with the integral unit it has never been able to construct. Best was quite troubled by the deprivation of this integrated space and the loss of the status of a self-governing Dominion within the British Commonwealth following the collapse of the Federation of the West Indies in May 1962. As Best noted, the political leaders began to suspect that independence could be achieved at the island level without the device of a single integrated Dominion. The federal idea had found strong competition during a time of spirited nationalism and the attractions of national sovereignty in an enlarging world of small states. The collapse of the Federation is still being considered by a number of contemporary commentators as a failure of West Indian nationalism and a triumph of the particularism of individual territories. In this way, political independence of the territories followed and the initial objective of regional compactness and solidarity was, as Best noted, torpedoed at the inception.

Lewis would make a valiant effort to salvage the federal ideal after the collapse. With the support of Sir Grantley Adams, the Prime Minister of the West Indies Federation, and the knowledge of Dr Eric Williams, he visited Barbados, the Windwards and Leewards islands and reported that the Eastern Caribbean Governments wished to continue the Federation with each other and with Trinidad and Tobago. If this were not possible, the units would try under the leadership of Barbados. Lewis did not get very far. In Trinidad and Tobago, the new attempt was rejected first by the Cabinet, then

by the People's National Movement (PNM) and finally at a Convention of the PNM on January 27–28, 1962. The little Eight was never realized and the Federation was officially dissolved.<sup>13</sup>

How to respond to this experience of disintegration, and the underlying hazards of insularity, would constitute the efforts of the succeeding generation of statesmen and technocrats. How to hold and glue the region together, to make it viable. Best was dismayed that there was no cogent programme or analysis of the West Indian temper to gauge collective action and to fill the breach of the dissolution of the Federation. It was out of this void that Lewis had advanced what Best considered as well formulated ideas for economic transformation and industrial development. Alas, the Lewis vision of a West Indian Federation and Customs Union, integrated space for industrial development, quite valid when proposed, was overtaken by the break-up and subsequent independence that was attained not as one state but as individual islands.<sup>14</sup> His dream of a single market and economy would be slow to materialize and its realization would tax contemporary endeavours. On the way would be established, in succession, CARIFTA in 1968, CARICOM in 1973, leading to the design in 1989 for the CSME.

William Demas was foremost with ideas for integration. Best, somewhat belittling, strikes down these ideas as Demas's "well-meaning wish list". Best finds these ideas too inspired by European models and dictated by the escalating demands of the globalized movement. With little sense of practical ways and means, Best argues that the ideas address at varying times notions of integration of industries, industrial programming, shared currency and order sequences from a free trade area to a single-market and economy. Proceeding in this manner can only be viewed as a holding operation until such time as a frank and informed discussion of West Indian innocence was conducted. Any movement toward an integrated whole has to resolve critical issues of ethnic mobilization, perhaps, the single most important primal urge of the civilization and the situation of island homeland factor being the most important basis of ethnic solidarity.<sup>15</sup>

In a speech during Caribbean Reasonings which Best delivered at the University of the West Indies, Mona campus, he further emphasized his historic theme that the integration of the region has to be promoted, nurtured and made to happen. It has to be driven by a vision powerful enough to withstand repeated diversions. It should also be buttressed by a history that recognizes and explains fully the region's brief existence of five centuries. This explanation will show how its transported population who brought a wealth of ancestral assets, was compelled to use them sparingly and had to build a new society and civilization out of its own creative imagination made up of a number of peoples of different cultures introduced under brutally proletarian conditions.

It is this diversity that had bred over the centuries a “kinship” and cultural identity of the Caribbean people that must first be recognized and then explored and further solidified. Best was not alone in discerning this imperative and strongly held that the people of the region deserved this validation and nothing less. Havelock Brewster, in his proposal for a West Indian Commonwealth, has also alerted to this quality and meaning of kinship.

More so, at a time of a global trend toward racial, cultural identity and solidarity, the West Indies needed to forge close on the basis of kinship and cultural identity. Sadly, Best advanced, the region has never come close to articulating such a vision and has arrived at the responsibilities of the present without the necessary seasoning of the past. Effective integration requires a fresh interpretation by a radical reorientation of the theoretical and empirical work. Thus, the future of the region cannot be created on the basis of economics alone; the new interpretation needs to assess the social, political and cultural realities equally along with a systematic approach to science and technology. Best would return often to this argument about the politics of the region.

He would therefore implore that the central issue was political reform for without such reform there could be no economic reconstruction. This, he maintained, was evident since the 1940's and, particularly, from the time of the Integration Studies at Mona, Jamaica in 1966–1968. No attention was given to this aspect of reform. There are currently fifteen jurisdictions, instead of one. Implementation of decisions was feasible only if the prior problem of democratic participation within single Member States had been effectively addressed, making it possible for Heads to get things done on a basis other than their own “political will”.

Exhaustive attention has scarcely been given to the modalities of implementation and therefore to the political, social, cultural and international context. What was decisive was whether an ethos of integration was being bred by the work of collaboration and by the contribution it could make to the building of a West Indian party with active political centres in all the territories.<sup>16</sup> The great flaw in the Report of the West Indian Commission was its timidity in dealing with this issue of implementation. The Report, which Best finds to be excellent on most other counts, studiously by-passes the central and intractable matter of political legitimacy and authoritarian governance as if this would be an unwarranted impertinence on the part of mere civil servants. Best, through his intense involvement in the politics in his home state, as distinct from his deep concern for all aspects of societal interaction, was finally attracted to the “traditional” excesses of doctor politics and maximum leadership. He would carry over these sentiments into his prescriptions for regional development.

He asserts that the associated tradition of government from above, without politics from below, was well reflected in the business of the regional movement. The repeated commitments given by CARICOM Heads were, to his mind, as much waste paper when there was no political machinery to join the outcome of expert negotiations and conclusions to the political concerns of the general regional public. The deficiency, or refusal, to take stock of this experience, that is, the absence of politics as the predominant failing and proximate cause of the dissolution of the Federation, may have permitted CARIFTA and CARICOM to carry on in much the same way as the Federation devoting massive energies to the formulation of expert programmes with no popular backing, and with much the same results. Even more, on account of the failure of politics, political integration has since been taboo.

Since 1956, Best had spelled out his concerns about the role and scope of politics with regard to the domestic constituency. It is, he had explained:

“the creative act of persuading, of mobilizing, of organizing and of committing the individual for the large purpose of collective action. Its basis can only be an active capacity for faith, and for trust and for hope—in advance of fulfillment. How can it ever proceed by the ways and the means of the confidence trick? How can it ever achieve national unity or One Love—in a glorious morning?”<sup>17</sup>

For the purpose of the region, he would later declare in 2002 that in the British West Indies there is the absence of a tradition of politics “as distinct from a tradition of campaigning, of any appreciable intellectual life or any insistent public poetry or any statement of private conviction” and that this was in tandem with the persuasive presence of authoritarian administration.<sup>18</sup>

Best betrayed a strong aversion to messianic leadership in the Caribbean raging often against doctor politics, the maximum leader or the Kabaka. He considered the corollary of impotence to be maximum leadership and argued that organization and planning were the processes by which leadership was both created and validated. Thus, having failed to invest in sufficient plan and organization, the omnipotent leadership becomes not only necessary but also indispensable. He rarely settled for the contemporary leadership of his generation, but found much comfort in the leadership of earlier generations whom he did not know personally; historic figures like Toussaint, Quamina, Cuffy or Damon, Garvey, Cipriani or Critchlow. The contributions of these leaders to the liberation of the region were of immense significance and should be kept alive in the people’s consciousness.

What is the future of CARICOM? How should CARICOM respond? Those questions asked by Best are still being asked in this first decade of the twenty-first century with a vocal and resonating pessimism. Best has noted some developments. CARICOM has already embarked on a process

of widening and deepening in the establishment of the Association of Caribbean States and the conversion into CARIFORUM as a body for involving the Dominican Republic into the critical issues of the Caribbean in a similar way as Cuba has been included. The deepening process has been further pursued in the decision to establish the Single Market and Economy (SME).

However, going forward has faced functional issues of real commitment, decision-making and the pace of progress and consolidation. Furthermore, Best assesses that the SME is far from being put in place and even when achieved can scarcely fulfill its original promise. The problem of implementation would remain: how will agreements reached, signed, enshrined in constitutional or legal text be definitely converted by culture and politics into obligations of popular habit and daily routine, he asked in the paper, "Economic Theory and Economic Policy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century West Indies: The Lewis Tradition of Town and Gown." The problem of the failure to implement decisions, he maintained, was less than the problem of the absence of political will but more the administrative and executive refusal to implement the decisions reached. (Best felt that James did not understand this aspect . . . to expand briefly C.L.R. offer which lacked this understanding as opined by Best).

Best agrees with Brewster that the region had not chosen an appropriate form of integration. CARICOM was already a dead movement that was in need of self-critical evaluation. He maintained that the source of this failure lay in the past in aborting Dominion status for the entire region. This was a major setback resulting in small space expansion and "doctor politics". Further, the achievement of political independence has been threatening to make the region obsolete; the main reason being the multiplicity of small space which has exaggerated the small space factor. Brewster further explains that the CARICOM and other models of Caribbean integration currently being offered are neither credible nor realizable in the contemporary world of widening economic space and globalization. They also do not do justice to the people's aspirations for unity.

Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, the challenge to diversify and transform the regional economy is scarcely different from what it had been at the cross-over from the eighteenth to nineteenth century. The region, as Best assesses, is under as serious a threat as at any other time in the past. This situation has been reached against the background of significant shocks in the global economy commencing with the four increases in the price of oil in 1970's and 1980's that ended three decades of uninterrupted growth to coincide with radical changes in the international financial system leading to the retreat from Bretton Woods system. With the terms of trade deteriorating, commodity prices continuing to fall, (note, however the current rise in the price of staple foods and another era of high

oil prices) aid programs end, cavalier recycling of petro-dollar surpluses mainly by commercial banks followed the so-called debt overhang and massive new flows of capital to emerging financial markets in Asia away from the Atlantic.

There is also concern about the end of Lome and of preferences, the phasing in of the Free Trade Area of the Americas and the ever-rampant World Trade Organization. This has led to much anxiety about economic issues and not enough attention to actual business. What is missing is a clear formulation of the collective assault the region intends to launch on its own unviable condition and uncompetitive character. These are issues of diplomacy and tactics which may not be in the open as yet.

A disturbing component of the existing threat is the resurgence of proposals for recolonization of areas of the developing world. This is a matter for immediate consideration in CARICOM that requires a strong response directed towards continuing the process of further deepening through the CSME. Moreover, with the termination of imperial preferences and non-reciprocity, Best urges the region to put a counter strategy in place, like hitching to a new bloc, say Africa or India. He poses further questions, pertinent but unanswered. What strategic reserves and measures are required if the Caribbean is to alter its terms of trade in the global market and if it is to change its way of doing business and secure competitiveness and viability? This was the question at the end of the eighteenth century, again at the end of the nineteenth century when Lewis made his entry. At the crossover to the twenty-first century, it is once again the question. How can the region exist in a new mercantilism that is born of the turn of the new century?

One suspects that at times, like the confluence of events that faced him, Best is overwhelmed by the enormity of the issues and the unpromising implications for the peoples of the region in the new millennium. His probing for alternative paths or models through experiment and the collation of ideas were not unlike the efforts of his contemporaries in government, whom he railed against. He says that we should deal with the problem in terms of what exists on the ground; that a solution has to be shaped from the cultural experiences powerful enough to be competitive in the prevailing global environment that cares less for and steers away from any historic colonial past or responsibility. So much for the caution, but a path will still have to be cleared and pursued.

His strongly held position of the resourcefulness, confidence and independence in the innate strengths of the Caribbean enforced his rejection of any syndrome of victimhood that seemed to him to have moulded the shape, form and orientation of the regional movement. Perhaps this helps to explain his pursuit of a continuing dialogue with the people at times of great stress underscoring his faith in their judgment. He used the media generously to disseminate his ideas in support of the

development of the region, seeking to outline his options for freeing the region from what he considered the shackles of the colonial economy and culture. He was a forceful advocate of self-knowledge which had to be built and shared with the entire population.

He sought to reach everyone in particular that group of society he argued which had been excluded from the decision-making process and consultation in the domestic and regional politics. That is why he was a co-founder of the New World Group in Georgetown and joined with like-minded academic colleagues and other regionalists like David de Caires and Miles Fitzpatrick to publish the journal, *New World Quarterly* in March 1963 in Georgetown as a medium for independent and original thinking. He wrote extensively for the newspapers of Trinidad and Tobago and launched the *Trinidad and Tobago review* in July 1977. He also played an active role in the establishment of the *Tapia Group* which also published the journal, *Tapia*, to cultivate regional consciousness for change. He may not concede that bringing his opinions to the masses was also part of the political process of campaigning for political office, part of the imperatives to get things done. He found limited success only, having served as Leader of the Opposition in the Senate of Trinidad and Tobago during 1974–1975 and 1981–1983, and losing the election in 1976.

Two contemporary developments appear to place the spotlight on these copious commentaries and ideas of Lloyd Best on behalf of the region. Not for the first time, as Best has recorded, the region finds itself at the cross-road.

First, there is the initialing of the CARIFORUM--EC European Partnership Agreement (EPA) in December 2007 that seeks to establish as far as necessary reciprocal free trade between the two regions while being remarkably deficient on issues of development and has opened a public dispute within CARICOM.

Second, there are the two initiatives of Venezuelan President, Hugo Chavez, the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) and the Petro-Caribe oil facility that offers generous and valuable terms for the purchase of oil to interested and invited states of the region that have also divided the region.

Both initiatives constitute a crucial diplomatic offensive into the entire Caribbean region and have significant geopolitical and economic implications for CARICOM. Both initiatives have further exposed the brittleness of regional solidarity and have advertised the regional tendency toward fragmentation, divergence and disarray. Best has fully dramatized these maladies in his paper: "Independent thought and Caribbean identity", thirty-seven years ago. The matter of the EPA, particularly, has promoted open adversarial positions not only among the political leadership, some positions being *ex post facto*, but also among respected academics and other professionals. Opposition to the agreement has been forceful and credible. Concerns flourish about the realities of the region's foreign policy and

about its coordination particularly at the level of policy formulation and the ongoing relationship between the leadership and the technocrats.

The current test of the region's cohesion and stability seems also to explore the depth of its identity and cultural solidity as much as the relevance of its institutions. Can the region survive, or, can the CSME be ever attained? Is the movement adequately equipped to take critical decisions at these critical times? Even the European Union, the dominating influence that has disturbed Best, is not without its divergences as national interests sometimes subdue the group's larger objectives; witness early decisions of the United Kingdom, and recently of France, the Netherlands and Ireland. However, these differences of national positions generally prompt the resort to diplomacy and collaboration as accommodating measures have to be designed by the technocrats at the drawing board.

For the regional movement, the current circumstance is also an invocation, as Best would have pleaded, to confront forcefully the confines of the "smallness" of the component parts of the region as being inherently advantageous. Best had differed with many whom he felt tended to stress the "disadvantages of smallness", including his distinguished teacher Demas, and would have cited examples of dignified development of the south east Asian states of Malaysia, Hong Kong and Taiwan, or the European states of Sweden, Norway, Austria or Switzerland. He would also have castigated any affectation of the role of the victim which, he deemed, when aligned with the drama of smallness placed the region in permanent handicap. Smallness offered Best the supreme opportunity in the globalized environment to develop suitable strategies to give the Caribbean a real chance to exist. To function outside this concept of smallness, he asserted, it was necessary to correct the debilitating of Caribbean society through the purveying of the psychology of the distorted personality.

In this vein he drew on his expansive knowledge, whether historical, cultural, religious and particularly of folklore, and his ever-present trust in the capacity of the people to demonstrate where the parts cumulatively were greater than the whole to keep the region one step ahead of globalization. The developments of this first decade of the twenty-first century would have stimulated further stirring analyses from him and may well have been compressed as a matter of leadership, of politics, and of reaching to the people of the region, pan in hand where necessary, to meet the prevailing threats to the future of the region.

Making available this selection of his essays, papers and working notes should help to keep before us the engaging and formidable conviction of one scholar of our region in the creativity and resilience of the peoples of the Caribbean region who have withstood the buffeting of five centuries.

At this critical turn, when the challenge is no less merciless, these essays can also be a guide, a source of support and confidence in rallying to the defence and security of the collective interests of the region.

## ENDNOTES

1. The Black Power Revolution, 1970: A Retrospective, ed. by Selwyn Ryan, p.716, Article by Lloyd Best "1970 and 1990: Recurring Crises of Political Legitimacy".
2. "Options for transforming the Economy", in *Trinidad and Tobago Review*, December 2, 2002, p.10.
3. "Models of Plantation Economy: Origins and Extrapolations", *Trinidad and Tobago Review*, September, 1994.
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9. See his paper: "Characteristics of the Caribbean Economy: A Sketch", no date.
10. See also *Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom*, edited by Selwyn Ryan in note no. 11
11. *Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom*, edited by Selwyn Ryan, paper "Development Strategy in Trinidad and Tobago" by Bhoendradatt Tewarie and Roger Hosein, p.337-38.
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13. Lloyd Rohlehr, "Arthur Lewis: Attempts to save the Federation of the West Indies", in *Stabroek News*, December 28, 2003. Rohlehr was named by Adams as Assistant to Lewis for this venture.
14. See his paper: "Reducing the Caricom task to Human Proportions", June 2005
15. "Watching chickens come home to roost" in *Trinidad and Tobago Review*, July 1. 2002.
16. *Models of Plantation Economy*", Pt14, p.38
17. *Ibid.*, Pt35, p.41 and pt36, p.41 18. *Ibid.*, Pt 35, p.41.
18. In Best's "The West Indies: Then and Now: Fragments of an Interpretation", 1998.

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#### **TIME FOR ACTION – MORE THAN 30 YEARS NOW**


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- The West Indies – Then and Now
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## THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY IN TRANSITION: Functional Cooperation as a Catalyst for Change



### INTRODUCTION

THE ARTICLES THAT APPEAR IN THIS PUBLICATION COLLECTIVELY, and at times quite critically, address a central theme which may be described as: *The Caribbean Community in Transition – The Case for Functional Cooperation in Community Building and for Strengthening the Regional Integration Process*. Each is a work in itself discussing and analyzing a specific theme as well as presenting conclusions derived there from. In almost every instance the Articles address issues that traditionally are considered to be aspects of functional cooperation – a building block of the regional integration process – as set out

in the Treaty of Chaguaramas and its recently revised version.

To give them some focus and relevance for this publication, a number of challenges had to be overcome. One of these was how best to arrange them for presentation in some logical order (but which might at times appear to defy logic). The obvious solution was to group them within easily understood subthemes. This has been done.

It is interesting to note that none of the authors were requested to address a central theme. Yet each Article presented herein has, in one way or the other, dealt with the need, indeed the imperative for strengthening the Caribbean Community at this particular juncture of global evolution. Collectively they see the current times as imposing a period of transition for the Community and as a virtual watershed in its development process. There is the recognition of the very real and pressing impact of a globalization process that is determining, affecting and integrating itself into our economic, social, political and personal lives. Climate change, advances in information communications and technology, new security INTRODUCTION issues, health and education concerns, migration and the brain drain all add their issues and have their impact in strident calls for new and innovative approaches to take us through this period of transition. How we respond as a community in economic and social terms and particularly in areas that are broadly described as functional cooperation will determine whether the correct and necessary steps are being taken to construct a Community for ALL. It is indeed the time for action.

This is not to be dismissed as simple rhetoric. All the Articles, written by persons with different backgrounds and covering dozens of differing subjects, focus on this central theme. It must be instructive that they have all been written during a coincident time period thereby giving credence to the assertion that our Community is indeed in a period of transition and that urgent and focused action is necessary to ensure that we emerge from this period as a stronger and more viable Community.

Drs. Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton, in their Paper entitled: *“Repositioning the Caribbean within Globalization”* begin by asserting that the Commonwealth Caribbean’s “current crisis of development is perhaps the greatest it has faced in the post-independence era”. The region’s competitiveness in the global economy, they note, also makes for uncomfortable reading. The Vision for our Community to which we all subscribe is in jeopardy of not being realized, postulates Prof. Norman Girvan. How often have we dealt at the highest level, with the concern that there has been so little implementation of the many positive and far-reaching recommendations for changes that will serve to strengthen our Community? How often have the region’s leaders been challenged “to engage the regional public and key stakeholders?” Girvan asserts that until we have the emergence of a genuine regional public, a regional media, regional people-based organization and genuine regional public opinion then the integration movement will really continue to be weak. We are without doubt in a period of transition, a point in time when critical action can be further delayed only at the peril of our survival as a Community in the first instance and ultimately as nation States.

Other writers in their conclusions have shared this evaluation of the region's current state of affairs accompanying it with a comprehensive analysis that provides viable options for change and, in most cases, specific recommendations to effect these changes. They all make interesting reading. But even as we read and at times applaud their cogent arguments and reasoning, it is also our responsibility as Community citizens to ensure that we support, respond to, and participate in the call for action at all levels of governance.

It is therefore heartening to note that at the leadership level focused responses have been forthcoming. The timing is significant in that they all fall within this period of transition suggesting that there is an appreciation of a sense of urgency and a renewed commitment to address the issues of social and economic development within the context of a strong and viable community.

It may be argued that the Articles only serve to reinforce what is already being done in the context of the preparations for the introduction of the CSME and in highlighting the potential economic advantages of the Single Market currently being introduced within the Community. That these advantages have not been universally embraced or understood throughout the Community is clearly not for lack of effort on the part of the CARICOM Secretariat and the regional leadership it serves.

The public information campaign for sensitizing the Community to the benefits of the CSME has been ongoing for several years, and for even the barely literate or those remote from the centres of economic and political activity, it should be obvious that the impact of external forces demand that the countries of the region should get together to protect what they have and to expand from a position of collective strength. The relatively slow pace of implementation of the CSME – and many are prepared to argue that some of the presumptions of the CSME may already be out of date – points to the need to look elsewhere and to address different points of focus in the transition to a stronger and more viable Caribbean Community.

The Articles in this publication collectively address this very point. The problem, they conclude, has been one of focus. It is not what the CSME is in terms of its potential economic advantages for the region. One suspects that the average person while recognizing as a concept the relevance and importance of the Single Market and of a Single Economy is likely to be more appreciative of, and receptive to a credible information package that describes “what the CSME can do for me”. A select group of UWI students when questioned on this subject last year lauded the CSME not only for its promise of regional integration and for socio-economic development but also for its potential contribution to personal security and to personal development.

Where the focus should be, is becoming clearer. What are the programmes, policies and plans that will contribute to Community building,

to a greater appreciation and understanding, by the Community citizen, of the extent to which these contribute to the amelioration of his personal circumstances and to the creation of the kind of space (and conditions) that will enable him to become a better person. To the extent that these 'conditions' are satisfied there will be created that critical mass of people and institutions that can genuinely be described as a Caribbean Community.

Again, this is not rhetoric and should not be readily dismissed as such. Over the past few years there has been a spate of regional activities at the leadership level which dramatically underscore the point that there is need for special focus on building the Community from the ground up, in ensuring the relevance to Community Building of existing programmes and of existing institutions of the Community and in further ensuring that functional cooperation as defined in the Treaty of Chaguaramas performs its true role as a Community building platform.

This has indeed been recognized. In February 2007 the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, meeting in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Eighth Inter-Sessional Meeting) received and accepted a Report by a Technical Working Group on Governance and formally recognized "Security" as the fourth pillar of the Community. At their regular Summit in July of the same year the Heads of Government "after noting the evolution of the concept and application of functional cooperation in the Community, identified the priorities and targets for implementing functional cooperation in areas that contribute optimally to the regional integration process and the development and wellbeing of CARICOM citizens". In emphasizing the centrality of functional cooperation to Community development, the Conference also issued a Declaration entitled: "A Community for All: Declaration on Functional Cooperation".

During the year 2007, the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community also convened two special Summits. The first was to deal with the issue of Chronic Non-Communicable Diseases in the region which were held in Trinidad and Tobago in September. The other was on Food Security which was held in Guyana in December 2007. Special attention must also be drawn to the CARICOM-US Summit in June 2007 and the opportunity which that provided for extensive interaction with the regional Diaspora resident in the USA. All of these Meetings, like the Articles in this publication, were responding to a special message that resided in the collective recognition that the region was in transition and that action at all levels was necessary to ensure that the transit led to a better Community – A Community for All.

The reader's attention is drawn to the Article by Haslyn Parris entitled "Who Shall Govern Us" which indirectly challenges our inherited system of parliamentary representation. The challenge is interesting particularly when viewed in the context of the current advocacy of people's power and people

centered development and the much-vaunted relationship between regional integration and governance for the people and in the interests of the people. Indeed, much of the development literature today is focused on the concept of people centered development and the latter's relationship to government as a means of ensuring transparency and good governance. The assumption is made that there has to be a correlation between these two agents of development. It is an assumption which through constant repetition has acquired the status of a truism but it has never been seriously implemented or indeed, perhaps for this very reason, thoroughly examined.

In this regard there are at least two factors which should be taken into consideration. The first is that the areas over which sovereignty has been historically exercised are slowly responding to other centres of power. This is a global phenomenon which serves to make even more vulnerable a region which fundamentally still adheres to the cult of "Father of the Nation" and responds to the whims and fancies of the charismatic leader. A community which has traditionally cultivated and followed such leadership will experience various traumas as it comes to grips with the inevitable changes brought about by the declining influence of their leaders and the demand for more representation by citizens in determining the affairs of State and indeed their own affairs.

The second factor which regrettably has not been explored among the many Papers in this publication has been the slow but steady rise, globally, of personal successes through greater application of innate creativity and self-development. There appears to be developing what may ultimately come to be described as a period of individualism. The Information Communications and Technological Revolution coupled with the liberating forces of globalization have done several things some of which, from the perspective of the Community, have been explored by Dr. Edmundson, among others, in his article entitled "Empowering the Diaspora and CARICOM to Collaborate – a Road Map for success in Today's Creative Economy". What we are surely witnessing is the beginning of an era in which the individual is becoming more dependent on himself and less on what the Government can do for him. As he turns to himself for his own salvation and development, the innate creativity within him experiences rewards in the production of a more self-reliant and self-sufficient individual. There are some statistics which indicate that the number of internet millionaires that have emerged within the past decade already outstrip those who had made similar amounts in all fields of endeavour over the past century. It is indeed the case today that in every field of human endeavour the individual, by his own efforts, is recreating himself – and this will surely have an impact on the society in which he lives.

If there is any value in the foregoing, then greater attention needs to be placed not on empowering the people to be a part of a system in which the power base is shifting and in which they will ultimately have little

interest. Instead, the emphasis must surely be on conditioning our citizens to a set of values that will make for a stronger and a more viable Caribbean Community.

Long ignored in this context but just as relevant today is the Regional Cultural Policy of the Caribbean Community that was approved in 1994 at the Tenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of Ministers of Education (SCME) which was held in Belize and amended in 1996 at the Eleventh Meeting of the SCME in Barbados. The Ministers firmly supported the Cultural Policy's assertion that the Caribbean people have the capacity to develop themselves. Culture, they agreed, was the instrument for empowering the people to be liberated to their creativity and self-development. As the Policy states "It is our culture which makes it possible to bond ourselves meaningfully to our physical and social environment and to each other. It is our culture that makes us one people".

In further elaboration of the values that make for a stronger and more viable Caribbean Community, in both a philosophical and practical context, attention is directed to two Articles which focus on community building and on maximizing the potential of the individual within the regional community. The first is the Article by Sir George Alleyne who, in tracing the history of functional cooperation within the Community, cogently argues for its reconceptualization in order to make it a more potent force for regional integration. The other is by Professor Hilary Beckles in his examination of "West Indian Nationhood and Cricket in the Twenty-first Century". It is a studied analysis that would have made C.L.R. James proud.

This Introduction would be incomplete without specific reference to the Article by Mr. Justice Duke E.E. Pollard entitled: "The Caribbean Court of Justice: An Innovation in Functional Cooperation". Justice Pollard asserts that Community Law within the context of a totally independent regional Court is "the backbone of the regional integration process". The Caribbean Court of Justice therefore has to be one of the most critical of institutions in the proposed scheme of arrangements for transforming the independent political entities of CARICOM into a single market and a single economy.

The region's institutions as identified within the Treaty and the many others that have been established to serve the region's interests can all be justified as useful instruments of functional cooperation. The real justification however remains the extent to which these institutions contribute to melding the people of the region into a more cohesive entity; the extent to which these are perceived by the people to be serving their interests; and the extent to which, within their respective articles of association, purposes and objectives, the overarching focus is the creation of a Community for All.

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
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- West Indian Nationhood and Cricket in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (Hilary Beckles).
- Cultural Industries and Small Developing States in the Context of Globalization: An Agenda for the Caribbean (Keith Nurse).
- Action Plan for Telecommunications & ICT Services in CARICOM: Addressing Convergence Issues in A Single Market (Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery).
- CARICOM Commission on Youth Development (Barry Chevannes).
- Global Climate Change: Challenges for CARICOM (Ulric Trotz).
- Labour and the CSME (Joseph Goddard).
- The Caribbean Court of Justice: An Innovation in Functional Cooperation (Duke E. E. Pollard).



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## PARADIGM SHIFTS & STRUCTURAL CHANGES: In Pursuit of Progress in the Caribbean Community



### INTRODUCTION

EACH OF THE TEN PAPERS THAT TOGETHER COMPRISE the main portion of this publication are associated with an introductory kind of abstract specific to it. Those abstracts are given below in the order in which the papers are presented in the publication. Taken together, the papers represent views on CARICOM covering a wide spectrum of issues—from conception, through current trials and tribulations, into bold peeks into the future. This statement is true in more senses than one.

For instance, in the dimension of conception, not only is attention focused on deliberate interruption of the process of generating human resources— ‘abortion’ (cf. the paper by Professor Stephen Vasciannie—*Abortion in Jamaica and International Law*), but attention is also focused on the origins and queries about the continuing appropriateness of the original dreams that have led to the CARICOM we now have (cf. the paper by Lloyd Searwar *Why CARICOM?*). The allegedly ‘self-evident’ turns out to be worthy of rethinking, sometimes with wider stakeholder involvement than originally had been thought necessary, as a result of changes in world circumstances and reviews of the meaning of democracy.

Current trials and tribulations encompass not only the difficulties of implementing the CSME with adequate protection for allegedly weaker member states of the Region, but also the more fundamental problem of securing individual and joint survival and progress in a world of non-benign, ruthless, market-led competition. The papers by Professor Havelock Brewster (*The CARICOM Regional Development Fund: Economic Sense or Political Expediency?*), and by Professor Vaughan Lewis (*The Changing Environment of OECS International Relations and Some External Policy Implications*) are examples of these types of concerns. In a not dissimilar sense of currency and as problems in need of response, but each with a different focus, are the papers by Professor Compton Bourne (*National Planning by Small, Non-Strategic Developing States in the Face of Declining Overseas Development Assistance*), by Professor Cedric Grant (*CARICOM Non-Intervention and Intervention*), by the Most Hon. Professor Kenneth Hall (*Jamaica in the International Arena: Leader or Follower, Historical Perspectives on Jamaica's Contribution to the International Community*), and by Colonel Linton Graham (retd.) (*Transnational Threats: Drug Trafficking and its Impact on International Security: The Caribbean Perspective*).

The bold peek into the future is perhaps best exemplified by the contributions of the Most Hon. Professor Kenneth Hall (*CARICOM Current Status and Future Prospects*), and by the redoubtable pair of the Hon. Lloyd Best and Dr. Eric St Cyr (*Modelling the Economy—focused on Trinidad and Tobago*). The second contribution is particularly interesting because it dares to try to impose paradigm shifts on both the methodology to be used, and on the desirable destination to be sought, if future generations are not to decry the current generation for its myopia.

Though the papers can reasonably be categorised as stated above, each paper has elements of all three categories of concern; and the balance of emphasis really will finally reside in the mind of the reader, depending on that mind's most recent state of stimulation and trauma. We have been fortunate to receive papers by Professor Cedric Grant and Mr Lloyd Searwar, from whom we shall receive no more, since they have passed away. We offer our sincere condolences to their families.

## **ABORTION IN JAMAICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW**

The role of human resources in the development processes of any nation is accepted as obviously pivotal, even where that role and its effects are not completely understood. A corollary is that any action that might impinge on the generation of human resources, in terms of quantity or quality, is deemed worthy of serious analysis. Thus, the Malthusian cloud of demise through over-population, has floated over the development landscape, and has been

accompanied by concepts of population control. Several methodologies have been designed to frustrate fecundity in the face of the implacable drive of our selfish genes for immortality through replication. In this milieu, abortion has a prominent place of dubious honour; and the laws and practices of states often reflect uncertainties and internal inconsistencies across the spectrum of honourable and dishonourable men and women. The case of Jamaica, a prominent member of CARICOM that often assumes a leadership role, is the subject of this paper that examines abortion in the context of Jamaican and International Law.

As a starting point, the social and political environment in Jamaica is briefly examined. Some of the internal contradictions of moral and medical origins, and consequently of precept and practice, are highlighted. Inevitably they impact on Jamaican Law—on the Constitution; on Legislation; and on the common law, in the form of decisions by judges. The observation is made that the Constitution does not specifically and directly state anything about abortion. That observation is however, tempered by noting that through Section 14 which pertains to the right to life for a person, the question does arise about whether a foetus is legally a “person”; a matter that has not been tested in the context of Jamaican law.

Within the ordinary Legislation, the focus is placed on sections 72 and 73 of the Offences against the Person Act. Therein, contextual difficulties of interpretation abound. The two main ones refer to whether there is a distinction to be drawn between “lawful” and “unlawful” abortions; and whether the prescribed penalty of life imprisonment for those who indulge in or aid and abet the act of abortion, is mandatory or maximum. In these matters, the legal significance of the 1939 case of *R v. Bourne* is examined. The case involved the distinguished surgeon Dr. Alex Bourne who had performed an abortion on a girl under 15 years old, who had become pregnant after being raped. The caution is given that much reliance should not be placed on the arguments underpinning Macnaghten J.’s judgement, about which Lord Diplock, approximately 40 years later in 1981, had written: “*No disrespect is intended to that eminent judge . . . if I say that his reputation is founded more on his sturdy common sense than on his lucidity of legal exposition.*” The caveat is also given that the policy guidelines set out by the Ministry of Health in Jamaica, in relation to medical doctors performing abortions, may be of little effect in the interpretation of the law by the Director of Public Prosecutions. One conclusion is that Jamaican law does not provide unequivocal answers to some important questions about abortion.

In the light of this conclusion, possible guidance is sought from International Law— International Treaties [such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 6(1)), and the American Convention on Human Rights]; and specified practices by States informing

customary international law. Neither the Treaties nor Customary Law provides unambiguous answers. As is demonstrated by statistics quoted from the Centre for Reproductive Rights, there is wide variation in the practices of states. In the final analysis, the paper concludes that the deeply controversial questions posed by abortion need to be addressed, not simply by lawyers, but by policy-makers sensitised to 'the core values of society with respect to life, individuality, and privacy.' This advice may well mean that in abortion we are facing a ponderous issue not resolvable by CARICOM as a regional group.

## WHY CARICOM?

The paper entitled 'Why CARICOM?' by Lloyd Searwar is perhaps best appreciated and understood if readers take account of the following self-explanatory note by David de Caires, Editor-in-Chief, which appeared in the *Stabroek News*, April 2006:

A few weeks before his death I had spoken to Lloyd Searwar about the possibility of him addressing the question of whether CARICOM was beneficial to its member states in his weekly editorials. He agreed to do so. I spoke to his widow last week Thursday, the day after his funeral, and she mentioned that Lloyd had left some written work. I immediately sent for it and discovered two editorials captioned 'Why CARICOM?' parts 1 and 2. It was strange, and moving, to see once again the spidery hand on the lined, yellow foolscap pages, that had been such a regular feature every Monday morning for the last five years. She said that she did not believe he had finally polished the work, as was his custom, but having read the two editorials I found that they maintained his usual high standard.

We therefore publish posthumously the first of two editorials by the late Lloyd Searwar on the subject of CARICOM. Quoting the late William Demas, he came to the conclusion that though there had been many problems, the alternative for the small member states was marginalisation or absorption by a more powerful regional state.

The paper presented in this journal marries the two planned editorials, with the second part (the intended second editorial that would have been published 'next week') simply following on from the first. A consequence of its origins is that it has the engaging attractiveness of an offering intended for the wider intelligent public, as opposed to one for the relatively rarified narrow environment of academia; but this has been achieved without any concessions to depth, width, or accuracy.

The question posed demands an answer; and indeed, as Searwar points out, it will continue to so do for as long as CARICOM exists with no variation in the clear goal, the dream, in the preamble to the Treaty of

Chaguaramas— *“Sharing a common determination to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of their peoples for full employment and improved standards of work and living.”*

Nevertheless, while CARICOM's basic objectives and aspirations may remain invariant, the domestic environment of individual members, and the international environment in which these objectives are pursued, are continually changing. Accordingly, there is a persistent interplay between matters of sovereignty and matters of foreign policy, within the group and between the group and the powers that be in the wider world. Furthermore, the strategic importance of CARICOM has not proven to be an invariant 'given', as both technological and political changes affect the world scene. These changes focus attention on new theatres of war and non-war competition.

Searwar captures the main specifics of these developments, lays them out simply, and starkly, but with the empathy of a native observer. It is from this standpoint that he considers the device, not usually considered by proponents of Caribbean Integration, of the possible use of referenda to put 'demos' into the practice of democracy in CARICOM, determining what the peoples of CARICOM think, and even confronting the possibility that they might conjointly opt for absorption into a more powerful country or group of countries in pursuit of their dream.

### **THE CARICOM REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND: ECONOMIC SENSE OR POLITICAL EXPEDIENCY**

Professor Havelock Brewster, Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank, and Honorary Professor of Economics, Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the West Indies, have brought his considerable knowledge and experience to bear on the issue of establishing a CARICOM Regional Development Fund (CRDF).

Beginning with the Preamble to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, he spells out the rationale for the Fund and very early makes the point, that any notion that such a Fund might be an analogue of the Structural Funds of the European Union is severely misplaced, and gives cogent reasons for that view. These reasons, taken together with the anomalous circumstance that the Per Capita Income of several of the states perceived to be disadvantaged, rivals or exceeds those of the prospective CARICOM donor countries, are given as an adequate basis for declaring the model of Fund accepted by the CARICOM Heads of Government not to be making 'Economic Sense'.

There is, however, the political reality that Eastern Caribbean States (ECS) have insisted that this model of Fund be implemented. Few more pointed examples of self-serving defection replacing cooperation within

g u o t t e r

a group can be cited, as the paper notes that the ECS participation in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy appears conditional on the activation of the Fund.

The paper proposes an alternative model of Fund, with key advantages of sustainability over a longer period, and administrative pluses of building on already existing institutions.

## **THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF OECS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SOME EXTERNAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

This paper is the Opening Address that Professor Vaughan Lewis gave on 24 August 2005, to a High-Level Retreat of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States on the Preparation of an OECS Trade Policy Framework. To facilitate the presentation, Professor Lewis concluded with a ten-point summary of the main points made during his Address. Readers of the paper may well find it useful to begin by reading that summary at the end of the paper, and then filling in its analytical underpinnings by reading the presentation from the beginning as they normally would.

Professor Lewis began by reminding his audience of the nearly forty-year-old observations that Dr Eric Williams had made, caveats he had offered about the unlikelihood that Commonwealth preferences such as those for citrus and sugar, would survive British entry into the European Common Market. Dr Williams had pointed to the fact that the whole mood of the world was changing against preferences; and he strongly advised that the time taken for Britain to gain entry into the European Economic Community should be used to “reduce our dependence on Britain either by lowering our costs of production or by judicious forms of economic diversification.”

Basically, the territories that were to become member territories of CARICOM did not utilize these emerging fortuitous circumstances as suggested. They spent time, energy, and resources, in a King Canute type attempt to hold back the waves of change that yielded globalization, liberalization, free market realities, and the overwhelming supremacy of the WTO over preferential arrangements. The new rules apply not only to the field of agriculture but also to areas such as financial services; and the larger, industrialized countries are no longer accepting special and differential treatment as an acceptable arrangement.

The disabilities of small size are repeatedly highlighted small is vulnerable; and the OECS is urged to take the lead in arguing for the mechanism of structural or cohesion funds to be applied to enable engagement in production and trade on a competitive basis. A strong recommendation is that, through appropriate regional diplomatic action and CDB-assisted research, the opportunity of the Economic Partnership

Agreement negotiations be signed with the European Union, to try to link the issues of trade policy and development policy, “to provide a rationale, and resources for, the structural adjustment of our countries that is needed at this time.” In all these circumstances, we must be prepared to revisit the type of regional integration we deem necessary, evolving from the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas framework through appropriate widening and deepening, to respond to the emerging international economic liberalization and its new rules.

### **NATIONAL PLANNING BY SMALL, NON-STRATEGIC DEVELOPING STATES IN THE FACE OF DECLINING OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE**

To A Mouse  
 The best laid schemes o’ mice and men  
 Gang aft a-gley  
 An’ lea’e us nought but grief an’ pain  
 For promis’d joy  
 —Robert Burns

This folk wisdom captured by the rebel Scottish eighteenth century poet, Robert Burns, who saw his father die, worn out from hard farm work and bankrupt, is an accurate three centuries old precursor of the paper penned by Professor Compton Bourne. Though Professor Bourne does not aspire to poetic heights in his presentation, he does present with admirable lucidity, the facets of the problem of small, non-strategic developing states planning for progress in a milieu of declining overseas development assistance—a rat race run by mice.

The paper charts a course of exposition of the issues by beginning with a perspective on planning. It notes that there are choices made about the nature of planning in which a country indulges. The choices range from the comprehensive rigidities of truly central planning to the more flexible attempts at indicative planning where a wish list of characteristics of the desired Promised Land is highlighted. In the case of the Caribbean, the government has often donned the mantle of planner as part of its assumed responsibility to marry economic prosperity to newly won nationhood. The paper notes that, ‘a la’ Burns, these well-meaning attempts often ‘gang aft a-gley’.

The weaknesses inherent in being a small, non-strategic state are next highlighted in an empathetic but realistic exposition. That exposition focuses on both the economic dimensions of what is, and what might be; and the political dimensions of what might be achieved in the international environment in which domestic survival and progress are being defined and pursued.

The concepts concerning the contribution that Foreign Aid, also called Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), might make to the pursuit of domestic economic survival and progress, are then briefly examined. That examination briefly surveys the published technical theoretical literature on the matter, and recounts the actual flows that have taken place globally in recent times. Against this general background, the recent ODA trends in the Commonwealth Caribbean are then highlighted, with specific attention being drawn to the fact that net inflows are declining and have been unreliably volatile.

The national planning options available, based on the nature of planning, on the weaknesses inherent in being a small, non-strategic state, and on the trends in ODA flows, represent a Byzantine mosaic in which it is well-nigh impossible to specify blueprints for success. However, there are guidelines presented. These include: fostering international relations in accordance with one's own strategic interests; identifying opportunities for mutually beneficial alliances; doing one's best to raise domestic savings rates and improve the efficiency of savings; avoiding the pitfalls of incurring commercial debt; and managing aid more efficiently. This cocktail of prescriptions is nevertheless not guaranteed to protect from the Burns jeopardy of the best laid plans of small, non-strategic developing states '*gang aft a-gley, an' lea'e us nought but grief an' pain for promis'd joy.*'

### CARICOM NO-INTERVENTION AND INTERVENTION

Professor Cedric Grant poses and offers answers to two related questions—"How had the world evolved in the matter of Interference and Intervention in the Internal Affairs of States?"; and "How had the affairs of CARICOM, as a group and as individual states, been treated when that evolution had taken place?" The answers comprise the paper entitled "CARICOM: Non-Intervention and Intervention".

As its starting point, the paper quotes Article 2.7 of the UN Charter that includes the statement "Nothing contained in the present Charter should authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . .". It notes that there were several resolutions affirming that principle, possibly the best known of which is the *Declaration of the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States* (Declaration of Non-Intervention) that was adopted in 1981. By 2002, this classical state-centric regime had been transmuted into a situation in which, for example, Multilateral Financial Institutions were routinely attaching areas of conditionality to loans in a manner that clearly impinged on the internal affairs of sovereign states. Indeed, in 2002, the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* was set up to

examine the dilemma between state sovereignty and the right to intervene. Its recommendations did not settle the matter unambiguously; and actual practice has not made matters clear. So, none of Treaty, Constitution, other domestic Laws, or praxis setting precedent, prevailed.

It is in this milieu of conceptual uncertainty, big power influence, and perceived individual advantage that CARICOM states have meandered through internal conflicts. The paper chronicles in much detail the events and circumstances surrounding the main upheavals in CARICOM member states. The chronicles include: Grenada, beginning in 1979 with the coup against Prime Minister Eric Gairy; Dominica, involving Prime Minister Patrick John; the crisis in St Kitts and Nevis in 1993; Guyana in 1992 and 1997; Suriname in 1999, St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 2001, Haiti, between 1999 and 2001; and Trinidad and Tobago in 2001. These examples though stating what was, and possibly why, show no final regional consensus, no general rule derived from the experiences, on how various crises should be treated with respect to the dimension of regional intervention as a prerequisite for conflict resolution.

That there is unfinished work to be done is perhaps best captured by the following quotation from the last paragraphs of the paper:

“While the current diplomatic modus operandi has served the Community reasonably well, there is the need for indicators for intervention to be developed and for a formal institutional mechanism to mediate political conflicts among stakeholders in the political process of the various Caribbean states to replace the reliance on ad hoc interventions such as those utilized in Guyana and St. Vincent and the Grenadines.”

The events since 2004 bear testimony to the truth and urgency for action contained in this remark; but will adherence to the Declaration of Non-Intervention not prevail?

### **JAMAICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: LEADER OR FOLLOWER, HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JAMAICA'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

Both the title and the content of this paper are interesting, especially if they are looked at from the vantage point of a member of a Regional grouping that is looking out at the world as an environment in which that member is primarily trying to satisfy its own national goals. The choice then, is only cosmetically between leading and following. Rather it is between cooperating with the group to which one belongs, and defecting in the event that the group's direction may conflict with one's own individual preferences and aspirations. 'Leading' and 'Following' are then perhaps best understood respectively as being up front, taking the initiative in persuading one's group

colleagues to go in the direction one prefers; or being in the crowd, going along with a direction that one has no qualms about following even though it has been espoused by someone else who is up front.

In a situation in which it is believed that the strength of belonging to a group is a necessary condition for survival and progress in an ongoing competition among powerful blocs of countries, this is not a one-off decision. It is a problem that continually presents itself in varying guises for repeated reaction as the environment itself evolves. The exercise of sovereignty is continually revisited.

Three quotations from the paper support the comments expressed above. The first has to do with events such as America's invasion of Grenada:

'By presenting itself as a model of democracy, capitalist development and a willingness to be supportive of America's dominant role in this hemisphere, as was evidenced by its support for the invasion of Grenada, the development of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), and the revival in 1982 of CARICOM, made Jamaica a visible and active player, out of all proportion to its size, as well as its political and economic importance.'

The second quotation refers to the question as to whether Jamaica's behaviour, which in certain situations might have lost its respect and reputation in the Third World, was that of Leader or Follower. That quote is:

'However, what is not disputed is the active presence of Jamaica in the various international discussions and its ability to influence policies to its benefit as a result of the establishment of alliances.'

The third quotation is self-explanatory. It states:

'Throughout the period, Jamaica saw its role in the international arena as a means of promoting national development.'

All members of CARICOM would have faced, and will continue to face similar cooperate/defect decisions. They may think of the matters as 'lead' or 'follow' decisions, but the reality is that this cooperate/defect type of decision is an inescapable aspect of the evolution of cooperation within the Community. The paper is a factual account of Jamaica's record since independence, which predates its membership of CARICOM. It records Jamaica's unwavering adherence, across changes of the Party in Government, to the principle of an active foreign policy for the purpose of satisfying domestic requirements.

## TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY — THE CARIBBEAN PERSPECTIVE

Among the most virulent pestilences that have descended on the Caribbean Region, threatening to obliterate both the dream and the reality of a Caribbean paradise is 'narco trafficking'. The paper presented, deals with this phenomenon and its main consequences. It derives from the dissertation submitted by Colonel Linton Graham (ret'd.) in September 2002, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Diplomatic Studies, to the Department of Diplomacy and Applied Languages in the Diplomatic Academy of London, University of Westminster. The dissertation has been shorn of its formal trappings, thereby being transformed into a seamless essay type contribution to this journal. It has therefore lost its form, but none of its substance; and its links to various sources of information have been substantially preserved through the endnotes.

The paper defines and explores the complex web of issues and concerns related to the drug trade and its impacts on individual territories of the Caribbean, and on the Region taken as a whole. The intricate mosaic explored includes: drug use; drug trafficking; crime; poverty; affluence; arms; politics; corruption; high technology; complex financial structures and transactions; national and international power plays; the institutional framework for the maintenance of law and order; the macroeconomic effects on foreign cash flows, savings and investment; issues of national and international security; and impacts on foreign policy, diplomacy, and sovereignty.

The aura of secrecy surrounding drug transactions, and the pervasiveness of the effects of narco trafficking is such that analytically it becomes very difficult to separate fact from intuitively plausible conjecture, and cause from effect. Fortunately, these inherent difficulties do not deter the author from forging forward with analyses of what he perceives is, or appears to be, on the basis of opinions expressed or statistics garnered from an array of eminent and experienced observers and commentators. Although neither eminence nor experience is a guarantor of truth, they do give useful insights into where 'truth' or useful understandings might lie. The endnotes provide readers with a more than adequate starting point to make their own determinations of these dimensions.

In the final analysis, having meandered as systematically as possible through the labyrinth of related issues, the paper bravely concludes with a menu of recommendations. This menu includes some basics, almost as self-evident truths—e.g. that 'Multilateralism is the only effective approach so far to combating narco-trafficking in the Region'; that 'Adequate funding is a vital contribution to the success of any drug prevention strategy in the Caribbean . . .' and that 'Improving relationships with Washington, Ottawa

and London is most desirable'. More ambitious are suggestions that 'The UN should establish a multinational strike-force to fight the drug war', that 'This force would strike simultaneously at the heart of the supplies, growth areas and production centres worldwide.' and that 'The UN should also oversee a series of regional security systems, each of which would operate under an agreement relevant to its regional idiosyncrasies of geography, politics, and culture and so on.' Whatever one thinks of these latter suggestions for international cooperation, there can be little doubt that the warning that 'The links between terrorism, narco trafficking and money laundering are growing rapidly especially in the Caribbean region', needs to be taken seriously with a view to designing and implementing counter measures for the benefit of the Caribbean region.

### **CARICOM CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS**

This paper treats with statements about development issues, related analyses, and prognoses proffered about CARICOM's evolution. The views are expressed in the format of a lecture to the 9<sup>th</sup> Annual Ordinary Meeting of the CARICOM Legal Affairs Committee, on 30 March 2006. The lecturer, the Most Hon. Professor Kenneth Hall, in treating with this triad of dimensions of the grouping's 33-year-old evolution, laid the basis for asserting that 'CARICOM is at the crossroads of history.' He concluded with confidence, based on his analyses and not a little tinge of hope, that 'the freedom, independence and dignity of our collective Community', will be secured through the application of the necessary vision and wisdom within the region.

This boldly stated prognosis is derived in the context of a conviction that the CARICOM Member States will conjointly design and implement necessary, integrationist procedures and structural arrangements. That an appropriate form of integration is a necessary condition for individual and group survival and progress, is treated as a self-evident truth in the context of competition among blocs in a globalised world. Against the background of this axiomatic assertion, the author notes that there is a conceptual clash between belief based on intuition, faith, hope and emotion, and scepticism based on the rationality of hard-nosed analyses. The battleground is mainly the arena of sovereignty in decision-making.

In this respect, Professor Hall has noted that many prominent Caribbean professionals and intellectuals have often adopted a sceptical stance leading to pessimistic appraisals. He clearly tends to support the view espoused by persons like Prime Minister Arthur of Barbados, 'against critics who make an industry of complaining and against the false pragmatism that treats economics and politics as compartmentalised.'

In the final analysis, however, there remains an underlying dissatisfaction with the slow pace of implementation of the decisions derived from the bold Regional vision, of which the signing of the Single Market declaration is a case in point. This inertia, a persistent psychological and logistical impediment to progress, may well be the key factor that determines whether the Region's wide range of natural and human resources can indeed be deployed to achieve the goal of what is described by Professor Hall, despite the disabilities related to small size, as 'one of the most prosperous regions in the world based on the exploitation of its significant resource endowment.'

### MODELLING THE ECONOMY

Against the background of the Vision 2020 Committee Report on Macro economy and Finance, the Report of the Energy Sub-committee and Article 4 Consultation report of the IMF for 2004, the Hon. Lloyd Best and Dr. Eric St Cyr propose a new strategic and management approach to the Trinidad and Tobago economy. In their approach they sought a strategy likely to bring a lasting solution to the Caribbean's traditional pattern of rapid expansion, contraction and stagnation. They envisage instead, a model that in their view, could give impetus to onshore transformation.

It takes courage to look into any crystal ball. The dimensions of courage required to so look, and comment, increase considerably when, not only is the area of interest that of a complex adaptive system such as an economy, but also the purpose of the exercise is to provide guidance to real, live people as to how they might best order their affairs to avoid mistakes of the past, and protect future generations from the folly of the present. The authors take on these tasks of suggesting how Tobago and Trinidad's economic futures might be perceived, using specially devised viewing glasses, and how Governmental decisions in the present and near future might be implemented to attempt to assure a desirable transmutation.

That desirable new state would be characterised by what is called an "inshore" sector that is made progressively less dependent on and determined by an "offshore" sector that is dominated by classic transnational corporations, foreign owned and financed. The "inshore" sector is "the cradle of the nation's economic life—Virtually the entire population, with its economic institutions including its would-be markets, functions in this sphere." The inshore sector is to become less of a trailer responding to the offshore sector's performance as the locomotive of the overall economy. The State, apart from its traditional responsibilities for law, order, and government, is the link between the two sectors, and is required to devise and cause the implementation of policies to change the form of dependency of the inshore sector on the offshore sector.

As with all complex adaptive systems, there is sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and this principle mandates an evaluation of what Trinidad and Tobago's current (initial) state is. That current state, described as "an age of plenty", has its fundamental macro-economic specifics spelt out in quantitative terms in a section on the economy in 2003 and 2004. The caveat is then offered, and the promise made, that These facts notwithstanding, but recalling the wide swings in output to which the economy has traditionally been subject, that domestic inflation largely mirrors international trends and that the unemployment rate had similarly declined to single digit in 1982, we offer a fresh planning and management perspective and a methodology for projections.

The current view, endorsed by the IMF in its Article IV Consultations, is a projected forty year life span for hydrocarbon resources (proven oil and gas reserves of around 4,500 million barrels of oil equivalent, with gas accounting for over 80 percent; probable and possible reserves adding to this to give total reserves of almost 9,000 million barrels, which, with current rates of production of 134,000 barrels of oil a day and 500,000 barrels of oil equivalent in gas per day, give 40 years reserve life). However, if the economy of Trinidad and Tobago is not simply to go along for the ride produced by the favourable prognoses about the offshore sector; and if future generations are not to bemoan the improvidence inherent in the current policies of treating wasting resources as though they were not, then there is the requirement of engineering transformation in such a manner that "the inshore sector will outpace its offshore counterpart", and become the locomotive rather than the trailer of the economy.

The paper cogently argues that the Point Lisas strategy, like its predecessors, will not achieve the necessary transformation. It suggests a way forward based on some new concepts, revised statistical definitions, and some new technical and administrative institutions (techretariats). These are all necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, if one accepts that "the imperative is to devise strategies for investing the surplus from the offshore economy to transform the onshore economy and to render it internationally competitive, and ultimately viable for being self-sufficient in foreign exchange." Whether the paradigm shifts and creativity necessary to do all this in the timeframe available can manifest themselves might well be the subject of another mentally stimulating paper; but in any event, time will tell.


Though these decamerous offerings of the Journal are not intended to titillate in the same manner as Boccaccio's Decameron, nevertheless it is anticipated that readers will find them mentally stimulating.

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## THE PERTINENCE OF CARICOM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: Some Perspectives



### INTRODUCTION

FIFTY-THREE YEARS AGO, A TIME WHEN MORE THAN almost two-thirds of the citizens of the Caribbean Community were not yet born, the West Indies Federation represented for many of us the dawning of a new era. Our political, economic and social landscape was about to be changed in dynamic and fundamental ways. There were of course many who were sceptical and with good reason, apart from the natural fear of the unknown. The Federation was not in fact a symbol of freedom and of independence, won

after years of engagement in violent struggle and therefore a prize to be cherished and preserved. There were no proud victories on the battlefield as took place in many emerging nations in Africa; nor were there no less traumatic experiences of non-violence and sacrifice that gave meaning and substance to the independence of India from British colonial rule. The British Government for reasons which need not detain us here fully embraced the request of our region's leaders for independence and offered it to us on the virtual platter. Apart from the sceptics referred to earlier there were also many among us who wanted a Federation, but one whose powers were so circumscribed as to be unlikely to affect or diminish those which they had already inherited as leaders of their respective self-governing colonies. For them that inheritance was a legacy to be cherished at all costs including the

failure of the federal experiment if necessary. One only has to look at the pace at which both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago developed as independent states following the collapse of the Federation to be emboldened in the suspicion that there was little regret at its demise.

For the rest of us the Federation, even with its limited powers, was a symbol of hope for the future of something bigger than being an islander with due respect to the geographical locations of Belize and Guyana. It represented our unique oneness against the outside world. Those little pals of mine, Ramadin and Valentine were not Trinidadians and Jamaicans, they were who we all were West Indians. The Federation was the embryo in the realization of a vision of something called the Caribbean Community, where as a body of people linked by our history, our culture and even our seas, we could collectively harness our mental and our physical resources, put behind us the stigma of slavery and indentureship, and create a proud vibrant nation. It is that hope, that vision which has sustained us over the years.

The vast majority of the peoples that comprise the Caribbean Community today were born in the period that began with the collapse of eight of the Federation of the West Indies. Absent from their lives are real symbols of unity, even the most rudimentary such as the free movement of citizens within the geographical space that comprises the Community. They have witnessed instead and have increasingly been a part of the inevitable struggle of having to survive within limited economies and they have seen their leaders become inactive when collective solutions seem to be the appropriate route to take. The more fortunate have left their respective shores taking their talents and their skills with them. And from their new home in the diaspora, they cry out for the opportunity to be a part of a strong and vibrant Caribbean Community.

To conclude that progress towards the realization of the dream of an organized and effective Community had not been anything to shout about and that the feeling of oneness among the Community's citizens falls far short of the desired critical mass, for such effectiveness would be reflective of the disappointment so many of us share regarding the current state of the regional integration process. To be fair, much has been accomplished. The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, for example, is a positive framework that addresses the foundational elements of what can become a strong and viable Community. Yet after all these years two of the strongest and most influential advocates for a community of Caribbean nations working together for the common good of all its citizens (The Rt. Hon. Percival J. Patterson, OCC and Sir Shridath S. Ramphal, OCC) can declare, though not yet from the depth of despair, that all is far from well in our Community. Both declarations, it is apposite to note, were made within a few months of each other and during the course of this year.

What has gone off course and what prescriptions are there to place us on track again? There is no shortage of answers. The Caribbean condition has been analysed ad nauseum. The Papers in this Publication of The Integrationist represent the Editors choice from among the thousands of articles, books and other commentaries that have provided clear and reasoned responses and solutions, to inform and guide our leaders to the extent of course, that they are genuinely interested in the creation of a Community For All. Leadership here refers not only to the political leadership but also to all pockets of influence in support of the dream of Caribbean unity.

Traditionally, we in the Caribbean have looked to our elected leaders to provide guidance and to take the blame for our failures. Almost all of the prescriptions for our success as a community are predicated on advice regarding what our political leaders should do. In a normal context this is the acceptable path to change and more forward-looking action. Is our situation to be regarded as normal after nearly five decades of minimal progress? It certainly cannot be and continued action as has taken place in the past will continue to produce similar results.

In a Time For Action, that extraordinary piece of work that analysed the West Indian condition as seen through the eyes of the citizens of the Caribbean Community, the voice of the people was heard. That voice sought action that would improve their lives and the communities in which they lived. It demanded that action taken in their name should also allow them to share more equitably in the intended benefits. It argued that the political and economic space which a Caribbean Community provided should also be theirs to share in an equitable manner. It made the telling point that all these intended benefits should be within a system of justice that protected their rights and their property.

Perhaps the time has come to relieve our political leadership of the burden of carrying the Caribbean Community alone and for us to do so not through pious, often self-serving statements but through formal and positive action. The citizens of the Caribbean Community need to be brought formally into the process that directly affects them and their capacity to live better lives. Firstly, they need to be informed and educated so that they can better appreciate what benefits, however little these may seem, that Community membership has brought them. Armed with such information they will be better equipped to take increasingly more positive action in their collective interest.

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
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## CARICOM: Appropriate Adaptation Changing Global Environment



### INTRODUCTION

THE PAPERS PRESENTED IN THIS ISSUE REPRESENT A set of penetrating analyses of aspects of the negotiations underway, as well as reform proposals and adjustment processes to which CARICOM countries have been, and will be subjected for the foreseeable future. Collectively, they consider the roles of the political economist, small State diplomat, non-State actors, and development journalist; options facing the countries in respect of their role as commodity producers (especially of bananas and sugar); the possibility of a novel approach to delimitation of the interlocking EEZ in the Caribbean; and renewal of the agenda of political integration.

While they all have an important bearing on the challenge of adapting to the changing environment, there is, however, no forced uniformity in the line of thought or emphasis.

In respect of trade in the new international environment, Ambassador Edwin Laurent advocates ruthless prioritization of the national interest of the small, single product-dependent State and mobilization of the entire national capacity of such States, to ensure that they influence decision-making of key governments and multilateral institutions so as to make proposed

adjustments to the “irreversible” trends of globalisation, smooth or acceptable in their speed of compliance or unemployment impact. Recognising there is no feasible alternative, ultimately, to diversification in bananas. He emphasizes the need to manage the relative speeds of liberalisation and diversification to avoid economic decline.

Professor Clive Thomas challenges elements of the EU Reform proposal for sugar, the portrayal of the Sugar Protocol as a handout, as well as the expectation that liberalization of sugar markets would be so advanced worldwide as to expand, significantly, opportunities for exports from CARICOM countries, but he acknowledges that numerous studies could not identify an alternative to sugar in terms of resource use, employment, linkages and so on. He also recognises that earnings from the ACP/EU arrangement have been vital to the success of the industry. However, he cautions against investment, especially of loan capital, in the industry at this stage of uncertainty. These views contrast with those of other industry analysts.

Jessica Byron calls for a realistic assessment of the results of the COTONOU and FTAA negotiations and recognition, perhaps anti-intuitively, that the former was the end, rather than the beginning, of a process with the EU.

In respect of legal issues, Dundas calls for recognition of the lack of capacity in the area of maritime boundary delimitation and advocates a contributory regional arrangement paid for by Governments, which would facilitate direct negotiations among Member States as against the more costly third-party settlements now in process for certain countries, thereby minimising acrimony among Member States and advancing the time horizon for accessing EEZ resources. Only eight of a potential forty-eight maritime boundaries have so far been settled.

Farier reviews the machinery in CARICOM for compliance and dispute settlement, anticipating that it would need to be reinforced in at least three ways; by facilitating urgent maritime boundary delimitation needs; by strengthening the reporting and institutional requirements for observance of the Charter of Civil Society; by strengthening, in an appropriate form, the Secretariat’s capacity to initiate action to hold up a regional frame of reference in the case of disputes originating in intrastate political divergences, bilateral disputes between States or disputes affecting fundamental interests of the Community. The onset of the Single Market would make such adjustments productive.

Judge Shahabuddeen examines the role, operating principles, and significance of international criminal tribunals noting that such tribunals could best establish that there is a place in the international community for the promotion of humanitarian law and processes of accountability and reconciliation in theatres of conflict. The Caribbean should appreciate such

processes as part of the effort to maintain the bonds holding together the international community.

Professors Kari Levitt and Lloyd Best (the latter through Carey Fraser's review of a series of essays) see the value of creating space for independent economic thinking and the return to the agenda of political union with the objective of fulfilling the sense of "West Indian" nationhood.

James appeals for the journalist to be less "parochial" and defensive of sectoral and national interests and more "global" in perspective in terms of reporting on developments and impacts of globalisation.

Parris reviews standard approaches and conventional concepts related to Economic Development and identifies nine such concepts for abandonment. Using a framework built on a systems approach, he offers nine "heresies" for consideration.

These observations merely set the tone for appreciation of the thrust of the Papers. The following synopses provide a compact entrée to the content of each contribution.

## TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

### Bananas

Edwin Laurent reviews the origins of the challenges facing CARICOM banana-exporting Member States and the evolution of reform of the EU banana import regime consequent on the 1993 decision on the establishment of a European Single Market, including a unified market for bananas.

In his Paper entitled "The Banana Dilemma – The Challenges Facing CARICOM", Laurent is keen to draw attention to the lessons learnt from the diplomacy of some of the smallest States in the world, which had "a decisive bearing on the evolution of the regime and the nature of the eventual resolution of the dispute". He identifies the role particularly of the Windward Islands as an "instructive case of the active participation of very small countries in major international trade negotiations and diplomacy". Their aim was to forestall consequential upheaval and crisis in Caribbean States dependent on the lucrative export of bananas to Europe and to continue arrangements for security of access as well as high returns despite successive exchanges to the regulatory system governing the banana export trade.

Laurent identifies three main options presented by the impetus towards liberalization and the reduction of trade preferences:

- i. bridge the competitiveness gap by reducing costs;
- ii. go against the liberalization trend by seeking continuation of preferential margins (keeping high import tariffs on other bananas

- while continuing to enjoy duty free entry of bananas under the ACP-EU Agreement); and
- iii. replace lost income and employment through new productive activities.

Laurent acknowledges that the third option is the only feasible long-term solution on account of the CARICOM States structural disadvantages. Yet he notes there was no alternative to buying time as “the decline of their banana industries resulting from EU reforms has been outpacing their progress in diversification”. Survival required raising the banana issue to the top of the foreign policy agenda in these States and pursuing active diplomacy “to change the relative speed of the two forces, i.e., slow down the pace of liberalization and loss of protection on the EU market whilst accelerating the domestic processes of diversification and adaptation”. The objective of diplomacy was to buy time to smooth over a potentially disruptive period in which unemployment would increase and national earnings decline – facing the fact that there was a demonstrably “substantive differential” in the production and shipping costs of bananas from the Caribbean compared with Latin American competitors.

The author explains the evolution of the EU regime between 1993 and 2000 identifying key elements, the interests of competing parties, and the pursuit of CARICOM in that context of an arrangement that would impede ACP bananas being supplanted on the EC market by “dollar” bananas. Part of this effort included promotion of arrangements by the UK, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece to obtain derogations from the “free circulation of goods” requirement so that re-export of “dollar” bananas could be restricted from these countries within the EU with liberal import regimes to other Members. Furthermore, CARICOM Members sought to have protective arrangements enshrined in the Lomé Conventions in which the EC undertook to ensure that none of the twelve traditional ACP suppliers would be placed in a disadvantaged position. In the prelude to the first battles, knowing that the derogations to free circulation above-mentioned would come to an end with their replacements by a unified import regime, the Windward Islands in particular, stepped-up efforts to ensure that the new system itself would permit continued marketing of their bananas on a viable basis, avoiding total reliance on a direct subsidy – the aim being to deliver “equivalent security of access and remunerative prices”.

The diplomacy of “buying time” and “equivalent security of access with remunerative prices” is striking. According to Laurent, it involved significant effort at coalition-building from the outset, to ensure that the Common Organisation of the Market (COM) in Europe would effectively limit imports of “dollar” bananas so as to “ensure a tight market and high enough prices”. The coalition included other ACP suppliers, the Caribbean Banana Exporters

Association (CBEA), Geest Plc, Fyffes Plc, as well as marketing companies and producer interests in the French Overseas Dependencies. A wide-ranging campaign targeted European Council Ministers, and various influential groups including the Commission, the EU Parliament, national Governments and Parliaments, NGOs, Church Groups and Journalists among others. "Third Parties" who could exert pressure on Europe for liberal reform were also targeted.

Through the changes to EC Regulation 404 of 1993, the Banana Framework Agreement of 1994 and subsequent changes, ACP diplomacy (with the ACP Working Group on Bananas chaired by the Representative of the Windward Islands) remained active in the context of the Dispute Settlement process at WTO on the issue. This effort included arrangements for the legal defence of the contested ACP/EU provisions through use of a legal consortium (although the inclusion of non-permanent specialists in country delegations was at first rejected). The Windward Islands sought, though also unsuccessfully, to secure "Third Party" status so as to be in a position to launch an appeal against an adverse Panel decision, yet in 1997 the sovereign right of countries to determine the composition of delegations to Panel Meetings was acknowledged in principle. Indeed, the WTO Advisory Law Centre was subsequently created in recognition of the institutional incapacity in this regard in most developing countries – indirectly responding to the ACP argument against disempowerment of small States.

Under the negotiated deals of 2001 between EU/US/Ecuador, new import rules have been implemented including export quotas as well as a market-sharing arrangement in which import licences were shared between traditional and non-traditional "operators", with 83 per cent to the former and 17 per cent to the latter. As part of a deal with Ecuador, some 100,000 tonnes were transferred from the ACP quota to the MFN (Latin American) quota in order to obtain a GATT waiver for the ACP quota – under Article XIII, i.e., for Phase II which began on 1 January 2002.

The new system involving the use of "operators" eligible for licences has been implemented. This concession by the EU has brought the dispute before the WTO to a formal end. The problem remains however that despite the quota for "dollar" bananas, the licences and the requirement for such bananas to pay 75 Euros per tonne import duty, "dollar" bananas can still be sold cheaper in the UK market. Thus, the Windward Islands, as high-cost suppliers, are unable to compete while others exert a downward pressure on prices overall. This is compounded by the de facto loss of subsidy enjoyed under the "B" licensing system that ended in 2000.

The author acknowledges that the success of their diplomacy has not entirely averted difficulties: the number of growers in the Windwards falling from 24,100 in 1993 to 7,300 in 2001; the emergence of massive overall rural

unemployment; a significant decline in export volumes from 274,000 tonnes to 99,000 tonnes; increased dollar quotas being granted in 2004 on the accession of new members to the EU. Importantly there remains the complex task of determining the rate of tariff (beyond the current 75 Euros per tonne on Latin American bananas) needed to protect the interests and viability of the high-cost Caribbean producers.

Laurent recognizes that a market-share of five (5) per cent, which has declined after EU enlargement, is a small supply segment from which to influence the market, without adequate independent political influence in Europe. CARICOM on its own would therefore be at risk of having its interests and concerns ignored in future import arrangements if this were not recognised.

There is however, he contends, a good basis for active diplomacy: the definite and “unambiguous” legal obligations to banana suppliers where under Protocol 5 of the COTONOU Agreement, EU has undertaken to ensure the viability of ACP export industries and to provide a continuing market outlet for them. These should be invoked sooner rather than later. Yet, he admits that the legal security of this provision is not watertight in that the EC has sought to exclude explicit market access commitments from the Banana Protocol under the COTONOU Agreement and the wording of Article 37:6 does not dictate the automatic continuation of existing trade benefits. Moreover, attacking principles of preferential treatment for developing countries is no longer considered politically incorrect.

In terms of broad systemic lessons to be learnt, the author highlights the following:

- “Small size and the resulting lack of commercial and political power do not by themselves preclude countries from exercising influence in international decision-making”, but this requires “clear, readily articulated comprehensible objectives” identified with ruthless prioritisation in terms of real national interests. Such a concern must however allow an interest beyond those of direct concern to enable the building of strategic alliances.
- “The stronger the international opposition to the particular goal being sought, the greater the effort needed” in terms of skillful presentation and valid arguments capable of changing the positions of governments and of major institutions.
- CARICOM States need to “effectively mobilize and engage all their national capacity” – political, diplomatic, business, NGO, academic and other – “who will articulate and advance their identified goals with persuasive, consistent and coherent arguments”.

It is essential that small States “field skilled and dedicated tacticians and negotiators who can actually win debates and persuade even the experienced and highly-competent negotiators and representatives of developed countries and multilateral institutions.”

In the author’s assessment, to date, the EU market has continued to be regulated, allowing changes to be benign, while delivering continued market access and price above market levels, on account of the active participation in relevant EU processes and negotiations by CARICOM States. Changes in future that affect the required favourable preferential access will demand that CARICOM remain active in diplomacy, taking into account the changed political dynamics but also the shared interests with specific Members of the EU. Though the apparent dilemma between liberalisation and diversification is artificial, since liberalisation is “irreversible”, the seeming conflict must be dealt with by greatly accelerating domestic pressures for restructuring and diversification while seeking to “buy time” through active engagement in the EU market reform process. Economic decline is not inevitable, even if recent trends instill little confidence.

## Sugar

In his Paper entitled “Smoke and Mirrors, Reform or Rip-Off: The EU Sugar Reform Proposals and CARICOM Sugar”, Professor Clive Thomas notes that the global sugar market clarifies in an unusually striking way, the difficulties of transition of the global trading regime to a new, WTO-led, rules-based, liberalised trade order, with a growing gap between rhetoric and reality. As one of the most preference-dependent Regions in the world, CARICOM exemplifies the difficulties being experienced, as seen in its sugar sector.

The immediate trigger of the difficulties facing CARICOM is the radical proposal made in July 2004 by the EU to reform its sugar regime. The proposal has understandably elicited strong adverse reactions from CARICOM Heads of Government estimating that it could mean a loss of \$180 million in the first three years and \$90 million annually thereafter.

Thomas provides a broad overview of the global sugar market. He draws attention to fundamental features of the market mainly: its high segmentation, rigid protection, heavy administration and penetration of political and social factors unlike any other global commodity.

Sugar itself, he observes is a complex commodity derived from sources other than sugarcane – the latter facing competition that has grown dramatically, for instance, from high fructose corn syrup – leading to accumulation of sugar stocks.

Against that background, Thomas points out that CARICOM’s role as a significant exporter and player has declined from the 1980s. From a peak of

1.4 million tonnes in 1965, CARICOM produces half of that volume, with its producing countries being reduced from ten to six, and falling. Eighty-seven per cent (87%) of its exports are directed to the EU preferential market with five per cent (5%) to the USA and only six per cent (6%) to the world market. He identifies several factors contributing to the decline (pp.914), noting that the survival of the industry in the Region is dependent on the sales in the preferential markets of the EU, USA, and CARICOM itself, rather than the world market, since the weighted average cost of production in the Region, at 29 US cents per lb., is more than four times the world market price of sugar.

In respect of the relationship with the EU over three-quarters of the Region's export sales are directed to that lucrative market in two segments, viz; The Sugar Protocol (92%) and the Special Preferential Arrangement (8%). In specific reference to the "preferential nature of the ACP/EU arrangement, he contends that the Sugar Protocol is mistakenly presented as a unilateral "handout" by the Europe. Contrary to that position, it had its origin in Britain's calculated post-World War II search for security of access to supplies for its refineries and was contracted (the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement of 1951-1974) at a price when the world market price was 2½ times as high. In 1975, because of its strategic value to Europe, the arrangement was pursued in the form of the Sugar Protocol of the Lomé Convention (simultaneously part of, and separate from it) provision being made for its continuance in event the Lomé Convention came to an end and for the indefinite timeframe of its provisions including non-reduction of volumes under Article 3(2), and assurance of continued application of the provisions under Article 8(2).

To all intents and purposes, the Sugar Protocol, contracted as an agreement that would not be time bound, must therefore be approached as reflecting a "convergence of interests between colonial and ex-colonial producers, British and European refineries, European beet sugar farmers" which made it worthwhile as it could be linked to the domestic price paid to European beet farmers, thereby contributing to the maintenance of farmer incomes and output, and securing the rural way of life in parts of Europe. It is the Special Preferential Arrangement of 1995, providing initially for 111,269 tonnes (now reducing) that clearly exists as the preferential market supplementation to the ACP/EU Sugar Protocol.

Accordingly, Thomas regards as most regrettable the mistaken portrayal of this Protocol as a handout and advocates a "public relations offensive" by the Caribbean to correct it, emphasising that it was a contractual arrangement aimed at mutual economic advantage through assured supplies and long-term stability of earnings. He highlights the fact that the arrangement of the Protocol was to Europe's greater advantage, since (though not anticipated) it had the effect of converting the EU, the world's largest importer when the Protocol was signed, into the world's largest exporter (white sugar) as well as the third largest producer (18 million tonnes) after

Brazil and India respectively, 24 million and 20 million tonnes. The clear advantage could be seen in the fact that in two decades the Protocol has brought about an “astonishing transformation” in Europe – though not the stated intent – in return for EU paying a special price linked to its own beet farmers. The effect of which has been to encourage production in Europe on a scale requiring the large surplus to be routinely dumped on the world market.

On the other hand, CARICOM sugar-producing countries evidently have not done as well. Although sugar prices were not as volatile, there has still been instability ranging from as high as seventy per cent (70%) in Jamaica to forty-five per cent (45%) in Belize and twenty per cent (20%) in Guyana. In three other CARICOM States, the reduction exceeded sixty-four per cent (64%). The benefit to CARICOM was in essence from income transfers on account of Protocol prices being two to four times higher than world market prices for long periods.

In examining the elements of the EU Reform proposal, Thomas noted that after the merger of A and B quotas which are subsidy-eligible, the volume of subsidised exports will be reduced by 2.8 million tonnes over four years commencing in 2005. It could result in substantial decline in subsidised exports. On the other hand, high fructose corn syrup (a cane sugar substitute) will have its quota expanded by 100,000 tonnes annually for three years starting in 2005/06. Furthermore, the EBA quota combined with import tariff reductions could lead to prices for ACP sugar relatively lower than those on the US market. The object of the new proposals must therefore be seen for what it is – to scuttle the intent of the Protocol while not directly challenging its legality.

Thomas points out that the WTO Panel’s finding on the BAT challenge to the EU was that an additional amount of 1.6 million tonnes of refined sugar was being exported by the EU and was the equivalent of sugar the EU imported from the ACP and India. He characterises this as “deception practised by the EU over all these years” – noting that at the outset of the Protocol, CARICOM Countries had accepted in good faith a price for sugar that was a fraction of the then world price, on the expectation that the price provided in the long-term would adequately remunerate reasonably efficient producers. In the result, the EU crafted an internal regime that enabled it to become simultaneously the world’s largest exporter of white sugar and importer of raw sugar.

In the EU’s effort to play a lead role in restarting the DOHA Development agenda talks, the EBA, under the Reform proposal of forty-nine (49) countries, offers a quota based on their best export figures of the recent past, plus an additional fifteen per cent (15%) each year. The EU, in circumventing the required consultation with the ACP, appears to have introduced the Initiative with the cynical intent of stimulating those

countries exports to fill the SPS segment of the EU market at the expense of current beneficiaries. Currently, the EBA countries produce 2 million tonnes mainly for domestic use. Also, the perceived generosity of the EU was achieved at the expense of ACP exporters in that praise was received while the transfer of benefits was not from the rich but from the poor to the poorer. Furthermore, the EBA is now a fixed parameter guaranteed at prices no lower than ACP prices. Unmistakably then, it competes with ACP sugar on the EU preferential market, continuing erosion of preferences. While the EU promised to consider introduction of specific programmes, such as for the banana sector, to help the ACP process of modernisation, competitiveness and diversification out of sugar, the importance of this is uncertain since in practice the banana assistance programmes have been far from successful.

In respect of the US sugar market and policy, Thomas notes that the system involves quotas for forty (40) countries with CARICOM assigned 53,000 tonnes out of 1.3 million tonnes. The US had committed under WTO to import each marketing year, 1.256 million short tonnes of raw sugar. However, as a member of NAFTA, an additional allocation is made to Mexico. This obligation is subject to a transitional period ending by the financial year 2007, but could then impact significantly on the USTRQ system under which CARICOM countries currently benefit. The other aspect of the US system, which is the Farm Support Programme, involves a loan arrangement for sugar processors which, analysis shows, is likely to affect the floor for sugar prices on the US domestic market by the manner of its operation in practice, leading to relatively better prices for sugar.

Thomas notes that the role of non-market factors in shaping the sugar market and trade are so pervasive that even in rigid free-market-oriented administrations, it would be difficult to make speedy and significant changes affecting the rural vote. Thus, despite efforts to reform inefficient systems of production subsidisation, realistically little change in terms of opening markets can be expected in the foreseeable future in terms of subsidies. In any event, CARICOM sugar producers themselves – who have benefited like their sponsors from income transfers because of the high cost of production, find that the availability of this benefit is vital to survival. In fact, while there are those who say that the arrangement is detrimental because it delays diversification, “none of the numerous studies of various alternative crops in the Region has shown that any of them has come close to what sugar offers in terms of effective resource use, employment, scale of operations and livelihoods it can sustain in terms of linkages, multiplier effects and so on”.

However, overall, it would not be wise to expect markets to become free, given all the “embedded” political and social considerations. This, therefore, calls for extreme caution in investing in sugar now, especially with loan capital, unless like Brazil one can make a profit at the low price of 7-8 cents

per lb. or produce for a sizeable domestic market. The author holds the view that these two options do not exist for CARICOM.

Thomas presents four (4) options:

- i. To abandon sugar production altogether if costs exceed the projected reduced EU price, unless non-commercial factors (political, social, and cultural) dictate otherwise.
- ii. To aim at production for continued preferential prices where, even if lowered, they can still cover the cost of production and provide a reasonable return. Efficient production is essential to this option, which does not support plans to expand output to sell the excess on the world market, on the presumption that increased output and sales would reduce unit costs.
- iii. To continue sugar production to seek to achieve value-added to raw sugar exports through further processing or production of specialty sugar, to obtain increased commercial use of sugar assets in areas other than sugar, or to increase commercial use of their sugar by-products.
- iv. To continue to produce sugar for use as a chemical feedstock rather than for its sweetener properties.

However, the foregoing would make sense only with a regional approach going well beyond current forms and levels of cooperation. In this connection he advises concentration on eight (8) new areas, including: financing the recapitalization– restructuring of the industry; harmonisation of domestic sugar import/sales policy regimes; rationalising the production of refined sugar; redefining the sugar enterprise.

### **Multilateral Negotiations**

Jessica Byron, in “CARICOM and the Current Challenges of Multilateral Negotiations”, draws attention to two key efforts undertaken by CARICOM since the early 1990s to prepare itself for the onslaught of globalisation. She singles out the establishment of the Single Market and Economy as a way of countering economic and political marginalisation and the undertaking of drastic structural adjustment processes to increase competitiveness. Viewing globalisation and their limited options with apprehension, CARICOM countries, she feels, essentially adopted a defensive posture. This was informed by the concern at the steady phasing out of development principles secured during North-South negotiations of the 1960s and 1970s especially non-reciprocal preferential market access, as well as concessionary capital flows for developing countries.

CARICOM now has to face the re-categorisation of developing countries in which middle-income countries like most CARICOM States would be “gradually subjected to the rules of a liberalised global economy”.

She notes that CARICOM has had to take steps to restructure the established mechanisms for diplomatic coordination in order to manage the wide range of trade negotiations facing them in the GATT/WTO, in the context of EU-ACP relations and within the Western Hemisphere. She examines the negotiations and trade environment since 1994 and CARICOM’s institutional responses since then, including negotiations leading to the COTONOU Treaty of 2000 and negotiations towards a Free Trade Area of the Americas, which began in 1998. She reviews the issue of regional trade agreements and the arguments offered for their use as defence measures against marginalisation.

Noting that the Caribbean has followed the trend of renewing its embrace of regionalism in 1989, in its decision to allow capital flows and greater mobility of labour – also using trade liberalisation within the group of countries as a training ground to enable businesses to become more competitive before they are fully exposed to global free market forces. She further notes that CARICOM, in its preparation, has also undertaken a level of institution-building including the Court of Justice (CCJ), the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) and the CARFICOM Bureau of Standards and Quality (CROSQ). In respect of the RNM, CARICOM has moved from a loose inter-governmentalism to promote tighter foreign policy coordination, research, and training essentially linked to enabling the countries as a group to participate in complex multilateral negotiations “singing from the same hymn sheet”.

In respect of CARICOM’s efforts, Byron takes the view that ACP/COTONOU negotiations were a test run for the RNM, which revealed strengths and shortcomings (including the need for active involvement of the private sector with government representatives). However, the RNM’s role has evolved to that of provision of assistance in more limited trade liberalisation agreements.

The Caribbean was therefore caught in the dilemma of negotiating an agreement on trade and development with ground rules set by another forum. Thus, COTONOU already revealed the extent to which neoliberal ideology and trade rules had to be engaged. To this were added the changes required by Europe’s own internal projects, foremost among them being completion of the Single Market, with European Union targeted for 2002 and the accession of possibly ten (10) East and Central European countries over the next decade. Thus, CARICOM had to deal with a Europe engaged in reinventing its internal institutions and foreign relations to fit its new realities to the more general requirements of globalisation. Inevitably, CARICOM’s negotiation approaches had to take account of the priorities of the EU policy

agenda with their implications for degrees of EU flexibility and timeframes. New issues of prominence emerged: human rights, the rule of law and good governance practices; expansion of cooperation to include non-governmental action in consultation processes, policy formulation and access to funds.

Byron notes that, faced with the many multilateral trade talks and deadlines, CARICOM viewed with “foreboding” the contradictions that might arise in different negotiating arenas, the difficulties of insulating one set of trade talks from another, and the issue of timing. In addition, CARICOM faced the dilemma of choosing maintenance of ACP cohesion, or separate regional partnership in its relationship with ACP and, internally, fragile cohesion among its members because of asymmetrical levels of dependence on the EU for aid or trade in commodities/services.

Byron expresses the view that the COTONOU process had value in the outcome of an all-ACP transition agreement with the EU, which essentially bought time and provided the financial and technical assistance for capacity-building and adjustment to trade liberalisation. It also provided a package of measures to enhance competitiveness in the rum industry in preparation for full liberalisation. On the other hand, it represented the end of an era rather than the start of something new with Europe’s new priorities more linked to the WTO agenda. New talks with the EU would therefore require a different type of preparation with increased input from the private sector and restructuring of the RNM as the erosion of ACP cohesion proceeds.

Byron notes that talks in trade liberalisation under the FTAA proceeded in a substantially different environment. They were dominated by the Western Hemisphere’s largest markets and powerful economies in which the “major dynamic is the juxtaposition of Brazil and the United States and their respective regional blocs MERCOSUR and NAFTA”. The talks did not proceed in a context of development cooperation, where small size, vulnerability are relatively settled issues. CARICOM, the smallest sub-group but with a high Human Development Index (HDI), would not have it easy to make the case of economic vulnerability of small size in a hemisphere with high levels of poverty and considerable economic inequality within most countries. Since 9/11 of 2001, primacy of attention had turned to national security preoccupation, especially in the United States.

Moreover, the US Administration had found it useful to engage in strategy of “competitive liberalisation” with selective negotiations of a bilateral or plurilateral nature to pressure other parties to understandings in larger multilateral fora. Brazil itself saw its major concern as consolidation of MERCOSUR and strengthening its links with other countries and sub-regions in the Americas.

CARICOM, on its part, never succeeded in bringing about the formation of a Central America/Caribbean alliance of smaller economies, as revealed in two distinct approaches: Central America focussing on market access to

Mexico and the USA, while CARICOM concentrated on clearer definition of Special and Differential Treatment, realistic timeframes for compliance and adequate technical assistance for capacity-building. On top of this CARICOM Members had less than a common perspective within the Group; some countries showing less than keen interest, as the chances of a favourable outcome for smaller economies grew dim; others like Trinidad, more proactive in pursuing its objective of becoming a Caribbean hub of interest in South America.

The FTAA talks which started in April 1998 are unlikely, Byron feels, to see major initiatives before January 2005, and it seems likely that it could be a “greatly diluted hemisphere trade agreement” with a patchwork of plurilateral arrangements.

Byron is of the view that CARICOM may still have the possibility of signing on to a limited set of basic commitments in a two-track approach now possible under FTAA. It may provide some prospect for CARICOM, provided it accommodates special provisions for smaller economies. CARICOM has nevertheless to maintain concern with the impact of FTAA on its non-reciprocal access arrangements with the USA (up to 2008) under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Agreement of 2000. CARICOM must also prepare for the way relations with North America will change, given the signals of the just completed Central American Free Trade Agreement. Furthermore, it must be concerned that the “WTO plus” thrust of FTAA negotiations will further expose the extent of its institutional weakness, lack of capacity and preparedness.

Nevertheless, overall CARICOM could consider it has had value from the FTAA process in terms of general awareness and knowledge of Latin America as never before. This will be the basis of expanded economic, cultural and political contact and could reconfigure the international relations of the hemisphere. Another aspect of value has been the usefulness of FTAA as a training ground for a new generation of negotiators from government, business and even civil society. Indeed, FTAA, as well as COTONOU, have been “catalysts” for extensive restructuring of regional and domestic institutions and this is likely to be “irreversible” as societies strive to adopt and survive the processes of globalisation. The need has been underlined for small States to take an active approach to refashioning of a “universal international system”.

## LEGAL ISSUES

### Maritime Boundary Delimitation

Carl W. Dundas, in his contribution entitled “The Price of Failure to Negotiate Maritime Boundary Delimitation Agreements in CARICOM”,

revisits the issue to which he had drawn attention since 1984. He notes that since the early treaties of the colonial era, notably between the United Kingdom and Mexico in respect of Honduras/Belize (1893) and with Venezuela over the Gulf of Paria (1942), eight (8) delimitation treaties have been concluded by CARICOM independent States, one (1) by the UK on behalf of Montserrat with respect to Guadeloupe and a further five (5) on behalf of dependent territories. Even with this background, only eight (8) of approximately forty-eight (48) maritime boundaries have been settled (excluding the most recent Guyana / Barbados Treaty, which had been signed in early 2004). The Associated States alone have settled only five (5) of a potential twelve (12) maritime boundaries remaining to be settled. There are four (4) cases, he noted, currently subject to third party settlement, namely: Barbados / Trinidad and Tobago; Belize / Guatemala / Honduras; Guyana / Venezuela, and Guyana / Suriname.

Dundas reviews the essential elements of the agreements already concluded for the following countries: Haiti – Cuba; Haiti – Colombia; St. Lucia and France (Martinique); Dominica – France (Guadeloupe and Martinique); Trinidad and Tobago – Venezuela; Jamaica – Colombia; Jamaica – Cuba; UK (Montserrat) – France (Guadeloupe); Barbados – Guyana. He also examines five (5) involving CARICOM Associated States individually with such countries as Puerto Rico, US Virgin Islands, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras.

The thrust of Dundas' concern is the urgency of finding resolution to a situation created by the Law of the Sea Convention, which came into force in 1994. This Convention recognises a 12-nautical-mile limit for the territorial sea and archipelagic water zone, as well as a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) limit and an extended continental shelf beyond 200 miles and up to a 350-nautical-mile limit from the baseline of coastal States. These limits, especially for the EEZ, have far-reaching implications where potential claims of up to 200 miles cannot be easily accommodated and where at least six (6) CARICOM States can claim archipelagic status.

Dundas considers the need for both win-win and cost-efficient solutions. He compares estimates of elements of costs for direct negotiations with those for third party settlements, noting the latter could involve millions of dollars as against hundreds of thousands per party. In examining the cost elements of preparation from a clean slate (drafting of modern legislation, a hydrographical and technical report, appropriate maps and charts, preparation of a negotiating brief, formation of a negotiating team), he notes that it could cost several hundred thousand dollars (though much less than a million) depending on the dilatory nature of the process, compared with third party settlement, which typically involves several tiers of legal advisers/agents and technical experts, high-powered law firms. The latter could rise to

a conservative estimate of US\$10 million per party or US\$780 million for the remaining boundary delimitations (39) in the Region.

He urges the Region to consider the alternatives and choose the appropriate means in terms of cost-effectiveness, and avoidance of acrimony, and emphasises greater awareness of the need for adequate preparedness for negotiations. He notes that, as against several hundreds of millions of US dollars for third party settlement, for the remaining boundaries an investment of several million dollars in direct negotiations could achieve desired results. CARICOM could consider a contributory mechanism for this purpose.

Dundas points out that most CARICOM countries, indeed the Region as a whole, lack the technical expertise to construct maps and charts for delimitation and to advise during negotiations. Urgent steps therefore need to be taken to develop a cadre of hydrographical and technical experts to participate in maritime boundary-making within CARICOM. He advocates a regional investment, which he considers could be recouped, in part, from marine natural resources, particularly hydrocarbons, fisheries and perhaps new economic activities in marine areas. Regional institutions such as CARICOM, CDB, UWI, should promote public awareness of the nature and importance of delimitation of maritime boundaries in CARICOM.

CARICOM Member States should commit to settlement of maritime boundaries by negotiation, avoiding acrimony and saving tens of millions of dollars.

Finally, Dundas expresses the view that the taxpayers of CARICOM should be asked to make an investment in boundary-making through negotiations ranging from approximately US\$19.5 million, with each party investing US\$250,000 to up to four times as much, depending on the duration of the process of settlement which could be up to ten (10) years. The alternative is third party settlement of US\$10 million per party (a conservative estimate) rising to about US\$780 million.

### **Compliance, Enforcement, Dispute Settlement**

In his review of "Compliance, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement in CARICOM" Joseph Farier considers the scope of the mandates of key CARICOM organs and institutions, as well as the role of the office of Secretary-General, in the light of the perceived need for expediting implementation and pre-empting the adverse consequences of disputes within and between Member States, as well as between Member States and neighbouring states. His contribution provides an overview of provisions relating to the settlement of disputes in the area of trade as well as an examination of provisions in the Revised Treaty related to sustainable development, in particular, fisheries resource management. The Paper

reviews the modes of settlement specifically provided in the Treaty and the settlement of disputes with regard to maritime areas.

Beyond the issue of fisheries, the Paper notes that the interlocking EECs of the countries exemplified by the Guyana/Suriname dispute over the area of overlap in 2000, emphasizes the urgent need for attempts to provide for the resolution of issues of maritime boundaries delimitation. A brief review is also presented of approaches adopted to land-based border disputes, disputes originating in intrastate political divergences, and disputes of more recent origin in the maritime zone.

The Paper highlights the special role in dispute settlements reserved in the Treaty for the Head of Government Conference despite other Treaty provisions. It comments on the evolving role of COFCOR, particularly in regard to elections monitoring. It also invites comparison with the OAS.

The Paper in conclusion argues that the integration process could benefit from a significant enhancement in the area of facilitation of maritime boundary determinations. It must also prepare for a strengthened presence in intra-state political disputes because of the potential adverse consequences for national and regional growth. Additionally, it suggests the need for an enhancement of arrangements for implementation and monitoring of the Charter of Civil Society.

### **International Tribunals**

In his contribution entitled “The International Criminal Process and the Global Community”, Mohamed Shahabuddeen provides an overview of the mechanisms and principals involved in international criminal processes and enhances appreciation of the implications for a stable world environment.

He identifies the main post-World War Two tribunals, as established in respect of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Cambodia, as well as the adoption of the Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998, noting that they generally include internationally appointed judges although some comprise mixed panels of domestic and internationally appointed judges. He observes that part of their importance lies in the fact that they relate to our concern for promotion of values that bind the international community together, as well as the need to set restraints so that people in conflict are not swept away by ungovernable passions but rather respect that there are general laws of humanity. He advocates the view that international criminal justice should be seen as a process aiming at ensuring that parties feel they belong to a larger whole than their states or tribes and that their duties are to a “larger citizenship”.

Judge Shahabuddeen states that the role of international tribunals should not be seen as an attempt at history, as primarily concerned with

identifying the root or causal factors that inexorably caused the violence (thereby explaining the suffering of victims). He suggests that it is important to understand that a tribunal is concerned rather to “establish incredible events by credible evidence”.

Using as reference the tribunal on Yugoslavia (ICTY) established by the UN Security Council in 1993, he shows that international tribunals are broadly similar in composition with permanent judges as well as ad litem judges, Trial Chambers and Appeal Chambers. In a comment relevant to the Caribbean and the Caribbean Court of Justice, he notes that it is not unusual for courts and tribunals not to have much work at the beginning, but that their workload picks up as shown in the case of the ICTY, the Supreme Court of the United States which was held in low esteem at first, and the European Court of Justice.

Shahabuddeen observes that although a tribunal may be ad hoc and without machinery of its own, it is not lacking in compulsory authority. It does not need the consent of anybody, state or organization. Its establishment by the Security Council, including powerful states, does not unduly expose it to interference, since that Council confers “specific jurisdiction, space-bound and offences bound; but within the jurisdiction so defined, the Security Council retained no competence”. He acknowledges the natural concern over the use of tribunals to impose a victor’s “justice”, but argues that such concern should be allayed by the fact that the tribunal is not created within a relationship of victor and vanquished but to consider all who committed serious offences against international humanitarian law in a given theatre of armed conflict. The advantage of such a tribunal is that individual actors, winners and losers, are made aware that their actions may fall to be judged by an impartial body set up by the international community, seeking reconciliation and return to peace and security rather than vengeance. In this respect he cautions that it is a mistake to view even-handedness as necessarily requiring indicting all sides, irrespective of the seriousness of their crimes. Such an approach is not justice. A tribunal is best seen as the judicial embodiment of the international community with a concern for treating the leading cases, leaving middle and lesser cases for national courts.

Shahabuddeen points out that a tribunal is best seen as an international body essentially intended to help restore and maintain international peace and security in a manner consistent with the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with the laws governing its own functioning. It is not merely penal in operation. A tribunal contributes to settling wider issues of accountability, reconciliation and establishment of the truth behind the evils perpetrated. A tribunal bears in mind that, given the circumstances, peace may be equally served by amnesty or prosecution, or by a combination of both methods.

The integrity of a tribunal in its process lies in the framework of the legal instrument under which it functions and in the guarantee of impartiality and independence under which it discharges its responsibilities. Such impartiality is aided by judges recognizing the need for tolerance of the modalities of different systems; pursuing a Universalist outlook and appreciating that accused persons and witnesses may not come from the same legal backgrounds or cultures. A good tribunal is not the transposition of any national legal system. The judicial process steers away from close adherence, for instance, to common law processes which not only vary but could give rise to difficulties emerging from the fact that common law practices may not be familiar to those concerned in the proceedings. Other differences between courts and tribunals include the fact that there is no jury in tribunals, they can use hearsay evidence, and they basically use an inquisitorial approach rather than an adversarial one.

In respect of standards, a tribunal is duty-bound to fully respect recognised standards of human rights of the accused at all stages of the proceedings as contained in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – but may make appropriate modifications required by special circumstances. Its solutions must be recognisably “judicial”. One danger faced by the existence of several tribunals, however, is consistency of their decisions. Tribunals will normally depart from previous decisions for cogent reasons only. Thus generally, decisions of a Trial Chamber are persuasive with another and decisions of an Appeal Chamber with those of the other.

In a summary comment, Shahabuddeen notes: “Criticism has been made of the absence of a jury, the admission of hearsay evidence, a tendency in the direction of more liberal use of documentary material, the advance availability of witness statements to judges, the admissibility of sealed indictments, the practice of considering guilt and sentence at the same time with the result that matters of mitigation are not fully pleaded and the extent to which use is made of plea bargaining”. He contends that in terms of relevant principles in various jurisdictions, the foregoing practices should be supported.

Finally, Shahabuddeen notes tribunals are normally time-bound. Yet the choice of a tribunal should be preferred over other methods, especially if consistent with the General Assembly’s 1985 Milan Resolution on Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. In serious situations, criminal justice processes possessing international components should be supported, if not as a replica of ICTY then something close. Such tribunals could best establish in the international psyche that there is a place in the international community for international criminal processes. The Caribbean should appreciate such processes as part of the effort to maintain the bonds holding together the international community.

## POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

### Independent Thought

Kari Levitt, in "Independent Thought and the Caribbean Community", recalls the intellectual ferment that swept the Caribbean immediately following the advent of independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (1962) and Guyana and Barbados (1966). Fired by the will to move from political to economic decolonisation, the best and the brightest intellectuals generated ideas to inform national strategies for building agricultural and industrial capacity. They identified techniques of national planning to moderate external vulnerabilities, as well as support capacity to serve domestic and regional markets for food and simple manufactured goods. Critical, fresh and independent economic thinking focused on the longer run of structural transformation rather than annual budgets.

The experience of the Region encouraged new theorising for the development of the Caribbean on its own terms, which was reflected in conceptualisation of models of The Plantation Economy. This work was an innovative intellectual initiative to specify the obstacles to achieving a self-reliant, self-sustaining Caribbean economy and to bring about modifications in a situation where the economic sectors were dominated by foreign-owned and extractive industries and the plantation defined the social as well as political and economic structures. The new framework prepared by the Caribbean economists was to be a tool of economic planning, addressing the continuities of historical dependency in order to break with them. The Accounting Framework developed in this context, as she recalls, was to contain the database for the multi-sectoral economic planning model. The Caribbean countries have had divergent experiences over the years since then; but the work initiated at that time continues to offer relevant insights although the model to deal with breaking dependency (Model IV) remained to be completed.

Against the background of economic thinking on integration by economists in the 1960s, Levitt notes that important regional initiatives have been taken, including CARIFTA and CARICOM. The latter has gone beyond free trade to establish a common market and common institutions in areas such as health, education, and disaster preparedness at the regional level, but given the rather weak performances at the national level since 1973, the early vision has faltered, especially where it hinged on the robust economic prospects of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and the land, forest and mineral resources of El Dorado/Guyana. The economic performances expected of countries whose GDP per capita had exceeded that of Singapore, Mauritius and Malaysia, proved to be very disappointing. The strategy did not anticipate the collapse of Guyana and Jamaica in the mid-1970s and therefore

founded as it had assumed that the development of the MDCs, including Barbados, would be the engine of growth to lift the LDCs out of poverty. The 1990s saw the structural adjustment programmes of 1980, “repackaged and marketed as the coming of age of globalisation” promising the benefits of neo-liberal policies. Barbados stands out by the success of its own model based on the social compact as against the traditional IMF way.

The IMF policies have come to hold sway over the new generation of West Indian economists with economic policy shifted to neo-liberalism, whether “by conviction or by absence of a viable alternative”. Levitt expresses the view that Caribbean intellectuals have perhaps been too quick to concede the end of sovereignty including even such leaders as Michael Manley, who assumed responsibility for the disastrous financial liberalisation of 1991 in Jamaica.

The fundamental fact, she notes is that, like other countries in the developing world, the Caribbean was “adjusted” to the demise of the Bretton-Woods monetary order, but structural adjustment programmes of the IMF are linked to globalisation and result in “impoverishing competition” and declining commodity prices. Key elements of such programmes, financial liberalisation and trade liberalisation with the sweeping away of preferential market access could only worsen the situation as evidenced in low average rates of growth and continued vulnerability to external shocks.

Levitt argues that it is “time to reclaim the right to development and the right of nations to engage in the international economy on their own terms”. This requires adequate space to follow divergent paths to development according to a society’s priorities, its own culture, institutions, and philosophy. The Caribbean should recognise its undoubted achievements over 30 years, acknowledging the value of numerous regional milestones reached, and forge ahead notably with-

- deepening the CSME, and making economic integration effective, while avoiding a piecemeal approach;
- creating a pool of financial and administration resources to assist Member States;
- establishing a common political directorate and recognising the urgent need for political union “which can no longer be ignored”;
- undertaking a comprehensive stocktaking on the national and human wealth of the societies as part of preparation for the future.

Levitt posits that the case for closer political integration ultimately rests, not on economic propositions concerning benefits of scale, but on the sense of West Indian nationhood and the need to formulate indigenous approaches to economic, political and social development.

g u t t e r

### Lloyd Best: Independent Thinker

This issue of *The Integrationist* also carries Carey Fraser's review of "Independent Thought and Caribbean Freedom: Essays in Honour of Lloyd Best" edited by Selwyn Ryan, 2003.

Analysing the contributions made in the various essays, Fraser notes that they not only acknowledge Best's influence across generations and the breadth of his intellectual interests, but also underlines the distinctive quality of his work: seminal, provocative and iconoclastic. He emphasises Best's belief, running through his work, that knowledge is the key to transformation and to liberation at both individual and social levels and that "regional empowerment" must be derived from self-knowledge and self-definition. Best however, believed that freedom can only have legitimacy through the abandonment of "imported shibboleths". Fraser also highlights Best's capacity to unsettle others with the thrust of his own thought, his rhetorical skill and picing as he presents his thinking as a social scientist.

Fraser points to Best's advocacy of some coherent statement of the Caribbean historical process as a precondition for new policies aimed at transformation of the Caribbean. Best, he notes, himself speaks of "grasping the experiences of Caribbean life" as a prism through which to envision other "possible futures".

In terms of his political positions, he notes that Best's radicalism has opened the doors to fresh horizons of Caribbean potential. But Best, himself, held his distance from the "millenarian" and "messianic" content of current Caribbean popular culture. Yet, Best championed the need for an engaged community, open-ended commitment to dialogue and change, creation of space for a wider range of representation in the political order, separation of powers and avoidance of the style of top-down politics – including that of "Maximum Leader" which he felt was always tinged with "gansterism".

Important also, among the characteristics of the contribution of this "intellectual for intellectuals", is Best's open optimism about regionalism. Many contributors recognised the value of his own contribution in this area and emphasised the need to see further development of the work he and Kari Levitt had done in the 1960s on models of the Plantation Economy to inform economic planning for transformation.

His continuing regionalism may be understood by reference to his recent writing. In an editorial for the June 2 issue of *T&T Review* 2003, Best demonstrates his optimism about regionalism by welcoming what he considered to be a return to the "agenda of political union". Best noted that analysis and assessment seemed to be opening up in a way they never did for the last thirty years. He expressed the view that CARICOM would have to engage, rather than avoid, "intensive examination of its modalities and approaches" and that the Region should grasp the opportunity opening

up for “systematic elaboration of sovereign policies and strategies to detail planning and management in common on the basis of joint report and review and more precise projections on a comprehensive regional basis”.

Best considered that Trinidad’s new position could help move towards consolidation of a family of Caribbean nations, pulling the Region along “while also hoisting itself” – thus, by deploying surpluses that may be otherwise sterile, leading to the conversion of “prosperous island into viable region”. This call for a return to the political agenda of integration notably echoes that of Kari Levitt in her own contribution on “Independent Thought” in this issue of *The Integrationist*.

### **Role of the Business Journalist**

Canute James, in his Paper entitled “Journalism for Caribbean Development” argues that if journalists see themselves as “defenders of sectoral and national interests”, then they deny the impact of globalization at their preferential peril. He shares the view that opening of markets through globalization is not necessarily inconsistent with the promotion of national development, but that the presentation of relevant information is often deficient on the impact of globalization on national jurisdictions. Journalists could be better equipped to present both information and interpretation of contemporary developments.

The author refers to the position held in political leadership circles, “the media as a vanguard of the process of economic development and mobilisation”, and the view that national interest should be the overriding concern of media. He observes that the reporter is often, subconsciously, unwilling to adopt a role departing from that of support of his/her national territory, thereby failing to explain the causes and potential benefits of changes due to globalization.

James presents warnings against “the hazards of narrow ethnocentric thinking” and “verbiage . . . about Third World nations finding their own development paths” and the “promotional” role of the journalist. While there is an understandable concern by policymakers about small open economies being overwhelmed in the process of globalization, there is “no informational value gained by a defence of a sectoral or national interest”. The business journalist should present information that offers context, interpretation and analysis. While he/she cannot entirely escape a parochial responsibility “this parochial responsibility must have a global perspective”. It would be too radical an approach to expect the business journalist to adopt a “new position” in dealing with the impact of globalization. The business journalist’s position should be “to continue to stand in the centre”, any change being purely one of perspective. Readers, listeners and viewers must

be allowed to come to their own rational conclusions on the basis of context, interpretation and analysis presented by the journalist.

The business journalist should move away from a parochial view of developments in the jurisdiction being covered and instead offer information that is contextual, interpretative and analytical. Traditional actions of “development journalism” are no longer relevant in the age of globalisation. Accordingly, the business journalist in emerging economies such as those in the Caribbean, must adopt a changed perspective if he/she is to report effectively on the impact of globalisation.

### Heretical Concepts

Among the more provocative of the contributions in this issue is one by Haslyn Parris entitled “Development Redefined – Nine Heresies”. The author, based on a chapter from his book *BUNARO – From Light to Darkness*, seeks to engage readers in a set of unconventional, even iconoclastic ideas. He encourages readers to take the heretical step of jumping out of some well-established thinking ruts, as a prerequisite for dealing with the Caribbean’s problems of economic development.

He pinpoints nine traditional concepts which he terms “heresies”, for immolation. These are:

1. that useful analytical purpose is served by trying to define a class currently called “developing economies”;
2. that there is analytical merit in trying to derive tools of economic analysis designed to determine whether one economy is more developed than another, or whether the same economy is more developed than it used to be;
3. that guidance from institutions outside the economy is useful in determining the target levels of various parameters at which our economy should be aiming;
4. that one’s ability to predict the economy’s behaviour improves *pari passu* with the sophistication or accuracy of measurement of the economy’s vital statistics;
5. that it is useful to identify a section of the economy called the “parallel economy” and to focus on means of integrating it into the official economy;
6. that economic development might best be pursued by emulation, i.e. by applying a model similar to that used by some other economy which we have defined to be “successful” in the development process;
7. that the same economic policies, differences in the international milieu apart, will produce the same or similar results in two different economies in two different time eras;

8. that the ends we intend for the economy should uniquely determine the means we deploy for achieving those ends; and
9. that “market forces” are analytically useful concepts for dealing in any other than a pedagogical manner with the policy areas of economic management.

However, Parris expresses reservation that the recommended demolition of some of the pillars of our standard framework for approaching economic development are likely to be as unappealing as some found the initial work of Brian Arthur on “increasing returns”. He notes also that Tolstoy was right when he wrote: I know most men, including those at ease with problems of the greatest complexity, can seldom accept even the simplest and most obvious truth if it be such as would oblige them to admit the falsity of conclusions which they have delighted in explaining to colleagues, which they have proudly taught to others, and which they have woven, thread by thread, into the fabric of their lives.


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30.

## ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION & JOB CREATION: The Caribbean Experience



### INTRODUCTION

*THE CARIBBEAN EXPERIENCE: The Growth Debate*

“Make no mistake about it. Our region is in the throes of the greatest crisis since Independence. The spectre of evolving into failed societies is no longer a subject of imagination. How our societies crawl out of this vicious vortex of persistent low growth, crippling debt, huge fiscal deficits and high unemployment are the most important questions facing us at this time.”

### THIS UN-NERVING PORTRAYAL OF THE CARIBBEAN BY

**ONE** of the Prime Ministers, Dr. Kenny Anthony of St. Lucia, is in keeping with the prevailing literature on Caribbean economic growth and unemployment over the past four decades. An equally pessimistic portrayal has been provided by an IMF working paper entitled “Caribbean Growth in an International Perspective: The Role of Tourism and Size.” According to the authors Neta, Thacker et. al.,

“Caribbean countries have experienced low growth since the 1980s, with the current global slowdown derailing the feeble recovery of the early 2000s. The region has been buffeted by a series of adverse exogenous shocks over time, including the erosion of trade preferences; the decline of official foreign

assistance; and recessions in source countries that drive tourism and FDI in the region. The recent global slowdown has exacerbated the already declining trend in growth. As a result, average growth has dropped from 3.0% in the 1970s to 2.7% in the 2000s.”

These alarming statistics have put the issue of growth at the top of the Caribbean agenda as it must be a matter of concern to the Caribbean people and their governments that the optimism that was associated with independence in Caribbean states has been replaced by pessimism about our future. Caribbean post-Independence period has been associated more with economic difficulties, if not stagnation, than with robust growth and transformation. Unable to sustain meaningful growth, our societies have been plagued by persistent high levels of unemployment. Caribbean countries often present to the world the unflattering image of a region dominated by crime and the export of drugs.

Recent developments at the global level have shown that the Caribbean experience is not singular. High unemployment in Europe, North America and elsewhere has resulted in a call for dramatic changes in economic policies and even the structure of government. We have witnessed the inability of many democratically elected governments to manage the consequences of high unemployment and economic decline. In our own region there is credible evidence that economic difficulties associated with high debt, slow growth and high unemployment have resulted in changes of government in many countries.

What is perhaps most striking is the absence of clear policy options that have reasonable prospects of resolving these problems in the short run. Governments in our region are constrained to stimulate their economies through programmes of public investment and employment creation. Moreover, programmes of austerity to cope with public debt and economic stagnation show every sign of worsening the situation. What is clearly needed is a new paradigm that could transform the economies to support sustained growth, create employment and resolve the government’s dilemma that is now being experienced.

In an effort to address the concerns identified above, the Commonwealth Secretariat and the University of the West Indies convened a symposium on May 30 June 1 2012, at the University of the West Indies. It was the expectation of the conveners that such a symposium would put forward credible policy options for economic transformation and job creation while promoting good governance to assist the governments of the region. Many of the papers in this volume were presented at the symposium. Other papers have been added specifically for this publication because of their relevance to the themes of this book. The main policy recommendations emerging from this symposium are contained in “Report of Symposium on Economic

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Transformation and Job Creation: New Governance Challenges” which is included in section one of this volume.

The presenters of the papers as well as the participants were drawn from across the region and included government officials, private sector leaders, university scholars and researchers and members of the NGO community. It was the general consensus that all relevant sections of the society including governments, business, NGO communities, universities and colleges, churches and labour movements should be included in the search for a new strategic direction. The recommendations of the symposium and the papers are included in the Policy Dialogue document that emerged.

It was recommended that the following issues take centre stage in the various Governments and States of CARICOM with the aim of Economic Transformation and Job Creation in the Caribbean:

- The review and possible expansion of incentives for investors, ensuring that policy objectives (such as job creation or the generation of foreign exchange) are achieved in practice and that those distortions do not occur due to economically irrational interventions, such as through politics.
- The granting of investment incentives to all investors, embracing local investors, foreign investors, and investors from the Caribbean Diaspora.
- The entire economy of the Caribbean be brought up to dynamic levels, as opposed to concentrating dynamism and growth to enclaves of foreign investment, since the overall vibrancy of the economy may be more important than particular fiscal incentives in attracting foreign investment. Results-oriented reform of the public service is seen as central to creating this overall dynamic, rules-based environment needed to stimulate investment and create jobs.
- Issues of trust are placed at the forefront in this effort as well, between governments and citizens, between employers and employees, between the private sector and public sector, between town and country, between locals and foreigners, between ethnicities, classes, and genders, and between rival political parties. Perhaps, central to this is a need to identify a shared objective to which all government, private sector, workers/unions and communities can subscribe and be held accountable.
- Manufacturing is actively encouraged by government because of its demonstrable effects on the entire economy in terms of both growth and contraction.
- Knowledge Management be placed centre stage in the economic transformation process, from management, to production, to skills training, to economic planning, etc.

- Agriculture not be neglected in economic transformation and job creation, but be an integral part of the process.
- Build on the strengths of existing entrepreneurs.
- The strength of the Caribbean mining sectors, in bauxite and gold mining for example, be properly exploited and integrated with economic transformation much more fully and for the benefit of the Caribbean people.
- The very insightful and high-quality analyses and recommendations of the past with regard to transformation and job creation, be heeded and acted upon, rather than be simply paid lip-service. Human Resources Services and Skills Development be properly integrated into development planning, investment, and job creation programmes.
- Key transformational opportunities, such as the development of the Kingston harbour in order to take advantage of the Panama Canal expansion, are seized upon in a timely manner.
- The Tertiary Education Sector should play a role in training, research, development, and direct business generation and entrepreneurship itself in the context of economic transformation and job creation in the Caribbean.
- The National Industrial Policy of Jamaica be revisited along with a recognition of the importance of Public-Private Sector partnership, including:

#### Re-examination of the Financial Sector:

- Governance issues including need for a rules-based system to be applied fairly and predictably; transparency with predictable judicial underpinnings; and the need for strong anti-corruption machinery.
- More focused and co-ordinated policy initiatives with regard to the role of the Diaspora, in terms of investment, network building, innovation, and transformation.

These recommendations are consistent with the emerging consensus about the measures that will facilitate economic growth and job creation in Caribbean countries. It is noteworthy that at a recent Forum, jointly organised by the International Monetary Fund and the Caribbean Development Bank in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago to discuss the challenges of low growth and high debt facing the Caribbean, several of their recommendations were similar to those listed above. For example, they noted that low growth remains a key challenge for the region. In addressing the solutions, the Forum recommended, inter alia, that countries with high debt

ratios will need to pursue fiscal adjustment steadfastly; that protecting the poor and vulnerable groups should be central to reforms; the challenge to achieve sustainable growth in the region calls for a broad-based collective and collaborative approach.

One of the points of departure in the recommendations of the Policy Dialogue Document referred to earlier, is the central role that universities and other tertiary education institutions are expected to play as entrepreneurial centres engaged in new businesses, leading innovation and creating knowledge driven jobs. What is being suggested is that universities should assume a new function in addition to their traditional role of teaching, research and public service. This is in keeping with the emergence of a new category of universities referred to as Entrepreneurial Universities.

Notice should also be taken of the focus on governance issues that would need to be addressed as part of the economic transformation leading to job creation. This is in keeping with the concept that the Caribbean countries must increasingly turn to their own resources, develop policies and institutions that will enable them to participate successfully in the global market place and provide acceptable livelihood for their populations.

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
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### INTRODUCTION

... To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle requires creative imagination and marks real advances... –*Albert Einstein*

**CRADLED BY THE ECLECTIC CULTURAL TRADITIONS OF AN Afro-creolised rural folklore and possessed by the indomitable spirit of the Black community responding to and resisting the vestiges of colonial influence, Professor, The Hon. Rex Nettleford, acclaimed and distinguished Caribbean intellectual and cultural messiah, has embraced with distinction his calling to shape West Indian intellectual tradition and cultural identity through the exercise**

of his artistic creative imagination and intellect.

It would be presumptuous to declare that any single journal, volume, or tome can seek to capture the entire oeuvre – perhaps not even the essence – of this august Professor, a man whose stature within the academic and intellectual life of the Anglophone Caribbean and further afield is as equally dignified as the sound of his name. Michael Manley's description of Rex Nettleford as a man of immense scholarship, elegance of language, international recognition, charisma and uncompromising aristocratic bearing, entirely at ease with people from all walks of Jamaican life, like the members of the trade union movement, or the old men in the rural villages who are the story-tellers of our history, is an attempt worthy of note.

Fifty papers, selected from his works, comprise the text of this publication and these reflect the broad themes of his philosophy expressed in his ideas and his thinking about institutions and individuals in the postcolonial Caribbean milieu. The publication is a modest attempt to chronicle some of the individual aspects of the wisdom of his work with a view to exhibiting to our peoples the scope and depth of the esteemed academic's contribution to our West Indian life. Let us not be found guilty of the errors often attributed to our ancestors of neglecting to honour great men of their times who are often recognized only by hindsight. The compilation of these works, therefore, is meant to substantially acknowledge the recognition accorded him by his contemporaries as one of the most ingenious of his age and time – a man whose outstanding contributions in the field of art, literature and humanities are among the most prodigious that a single man has put forth, definitely making his philosophy worth knowing and disseminating as together we journey towards a future free from the obscenities of the past.

The society that Nettleford grew up in was filled with the folklore, the music, the religious practices, the language of a people newly freed of their shackles and chains and who were beginning to free themselves of the mental strictures imposed upon them; a people whose culture – according to Nettleford – was forced into subterranean caverns. Prof. Nettleford's academic and intellectual sojourn and personal accomplishments epitomise that freedom, a mind released to enlighten, and a life lived to educate and liberate the Caribbean citizenry from any caverns of captivity. He summons the collective creativity of the region to action, its peoples to self-determination through education and the discovery of self, and its leaders to nation building forged through “mastering the management of the complexity” of the region's cultural diversity. His legacy will be recorded as the force behind the decolonisation of the Caribbean spirit and imagination.

Throughout his lifetime, his voice has been heard along with that of his contemporaries like Lloyd Best and Derek Walcott, calling for a focus of the tremendous creative energy of the people of the Caribbean towards a consolidation of a positive sense of self – a view of our history and culture which negates the imposed façade of inferiority that had been constructed within our collective psyche, a system of thought which vindicates and enhances our creative potential, liberation of an imagination that was still shackled long after the chains and strictures of slavery and indentureship were broken.

He has graced the intellectual landscape of the Caribbean with the profundity of his philosophies and convictions about harnessing the collective creative energies of the Caribbean as the true means of development. Pivotal to his thinking over the years is the value of the creative intellect, imagination and cultural diversity which comprise the foundation

of our society and which are an essential element in an understanding of our historical experience and existential reality. His belief is that our creativity is a critical variable in our pursuit of self-discovery and, when collectively engaged, becomes a cultural force that energises our growth and development and ultimate evolution into wholeness as individuals and as a people. When exercised from an early age, our creativity guarantees us a safe passage throughout life and becomes critical to our development. It equips us to shape native born and bred belief systems, expressions of artistic culture, organic means of communication, kinship patterns, production, distribution and exchange system which are appropriate to our native situation and which guarantees the security of our highly renewable Caribbean species.

In furthering his unshakeable belief in the power of our creativity to reinforce our sense of confidence in self, Prof. Nettleford posits that it engages us in the continuous process of discovery and rediscovery of who we really are and how our lives have been forged from our textured history. Indeed, the principle of cyclical continuity in the development of humankind, in his view, is a life paradox which sees the moment of maturation as coterminous with the moment of degeneration, itself coterminous with the moment of regeneration. Where a ripe fruit falls there a tree shall, indeed, grow.

The coexistence of Caribbean peoples is due to the exercise of the creative imagination and intellect by its citizenry, which made it possible for the region to forge a viable plural society, living not just side by side, but together. This occurs largely through the exercise of the creative imagination by which the Caribbean has come to understand the dynamics of the 500 years we spent becoming and producing in all of the Americas, genuinely new peoples, and a new sense and sensibility of sufficient substance.

He underscores the centrality of imagination, the human intellect and the human spirit to the process of nation building in the Caribbean and the creation of a new social order. "It is the faculties of imagination, intellect, spirit that must now be mobilized in the interest of shaping a new social order and, in building a nation worthy of its place in the democratic family of nations". The emergence and formation of the Caribbean "nation state" throughout the centuries of colonization and post-colonial independence and self-determination has in essence been the culmination of the interaction of the creative imagination of the people of the West Indies, the fostering of their kindred spirit and the application of their wealth of intellect. The poverty of the region, compounded by enduring ethnic and cultural differences, demands solutions that can best be derived from maximizing the diverse creative potential of its critical human resources.

The realization of a new social reality that is native-born and native-bred in Professor Nettleford's, judgment, cannot result solely from discharges by the political directorate. Rather "it is the people who must invest in the two cultural faculties that are basically human, whatever one's cultural, racial

or class origin". These are the faculties of intellect and imagination. In his words, "it is the creative exercise of these faculties which will result in the true empowerment of both individuals and the society".

Indefatigably, he uses every means and opportunity, through his writings, through his lectures, as a forum for expressing his thinking about the creative capacities of Caribbean peoples. In his homage to the many Caribbean citizens whose legacies have defined and redefined the Caribbean reality in diverse ways, he expresses their achievements as "artists" who, through the application of their intellect and the extraction of the creative human potential of the Caribbean citizenry, have helped or are helping to mould the Caribbean nation. Jamaican leader Michael Manley is recognized by Prof. Nettleford as a leader with the conviction that national development must be linked to culture and the common peoples' collective creativity. The self-worth of the human being was central to Manley's political philosophy. Norman Washington Manley is heralded as such a visionary leader who has moulded the nation of Jamaica through his own belief in the "capabilities and genius of his people, emerging from a history of enslavement and . . . living as subject people enduring the obscenities of colonialism, denigration and marginalization". In writing about Dr. Eric Williams, Prof. Nettleford observes that he (Dr. Williams) understood and demonstrated that it was only the people of the Caribbean who could emancipate themselves from the mental degradation that was a consequence of slavery and its concomitant capitalist cosmology. "One modality of redemption," Williams insisted, "was the mandatory exercise of the creative intellect by people of African ancestry everywhere. That every human act is an act of intelligence which demands mastery over bodies of knowledge that can serve a people's growth and development, was for him the reason for living."

The creation and sustenance of an Afro-creolised sensibility in the Caribbean is posited by Prof. Nettleford as a crucial requirement for the self-realisation of the Caribbean African Diaspora and for redressing the self-contempt, self-doubt and lack of self-esteem among Blacks, which are obstacles to development. The oppressive experiences of slavery and colonization extracted from the ancestral generations of Caribbean peoples' strategies of survival which could have only evolved from the release of creative energy by their own efforts. In the long history of struggle for Black dignity, self-empowerment, rights and respect, he identifies two Caribbean sons, Alexander Bustamante and Marcus Garvey, as icons for all seasons, and who in varying ways helped in the assertion of the status and liberation of the Black offshoots of African soil.

In addressing Marcus Gravy's legacy for the region and further afield, Prof. Nettleford alludes to his preoccupation with "the eradication of racism in all its forms and the increase in the efforts of people of African ancestry to proceed in their advancement on the basis of self-reliance and creativity".

Garvey, in Nettleford's judgment, contributed to the reformation of the black movement through his "strategic position as a source of energy for self-empowerment and the psychic strengthening of the country's black masses." Using as his medium the movement he led, he "challenged many throughout the African diaspora to yet another mode of self-definition in this awesome quest for authenticity". Equally influential and impacting "were his ideas for programmes of action that addressed the lot of the black man in the wider world that sought not simply to explain or interpret that world but to change it in terms of the perceived interests of people of African ancestry". This, Professor Nettleford considers to be a "bold, unprecedented and still unequalled and unsurpassed achievement in the history of Black liberation struggle, if not of mass movements for liberation anywhere". Such was the legacy of Garvey which has now come full circle and challenges us at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in a world where racism and discrimination persist.

He singles out some of the current challenges:

- a) continuing the assertion of Africa's cultural certitude and authenticity;
- b) synthesizing that African cultural authenticity with modern progress;
- c) addressing developmental imperatives for the material improvement of African peoples all over the world but especially within the framework of the nation-state;
- d) mastering the knowhow and know-why of communications technology and worldwide communications systems;
- e) accessing power through the creative exercise of intellect and imagination. Bustamante and Garvey are hailed by him as two champions who "acted separately and from different points of emphasis but in the common quest for human dignity, guaranteed freedom, self-respect and dignity for the people from below, as well as material well-being for a life beyond survival".

In spite of the remnants of slavery and colonialism and the continued socioeconomic dependence of Caribbean nation states, Prof. Nettleford sounds a chord of hope premised on the belief that there is "a reservoir of psychic inheritance and intelligence" residing among Caribbean peoples which have always "guided their skilful discovery of appropriate designs for social living". Or as he puts it in the opening paragraph of his CARICOM 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary Lecture, delivered in the George Walcott Theatre, University of Guyana:

“An appreciation of the history of this region is critical to a fuller understanding of contemporary realities and future challenges. For the Caribbean shares in the great drama of the Americas of which it is an integral part, whereby new societies are shaped, new and delicately tuned sensibilities are honed, and appropriate designs for social living are crafted through the cross-fertilisation of disparate elements. The process has resulted in a distinguishable and distinctive entity called ‘Caribbean’. The process is intensely cultural.”

He lamented the persistent ostracizing of things African and the marginalisation of East Indians, Hindus/Muslims who are all relegated to the bottom of the cultural hierarchy that ascribes race, ethnicity and class. Such obscenities, he contends, have to be re-engineered out of the Caribbean cultural ethos if an economically productive future is to be realized.

When one considers the legacy of Nettleford and both Walcott and Best, there are noticeable points of departure. Walcott for example, stayed in the region but for only so long. His teaching career at Boston University took him away from his native St. Lucia for the greater part of each year. (On his behalf though it should be noted that Walcott now only teaches during the fall at Boston and spends the rest of his year on his home island.) Walcott’s poem, *Hic Jacet* (Latin “Here I stay”), might as well have been speaking for Nettleford when he lists his reasons for staying in the Caribbean,

“For something rooted, unwritten  
that gave us its benediction,  
its particular pain . . .”

To the obvious detriment of his international image – or perhaps more accurately, an international rate pay check – the Honourable Rex Nettleford has adopted a *hic jacet* attitude, which, while assuring his commitment to his people, has placed him at the periphery of what is undoubtedly a more efficient global system of academia, which has brought us, in a way, to his point of departure from Lloyd Best. While the words “University of the West Indies” are anathema to Best’s ears, Nettleford chose to work within what some might refer to as the confines of the Anglophone Caribbean’s premier academic institution.

This choice – to consciously exist here within the region, and to exert his energies towards the betterment of the educational apparatus that produces our regional scholars – has placed him in a peculiar psychological and professional location. More importantly it has allowed him to speak to those outside of the region with both authority and authenticity on not only our behalf but on behalf of other former colonies across the globe. For example, in his Commonwealth Lecture at Rhodes House, Oxford University in 2003, Nettleford declares that,

. . . Not even the miracle that is the Commonwealth has been free of the viler consequences of history which may not repeat itself but nonetheless maintains an awesome presence in ways that do not always help. So, racism remains rooted that daunting and indefensible notion that non-Caucasian blood is somehow weaker and less precious than that which flows in the veins of the former colonizers. The view persists that Western philosophy, religion(s) and aesthetics are superior to those of other (lesser) civilizations, as does the view that Europe spells reason while Africa spells passion; and a corresponding position is indeed taken that the division of labour on the North-South axis leaves intellect residing in the North while the hewing of wood and the drawing of water accompanied by rhythmic sounds and exotic body movements to lighten the burden remain in the South. In so far as such mythology has been forced to adjust to reality, the Commonwealth can take much credit for being a pretty good and faithful contributor since the liberal forces of the Mother Country long helped to produce, and the wider Commonwealth to sustain, the liberators from such colonial attitudes through the education and subsequent activism of the likes of Gandhi and Nehru from the Indian sub-continent, Nkrumah and Kenyatta from Africa South of the Sahara and Norman Manley and Eric Williams of the Commonwealth Caribbean.”

It is perhaps only modesty or a sense of the generation gap that precluded him from adding his own name along with the latter two, as so much of his work not only strives to debunk the myth of racial superiority but is in itself a deconstruction of it.

There is the acknowledgment in Nettleford’s work that we live in – a la V.S. Naipaul – half made societies. Unlike Naipaul however, he refuses to believe that much of the absurdity around him is irreversible, indicative of our inevitable descent into Avernus. Instead of focusing on our areas of societal darkness, he concentrates on the growing light within us, a light that he is convinced will grow, hence his toil. As he says in the same Commonwealth Lecture,

“Most of us in the Commonwealth have had to do things from the margin. One need not regret that quite frankly, because it helps one to be creatively subversive and it also gives one a bird’s eye view of things. One is able to locate oneself a little easier than if one is immersed in the Establishment, and many individuals certainly found a way to do this and were able to extend their activities into the wider community all over the Caribbean, for example, and even beyond, as seminal contributors to human development. Much of this has taken place through the work of creative artists.”

This is in direct – if at the time undirected – antithesis to Naipaul’s statement that “nothing was created in the West Indies.” Not only has there been creation/creativity posits Nettleford but this has been the animating force behind Caribbean survival.

For him, the liberation of the Caribbean people through the imagination, or the liberation of the Caribbean imagination itself, is a work in progress. He holds the firm belief in the connection between the arts of a people and their capacity to survive and resist undermining forces. He sees the arts as critical to survival and resistance. The arts as a form of action offers people in multicultural environments the opportunity for self-definition and action. They (the arts) are an expression of the creative imagination of a people. In his words, “the arts provide an excellent means of self-cleansing, self-reflection and self-criticism” and “provide avenues for the harmony of inner and outer space: the surest guarantee to psychic and social stability . . .”

Nettleford categorises education as a prerequisite for continuity, and the building of creative intellectual capital as well as the sustaining powers of exercising the creative imagination. His concern is for the delivery of the sort of education to our young people which equips them to take a hold of their destiny and to benefit from the legacy of that spirit of independence, of self-reliance, and of individual initiative. In his view, intellect was critical to existence and together with imagination (the output which comes sharpest in the creative and related arts), were the surest routes to “a more resourceful, renewable, constructive, creative, dynamic and interactive Community capable of demonstrating equity and unity in diversity”.

The people of the Caribbean, for Prof. Nettleford, are creatures of severance and suffering but most importantly, creatures of survival. He speaks of travelling from severance – psychic in the case of the indigenous peoples of the Americas and geographical in the case of the peoples uprooted from Africa, through suffering in the system of slavery to survival both in those zones of oppression and beyond into our contemporary globalised world. Education is an investment of that survival which has undoubtedly been the investment our forebears made and now we ourselves are making.

He sees ignorance as the real mass weapon of destruction and education as the crucial means for adapting to and directing change, reducing poverty; ensuring security; improving health and well-being, enhancing economic prosperity and personal security and safety; promoting fairness, justice and peace; and achieving environmental security. It is fundamental in developing democratic values and good governance. It is the means through which social economic and political change is generated. Educational institutions are “the hub of any truly articulated educational system with spokes connected to feeder sources ranging from primary through secondary to post-secondary levels of learning”.

Prof. Nettleford accords great value to tertiary education in general and university in particular for the preparation of people who are “equipped for textured, dynamic, imaginative, creative, leadership....and leadership for all levels of social existence now challenging our globalised world”. Such leaders, he further posits, are able to function in civil society within a country as

well as participate in multilateral fora designed to unearth answers for the big questions of health, communication, poverty eradication, environmental integrity and human resource development and management through education and cultural deepening.

His position is that the discipline that underpins the mastery of a craft through which all art or serious scholarly work finds expression, the demands made on continuous re-creation of effort and application, the challenges encountered on the journey to excellence, habits of realistic self-evaluation, the capacity for dealing with diversity and the dilemma of difference, whether in the performing arts or in the key branches of sports, constitute excellent preparation for learning to be, learning to know and learning to live together which characterizes human existence in the world we now inhabit.

He challenges leaders to “help to shape and implement the kind of social vision which would allow for the application of creative responses to the crises and which would encourage the cultivation of that kingdom of the mind with rank shoots of creativity sprouting from the exercise of both intellect and imagination and which will work in tandem to produce a self-reliant, self-respecting, tolerant, peaceful enterprising and productive community of souls strategically placed at points of the compass”. In other words, provision must be made for an education that is “holistic, continuing and diversified and which would chart the course round the cycle of civilization, the cycle of creativity”. It is our people who are, after all, the makers of history, the true architects of their fortunes and the creators of their destiny.

Among his many legacies to the Caribbean, he leaves a charge for the region to embrace if it is to survive the current global economic, political and cultural realities and beyond. This charge has taken the form of challenges which confront the region and to which it must turn its attention. He underscores the urgent need for the Caribbean to be able to position itself in the new dispensation of the 21<sup>st</sup> century just as our forebears had to find mechanisms of demarginalisation in responding to the entrapments of “plantation chattel structures”, “assuring to themselves a sense of place and purpose other than that prescribed by slavery”. The developing world is challenged to “cross the boundaries that have been traditional hurdles and enter the dialogue of the new millennium as full-fledged participants – vocally constructive, actively creative, sharply focused and with a sense of direction rooted in self-interest as well as in the greater good”. For the Caribbean this means developing the “capacity to make definitions about the world” and to act on the basis of such definitions i.e., “to become part of the solution rather than remain the problem” which it is perceived to be. This, for Prof. Nettleford, is one major boundary to be crossed.

Solution wise, he deems the institutional frameworks of the region in the form of institutions such as the University of the West Indies, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Caribbean Single Market and Economy and the Caribbean Court of Justice as critical for its survival and repositioning. In the light of current global realities and the reordering of the world system, the region faces the imperative of “reformatting and repositioning” itself, ensuring that it is part of determining “the mainstream rather than enter one designed by and for others”. These institutional mechanisms are critical in this regard, functioning as the building blocks under the roof of a restructured CARICOM, the edifice of effective regional integration. He accords great importance to the institution of government and the relationship between the governor and the governed for the forward movement of the region and its citizenry. In his words:

“There is need to ensure that the government and people regard themselves as different but complementary parts of the same whole; that government and its supporting bureaucracy are not seen as millstones around the necks of a powerless citizenry; that government is not encouraged to continue projecting itself as sole provider and deliverer in a messianic dispensation that nurtures paroxysms of excess, leading to the celebration of a saviour one week and his crucifixion the next; that distrust, disintegrative tension and cynicism do not continue to inform the relationship between governor and governed.”

Prof. Nettleford identifies the challenges of the millennium or the boundaries to be crossed that pertain to the issue of poverty and development – economic globalization, illiteracy and the environment. The region and its leaders have clear responsibilities. He makes reference to the “natural leadership that has emerged as products of that defiant exercise of intellect and imagination in response to the historical marginalization of their kind”. A major area of priority for the intellectual corps of the region in the new millennium is to generate a careful account of the emergence and dynamic development of the region.

The region must meet the challenge of increasing investment in social sector programmes beneficial to both the poor in terms of material wealth and the poor in terms of psychic and spiritual deprivation; of taking steps to reduce gross disparities of wealth; of preventing armed conflict where reason could prevail; of avoiding yielding to the temptation of institutionalized corruption especially in the independent nations of the Caribbean; and of strengthening democratic institutions if by democracy is meant the guarantee of individual freedom and the ability for each citizen to participate in civil society on the basis of trust, self-respect, self-esteem, human rights and all related attributes after which a Caribbean, forged in slavery and racism, has in any case been hankering.

He calls on the Caribbean to take stock of its past and chart new directions based on the experiences of the past and the current realities. At this point of human existence, the world is challenged “to new designs for social living, to new rules of representation, a new sense of being, new world views and new ways of knowing”. The challenge for the region “continues to be mainly that of finding and applying strategies of demarginalisation so that involvement and participation in the process of self-definition and the determination of one’s own destiny can be a central and pivotal one”.

The questions the region should be addressing at this time are where it stands in the matter of human dignity, equality and freedom as well as where and how it stands “with respect to such issues as economic globalisation, crippling external debt in poor countries, the HIV/AIDS pandemic and the degradation of the environment” which is vitally and equally important for the physical survival of the peoples of the region as it is for the rest of the world. He further challenges the region to consider where it stands in relation to the issues of the alleviation of poverty, the promotion of peace and security, the promotion of good governance through civil society “that guarantees to each citizen a strategic place and sense of purpose irrespective of race, creed, political orientation, in short his/her empowerment”.

Equally important is his call for the workers’ movement to reinvent itself in order that it might line up with other components of the social system such as employers and government. Such a step is considered a necessary prerequisite to the accommodation of current regional and global imperatives. Not only must the role of labour rise above the level of Occupational Health and Safety standards of traditional industrial relations, but it must be equipped to look at the wider field of health care and labour policy in the current global dispensation. Perhaps one of his prescriptions for enhancing the effectiveness of the Movement could be said to be provision for the humanness of labour to be pivotal to the Agreements and negotiations of the labour movement and for labour policy generally to consistently reflect the now incontrovertible fact that labour is human whether he or she be common and manual, intellectual or even managerial. These are major development imperatives for the citizens of the “two-thirds world”.

He believes that the Caribbean’s role “is still clearly *inter alia* to have all who are responsible held accountable for violations of human rights, including crimes against humanity”. This he believes should be accomplished without vengeance, without self-righteousness, but with compassion.

It is his belief that the Caribbean yearns for recognition in this new dispensation called globalisation “which from the perspective of the south threatens to be a calculus of inequality rather than an opportunity to make a last dash towards universal human dignity and individual freedom in praxis”. Importantly, “such dignity and freedom in praxis must continue to be on the agenda of concerns and positive action for the Caribbean communities

in the new millennium". The challenge for the Caribbean region in the 21<sup>st</sup> century "is to have the new globalisation steered away from inherited obscene habits of racialised division of the world into the rich industrialized North and the poor non-Caucasian South, the developed civilized world versus the two-thirds underdeveloped world misnomered the Third World". Nettleford's firm view is that this can best be accomplished "by the manifestation of achievement through the Caribbean region's exercise of the creative intellect and creative imagination of achievement". For him, the goal is to show that "genuine creativity and intellectual rigour are not mutually exclusive and that the harmonization of the two may well be the hope of a third millennium world". It is the faculties of imagination, intellect and spirit which must be harnessed by our peoples in the quest to shape a new world order and build a Caribbean nation that is justifiably counted among the comity of democratic nations.

In its thrust to cross the boundaries of hate, intolerance, discrimination, racial arrogance, class exclusivity, as well as intellectual snobbery, and cultural denigration, Prof. Nettleford firmly believes that the Caribbean must stay on course with its time-worn strategies of demarginalisation, reinforcing the intensity of creative expression in the expansion of the communication arts. He states:

"It is the full grasp of the creative diversity of all human kind that provides the source for tolerance, generosity of spirit, forgiveness, respect for the other, that the new millennium will require if it is to house the brave new world with the human being as centre of the cosmos. It is the source, as well as of the patience which is needed for the human-scale development which all the grand objectives of United Nations declarations envision. That patience is honed in the habit of the Caribbean citizenry who have had to negotiate their space over time and to find form on a playing field that has not been level. The Caribbean region is for this reason more than equipped to enter the dialogue among civilization having seeded the germ of a civilization itself". The dialogue "is the quest for peace, tolerance, justice, liberty, sustainable development, trust and respect for human understanding and should not be seen as a threat but rather as a guarantee for peace within and between nations".

In undertaking its journey into the new millennium, the Caribbean region is exhorted to apply nothing short of an expansiveness of thought in embracing a new vision of a groping rainbow world, a new sense of self and new ways of knowing to underpin new ways of living, without which safe conduct way into this third millennium cannot be guaranteed. He emphasised the ultimate significance in the order of things, of a culture which is both self-redeeming and self-accepting of ourselves as a people – particularly those of us who will truly inherit the twenty-first century.

The Honourable Michael Manley notes that perhaps the most profound insight which Nettleford provides concerns the nature of process itself. “To most people the process leading to change is seen as involving a journey from a predetermined point of departure to a projected point of arrival. Nettleford insists that life and history are dialectical in a primary, Hegellian sense. To him, therefore, the process is an unending dynamic and change, a permanent condition. In short, as Jimmy Cliff’s vision suggests, there will always be “many rivers to cross”.

Michael Manley further argues that it is the failure to understand this that has led to the intellectual paralysis which overcame the progressive political forces of much of the world, following the success of the radical right in the 80s. Many are only now coming to terms with the fact that the world is changing and that their own approach to a political agenda, no matter how idealistic, must seek to marry enduring social principles with new realities. Nettleford is recognised for his exhortation to us to acknowledge the significance of completing “an important part of the search for identity, of widening the net of our sense of heritage, to include Africa no less than Europe, along with India, China, and all the other parts of the world from which we spring. He reminds us that even that journey is only an element in an unending process. In all of this, he is the true heir to the social dynamics which those first pioneers helped to precipitate and a brilliant exponent of the journey which we must have the courage to take if the process itself is to continue to unfold.

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## INWARD VISIONS: Caribbean Governance and Development



### INTRODUCTION

THE SELECTION OF PAPERS FOR THIS EDITION HAS managed to accomplish the feat of drawing the irrefutable linkages of the progress of Caribbean society across time into a coherent framework allowing retrospective assessment and futuristic projections. To attempt, as though in one mighty swath, to capture the myriad consequences of our 500 years of actions and interactions on plantations and latterly, in our modern independent societies, is a major undertaking and a task of enormous proportion.

This mission commences with Dr. Meighoo's interesting riposte to a momentum gathering discussion on our Caribbean civilization and concludes with Professor Levitt's 'imagined future.' We are taken on a journey between two extremities—the distant past and the beckoning future. What we are and have become through time and the plantation experience, and the new and distinct society that has emerged in the Caribbean through our cultural diversity, is not in debate on our Caribbean civilization. Neither is there uncertainty about our place, performance and evident contributions to the world community. The heart of the debate is whether the Caribbean possesses all of the attributes of a civilization and thereby provides a centre political, economic, philosophical, linguistic, cultural, juridical, and aesthetic, among others – for its people.

Admittedly, this engagement has not so far produced consensus nor has it arrived at a generally acceptable resolution. In the ferment that is likely to follow, we may, in the process, rediscover much of what has been forged in our unique historical circumstances and that much of this is taken for granted. The debate of our claim of a Caribbean civilization is in itself a sign of our maturity and confidence since, as Dr. Meighoo affirms, a civilization cannot be derived simply from indignant sentiments that if others have one then we must have one also.

There is however, little disagreement that the sugar cane plantations, once notorious for inhumane conduct, and replete with every possible atrocity, were more than wealth producing entities. They served as laboratories for the pioneering of the economic system of division of labour and, on these plantations, the establishment of production facilities on capitalist principles emerged, and if Professor Levitt is accurate, the Caribbean, through its regional integration movement, is playing a part in the evolution of the impending world system transformation. Our regional integration movement will feature in the imagined future which anticipates a significant retreat from the universal capitalism of globalization through the formation of large regions of economic integration with political institutions of governance appropriate to geographic and historical realities. In this resides the greatest tribute to the vision of the past and confirmation of the correctness of the undertaking of the Community.

Within the two extremities constructed by Dr. Meighoo and Professor Levitt, is located the 1940s vision of the Caribbean to establish itself as a light rising in the West. The Hon. Lloyd Best reminds us that the founding fathers of Caribbean integration had definitive thoughts of what we are and what we should become. It was with abounding self-confidence that we desired not to be a European outpost, or become a North American backyard or a non-descript constituent of Latin America. So, the West Indian Federation was inaugurated with great anticipation and fervent hope. The fathers and founders of Caribbean integration envisaged a union of the English-speaking West Indies within the British Commonwealth. That the efforts at federation failed did not lead to an abandonment of the initial vision but rather to the discovery of other vehicles, such as CARIFTA in 1968, CARICOM in 1973, and a call for the CSME in 1989, capable of taking the region to the desired destination.

There has been progress along the continuum constructed for us by the writers, but today there is the fear that the region's people are not exuding the confidence displayed in the past. We may have become susceptible to encroaching self-doubt, having in the past been responsible for bold initiatives—regionally and internationally. Best locates this condition in our education system. He thinks we are experiencing an education crisis that is pervasive and epistemic, and rooted in the failure of the formal and informal

institutions to liberate the Caribbean imagination and provide sources of confidence and venture. He diagnoses that the issue is epistemic sovereignty and we must assume responsibility for our own philosophical conception of the world seen primarily, although not entirely, from the coordinates of our own historical, cultural, and institutional context. We must adjudicate our own truths properly, taking into account the experience of the others.

The rising edifice of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy bestriding the region and having the potentialities to bring us to the desired haven envisioned by the founding fathers of integration, also appears along this timeline. Professor Vaughan Lewis tells us that while we have been on the road to integration for many years it is our interpretation of the external environment that goaded our leaders and galvanized us into establishing the CSME. His contention is that the decision of CARICOM Heads of Government to pursue the establishment of a single market and economy was influenced by perceptions and expectations largely driven by external factors and sources. Additionally, perhaps, the timing of the development to some extent owes its origin to fortuitous circumstances. These facilitated the progressive implementation of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, thereby bringing the specific elements of the CSME into effect.

It is an acceptable principle that precipitating factors may be studiously identified in historic and momentous actions. Whatever wind blew the region towards the destination of the CSME succeeded because the sails were set correctly; for it is only an ill wind that blows nowhere and blows no good. This introspection is however necessary as it makes us conscious of our decision-making apparatus, its flaws and limitations and need for transformation. This statement, is in no way however, intended to dispute or trivialise the inherent difficulties of such a task. The Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Owen Arthur has called the CSME constructing the 15 participating economies into a single market and a single economy—a most complex, most ambitious and most difficult undertaking in a region where ‘division is the heritage, contrast is the keynote, and competition is the dominant theme’, whereas economic integration requires cooperation.

There are vital Caribbean integration lessons in retrospection. Therefore, the close up and personal recollections of Ambassador J. O’Neil Lewis occupy an important place. They provide background and give colour, supply context and include texture for deriving meaning from developments of the past. The matters of his reflections are not obsolete, although they are of historical and recurring relevance and present significance to the Community. The interesting disclosure that we may have been subsumed under the United States; the role of Caribbean diplomats in the birth of the ACP; the manner in which the first Lomé Convention emerged; and the failure of the Federation, awakened our pride and simultaneously imposed a sense of soberness. What, however, is intriguing is how closely our past resembles the present even

if history does not repeat itself. There is little need of great imagination to identify the parallels between the Lomé Convention and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) being negotiated. The future is not like the past in that there is little recognition and consideration of the historic fact of former relations and that therefore, something is owed to the former colonial territories.

The region may not negate its historic colonial relationship, escape its geography, dismiss its past geopolitical role and its size, or deny its place in the shadows of the US in a uni-polar world. However, we are advised to realistically reconsider our foreign policy orientation; that is, it must accept its past but redefine future relations with other nations.

Professor Stephen Vasciannie sees scope in the Caribbean situation for creative diplomacy, and support for alliances that will give the small Caribbean an extended voice in global affairs. He tells us that there are options and then warns against uncritically embracing all aspects of the neo-liberal projects presented by the developed world. Considering our reality, the Community is urged to protect its supremacy and to be reluctant to sanction attempts to reduce the significance of State sovereignty.

Dr. Mark Kirton supports that view point that we are not hapless prisoners of our past and suggests that with the political will and through strategic alliances, increased collaboration and structured programmes of cooperation with Brazil, we may transcend past limitations. In considering the historical non-engagement between Latin America, and Brazil in particular, and CARICOM, he identifies expansive opportunities for cooperation in the changing regional and global environment.

He clearly believes that out of every evil cometh good and therefore sees the loss of special consideration for small states like those of CARICOM, the reduction and impending elimination of preferential trade arrangements together with the changing global and regional economic and political configuration, as merely providing windows of opportunity for the emergence of a new agenda between CARICOM and Brazil, one which would be capable of accommodating appropriate strategic alliances, increased collaboration and structured programmes of cooperation.

Meanwhile, Dr. Diana Thorburn positions the contemporary Caribbean basin within a changing diplomatic and political arena and on a wave of new international political dynamics in the region. While this presents opportunities for the region to extend its political and diplomatic relations beyond the US and Europe, the caution to be cognisant of its smallness and pragmatic in its approaches has been sounded.

It must be reassuring to the hesitant to discover that already some of the expectations of CSME are emerging in CARICOM. Dr. Trevor Farrell has searched and found ample evidence of growing intra-regional investment. He makes the point that Trinidad and Tobago and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica

and Barbados, account for much of this development. He tells us too, that much of the intra-regional direct investment flows take place through some form of inter-corporate linkages, based on joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances rather than through the setting up of new operations. Cross-border investments have involved mainly 'market extension diversification' rather than production integration but portfolio investment is becoming a new dynamic in regional economic integration.

Beyond corroboration he sees positive developments in the emergence of a regional capital market as well as the development of offshore financial centres in various countries in the region. It is true that at this juncture much of what is happening falls within the area of trade in services rather than trade in goods. Perhaps the visible hand may well intervene and encourage the region to 'identify strategic industries' in which it has the best chance to build a competitive advantage. He believes that while the CSME is important, if the region is to develop its full potential, public policy will need to be more specifically targeted in the future.

The Caribbean Sea preceded us. In fact, it was the means by which our forebearers were brought to the New World. Our relationship with the sea therefore goes back into the tortuous past—our Caribbean beginning. It is therefore understandable that we may even subconsciously be ambivalent about the sea although it is essentially part of our home. There is today growing recognition that the economic potential of the Caribbean Sea, and more so its centrality to the life of the Community, demands that it be ranked higher in national and Community affairs and be cared, preserved and protected. There is admission of benign neglect.

Carl Dundas and Cedric Joseph speak about the Caribbean Sea in related ways yet with distinct emphases. Dundas tells us that these delicate ecosystems of the Caribbean Sea face serious threats from a variety of human activities as well as from climate change and consequently, there is urgent need for the states and dependent territories of the region to embrace and implement conservation measures and foster international cooperation with a view to furthering research into the health of the ecosystems of the Caribbean. There is clear evidence that serious threats exist to the health and survival of coral reefs, mangrove forests and seagrass meadows. These threats emanate mainly from human activities as well as climate change.

Meanwhile, Joseph calls upon the Community to realize the potential difficulties and negative impact of border controversies and maritime delimitation issues on the Community. The situation is placed below crisis level but there has already been failed mediation between Suriname and Guyana and the employment of naval force of one Community Member against another. The situations are said to be indicative of some turmoil in regional affairs with the prospect for disruptions in the workings of the Community. Further, the prevailing situation has the potential to convey

to the international community the region's incapacity to settle disputes peacefully, which is a major requirement of international behaviour. He recommends collective effort in support of bilateral initiatives as a way of managing the extended maritime area.

We had always held the view that the cultural diversity of the region as represented in its peoples is a distinguishing feature of strength rather than a pathological and problematic issue. In fact, Professor Rex Nettleford says that it is the encounters in the Caribbean that has given rise to what he calls a distinguishable and distinct entity called 'Caribbean.' Nevertheless, the Caribbean itself has struggled for all of five centuries with mastering the management of the complexity of its diversity and so today it is possible to say we have learnt to live together rather than simply living side-by-side.

As though the matter is not settled Dr. Jack Menke and Haslyn Parris have revisited our diversity in relation to governance. Their perspectives diverge and so did their conclusions. Dr. Menke looks at the political systems while Parris looks at political relationships and voting preferences and ethnicity. Dr. Menke's conclusion is that the standard system of political democracy as is evident in Guyana and Suriname produce persistent problems such as blocked development, political instability, ethnic polarization and blocked nation building. Furthermore, empirical data and events in these societies contradict the theoretical concept of the plural society and the related standard political models, the majoritarian and the non-majoritarian models.

Parris consigns 'assertions and allegations' about ethnic voting in Guyana to the category of great malignant myths. He reasons that the existence of a correlation between ethnicity and voting preferences seems to bolster the erroneous view with its proponents failing to realise that correlation does not unwaveringly imply causation or offer a sufficient explanation. According to him, the theory of ethnic voting faces insurmountable difficulties. It must deal with the complications of a definition of ethnicity and explain how ethnicity and race may be utilized interchangeably. It must be able to define what voting along ethnic lines means and whether voter-perceived ethnicity relates to the Party Leader, the Party, or the Presidential candidate. Theorists of ethnic voting must then be able to explicate the determination of the aggregate societal mandate of the elections, and finally to determine whether 'Apan Jhaat' is the major decision-making criterion in elections where the secrecy of the ballot is preserved.

The issues taken up in this edition, move like a pendulum between our past and our future. They are formidable issues for our consideration and require the application of our creative powers. In many instances, these matters are already occupying the region's attention. The fact that some degree of constitutional reform is being contemplated and / or undertaken is admission of difficulties and a determination to perfect the democratic

system considering our peculiar realities. There are some issues that are new but with resolve and political will, are capable of being amicably resolved.

These observations merely set the tone for an appreciation of the thrust of the papers. The following synopses are intended to provide a compact entrée to the content of each contribution.

## CARIBBEAN CIVILIZATION

Dr. Kirk Meighoo remains unconvinced of the veracity of the usage of the expression 'Caribbean Civilization' and the arguments advanced for its existence. He admits that the Caribbean possesses many, if not all, of the attributes of a civilization but misses the essence, and the main features of a civilization. According to him, a civilization is often composed of many societies, nations, and peoples and has an identifiable cultural, and often geographic centre around which others revolve, feed off, rebel against or feed into. It provides for its people a primary point of reference and orientation and its people are sure of the standard that is set. However, the Caribbean does not fit this definition but remains a collection of satellites. Its states and peoples revolve around centres of authority outside of the Caribbean.

Admitting that a civilization is difficult to define and opting instead for an intuitive definition, he rejects the Marxist and radical critics' view of civilization as a mask for economic relations of dominance, and he is not satisfied with the emphasis of Prime Ministers Errol Barrow and Ralph Gonsalves on the existence of a distinct identity to arrive at the conclusion that the Caribbean constitutes a civilization. Instead, he supports CLR James's contention that the Caribbean is an outgrowth of Western civilization, stating that our intellectual world is overwhelmingly North American and British, and while many native ancestral and genuine West Indian strands are threaded into our cultural life, these survive at the informal level. He argues that consequently, our societies are half-made, since there is disconnection between the formal and the informal, between lived experiences and official institutions.

Returning to his definition of a civilization, Dr. Meighoo believes that we are unsure of our autonomy and independence in matters considered serious. He notes that this prevails in the areas of economic organization, justice, military matters, constitutional systems, and other institutional arrangements; and our native sense is marginalised in favour of the international. In concluding, he cites Lloyd Best as observing the persistence of West Indian ambivalence an ambivalence that springs from the fact that there is this dual consciousness and an inability to bring about the integration of the two halves, and distilling what is the new Afro-Saxon heritage.

## DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONALISM

According to Professor Kari Levitt, the new wave of globalization has shattered the prolonged period of relative economic stability and economic growth in Europe and North America enjoyed after the Second World War, and there has been instead massive social dislocations and exclusion on a global scale with polarising inequalities. She states that the global community has arrived at one of those critical moments in history when the world system experiences a transformation.

This imagined future anticipates a significant retreat from the universal capitalism of globalization. This may be realized through the formation of large regions of economic integration with political institutions of governance appropriate to geographic and historical realities. The embrace of regionalism as in the EU and the expected emergence of a powerful East Asian formation including China, Japan, Taiwan, and Korea may be manifested. Additionally, the change may come through a civilizational change to transform institutions governing economic life in order to resolve the contradictions to the requirements of the capitalist economy and the requirements of people to live in mutually supportive ways. Moreover, the discipline of Economics must return to basic questions of value and exchange value, and there will have to be the reconciliation of the criteria of technical efficiency with distributive justice and the democratic process.

Her view emerges from the recognition that by the close of the 1990s the neo-liberal policies had failed to produce economic growth with stability and instead had widened the disparities of income in Latin America; resulting in falling living standards in Sub-Saharan Africa; and has been an engine of inequality and instability. This has given rise to severe financial crises in Asia, Latin America, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, and Russia.

At that time, the World Bank expressed that globalization offered a return to the 'golden age of the 19<sup>th</sup> century', which could bring prosperity to the developing world so long as countries adhered to the market principle. Consequently, GATT was converted to WTO and the North American Free Trade Agreement was signed intending to extend to the entire hemisphere. This emergence was assisted by the Bretton Woods institutions which in response to the maladies of the capitalist system, exhibited in creeping inflation, declining productivity and profits, and political radicalism in the South, utilized their financial leverage to remove restrictions to trade and capital in the developing world. There was also an intellectual attack on development economics as a sub-discipline devoted to the problems of developing countries. Instead, the World Bank declared that there was one and only one economics, and that economic science could explain the functioning of the economy anytime, anyplace, anywhere, regardless of institutions.

Tracing the emergence of the present world system, Professor Levitt observes that globalization manifests similarities with earlier penetrations of capitalism into the developing world. Noting three waves of capitalist expansion in the 500 years of the modern world system, she identifies mercantilism from 1500–1800; the creation of the world economy in the nineteenth century; and the present wave of globalization. In the first era, she stated that North-South relations of dominance and dependence were established; the second globalization created a world economy and the rise of industrial capitalism from England to Europe, to North America, and Japan. The surplus labour displaced by industrialization emigrated to empty lands. Peripheral countries were transformed into export economies, the traditional division of labour between centres exporting manufactures and a periphery exporting primary products was established.

### **THE CARIBBEAN SINGLE MARKET AND ECONOMY (CSME): THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND OPTIONS FOR CARICOM AND THE OECS COUNTRIES**

Professor Vaughan Lewis contends that the concomitants of international trade and economic liberalization; the adoption of IMF/World Bank Washington Consensus principles and programmes of structural adjustment by some CARICOM states; the abandonment of the principle of tariff-protected import substitution as the basis of industrialization and economic growth, and embracing Open Regionalism, implying full integration into the world economy; and the recognition that the major powers of the world were bringing into force new principles of regulation of the conduct of international trade and production, which all countries, developed and developing would have to subscribe, facilitate the progressive implementation of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, thereby bringing the specific elements of the CSME into effect.

He identifies fortuitous circumstances facilitating the creation of CSME as the timing of the original decision, and the revival of the Trinidad and Tobago economy in the second half of the 1990s. The decision was taken when the economies of many of the leading Caribbean states were in recession, or beginning to emerge from recession and acceptance of structural adjustment programmes compelled open, tariff-free national market systems, while the accrual of substantial surpluses of capital in the financial sector of Trinidad and Tobago occurred in a context of a deficit of capital in other economies. This, he claims has induced a movement towards what can be called *commercial and financial integration*—private sector based—that has itself placed pressure on governments to speedily implement arrangements for rights of establishment, liberalized movement of capital and easy movement and settlement of professional persons.

He concludes therefore, that in a sense, our governments were somewhat forced into moving from our protected common market system to the open market system, since it had become virtually a principle in donor circles that protected import-substitution as a mechanism for economic growth which was not possible in the new environment.

He calls for the Community to test the EU assertion that the Regional Economic Partnership Agreement is intended to enhance the scope for Caribbean regional economic integration, noting that regional economic integration is a means to an end—the end of enhanced economic growth. Effective regional economic integration must permit, or increase, the possibilities for our competitive participation in the wider liberalized global economy. It would therefore serve both their interest and ours.

Consequently, the EPA negotiations must not be perceived and treated simply as a follow-up to the previous arrangements. We have to agree, and then assert to the European Union on the basis of a set of principles, schemes and programmes, that we wish our effort of construction of a Caribbean single market, and more importantly, a Caribbean single economy to be integrally a part of the new EPA aid arrangements. Accordingly, the Community needs a certain mental approach to the negotiations so that while it recognizes the need to ensure appropriate conditions for the sustenance of the current set of agricultural exports to Europe, it cannot be the centrepiece of negotiations for an EPA. The central objective of an EPA must be to help CARICOM to move its economies, and therefore the Caribbean economy, to a new level, as the structural adjustment funds helped the poorer countries of the European community to lift their economic levels.

## FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS FOR CARICOM

In considering the foreign policy options of CARICOM, Professor Stephen Vasciannie begins at the historical forces that have functioned to shape the region's foreign policy. He notes that the region's foreign policy orientation has been shaped by its historical legacy, its geographic location, and its small size. This is apparent in historically determined arrangements, including preferences, which have kept CARICOM States locked into a durable relationship of dependency with Europe. He points out that small size has imposed considerable constraints in respect of market size, economies of scale and political power in the international arena, on individual CARICOM States.

Professor Vasciannie identifies the foundation of the region's foreign policy noting the significance of economic considerations which have shaped it. Most CARICOM initiatives and viewpoints ultimately turn on economic factors, since in the field of foreign policy, and at the foundation

of most political issues in the Caribbean lies an economic foundation. Economic concerns play a significant role in determining possible options for CARICOM, and the limits that may be applicable to each approach contemplated. Likewise, macroeconomic concerns are of paramount importance in assessing the prospects of individual CARICOM Member States, and the strategies they may pursue to enhance standards of living in their respective territories. While economic self-interest may be a general feature of international relations and a key factor in policy formulation, in the case of CARICOM, this emphasis is even more well-placed, having regard to the economic difficulties encountered in the post-independence period by members of the regional grouping.

He notes that the fixed reality of CARICOM is not perceived in purely negative terms and observes that proximity to the world's main military and economic power in a unipolar environment, forms the basis for a range of opportunities and challenges for the Caribbean region. There are opportunities for trade and the provision of services but proximity also places the Caribbean clearly within the vortex of illegal drug activities which culminate mainly within the American market, with increased moves toward freer trade which should lead to the identification of other appropriate strategies. In respect of multilateral negotiations, CARICOM should seek to develop positions that will improve Caribbean reliance on provisions for special and differential treatment in some matters. Given the structural features of CARICOM economies as well, efforts should be made to link the period of time for transitional measures to specified adjustments to these structural features.

Professor Vasciannie advises CARICOM against lending support to efforts that attempt to reduce the significance of State sovereignty. While diplomatic means will always have to be found to counter serious violations of human rights, the current state of the world order does not suggest that humanitarian intervention is an appropriate solution. At the policy level, this form of intervention could be used by powerful States as a means of bolstering their post-imperial pretensions, and it could open the way for interventions for narrow economic or political advantage being undertaken under the guise of humanitarianism. Moreover, as there is no generally agreed threshold for humanitarian intervention, and the identification of a threshold is so notoriously difficult in practice, this doctrine of intervention could eventually be used to justify illegitimate threats against small countries such as those that comprise CARICOM.

CARICOM States are advised to pursue a number of initiatives including encouraging the continued development of election monitoring in the interests of fairness within the clear principle that international observation of elections is contrary to State sovereignty, unless it is sanctioned by the host State. At the diplomatic level as well, CARICOM States should place

themselves in the forefront of post-September 11 efforts to consolidate anti-terrorism initiatives through the United Nations and should be in the vanguard of efforts to clarify and enhance the right to democracy.

### **BRAZIL AND THE CARIBBEAN IN A CHANGING REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

Although there exist socio-economic similarities, common historical experiences and geographic proximity between Latin America and the Caribbean Community, the beginnings of the cautious and mutually suspicious relations between the regions, is traced only to the 1960s. Dr. Mark Kirton endorses the view that the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Latin America have appeared to constitute 'two separate worlds which took no notice of each other in spite of their proximity. Separately, they organised their national existence, having as axis a preferential relationship with the countries that fulfilled a hegemonic function with respect to them.'

He views CARICOM's engagement with Brazil as commencing in 1973 with the Treaty of Chaguaramas which included in its objectives the expansion of trade and economic relations with third world countries. This objective was reinforced and solidified by the explicit mention of the West Indian Commission, that for the future it will be important for CARICOM to seek to strengthen relationships with Brazil since its location, the ethnic make-up of the country's population and its rising status as a rapidly industrializing state, all point to advantages to us in pursuing this orientation.

While in their separate histories the regions have been constrained by colonial bilateralism and inhibited by other factors, the writer contends regional and global changes have emerged and influenced the convergence of interests between CARICOM and Brazil. He identifies the impact of globalization on developing states, a renewed awareness of the vital role of economic cooperation, common challenges including the HIV/AIDS pandemic, environmental and security concerns, among others, as serving to stimulate active collaboration between CARICOM and Brazil.

He sees opportunities for CARICOM to effectively utilize its geographical proximity to network with Brazil for mutual economic and social benefit, as that country attains influential regional and global power status. The development of a robust trading partnership with Brazil can also demonstrate that emerging Latin American powers and Small Caribbean states can become involved in constructive fair-trade arrangements without having to rely on US supervision and therefore reduce CARICOM dependency on the United States.

According to Dr. Kirton, CARICOM has articulated the need for a sustained level of engagement with Brazil in the context of the aggressive postures of the United States in the global arena, and that country's pursuit of hegemonic policies in the region. Furthermore, the loss of special consideration for small states like those of CARICOM, the reduction and impending elimination of preferential trade arrangements, along with the changing global and regional economic and political configurations, have set the stage for the emergence of a new agenda in CARICOM-Brazil relations.

Additionally, several political, economic and security challenges which face CARICOM can be addressed through a strategic alliance, increased collaboration and structured programmes of cooperation with Brazil. Challenges such as increasing levels of drug-trafficking, trafficking in persons, the illicit trade and manufacture of firearms and other forms of transnational crimes, which represent potential threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity may be addressed through cooperation agreements.

The writer admits that there are areas of divergence of interests between the two parties, noting that CARICOM and Brazil, while still with differing positions on some global and regional issues are also natural partners with converging interests and these present significant potential for cooperation. The perception in CARICOM states is that the major players in the Americas demonstrate little respect or regard for the geopolitical concerns of the small states of the region, and it is argued that the widening of relations at this time would undermine the further development of a CARICOM identity and would allow for the cultural influences from Latin America to dominate the small states of the region. There is also the view that further Brazilian involvement could emasculate CARICOM solidarity and initiative and lead to new forms of dependency.

Noting the successful challenge to the arrangements for CARICOM sugar and the attendant financial loss, he wants CARICOM to act decisively and to secure firm commitments from Brazil to reduce the impact of the potential economic losses from sugar on the lives of the people in the region. These commitments must include partnerships in the area of ethanol production, especially since the diversification of the sugar industry would assist in offsetting the repercussions of the recent European Union (EU) decision to cut preferential prices on sugar produced by African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Further, this alternative form of energy—ethanol—would present CARICOM sugar producing states with another avenue for income generation and foreign currency earnings and a new and better opportunity to cope in the competitive global market which has emerged.

Dr. Kirton advocates that CARICOM continues to vigorously pursue Brazilian support for its position at the WTO, that the small open and vulnerable economies like those of CARICOM, be placed in a separate and distinct category and be allowed special preferences because the volume

of their export trade does not provide any threat to the larger economies like Brazil, or to the world trading system and that 'special and differential' treatment is crucial in order for CARICOM to survive and sustain its development.

Dr. Kirton concludes that CARICOM and Brazil, despite their differing positions on some global and regional issues, are natural partners with converging interests which present significant potential for cooperation.

In her paper, Diana Thorburn positions the contemporary Caribbean basin within a changing diplomatic and political arena and situates it upon 'a wave of new international political dynamics in the region.' She summons and interprets three silent but significant recent occurrences relative to Haiti, and conducted under the auspices of France, Brazil, and the People's Republic of China, to substantiate her claim of a changing environment. Then additionally, she describes a grounded South African military jet loaded with arms destined for Haiti as a twist of historical precedence since also from Jamaica Cuban jets once took off for Angola 30 years ago and thereby precipitated the demise of apartheid South Africa.

In the writer's view, the purported role of France in President Aristide's removal; the first significant Latin American military presence in the circum-Caribbean with Brazil's leadership of UN peacekeeping forces; and the first overseas deployment of the People's Revolutionary Army since the early 1950s signal the arrival of new international actors in the region.

The increased diplomatic and military involvement of Brazil in the region is noted. While party to the challenge of ACP sugar arrangements at the WTO, Brazil has promised to help the region achieve its agricultural diversification goal. Meanwhile, South Africa and India both with ambitions to permanent seats on the UN Security Council are seen strengthening ties with African diasporic countries and its extant diasporic relations, respectively. The overtures of Venezuela with its oil wealth are also captured.

In validation of her perception of the changed environment, she accounts for the absence of the US in its traditional role as self-appointed neighbourhood policeman. The United States is represented as distracted from its 'backyard' by its Middle East commitments and simultaneous engagements in other areas of the globe such as Afghanistan, Iraq, concerns of nuclear proliferation by North Korea, the Taiwan issue, and of course its absorbing war on terror. Furthermore, she reflects the growing speculation of US decline as a global power.

Furthermore, the author alludes to tensions and chills in US Caribbean relations. The region's discontent regarding NAFTA, its dislike of the manner in which the US is prosecuting its war of terror, and unease about US Cuba relations, are added to more recent scepticism concerning US role in the Aristide's removal. More so, and instead of a concurrence of views, the US

and the Caribbean conflicted on the choice of candidate for Secretary General of the Organisation of American States.

According to the writer, the lack of US vigilance has permitted other international actors to exploit the vacuum and use the new political space to establish relationships with Caribbean countries. While the opportunity could be used for broadening diplomatic and trade relations beyond the US and Europe, the caution has been sounded and the reminder given that the region should be consistently cognisant of its smallness since, 'bombastic foreign policies (a reference to the 1970s) achieved little medium or long-term developmental gains'.

Caribbean policy makers are advised to be cautious and pragmatic in the enthusiasm and the extent which they pursue the diplomatic and trade opportunities that the changing environment permits. Three reasons are given for this attitude. Firstly, that even if the US hegemony declines, it will not be precipitous; secondly a change in unipolarity may not prove entirely beneficial, and most importantly the Caribbean's proximity and trade dependence and the Caribbean Diaspora will all ensure the region's dependence upon the US.

There is a call for greater reality in alignments and choices relative to the political parties in the US and a reassessment of historical support. There is also a call for less arbitrary and uninformed Caribbean diplomatic attitudes, since it is claimed that there has been certain superficiality to the relationship between the English-speaking Caribbean and the US. This superficiality, in the writer's view, has precluded a critical understanding of the US political process and how its foreign policy really works.

Finally, the region's attempt at foreign policy coordination is described as unfulfilled and member states are seen to be acting in directions away from that objective. Failed consensus in responding to US invasion of Iraq, discord over the recognition of Haiti's interim government, and Jamaica's unilateral opening of new diplomatic missions in three countries lead to the confirmation of that view.

## **CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW, WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE**

Dr. Trevor Farrell's empirical analysis of intra-regional investment trends reveals that Trinidad and Tobago is the lead country in the Community followed to a lesser extent by Jamaica and Barbados. His survey finds that much of the intra-regional direct investment flows take place through some form of inter-corporate linkage, based on joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances rather than through the setting up of new

operations. Dr. Farrell states that cross-border investments have involved mainly 'market extension diversification' rather than production integration.

He sees portfolio investment as a new dynamic in regional economic integration while the emergence of a regional capital market as well as the development of off shore financial centres in various countries in the region will be future positive developments. While much of what is happening in the Community so far falls within the area of trade in services rather than trade in goods, there should be regional initiatives to 'identify strategic industries' in which the region has the best chance to build a competitive advantage. He expresses that while the CSME is important, public policy must be better targeted in the future to facilitate the region in developing its full potential.

### REFLECTIONS OF A DIPLOMAT

The reflections of Ambassador J. O'Neil Lewis are not vapid tales of journeys undertaken or dazzling accounts of capitals visited and credentials presented. Instead they are selected and close-up recollections that provide background and give colour, supply context and include texture. They allow those absent in that period to derive meaning and assign interpretations to developments of the past. Furthermore, the matters of his reflections are not obsolete although they are of historical facts. These reflections are of recurring relevance and present significance to the Community and their implications go beyond the public invited by the Economic Association of Trinidad. His discourse contains much about the life of the Community, captures many of our persistent difficulties, and encloses a multitude of concerns and details hardly known and perhaps, little appreciated hitherto within the region.

Ambassador Lewis invokes General de Gaulle's disparaging inquiry, 'What can these specks of dust in the Atlantic do in the international world?' to locate the role and purpose of Caribbean diplomacy in the international system. We can act, perhaps on principle; take our stand on the principles inscribed in the charters of the various organizations to which they belong. We, in the Caribbean, have in the past taken our stand on those principles. We have loved to be a mediating influence, bringing people together, because we have no other way in which we can discharge our obligations under those charters.

To some extent, we can take some satisfaction in such achievements as we have had. Looking to the future and contemplating Trinidad and Tobago's diplomacy, and by extension, that of the Caribbean region; he notes that as in the past, there will be need to bring some influence to bear on world affairs. It can be done, even if it is only a moral influence that we bring. Although we have no nuclear weapons, we are a signatory to, and we have ratified, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We do not have nuclear weapons and we

do not want them; but we want to be in a position to use whatever moral influence we can. It may be that all those small countries, like ours have, are words; but words, after all, are the tools of diplomacy. It is words that we use, not weapons, to try to persuade other people to our point of view. At best, our only force is that of moral suasion.

## CARIBBEAN REASONINGS

The Hon. Lloyd Best calls for the articulation of a vision that is capable of driving the integration movement. A vision underpinned by vigorous empirical work that recognises and describes the history of the region as it has evolved. In his view, such a vision has never been articulated by CARICOM and consequently, the Caribbean region needs a new start and CARICOM requires an entirely new approach to regional integration—an empirically-grounded, pragmatic way forward.

He reasons that a Caribbean nation state has been slow to materialize because integration is not a natural spontaneous process. This principle holds true particularly for the Caribbean islands, which throughout their history have operated as separate social and political units and as distinct units of production and exploitation. Therefore, integration has to be promoted, nurtured, and made to happen but above all, it must be driven by a mission powerful enough to withstand repeated diversions; sufficiently robust to overcome obstacles as they arise by providing the basis for shifting and ranking priorities; and establishing effective guidelines to choice.

The region is faulted for failing to derive criteria for the measurement of progress, neither have we designed the institutions required nor utilised the existing institutions such as the regional university. More so, there is not a committed cadre capable of breeding integration ideas. There is a paucity of this and this requires the UWI to return to its original purpose.

There is an education crisis that is pervasive and epistemic, rooted in the failure of the formal and informal institutions to liberate the Caribbean imagination and provide sources of confidence and venture. The issue is epistemic sovereignty and we must assume responsibility for our own philosophical conception of the world seen primarily, although not entirely, from the coordinates of our own historical, cultural, and institutional context. We must adjudicate our own truths properly, taking into account the experience of the other.

In an appraisal of the performance of the region's responsible elites, including academics and the intelligentsia, Best says the independence generation has an enormous number of sins of omission for which to account. The university has been incapable of fulfilling its role of driving the social process forward. Therefore, a fresh start is imperative in order to bring a

fresh interpretation underpinned by a radical reorientation of the theoretical and empirical work. Best sees the restoration of the university to its original purpose as the starting point. He cites the change as seen in Trinidad and Tobago where the entire student body is exposed to the humanities; there is an emphasis on research; and a different relationship is being forged between university and communities; graduates and undergraduates and, alumni and campus cadres.

## THE CARIBBEAN SEASCAPE

The dominance of the Caribbean Sea in the very formation of Caribbean societies and its continued defining role in the survival and development of these societies has been brought into sharp focus by Mr. Carl Dundas in his consideration of the Caribbean Seascape. He employs the landscape ecology terminology when he speaks of seascape to refer to the ecological and biological relationship between the various ecosystems found in the Caribbean, a seascape described as embracing a number of sensitive and vulnerable ecosystems which are linked to the land through coastlines and currents of the sea, and have important economic potential for the region as a whole.

He tells us that these delicate ecosystems face serious threats from a variety of human activities as well as from climate change and consequently, there is urgent need for the states and dependent territories of the region to embrace and implement conservation measures and foster international cooperation, with a view to furthering research into the health of the ecosystems of the Caribbean. There is clear evidence that serious threats exist to the health and survival of coral reefs, mangrove forests and seagrass meadows. These threats emanate mainly from human activities as well as climate change.

The responsibility for the protection of the Caribbean seascape from harm is distributed over governments of the region, non-governmental organizations, and the inhabitants of the region. He advises renewed and continuing efforts to declare and maintain new maritime protected areas in the Caribbean. In addition, there should be continued cooperation between institutions of science and research into the many ecosystems that are interlinked in the seascape of the Caribbean.

Dundas provides a survey of the geographic, geological, geomorphologic, geopolitical, economic, and legal features of the Caribbean seascape. He reminds us that the Caribbean Sea dominates the geography of the Caribbean region and the features of its islands, islets, and rocks bordering the South American Continent; its various channels which allow shipping lanes from the Atlantic Ocean to the Caribbean Sea give it its distinctive shape and

classification as a semi-enclosed sea. Geologically, the Caribbean area has two main basins which are separated by a relatively broad submarine plateau.

The geographic dimension has the potential to impact considerably on the seascape of the Caribbean with respect to the physical state of the environment and on the human, social and economic activities. An additional factor for consideration is the political division of the area which has in fact partitioned the Caribbean Sea in a way that will profoundly influence the development and environment of the seascape of the area in the foreseeable future.

He sets out to both define and describe the features of the Caribbean Sea in the process of identifying the particular threats to each. He tells us that the Caribbean seascape is characterised by tropical marine ecosystems which revolve around coral reef fauna, mangrove forests, and seagrass meadows. Other factors which impact on the seascape include Salinas, narrow tidal ponds which can be found on the coasts of most Caribbean islands, fish, birds, currents, waves, sand and human activities.

### **BORDER CONTROVERSIES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY**

Cedric Joseph asserts that the existence of age-old territorial disputes and of undelimited maritime zones contribute to local uncertainties and that the consequences can proliferate beyond the initial areas of involvement. He also contends that the newer maritime issues should be managed by regional diplomacy in good faith, since it is the failure of that diplomacy that would be unhelpful to the Community.

The Caribbean Community must find mechanisms to manage the existing border controversies among Member States and those likely to emerge from the new situation, requiring maritime delimitation. The situation has not attained crisis levels but it is indicative of some turmoil in regional affairs with the prospect for disruptions in the workings of the Community. Furthermore, the prevailing situation has the potential to convey to the international community, an incapacity to settle disputes peacefully, which is a major requirement of international behaviour. It invites the agents of division and intrigue at a time of vital trade negotiations.

Joseph recommends collective effort in support of bilateral initiatives as a way of managing the extended maritime area, a considerable portion of which lies in the Caribbean Sea. He cites Carl Dundas, who has argued the necessity of delimiting the maritime boundaries in CARICOM, primarily for defining the extent and limits of the maritime jurisdiction of the coastal States, the management of the EEZ, and for attracting investments in hydrocarbon exploration.

Admitting that the peaceful delimiting of maritime boundaries within CARICOM will demand political goodwill, understanding and compromise on all sides, he notes that such is demanded in the interest of both the current and future stability and security of the Community. He is of the view that CARICOM should exert greater efforts in relation to the issues of the Caribbean Sea. We should be at the centre shaping the procedures for protecting the ecological systems of the Caribbean Sea.

The discussion on Border Controversies and their implications for stability and security of the Caribbean Community is premised on two fundamentals: that geography would have spared the English-speaking Caribbean states of the encumbrances of boundary and territorial disputes, and that a common history, people, culture and language would have afforded protection from the traditional territorial disputes and rivalry of coterminous land-based states. The same tranquillity was not necessarily expected to prevail in the situations of Belize and Guyana, but the other states, through participation in sustained diplomacy towards securing and maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Guyana and Belize, would have learned vital lessons.

That such a situation has not obtained is evident from the fact that territorial claims are maintained against two CARICOM Member States by three neighbouring states, one of which has become a member of the Community. Alongside these ancient claims is the new situation requiring maritime delimitation. Two Member States have unilaterally resorted to the procedures of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Furthermore, Dundas has calculated that there are 39 maritime boundaries outstanding in CARICOM for settlement.

Joseph tells us that procedures for resolution are costly, and holds the strong view that the prevailing situation has the potential to undermine unity and solidarity in the Community. It advertises the existence of a dispute and whets perceptions about disharmony and fractiousness within CARICOM when the separate interests of Member States are at stake. CARICOM should also find useful the lessons of the several border disputes in Latin America, and Central America, specifically, and the harmful effects they have had on the various initiatives for integration.

### **THE PERFORMANCE AND SUITABILITY OF THE STANDARD SYSTEM OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GUYANA AND SURINAME**

Dr. Jack Menke notes that Guyana and Suriname face a number of problems, of which some appear to be persistent. These problems—ranging from ethnic disharmony, political instability to blocked economic development—raise questions on the suitability and performance of the standard

democratic system, whether it is the majoritarian or the non-majoritarian (consociational) model.

According to the writer, the main problems perceived in the majoritarian model are ethnic disharmony, blocked nation building, political leadership and instability. Some of the suggested solutions to these problems were identified as power sharing, the introduction of a proportionate electoral system and constitutional reforms. Other specific problems identified included breakdown of ethnic parties, fragility of inter-ethnic political alliances and regime instability.

Through introduction, explanation and application of the Instability Index in support of his argument, he notes that the overall instability index for Suriname, based on the results of 13 elections from 1949–2000 is 36, which are high if compared with Guyana. Guyana generally has a low electoral instability index of 5.7 in the 1953–1997 periods. The highest electoral instability is registered for the 1964–1980 period, with an index of 40.1.

He also considers the political instability of the two states. He defines political instability as a broader concept than electoral instability and one that is much more related to the behaviour and performance of governments. An indicator of political instability is the mean duration of governments. Suriname has the shortest duration of governments with an average of 2.5 years in the 1949–2001 periods which is still lower than Guyana (3.9).

The writer's conclusion is that democratic practices and theoretical models discussed above give evidence that both the reality and model of the political systems in Guyana and Suriname are going through a crisis. The more or less persistent problems range from blocked development, political instability, ethnic polarization (except for Suriname) and blocked nation building as mentioned above. Furthermore, that empirical data and events in these societies contradict the theoretical concept of the plural society and the related standard, political models, the majoritarian and the non-majoritarian models. A main difference is that unlike the non-majoritarian system of Suriname, the majoritarian politics of Guyana appear to suffer from ethnic polarization.

### **ETHNIC VOTING: A MYTH?**

Haslyn Parris undertakes to demonstrate the inadequacy of current and prevailing theories of ethnic voting in Guyana, claiming that these theories lack both explanatory and predictive validity. He consequently consigns these 'assertions and allegations' about ethnic voting in Guyana to the category of great malignant myths. He reasons that the existence of a correlation between ethnicity and voting preferences seems to bolster the erroneous view with its

proponents failing to realize that correlation does not unwaveringly imply causation or offer a sufficient explanation.

He determines that since the myth is derived from prejudice and stereotypes which are not eradicable or mutable in the short term, the myth will persist with its malignant effects in the short or medium term. He therefore recommends changes in the electoral game in which voting for your own is applicable; changing of the electoral process so that issues are canvassed; the emergence of an autonomous Electoral Commission; and the existence of a rational electorate capable of weighing the merits of proffered visions and solutions. Parris is convinced that in the absence of such rationality in the electorate there is no resort.

He traces the origin of this myth to the introduction of 'Apan Jhatt' a Hindi expression meaning to vote for your own in the country's politics in 1957. The probability of utilizing such a strategy for winning elections arose in spite of the heterogeneity of the major political parties. Guyana possesses the necessary conditions for the emergence of such a myth. Adult suffrage was introduced in 1953; there are two main political parties, and the main political parties are led by persons of different ethnicity.

Furthermore, if voting is ethnically determined, then this may have provided a stimulus for electoral rigging by demographically disadvantaged contestants. It may be the cause of counter-rigging, and it may be the basis for interest in executive power-sharing. Furthermore, he provides evidence that those who have come as election observers and those who assist in the country's elections have also succumbed to the myth of ethnic voting. The responses and recommendations of international financial organisations, foreign governments, and donor agencies are premised on the false theory, and multi-ethnic societies are perceived as problematic.

Parris identifies other serious consequences for national and political development in the persistence of this myth. He claims that efforts and attempts at manipulation and counter manipulation of the electoral process will become entrenched; the battle for the control of the Electoral Commission by political parties will rage and a denial of its autonomy will result.

The rich perspectives, interpretations and recommendations offered in these papers should serve to enrich the reference material available to those charged with the responsibility of formulating appropriate strategies and determining options to be pursued in advancing the interests of the Caribbean Region.


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# 33.

## IMPROVING THE ORGANISATION OF ELECTIONS: A 2006 Perspective



### INTRODUCTION

**IT TAKES A GREAT DEAL OF COURAGE TO** write a book about inherently complex matters, especially when many of those matters are still under active consideration, and accordingly settled answers to many questions do not exist. To do so, forthrightly expressing one's own preferred solutions in the form of advice and recommendations in a book intended for the general public, and therefore not permitting rigid proofs, is tempting faith. For, history will surely judge the correctness of the author's flights of intuition, even when those flights are based on sound empirical evidence

and accurate observations of custom and practice.

This book is the result of such an act of courage. The deceptively simple concept of organizing a process, called an election, that seeks to derive societal preference by aggregating individual choices, is taken by the short hairs, so to speak, and pronounced upon. The perhaps objectionable vantage point taken is that the matter is a relatively simple one that so-called older democracies, equated to Western democracies, have been successfully organizing 'for many decades. The so-called 'emerging democracies' are advised that over time, the adherence to some simply stated rules comprising good practice, use of emerging technology, and a non-partisan culture in

the delivery of transparent election processes will get them to the level of competence and acceptance of incompetence of the established democracies. This vantage point guarantees highly informative text (and the book does deliver this); even though the conclusions and recommendations may encourage some false hope.

The editor's concern about false hope derives from two sources. The first is from Kenneth J. Arrow's Impossibility theorem.

In Paris in 1785, the Marquis de Condorcet exposed a problem now referred to as Condorcet's paradox. Essentially it dealt with the following problem: *'Assume there are three alternatives: X, Y, Z, among which choice is to be made by free and fair voting. One-third of the voters prefer X to Y and Y to Z, one-third prefer Y to Z and Z to X, and one-third prefer Z to X and X to Y. Then X will be preferred to Y by a majority, Y to Z by a majority, and Z to X by a majority. What should be the societal decision based on these freely expressed individual preferences?'*

It is tempting to think that the way out of this paradox, for clearly it must be an arithmetical trick, is to correct the imperfection in the particular system of majority voting. Unfortunately, not only is this not a way out of the problem, but also there is no way out!

Kenneth J. Arrow, who was awarded the Nobel prize in Economics in 1972, presented in 1966, a paper entitled 'Public and Private Values' to a symposium on Human Values and Economic Policy at the New York University Institute of Philosophy. In that paper, he presented a proof of a very powerful generalization now referred to as 'The Impossibility Theorem'. This theorem says that something like Condorcet's paradox characterizes every voting system. More specifically it says that there is never a way to derive societal preferences from individual preferences that can be guaranteed to satisfy the following four conditions: (a) the societal preferences must be transitive, that is, if X is preferred to Y, and Y is preferred to Z, then X is preferred to Z; (b) the societal preferences and the individual preferences must be restricted to the available alternatives; (c) if every individual prefers X to Y, then the societal preference must be to prefer X to Y; and (d) the societal preferences must not be automatically determined by any individual's preferences.

In the listing of the conditions above, (a) requires choices to be 'rational', (b) requires the choices to be 'disciplined' in the sense that neither the society nor the individual can express preferences for choices that are not available (this is the concept of the 'spoilt vote'), and (d) presumes that no 'dictatorial' behaviour is allowable by any person or group of persons. Condition (c) has an obvious appeal; in that it would be untenable to have things any other way.

If, quite reasonably(?), you are of a mind to accept (a), (b), (c), and (d), as joint characteristics of 'reasonableness' in decision-making in the society, then a disturbing way of restating Arrow's theorem is to state that any

decision rule based on voting must make ‘unreasonable’ decisions at least some of the time!

The editor’s second source of concern is the fact that with countries we are dealing with complex adaptive systems – a situation that guarantees that they will make the paradigm shifts required for survival by going to the edge of chaos from time to time. Accordingly, one should expect that this book will give useful information about the experiences and practices of several countries flirting with democracy and therefore indulging in election processes; but there should be little, if any, hope that the fundamental problems have solutions distillable from those observations – even if the observations made from the vantage point of the ‘successes’ of established democracies in running their systems of choosing governments.


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## 34.

# REALISING THE DREAM OF CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION



### INTRODUCTION

"WE THE SECRETARIAT AS THE REGIONAL INTEGRATION NERVE centre must take stock of ourselves. We cannot postpone the determining of our priorities and the mapping out of our strategy for the future. This we must do now if we are to play our full part not merely in achieving the vision of the founding fathers of the Regional Movement, but also in helping to fashion the means of fulfilling the growing aspirations of the Caribbean people - (Carrington 1992)

The year 1992 was a momentous one. It was the year that the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community issued the Protocol of Port-of-Spain, which set out their vision for charting the course of Caribbean Integration. It was the year of decision for the creation of new institutions to strengthen the structure of the Community. It was the year that Edwin Wilberforce Carrington assumed captaincy of the ship of Caribbean Integration.

History has shown that the choice of head of Secretariats established to guide development has been a determining factor in the future direction and dynamism of the grouping. Since its establishment in 1973, the Community has accommodated six (6) Secretaries-General at its helm, all of whom took up their appointments at particularly challenging periods in the integration

process. William Demas, for example, the first Secretary General of the Caribbean Community (1970 to 1974) had the assignment of consolidating the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) and of transforming it into a Community and Common Market in the midst of the spin-off of the first oil crisis or energy shock of 1973. Sir Alister McIntyre's (1974 to 1977) challenge was the consolidation of the integration movement and the Common Market within the context of the first international economic crisis of soaring international inflation and increasing balance of payment crises. Internal regional differences pertaining to political leadership marked the tenure of Secretary-General, Dr. Kurleigh King (1978 to 1983). He faced the foreboding task of rebuilding the Caribbean integration movement against the background of the world's second economic crisis fuelled by the 1979 to 1980 energy crisis. While Roderick Rainford, who was the fourth Secretary-General, (1983 to 1992), was charged with the responsibility of shepherding the movement through the havoc of the Grenada Invasion and a period of unilateral action to cope with national imperatives. It fell to Sir Edwin Carrington to lead the CCS as the Region sought to position itself in the hemisphere and the new globalised international community. That he has rendered yeoman service in the discharge of leadership during this period is beyond challenge.

He was called upon to serve at a time of "awesome responsibility", when the Secretariat's role in the integration process would prove decisive, a time which demanded a shared perspective approach to confronting and resolving the many challenges which would be faced by the Community. These included high unemployment, limited intra-regional trade, fragmentation tendencies in some territories, the sometimes slow implementation of important decisions, the clashing of national interests to the detriment of the higher interests of the Community, lower than expected involvement of the people of the Region in the integration process, low productivity, poor work habits and the rather limited use of technology in the development of Caribbean societies. These challenges beckoned a fundamental re-ordering of our Caribbean society, if they were to be overcome.

It is on Sir Edwin Carrington that the camera must now be focussed. His has been the herculean task of transforming the movement into a production-driven, people oriented Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), and our Heads of Government, on three (3) distinct occasions, five (5) years apart, have felt themselves compelled to reaffirm their confidence in his ability to firmly grasp the helm of the vessel bearing the Caribbean Community and to skillfully pilot it through the seas of the Caribbean often made treacherous by developments occurring both within and outside our shores and with the capacity to disrupt the Region's fragile equilibrium.

Secretary-General Carrington considered it a privilege and welcomed the offer of continued service to his Region for a third term. "If, therefore, during

this third term, I can help to get the Single Market (SM) up and running, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) established and functioning, the process of consultation and decision-making widened, and the CARICOM Secretariat occupying its long-awaited new home, then, not only would I consider the mission would have been worthwhile, I would also be able to leave the Secretariat a very happy man. (CARICOM Perspective: July 2002).

In considering the task of leading the region for a third term, Secretary-General Carrington was motivated by the fact that the Community was at a critical stage of its development. The new millennium bestowed an era of implementation. The regional movement needed to stay the course and accelerate its plans to actualisation. The Community could not afford to undo what had been accomplished in the long hard-fought battle to deepen and strengthen the integration process. In the words of the Secretary-General “we are currently straining every sinew to have the Single Market and Economy (SME), including the Caribbean Court of Justice, fully established and operational.” (CARICOM Perspective: July 2002).

Many of the recently created institutional arrangements of the Community, such as the Quasi Cabinet and the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) have just begun to demonstrate a welcomed measure of viability.” (CARICOM Perspective July 2002).

For the generation of citizens of the Caribbean that has grown up during the hectic nineties, the name Sir Edwin Carrington has been synonymous with CARICOM. In his introduction to the CARICOM Perspective of 1994, he wrote that:

This was two (2) years into his first five-year tenure as the Region’s leading public servant, the man whom unfalteringly accepted the task to lead the Region through those very ‘treacherous currents’. Flux has perhaps been one of the Caribbean’s dominant characteristics ever since the post-Colombian era as evident in the constant movement of peoples, of sovereignty, of ships, of the very waves which lap at all of our common shorelines. It is, thus, that Sir Edwin Carrington’s pronouncement was in a very real way both a recollection of history and a pragmatic and incisive perspective on the contemporary environment. As can be seen in the global developments now, his pronouncements bear the semblance of prophecy.

## **GROUNDINGS WITH HIS BROTHERS**

Confronting the challenges and conceiving, developing and implementing appropriate programmes and courses of action for the ultimate benefit of the Caribbean peoples was a task and responsibility that Sir Edwin Carrington was quite prepared for on assumption of the Office of Secretary-General of CARICOM. His academic accomplishments, coupled with a distinguished

record of public service regionally and internationally provided the grounding, qualified and equipped him for the task at hand. As a proud student of the Region's premier tertiary institution, the University of the West Indies (UWI), from 1961 to 1965, the Secretary-General considers the greatest gain to be not so much the academic excellence to which he was exposed but the "West Indianess" that was characteristic of the campus experience. Describing his sojourn at the University of the West Indies (UWI), which resulted in the B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees in Economics in 1964 and 1965, respectively, he concludes that he went to the UWI as a national of Trinidad and Tobago and returned home as a West Indian (Perspective No 71, July 2002).

Through the collective university experiences and interaction with other Caribbean brothers and sisters he learnt his deepest lessons about Caribbean peoples and was motivated to fulfil his yearning for development work of a regional dimension. In preparation for such a task, Sir Edwin Carrington pursued post-Graduate studies at McGill University from 1965 to 1968, in Advanced Economic Theory, Economic Planning and Development. As a Teaching Assistant at McGill, he learnt the very important lesson – how to transform academia into practical operations – from his highly regarded mentor and teacher, economist, Professor Kari Levitt. This grounding, as he himself would be the first to acknowledge, explains his undeniable ability to pro-actively translate policy and plans into definite actions, which tangibly benefit the citizens of the Caribbean to whom he has dedicated his public service.

Before assuming the Office of Secretary-General (OSG) he had a varied and very successful public career, which commenced in his early preuniversity years with a fleeting stint as a teacher in his homeland, followed by three (3) years in the government public service. It was while working in the dusty post office of Trinidad's high security Defence Branch that the values of perseverance, diligence and commitment, which he espoused, singled him out from his colleagues and earned him the "reward" of a transfer to the new Ministry of Home Affairs of Eric Williams' government. Not to be deceived by the "delight" of securing a job in the Civil Service, Carrington thought rather that his life had only just started, and persisted in study while working to gain the scholarship that catapulted him into the University of the West Indies in 1961. In his continuing commitment to public service, he served as an Administrative Cadet in the Economic Planning Unit of the Office of the Prime Minister from 1964 to 1965. The UWI benefited tremendously from the knowledge he acquired at McGill University when he joined its faculty as a Junior Research Fellow at the Institute of Social and Economic Research from 1969 to 1970.

The characteristics of his career as Secretary-General within the Caribbean Community flowed naturally from the experiences he gained

during his service at the University of the West Indies. William Demas, Secretary-General of CARIFTA, on the *qui vive* for brilliant young men to enhance his new Department, enticed Sir Edwin Carrington to join him in 1970, as Chief of the Economic Section. His grounding in regional public service was firmly established over the next six (6) years during which, with the creation of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CCCM) in 1973, he was promoted to Director of Trade and Integration, serving in this capacity until 1976.

A defining point in the professional career of Sir Edwin Carrington was his appointment, first as Deputy Secretary-General of the ACP from 1976 to 1985 and then as its Secretary-General from 1985 to 1990. He attributes this achievement largely to his extensive involvement at CARIFTA/ CARICOM in working on relations with the enlarged European Community (EC). His forte then was trade relations between the Commonwealth Caribbean countries, those of Africa as well as the Pacific with the European Community. A key concern was the negotiation for the Sugar Protocol, given the threat to the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, which Britain had ended on joining the European Community. The interest of the Commonwealth sugar producing countries was at stake and as Technical Adviser to P.J. Patterson of Jamaica, the ACP negotiator for the Sugar Protocol, Sir Edwin Carrington, with skillful manoeuvring and *sang froid* had greatly impressed the officials of the ACP and the European Community.

His nomination and appointment to the post of Deputy Secretary-General of the ACP was widely supported. After two (2) terms in that position, Mr. Carrington assumed the highest office of Secretary-General of the ACP Group. This was recognition of his unquestionable competence as an economic policy and trade negotiations expert of the Caribbean grouping by their partners in Africa and the Pacific.

During the period 1991 to 1992, he returned to serve his homeland as its High Commissioner to Guyana prior to being appointed Secretary-General of CARICOM in 1992.

Sir Edwin Carrington's acquisition of intellectual and managerial competence and his capacity to interact and establish relations with diplomacy at the international level, were gleaned from his previous tenure at the CARICOM Secretariat and as Secretary-General of the ACP. Such experiences provided the foundation for him to effectively master the new task of spearheading the Region's integration movement. His long association with a number of experts of West Indian economic development and Caribbean integration, including the revered William Demas and Sir Alister McIntyre, provided the grounding in regional public service and his exposure to and understanding of the European unification process placed him in good stead in charting the future direction of the Region's development and integration process.

These great Caribbean leaders, whom had played such a critical role in the formation of the Community and whom had such impact on its leadership and direction, provided the mentorship that Sir Edwin Carrington draws from in successfully guiding the regional movement forward.

## TIME FOR ACTION

Towards the beginning of the nineties, numerous challenges faced the Caribbean Community particularly in the political and economic global systems. Expansion in trade and financial systems and the increasing marginalisation of smaller economies such as those of the Caribbean were occurring at an unprecedented pace. In response, the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community at Grande Anse in 1989 proposed a programme of action to secure the survival and viability of CARICOM Member States to pursue initiatives to consolidate the process of strengthening the Community through the restructuring of its Institutions so as to establish integration and functional cooperation relationships with other Caribbean Basin countries, and to foster beneficial linkages with the international community.

The West Indian Commission (WIC) appointed in 1989 to take these initiatives forward was critical to the strengthening and restructuring of the Community to ensure its continued participation as a player, though small, in the world economy. The West Indian Commission was timely in its recommendations for major institutional and structural changes that would ensure that the Community could participate in a dynamic globalised economy dominated by unprecedented advancement of new technologies, an increase in the emergence of trading blocs; turbulence in the international financial system and the consequential massive increase in the debt burden of developing countries including those of CARICOM. That was not all. As the century ended the problems associated with the AIDS epidemic intensified and terrorism reared its dreaded head. (*The Integrationist*, July 2003).

The Community seemed in danger of potential marginalisation. In fact, Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Mr. A. N. R. Robinson warned of the Caribbean “becoming a backwater, separating the main current of human advance in the 21<sup>st</sup> century”. (Payne/ Sutton: *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, *The Caribbean in the New Order*, p. 41.).

This situation required that the Community weigh its options, that it make deliberate choices to pilot the Community’s ship to safe harbour, a harbour which would offer tangible advantages to our people. With the blessings of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, Secretary General Carrington, set out in pursuit of the option of co-operation with others by way of combining resources, negotiating common interests

and jointly managing the Region's economic space and economic relations with its competitors under the umbrella of regional integration/co-operation. The major challenge of Sir Edwin Carrington's tenure as Secretary-General was the transformation of the integration movement from a trade in goods driven arrangement into a production driven Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME).

The basic tenets of this option were enshrined in the Grand Anse Declaration of 1989, which naturally evolved over the years and into the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It comprises three (3) components:

- The first focuses on the deepening process of regional integration by advancing beyond a common Market towards a West Indian economy that is more modern, cohesive and designed to function effectively in the prevailing global economic and liberalised trading conditions;
- The second component of the strategy addresses the widening of the membership and by extension, the economic and market mass of the Community, thus leading to the admission of Suriname and Haiti;
- The third component is the effective participation in the global trading and economic system which is being pursued through a number of key sub-strategies, one of which involves establishing economic and trading links with non-traditional trading partners within our immediate Caribbean Basin area under a series of bilateral agreements and another involving the revamping of our traditional trading relationships such as the re-negotiation of the LOME Convention (now COTONOU) and CARICOM Agreement and yet another, the current hemispheric programme to create a Free Trade area of the Americas and of course, the World Trade Organisation (WTO). (*Carrington: Towards Making the Caribbean Whole, April 1999*).

The pursuit of such a strategy seemed tailor made for the emergence of a single, seamless economic space within which the majority of transactions in the Community would take place on essentially the same legal basis and commercial terms and conditions between and among individuals and business organisations from different geographical parts of the market space and between separate sovereign entities which are contracting parties. It envisioned greater economic opportunity based on the emergence of active, expanding, progressive and fully integrated markets for goods and services, and in which factors of production and trading in goods and in the provision of services, moved freely and were accessible to any national of the Community who wished and had the capacity to participate in the regional

economy under conditions which, for all practical purposes, functioned like a national economy.

It also catered for expanding sophisticated forms of business activity and business that encouraged risk-taking and investment which could negotiate equally predictable market access and other trading conditions and of course provided for effective governance and practice. (Carrington: *Towards Making the Caribbean Whole*, April 1999).

At the regional level important developments were also occurring. The Region was celebrating the centennial of Columbus' arrival. These celebrations helped to dramatise the need for the Community to project its unique cultural values and channel the consciousness of the people into areas and programmes, which could lift the profile of the community, and its peoples. (*The Integrationist*, July 2003).

As the 20<sup>th</sup> century was drawing to a close it seemed unable to shake off the major challenges and urgent tasks arising from changes in the international political and economic systems, which had become more pronounced after the collapse of the Soviet system in 1989. (*The Integrationist*, July 2003) Sir Edwin Carrington chose to take example from the Good Book and set for himself, ten (10) guiding commandments, which would instruct him as he purposefully, steered the Community in times of turmoil and relative calm. These set tremendous store on the following:

- i. **Stimulating** the people of the Region to become involved on an ongoing basis in matters affecting their lives, be it in their villages, communities, countries or Regions;
- ii. **Within** the context of the various regional institutions, developing a shared perception, among the Region's leadership of the future direction for the Caribbean;
- iii. **Adopting** clear policies to shift the axis of economic activity away from the traditional domination of primary commodities towards a more balanced mix of goods and services;
- iv. **Adopting** domestic and regional policies which incorporate as an integral part, the social dimension of development;
- v. **Strengthening** regional co-operation and the formulation of strategic alliances between institutional arrangements as a basis for developing production, increasing trade and pursuing external negotiations;
- vi. **Strengthening** of our human resources by according greater priority to our Universities and other institutions of learning and research, firmly grounding our educational policy in regionalism, linguistic versatility and computer literacy and extending into the new technological developments such as bio technology and informatics;

- vii. **Developing** of production and marketing infrastructure through deeper forms of integration which permit freer movement of all factors of production, the formation of regional companies as well as strategic alliances between production units regionally and globally;
- viii. **Strengthening** of vital information and telecommunication infrastructure to achieve improved production processes, including the production of a number of new services;
- ix. **Democratisation** of the private sector to encourage the general population and not simply a limited class, to participate and benefit directly from the fruits of successful economic and social development;
- x. **Engendering** an explicit regional commitment to ever-closer political, economic and cultural co-operation. (*Carrington: Towards Making the Caribbean Whole, April 1999*).

This course of action in essence, was geared to strengthen the three (3) main pillars upon which the integration movement is built, i.e., integrating the economies of all the Member States; Coordination of their Foreign Policies; and Cooperating in the provision of a number of common services such as transportation, health, education, culture etc.

Reflecting on his course of action and the major achievements of the Community under his leadership, Secretary-General Carrington notes that the growth and strengthening of the Community and its recognition as a respected regional grouping in the international community over the last decade was a major accomplishment. As he puts it: "Although our challenges have been considerable, we have not faltered in facing them. In the process we have been able to carve an indelible mark on the global map. Within the three (3) decades of its life, the Community has earned recognition as "a distinct entity with an international personality" (Carrington: Annual Report 2003) and has managed to acquire separate status within some international organizations.

The Secretary-General describes the growth and strengthening of the Community during his term of Office thus:

The increasing incorporation of once "remote" members of the Community such as Belize and The Bahamas into the fold of the CARICOM family is hailed by the Secretary-General as another notable dimension of the achievements during his tenure. Great import was attached to the widening of the Community during this period as Suriname and Haiti were accorded membership status in CARICOM. Three (3) new countries – Anguilla, Bermuda and the Cayman Islands – were accorded the status of Associate Members of the Community.

Much of what has been accomplished he attributes to the firm and effective institutional structure existing in the Community, particularly the

Heads of Government and the Ministerial Bodies, which provides him with the guidance he needs to function effectively. The Heads of Government give direction to the integrative process of governance of the Community and the direction of the Community.

## TENURE OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

An important responsibility, which fell to Carrington, was the need to examine the relevance of the Community's Institutions and the particular structures and strategies, which were necessary for adjustment and survival. The Caribbean Community at the beginning of Sir Edwin Carrington's tenure was in the process of being redesigned to respond to external challenges. A number of important institutions were proposed by the West Indian Commission, some of which were ratified by the Conference of Heads of Government. A signal development in the process of institutional reform was the restructuring of the Ministerial Institutions by Heads of Government through the creation of a new Caribbean Community Council with overall responsibility for prioritising and resource allocation; a Trade and Economic Council, a Foreign and Community Relations Council and a Human and Social Development Council. Parliamentarians (ACCP) and the Charter of Civil Society; responsive to the challenges of the global environment and facilitating regional economic development – the CARICOM Single Market and Economy – and to underpin this, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ).

The Community leaders recognised that a major challenge was the actual establishment and implementation of these new institutional arrangements. During his tenure, the Secretary-General has achieved significant success in making these Institutions a reality. His was the task to ensure that the gap between decision-making and implementation was as narrow as possible. In his own words, he noted that, “when you take decisions and there seems to be too long a gap between the decision taken and the decision to implement it, you are courting trouble.” (Carrington 2003).

The CCJ, as a regional judicial tribunal and centrepiece of the CSME, will be the vehicle for settling disputes among Member States emanating from the interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC). The centrality of the CCJ to the functioning of the CSME is captured by the Secretary-General who notes that a permanent, central, regional, judicial institution is of absolute importance to protect the many rights and obligations enshrined in the CSME agreement, rights which pertain, for example, to the establishment of economic enterprises, the movement of capital or the acquisition of land for business purposes. The CCJ will replace the Privy Council, functioning as a final court of appeal in civil and criminal matters from the courts of Member States. The CCJ

is “a most significant part of institutional strengthening that consolidates a Caribbean social identity and secures Caribbean nationhood, dealing directly with the preservation of Caribbean citizens’ rights, guaranteeing constitutional protection and supervising the benefits of Caribbean integration in a way that no foreign jurisdiction could”. (Carrington: *Perspective July 2002*).

The Charter of Civil Society and the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP) were issues, which Secretary-General Carrington sought to implement without much delay. The Charter of Civil Society, recommended by the West Indian Commission and adopted by Heads of Government in 1997, sets out the fundamental principle of human rights and freedom enshrined in the integration process. The Charter, described as the normative moorings of the Community, seeks to advance a set of core values, which can be translated, into a Community ethos to enhance the quality of governance in the Region. (Carrington: *50 Years of Building Integration*) The Charter enjoins Member States to honour such values that characterise the integration movement. Values that speak to the protection and promotion of democracy and human rights, the guarantee of equality of rights, the rule of law, just and honest government, universal access to education, promotion of sustainable development and alleviation of poverty and the protection of the environment through sustainable development.

The ACCP, a multi-party forum for Members of Parliament of Community Members established in 1996 and heralded as a significant development by the Secretary-General, remains one of his areas of concern. Its poor impact and slow pace of developing into an effective institutional mechanism for representing the voice of the people is seen by Sir Edwin Carrington as unfortunate.

Under the leadership of Sir Edwin Carrington, the process of institutional expansion to propel the Community forward proceeded at an unprecedented pace. The creation of the Quasi Cabinet in 2000 which assigns portfolios to various Heads of Government for different aspects of the functioning of the Community is one in the line of institutional arrangements, which can be attributed to Secretary-General Carrington’s tenure. He sought to implement a system of apportioning responsibility to specific Members for various components of CARICOM’s operations such as External Negotiations, Single Market and Economy, Health and Human Resource Development, Science and Technology, Tourism, Services, Agriculture and Agricultural Diversification and Food Security, Security, Labour, Sustainable Development, Community Development and Cultural Cooperation, Justice and Governance and Bananas and Air Transport. Additionally, the Heads of Government established a Bureau of their peers, which functions as a Steering Committee overseeing the management of the business of the Community. Ministerial responsibility has been given

to various Member States for coordinating different aspects of the region's trade negotiations including negotiations under the WTO, the Cotonou Agreement, bilateral trade arrangements and for the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The Region has embarked on negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which will replace the Lomé Convention and transform its relations with the EU of twenty-five (25) countries and growing.

The establishment of the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) in 1997 marked a turning point in the Community's organization and effectiveness in its external negotiations. The *raison d'être* and integral value of the RNM to the CARICOM grouping is captured by Professor Denis Benn in this excerpt:

### INTEGRATING THE ECONOMIES OF MEMBER STATES

The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME), the Region's response to sustaining its position in the era of globalisation is deemed "of special significance since it provides an opportunity not only for further trade expansion in the Region but also has considerable potential to promote an integrated pattern of production based on optimal utilization of the human and physical resources in the Region . . .". (Denis Benn, Concept Paper to Mark the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Caribbean Community, 2002). "The intention of the leaders of the Community is to integrate the economies of Member States in a single market in which people, goods, services and capital can move without hindrance and to establish a single economy and space characterised by co-ordinated and harmonised economic policies." (*Kenneth Hall: Integrate or Perish, 2003*).

To see the CSME move from a 'concept to a lived experience' Sir Edwin Carrington has noted: "With every passing day this concept of a unified community loomed larger as did the conviction that greater haste was needed to put in place the instruments and institutions necessary to realise this vision and facilitate regional economic development" (Carrington, Annual Report, 2003).

As Secretary-General, Sir Edwin Carrington sought avenues to redress the Region's disadvantage which resided in the smallness and the relatively underdeveloped nature of its economies, the small scale of intra-regional trade and the consequent dictating of regional trading policy by considerations pertaining to the large percentage of external trade. He cautions: "Let us, as Caribbean People, not delude ourselves. There is no way that our small and vulnerable states can hope, on their own, to dodge between the raindrops of the deluge of globalisation. The cloak of deeper integration is our only shield against that storm. Indeed, as it intensifies, we

will all need to shore up our defences by taking that step beyond the Single Market and Economy". (Carrington: Conference of Heads of Government Meeting, July 2002). He advocated the need for and services deal with only a small part of integrating the economies of the Member States. One also needs to look at freeing up the movement of factors, which go to produce the goods and services, namely labour and capital. (*Carrington Annual Report, 1993*).

The creation of the conditions and concessions by governments of Member States for the free movement of labour, goods and services is being accorded high priority on the CARICOM agenda during the current Secretary-Generalship of Edwin Carrington. Efforts are being intensified for the introduction of the CARICOM passport. The free movement of goods and services and of labour and capital, can indeed be classified as a prerequisite for the creation of the Single Market.

The pursuit of a Single Economy, as perceived by the Secretary-General at the beginning of his tenure (*Carrington Annual Report, 1993*), hinged on the development of a monetary union and on certain aspects of the Common Market as set out in the Treaty of Chaguaramas. These pertained to coordination of economic policies and planning and included issues such as consultations on economic policy and action; harmonisation of incentives to industry; services and agriculture; double taxation arrangements; monetary payments and exchange rate policies and coordination of sector policies in agriculture, industry and tourism. In the area of coordination of economic policies, progress over the last decade has been slow but steady such as the movement towards the establishment of a Regional Stock Exchange to facilitate cross border trading in shares, and the setting up of the CARICOM Enterprise Regime. Secretary-General Carrington recognises that the Region has a long way to go towards economic integration but bases his hope on the institutional reform, which has largely been affected at the regional level emanating from the seminal West Indian Commission Report. The promotion of crossborder investment occupies a place of precedence on his agenda for advancing the economic development of Member States.

## **COORDINATING FOREIGN POLICY**

CARICOM's foreign policy and external relations "are pursued with the express purpose of maximising benefits to the Region" (Kenneth Hall: *Integrate or Perish, 2003*) ensuring the attainment of greater integration with other regional groupings and individual States. Such efforts also facilitate cooperation with other groupings and states which share similar objectives as the Community". (Kenneth Hall: *Integrate or Perish, 2003*)

As Secretary-General, Sir Edwin Carrington has indeed played a major role in marshalling the Region's efforts to widen and strengthen its external relations.

The inclusion of non-English speaking members and the extension of the Community's outreach through negotiations and trade arrangements with Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela are symbolic of the process of widening of the integration movement. So too was the formation of the Association of Caribbean States in keeping with the Community's vision of 'making the Caribbean whole'. The Region's effective participation in the Summit of the Americas process, the negotiations leading to the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the EU-Latin America process reflect the Secretary-General's commitment to the firm positioning of the Community in the affairs of the hemisphere and the building of strategic alliances.

A notable development during Sir Edwin Carrington's term as Secretary General was the institutionalisation of relations with the United States. The impetus for this was the visit to the Region by US President William J. Clinton in 1997 and the adoption of the Bridgetown Declaration of Principles and the Caribbean/United States Plan of Action to govern the Region's relations with its powerful North American neighbour, the United States of America (USA).

Relations with another traditional partner, the United Kingdom has expanded and has been formalised with the establishment of the UK/Caribbean Ministerial Forum. Among the issues, which are the subject of review and decision, are regional security and law enforcement, trade and investment, terrorism and HIV/AIDS. The UK has also been providing support to the Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM).

The Community's special relationship with Canada has been enhanced within the last decade, particularly at the political and technical levels and the Region has been the recipient of significant development assistance. The regular summits between leaders of the Community and the Prime Minister of Canada have served to further cement the special relationship.

Under the leadership of the Secretary-General, relations with non-traditional partners have intensified. Joint Commissions have been established since his assumption to office with Cuba, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Spain. He has also placed much effort in encouraging the strengthening of political relations with the Central American Republics and with Mexico and Brazil as well as trade relations with Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.

Steps have also been taken to boost the Community's relations with Africa, as evidenced from the meeting between the Chairman of the African Union (AU) and President of South Africa, and the CARICOM Heads of Government as well as through Ministerial discussions in the margins of

CARICOM Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGM). These meetings were aimed at devising a suitable mechanism to promote regular interface between the CARICOM and AU Region in order to further deepen cooperation and strengthen ties.

A significant advancement in relationship has occurred during the establishment of Sir Edwin Carrington's tenure, and this is reflected in the strengthening of relations with Japan which now makes provision for political exchanges in addition to the delivery of technical assistance from Japan to the Region, and the official visit by the Chairman of the Community Council and the Secretary-General to India during which the Agreement establishing a CARICOM-India Joint Commission on Consultation, Cooperation and Coordination was signed. Also advanced are the Community's relations with South Korea. A feature of Sir Edwin Carrington's tenure has been the readiness of the Community's leaders to chart courses for the Community in response to changes, to ensure the relevance of its operations and institutions in the new environment.

The Rose Hall Declaration which was issued from the Conference of Heads of Government at their Twenty-Fourth Meeting held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, in July of 2003, is a document which identifies the steps which when pursued by Member States, will undoubtedly result in the evolution, development and renewal of the integration process. It is timely, and is a collective instrument capable of enhancing CARICOM's resilience in adjusting to transformations in the regional and global arenas.

### **PROMOTING FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION**

The entire area of functional cooperation in which much progress has been recorded in the field of education (Caribbean Council of Examination – CXC), health etc. has served to provide some steady progress and to keep the candle lit to guide the integration process at a time when darkness descended on other areas of cooperation. (Carrington 1993) During Secretary-General Carrington's tenure, special attention has been paid to advancing the human and social development of the Region's peoples through the introduction of a number of initiatives and programmes geared to enhance the Region's status in education, health, labour, youth development and sport. HIV/AIDS, reduction in drug use, crime and violence are now critical issues on the agenda of the regional grouping.

The scourge of AIDS and the pandemic in the Caribbean is an area of great concern to the Secretary-General who has committed to allocating maximum resources and effort to effecting solutions to this regional problem. The Caribbean Partnership to Fight Against HIV/AIDS (PANCAP) initiative is one of CARICOM's flagship activities. While we have the Single Market

and Economy (CSME) to develop the economies, we have the PANCAP to try and save the societies for which we are seeking the development. (Carrington 2003). The Secretary-General admonishes that decisive and sustained regional action are required if we are to successfully grapple with the growing problem of HIV/AIDS and its devastating impact on Caribbean social life and on our human and economic resources.

The health of the Region's peoples is a matter of singular importance and this has been underscored in the introduction of a number of health-related initiatives introduced under Secretary-General Carrington's guidance. Among the major initiatives was the "Nassau Declaration on Health" approved by Heads of Government in 2001. A Commission on Health and Development has been established and in 2003 a Regional Strategic Plan for Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) was developed.

Sir Edwin Carrington holds the firm view that women should be at the forefront of the developmental process realising their full potential and making a significant contribution to their society's advancement. Programmes geared to promote the fuller participation of women in the Region have been given a fillip during his administration including comprehensive studies on gender differentials done in collaboration with the UWI. The Plan of Action to 2005, a framework for mainstreaming gender in key CARICOM Programmes was launched.

In the area of youth development, the Secretary-General is decidedly of the view that the movement must move to a point where there is greater involvement of the younger generation in order to prepare them to take up the mantle of the integration process and build on what this generation is accomplishing. He believes that "it is time to move to agreements where young people are more involved. We have to develop institutions such as a regional youth forum . . . my view is that central leadership must pass to the younger generation . . . there should be a decided policy shift towards younger people." (Carrington: *The Courier* September to October 1998). In keeping with this thrust, CARICOM Youth Ambassador (CYA) networks were established and expanded at the national level through linkages with Youth Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), governmental and nongovernmental agencies and institutions.

The media are emphasised during the tenure of Secretary-General Carrington who feels that this institution should be bolder and given more prominence in advancing the ideas and issues pertinent to the integration movement. They are expected to foster greater understanding among Caribbean peoples of the dynamics of modern economic development and the challenges, both internal and external, facing the Region are also considered to have a special and unique role in the integration process, particularly under a Secretary-Generalship that attaches great importance to public education. "It is the main medium through which the Community

informs and is informed. It carries the message to and brings the message from the people at large. It is the single most vital inter-linkage between and among the Community, to the extent that the Community has undoubtedly achieved some measure of success. The media's claim to contributing thereto cannot be denied or overlooked. Equally, to the extent that the Community has suffered its share of setbacks, the media cannot altogether distance itself therefrom. The role of the media in the integration process is a *sine qua non* of democratic development. Therefore, investment in its development must be a social priority." (Carrington: Conference of Heads of Government Meeting 1998).

The Caribbean Festival of Arts (CARIFESTA) has returned to its place of prominence on the cultural landscape of the Caribbean since 1992 after an extended break of eleven (11) years. Secretary-General Carrington recognises the value of culture as a unifying force and embodiment of integration and proactively promotes and encourages any initiative that fosters the growth of the cultural industry in the Region. For the Secretary General, what is critical is to begin to ". . . encourage the growth of our cultural industries" (Carrington: *CARIFESTA V*, 1992), quantify the earnings from the marketing of our cultural goods and services, "recognise the field of culture and the arts for the catalyst that it is [and] devote the resources necessary to its sustenance so as to allow it to realise its potential in fostering the growth of our peoples, socially, economically and culturally." (Carrington: *CARIFESTA V*, 1992).

### ADVOCATE OF A PEOPLE CENTERED APPROACH

While the emphasis is on institutional reform, a critical value that Sir Edwin Carrington brings to bear in his administration of the affairs of the Caribbean people is that of "people centeredness". It is the Secretary-General's firm belief that it requires the people of the Region to be the mortar, which holds the bricks together. A hallmark of his term of leadership is the faith he has in the fulsome and active involvement of the people of the Region as he noted at the Fourteenth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community in 1993, "a community, no matter how well structured, however, will not be able to respond adequately to the aspirations of its peoples – certainly not the West Indian people – if it does not cater for their active and fulsome involvement". The advancement of the Region's development and its journey of integration could only be effected if it is hinged on and subject to the genuine involvement and scrutiny of its beneficiaries, the citizenry of the Caribbean. A consultative, people centred approach, which draws on the wisdom, knowledge and commitment of the Caribbean citizens is the single most important factor in realising the dream of integrating the economies and societies of the Region.

He opines that it is all perception that the Community is a kind of bureaucratic entity, which is made up of public servants. Sir Edwin Carrington noted that the people of the Region must realise that it is theirs – they have to fuel it, they have to criticise it, they have to redesign it. It does not belong to the leaders or the Secretary-General or the Secretariat. The Caribbean Community could only progress and realise its developmental and integration goals if it is centred on the people of the Region, regardless of the institutional adjustments or the programmes of economic reform.

It is the Secretary-General's desire to have the people themselves be in a position to pronounce, to influence, to orient, to criticise and to support CARICOM. In fulfilling his dream of a people centred Community, Sir Edwin Carrington is credited for his introduction of an annual CARICOM outreach programme to various social groupings which he introduced, commencing with a "Forward Together Conference" held by the Secretariat for civil society. The interaction facilitated the direct involvement of members of civil society in discussions with the Heads of Government about appropriate courses of action. In 2001 and 2004 respectively, children and senior citizens were the focus of the CARICOM outreach initiative in which CARICOM staff, led by the Secretary-General, interacted with and made donations to selected groups in institutional settings.

A number of other significant outreach initiatives can be attributed to Sir Edwin Carrington's unyielding belief in putting people first and involving them directly in CARICOM's integration process. In his words, "CARICOM is all of us whether you are actively or inactively involved, it is all of us, all of us are in it". These initiatives include the highly successful 30<sup>th</sup> CARICOM Anniversary "Torch of Unity", Run throughout all Member States, the introduction of "The Distinguished Lecture Series" in which leading Caribbean scholars and intellectuals are invited to present lectures on pertinent regional issues, the holding of a televised CARICOM School Quiz, and the eagerly awaited publication "Our Caribbean Community".

## CONCLUSION

Our own Nobel Prize-winning Saint Lucian poet, Derek Walcott says, "Break a vase, and the love that reassembles the fragments is stronger than that love which took its symmetry for granted when it was whole." (*Derek Walcott, The Antilles: Fragments of Epic Memory; Nobel Lecture, 1992*).

There is no doubt that Sir Edwin Carrington, having captained the regional integration vessel and charted the course for its journey over the past twelve years, possesses that love which can reassemble and mould the disparate yet so similar nations of the Caribbean Community into a strong and viable whole.

Sir Edwin Carrington, impassioned and inveterate integrationist, in his own words to the people of the Caribbean:

When the pages of the various chapters of the book on Caribbean Regional Integration are read, the reader will be transported into a time and era in which one character stands out as a truly remarkable leader, a visionary, a humanitarian, a quintessential Caribbean man, an unwavering advocate for widening and deepening the integration process. He would have spared no effort to rally the peoples of the Caribbean around the cause and necessity of unification in a world, which tolerated little else. He would be regarded as the leader who shattered perceptions of CARICOM as a separate, elitist, unconnected entity and transformed it into a real, live experience for the Caribbean masses. The reader would be captivated by his warmth, his genuineness and deep commitment to what he believed in. Most of all, he would be remembered as one of the most dynamic and effective leaders of the Caribbean Community whose success revolved around his unique ability to transform plans and policies into action and practice for the sole benefit of the people of the region he so loved. The name of that man would be the highly honoured, Sir Edwin W. Carrington, Secretary-General of the Caribbean Community.

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